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Introduction 
In the broadest terms this thesis examines how animal liberation seeks, through 
revelatory means, to overthrow, rather than find space within, dominant and 
unifying speciesist ideology, its exploitations and self-blinding. It analyses how, in 
so doing, liberationist thought and activity give rise to elite representations which 
illustrate how speciesism is reproduced and otherness confronted, and which are 
driven by fear of the liberation of nonhuman Others, in whom and in whose 
don-tination, exploitation and subjugation humans seem to have so much invested. We 
trace how a dialectical process operates throughout history to reach a nineteenth 
century synthesis after which a consolidated welfarist paradigm is faced with 
increasingly powerful challenges, and how ideological strategies are deployed in 
the recoil from them. Before we look at this in more detail it is necessary to 
establish what this thesis is not about and to declare its presuppositions primarily 
in relation to animal liberation as a social movement. 
Although this thesis recognizes animal liberation as a contemporary social 
movement it does not concentrate on this status. We are more concerned with animal 
liberation and dominant, animal-using culture as opposing or contradictory forces, 
and there is as much attention given to speciesism and speciesist discourse as there is 
to liberation and its own counter discourse(s). However, we can acknowledge or, 
rather, assume certain things about animal liberation as a movement, for it has been 
a commonplace of sociological literature that references to social movements exclude 
mention of animal liberation, and there is no book-length sociological work on the 
UK animal liberation movement as a social movement which may guide us in the 
way that, say, sociologists Jasper & Nelkin (1992) and, to a lesser extent, 
philosopher-activists Finsen & Finsen (1994) could in relation to the movement in 
the USA, although there are UK-focused historical overviews (e. g. Ryder 1989 and 
Kean 1998), works of political science (e. g. Garner 1993) and works concerned with 
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the movement's strategic or tactical dilemmas (e. g. Garner 1996). Most of these 
works come from within or are sympathetic to the cause. Others we shall refer to 
later, within different contexts. 
Here we shall be working on the premise that animal liberation as presently 
constituted aims at cultural, cognitive, affective and behavioural transformation 
(total in that all people are targeted) rather than political revolution. Despite 
claims from some within the direct action wing of the movement, for instance, that 
animal liberation is impossible within capitalist structures, the movement operates 
in the main as if its ends can be achieved within them. Indeed, this is the explicit 
stance of animal rights philosopher Tom Regan (1984: 341), and 'animal 
liberationist' Peter Singer's utilitarianism has more than a hint of the pragmatism 
which has been maligned as the philosophy of capitalism. If we take too this 
statement from Animal Liberation Front founder Ronnie Lee we can see the emphasis 
on changing people: 
I don't like capitalism and I'm very sympathetic to at least certain aspects of what I'd call green 
anarchism. But I don't think that the end of capitalism would necessarily mean the end of animal 
persecution. People in an anarchist society, if they didn't fundamentally understand the reasons 
why animals shouldn't be abused, would carry on abusing animals ... A society that's good for 
people doesn't necessarily mean that it"s also a society that's good for other animals. The way 
that people view animals has got to be changed for that to happen. (Lee 1995). 
A change in man, not management. Although the movement also targets government 
and companies in order to secure measurable gains, its overall liberal strategy 'takes 
the individual as a sovereign actor, and sees changing individual values and 
perceptions as the primary means toward social transformation ... [It relies on] 
persuading enough people to change their beliefs and values and hence public 
policy' (Birkeland 1993: 15). Such a strategy may be naive in that it seems to ignore 
the possibilities of consciousness being determined by structure and under what 
structure the desired changes may best be effected. But this is not our business here. 
Borrowing David E. Apter's classifications of emancipatory social movements 
(Apter 1992: 140-141, although he doesn't consider animal liberation), we shall take 
the movement here then as an extra-institutional protest movement, confrontational 
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without challenging the political system as such. It is not one of revolutionary 
insurrection for it does not seek to overthrow the state (due to its lack of will or 
numbers), but it does contain an element of Apter's third kind - pejoratively known 
as 'terrorism', utilizing "violent' symbolic acts, although the majority within the 
movement and its major organizations appear to be appalled by this. 
Next, although we are not about to examine the movement qua movement we shall 
consider animal liberation as perhaps the highest expression of what Klaus Eder 
(1996) calls bloodless or vegetarian culture which stands in opposition to, is the 
contradiction and negation of, dominant bloody or carnivorous culture; now having 
become an organized movement, forging an 'unfamiliar modernity. However, this is 
not to say, as Eder does (1996: 142), that such an oppositional movement is concerned 
more with 'irrational' issues such as the integrity of the body rather than 
traditional 'rational' movements' concern, like animal liberation's, with freedom, 
equality or liberation. 
And we should note here animal liberation's somewhat anomalous status and 
historical position. Apter describes his three movements in the following terms: 
'Theirs is the politics of the moral moment, disjunctive, redemptive or 
transformational", their discourse is 'negating and transcending". 'To the extent that 
they downgrade conventional knowledge while claiming superior moral insight, 
they challenge order ... Their inversionary discourse claims emancipation as a moral 
project rather than a form of alternative organization or structure'. They aim at 'the 
capture of the moral initiative and net gains in imagination' and they have the 
'disturbing quality of making visible a group that tends to be politically invisible' 
(quotations from Apter 1992: 140-143). This, we can suggest, applies no less to animal 
liberation itself, except that its discourse is probably more subversionary than 
inversionary. 
But Apter also tells us that critical theory is the privileging weapon of the 
emancipatory movements he classifies, and that their intellectual pedigree includes 
such figures as Marx, Foucault, Bataille and Lacan (Apter 1992: 142), which brings us 
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closer to Eder's oppositional movements. However, animal liberation, as constituted 
since the 1970s, has not been notably characterized by such thought. In part at least, 
animal liberation is concerned with developing the unfinished project of the 
Enlightenment in an evolutionary teleology. This is not to suggest however, that 
animal liberation itself, or indeed all its philosophers, can be viewed narrowly as 
only appearing along the Enlightenment continuum, but that some of the main roots 
of its contemporary movement lie there. However, at least a newer part of the 
movement appears now to be congruent with Apter's notion here; it is then, in this 
sense, possibly modern into postmodern. This amplifies the complex social movement 
status of animal liberation if recognized in its different forms - it is primarily 
about other animals (though this is heavily contested by some of its critics); it is not 
economistically determined nor does it have conventional goals; it is both an 'old' 
and a 'new' social movement; it is concerned with both equality and the negativized 
Other, and with both the "rational' and the "irrational'. The point to note is that 
although we shall take animal liberation in its most conspicuous modern rather 
than postmodern emancipatory condition, we shall also find it legitimate to refer to 
or describe it in terms and concepts more readily associated with postmodern 
critiques. 
Notable amongst these have been those from the more inversionary animal defence 
current within contemporary feminism, e. g. Donovan (1990), Gruen (1993), Kheel 
(1993), Luke (1995), Birke (1995) which, although respecting the groundbreaking 
contributions of animal liberation philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, 
subject them to a critique which highlights the abstract, humanocentric, 
hierarchical, malestream, objectivist rationalism of such works which, in setting 
out to overcome commonplace accusations against liberationists of 'womanish' 
sentimentality and emotionalism, also inadvertently preclude the opportunity for 
these to become legitimate responses to animal use, and tend to disallow an urgently 
required conceptual break from the structures that maintain interlocking 
oppressions. More overtly respectful of human/nonhuman difference, such feminists 
have not been alone in this 'internal' critique. Other works of a related reflexive 
nature include Benton (1993) for whose eco-socialist view a liberal-individualist 
Introduction 4 
animal 'rights' cannot impact on industries of vast job and sector demarcations 
(rights, for instance, as merely a checks and balance device, being easily subsumed 
under existing power relations); Baker (1993) who seeks to loosen fixed meanings of 
animal representation for liberation purposes in proposing a strategic 
dedoxafication process; and Eder (1996) who, at a greater remove (to 
environmentalism), is also concerned with the impotence of bloodless culture 
rationalism (especially in the shape of utilitarianism). In sum, that animal 
liberation requires to be informed by more than rational ethics1. 
This thesis does not directly address the above shifts and turns 2, though draws from 
some of them (e. g. in recognizing liberationists' identification with animals, 
reinventing themselves as Other, though this is not especially new in general 
analytical terms), but it is against such background that it is written and it does 
situate it within an interesting period of possible transition in the animal liberation 
career. And, this thesis may or may not support their general claims, for it examines 
animal liberation and animal use and their representations at a time when animal 
liberation is still founded upon and guided by ethics and self-presented as primarily 
a rationalist project (although the work of animal liberation philosopher Stephen 
Clark (e. g. 1984) provides an often neglected counterpoint to this; see Chapter 3 
here). 
This thesis appears at a point which may in the future be looked upon as the time 
when animal liberation as a whole was entering a post-philosophy, not to say a 
postmodernist-poststructuralist phase. To some extent then, the thesis will serve as 
a report on progress made by an emancipation movement in philosophy-ethics and 
late modernist mode, 'progress' being gauged in terms of its representation by others. 
This is not to say that the thesis sets out to critique animal liberation on this basis or 
to promote the claims of others, nor are there recommendations in the 'report'. In 
general though, the modern/ postmodern divide, if that's what it is, may not be 
crucial. As Pieterse (1991: 32) suggests ... 'emancipation refers to collective actions 
which seek to level and disperse power, or seek to install more inclusive values than 
the prevailing ones. This means that emancipation, postmodern turn or not, involves 
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a moral horizon. It is the ethic (or ethics) of animal liberation, installing more 
inclusive values, that informs the view of it taken here. However, we should 
recognize that the movement, in its beliefs and practices, goes beyond what is 
formulated in the works of its foremost philosophers; just one reason for the 
insistence on the term animal liberation here and for not limiting our view of the 
struggle to one of, say, animal 'rights". 
There is a further point which is partially related to the above. Although this 
thesis is concerned, as it cannot fail to be concerned, with power - the power that 
humans exert over other animals and the power exerted by the media, for instance - 
we shall not be analysing these two areas specifically in terms of power. But we 
should note three aspects. First, contrary to the Foucauldian concept of power, there 
is a binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of 
power relationships in the human/nonhuman context. Foucault tells us that by 
power he does not have in mind a general system of domination exerted by one group 
over another, a system whose effects, through successive derivations, pervade the 
entire social body (Foucault 1981: 92): but this is power in the human/nonhuman 
context, and this thesis does go some way to show how the entire social body is thus 
pervaded. Second, another aspect of the animal liberation social movement 
complexity is that it is about liberation but not empowerment. We can say that 
animal liberation seeks, if not to do the impossible and eradicate power relations 
(we are in a position of power over other animals whether we like it or not), then to 
minimize them and use that power in a benign and just fashion which dissolves the 
notion of animals being means to human ends. Again, we can view animal liberation 
as more subversive than inversive. Third, although it makes little sense to talk of 
empowering animals and, because of that, of promises of power and the shuffling of 
elites within the human/nonhuman context, we should recognize the possibility of 
the animal-using orthodox perceiving an order-negating animal liberation as an 
attempt by certain humans to gain a form of power for themselves, especially if 
ulterior motives can be 'successfully' ascribed to animal liberationists. At the very 
least, we can see how animal liberation can be viewed as transforming human power 
over other animals into power over other people, in the shape of moral claim 
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enforcement. Already we can suspect and anticipate a fear of this kind of real or 
imagined threat. 
Moving on, a large part of this thesis is concerned with media representations of 
animal liberation - how the challenge is met - but we find that, as with animal 
liberation as a social movement, there is no book-length sociological work on, for 
instance, animal liberation and the media, although there are references to media 
coverage and representation in several other works such as those mentioned above 
(e. g. Garner, Ryder, Baker), in articles in the campaigning magazines (e. g. Anon 
1986/87, Mclvor 1988, Anon 1989) and academic material relating to the American 
experience (e. g. Jones 1996,1997a, 1997b, 1997c, Kruse 1998, Gerbner 1995). This again 
is symptomatic of the neglect animal liberation has experienced in the UK and 
elsewhere (but see, e. g. Birke & Michael 1998 on xenotransplants and the media), 
whilst there has been much work on, for instance, media and: gender (e. g. Dines & 
Humez 1995); race (e. g. Campbell 1995, van Dijk 1993, Hall 1995, Riggins 1997); class 
(e. g. Hall 1986a, Philo 1990, Glasgow University Media Group passim); the 
environment (e. g. Hansen 1991, Gamson & Modigliani 1989) and, of course, there is a 
large body of more general media theory from various positions (see McQuail 1994). 
This manifold paucity of directly relevant literature has to a large extent 
determined the methodology and structure of the present thesis. One could perhaps 
embark on a full-scale analysis of representations of animal liberation (and animal 
use) but something would be missing; the nature of animal liberation itself. What we 
have to do first is some, a lot of, history, exposition and interpretation, or our own 
representation. We cannot really examine representations of animal liberation (and 
animal use) without exploring what animal liberation is or may be, and what 
animal use and speciesism are, and upon what they are founded. Before us stand 
their yesterdays. 
We do not want to approach animal use and liberation in a vacuum which would be 
the case if (a) we ignored animal liberation's own (internal) context, and if N we 
ignored the history which allows us to analyse the arguments and the changes of 
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attitude towards other animals. What have been and/or are the characteristics of 
the exploitative mentality? What social, historical, cultural, political factors 
have played or play what part in its origins, development and continuation, even 
though, simply put, it could be expressed as plus qa change ... ? What has been and is 
the nature of its opposition and what factors have played their roles here? We do 
not want to take an assumed view of animal liberation as if it were this or that 
without exploring the obvious prevalent confusions over 'welfare', 'liberation', 
"rights', 'protection', and so on. What sense are we to make, for instance, of: works 
promoting animal liberation or rights which also promote the use of animal 
products?; an 'animal rights" organization that does the same?; research papers 
which list the animal experiments animal rightists were in favour of*?; an 'animal 
rights' organization whose campaign to stop the use of horses was conducted from 
the back of a horse?; academic works on "animal rights' which systematically 
ignore or sideline what is possibly definitive of animal liberation? Certainly 
animal liberation does not appear to be, though from the point of view of its 
detractors often does appear to be, and from the point of view of its practitioners 
perhaps should be, a monolithic whole. 
The 'problem' immediately confronts us. How can we represent, and analyze 
representations of something SO seemingly amorphous or inchoate? All we can do at 
this stage at least, it seems reasonable to suggest, is to ensure that animal liberation 
and representations thereof are analysed in terms which acknowledge and 
investigate the above confusions. We need to try to get at just what animal 
liberation is or means and, especially for our later chapters, in relation to normative 
welfarism, today's bloody-carnivorous culture. This is not to claim that at some 
point we shall arrive at the 'truth' or 'reality' of animal liberation but to 
acknowledge that a particular understanding has been reached and that it will 
provide a reference point for examining, for instance, what the media mean when 
they use, say, the terms 'animals! ', 'animal rights', 'animal rights extremists' and 
/animal welfare' and what it is they are doing with them. 
it is how we perceive the history that to a large extent determines how we perceive 
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the theories and practices of animal use, animal liberation and liberationists today, 
for modern day representations are undoubtedly linked with historical and 
institutional assumptions and practices. But what kind of history are we to do here? 
As alluded to above, the contemporary animal liberation movement tends largely to 
see itself within a time continuum, a metanarrative drawing inspiration not just from 
its foremost philosophers but from pro-animal thought down the ages. It is this 
version of history, largely processual but emphasizing the continual rather than 
continuous, that we shall follow, for it can lay claim to some kind of credibility. 
Moreover, the transhistorical perspective adopted here also reflects the 
transhistorical orthodox perception and treatment of other animals as resources. 
Chapter 1, then, surveys the history and tradition of and traces the discourse of 
animal use up to and including the nineteenth century in order to explore the reasons 
for using animals as material and symbolic resources; the various attitudes and 
beliefs developed and strategies deployed to rationalize human behaviour; the 
voices which have been raised against this orthodoxy at different times in history 
in a broken competing discourse; and the cultural and societal factors which have 
undermined and forced reassessments of the human/nonhuman relationship. The 
organizing structure of the narrative is one that depicts a dialectical process 
involving tension between two seemingly incompatible forces. These are 
characterized within a concept partially borrowed from Eder (1996): of dominant 
bloody-carnivorous culture and repressed bloodless-vegetarian culture. Although his 
symbolic organization of society thesis is not followed, its influence is undeniable. 
This struggle of opposites, which are both riddled with inconsistencies, escalates 
until strands from within each appear to merge in a 'synthesis' and a new dialectic 
proceeds on a higher level. But the same contradiction continues, with both cultures 
becoming more formidable adversaries though in different ways through, on the one 
hand, the consolidation of a welfarist paradigm and, on the other, in the further 
development of liberationist ethics and a liberation movement; a new thesis and 
antithesis which have yet to reach a further synthesis. The chapter also serves as a 
reservoir of themes to be drawn upon throughout and in so doing opens up the topos 
which feeds into contemporary rhetoric. 
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Chapters 2 to 4 concentrate on the antithesis; the challenge presented by animal 
liberation. Continuing the chronology, and exploring the revelatory character of 
animal liberation, Chapter 2 covers the approximate period 1880s-1970s, from and 
including the work of Henry Salt (who, according to Keith Tester [19911, 'invented' 
animal rights) to the eve of publication of Peter Singer's seminal Animal Liberation 
and begins to look at the movement's cohesive and deliberate oppositional 
strategies. The chapter is divided into three sections: the first examines Salt's work 
and its late nineteenth century context; the second covers the period from there to 
the 1960s' signs of emergence of a contemporary movement; the third builds from the 
1960s to reach an assessment of how, in their identification with nonhumans, animal 
liberation's latter-day representatives attempted to expose (again) what they now 
saw as the facts and fictions of prevailing ideology. Questions of relative and 
universal /alternative value in relation to the movement's ethic are addressed as 
are the related concerns of historical context, conducive conditions, discourse and 
rebellion. What factors account for the appearance of Salt's Animals' Rights in 
1892? Why did a 'manifesto' of animal liberation appear in 1971? From the 
movement's writings certain themes are identified as fundamental to the case being 
made - evolutionary kinship as opposed to speciesism; the need for a 
comprehensive principle to bind disparate animal concerns; explosive combinations 
of empirical evidence and animal liberation theory; the balancing of intellective 
and intuitive faculties and the recognition of a co-operative rather than 
competitive 'nature'; the struggle between symbolism and the literal, between logic 
and illogic; the challenging of orthodox sentimentalist fantasy, self-interest and 
conformity; and the overcoming of 'blindness' though revelation. 
In an attempt to understand how contemporary animal liberation was galvanized by 
and remains underwritten by moral philosophy proceeding from the revelatory 
platform, Chapter 3 introduces three of its foremost philosophers and their 
strategic works, examining the similarities and differences of these developed 
expressions of pro-nonhuman (and pro-human) thought. Consideration is also given 
to the movement's successes and failures. 
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Chapter 4 is pivotal, offering a critical assessment of animal liberation's 
contemporary identities and self-presentations. The analogy of slavery drawn by 
the movement generally, and the neglected model of veganism, are used to examine 
the proscriptions, prescriptions and putative comprehensive principle status of the 
philosophies and lead to a questioning not only of animal liberation"s bloodless 
culture status but also of the entire two-culture scheme traced thus far. This also 
takes us to an examination of the movement's related welfare/liberation, 
means/ends tactical dilemmas. 
We should then be in a position to analyse, in Chapters 5,6 and 7, how the 
challenge of animal liberation is confronted in contemporary articulate thought as it 
appears in representations of animal use and liberation. In Chapter 5, which will 
act as a path between the previous and following chapters, we turn to a contrasting 
narrative, understanding and analysis of animal liberation. In a largely empirical- 
and textual-based engagement with Keith Tester's (1991) academic view of animals 
as blank pages in an epistemic-constructivist scheme, we shall be able to draw upon 
the material of Chapters 1 to 4 and also to identify representational themes of 
reduction, redefinition, entrapment and incomprehension which will have relevance 
for the analysis of media representation. 
Drawing upon these themes, Chapters 6 and 7 concentrate on how the media function 
to maintain a system of control, regulate normality and reproduce the dominant 
ideology through speciesis t-hu ma no centric forms of understanding. The chapters 
offer an analysis of media representation of animal use and liberation as an element 
of the wider speciesist discourse, postulating the theory that media performance is 
a function of ideological domination acting as to obstruct revelation, inhibit animal 
liberation's development and to eternalize animal use. What we see from an 
analysis of media discourse is the performance of a system under attack. An 
introduction sets out the theoretical perspectives relating to ideology, hegemony 
and myth, preparing the ground for an investigation into how, through signifying 
practices and the general command of reality, accounts and 
definitions of 
exploitation, liberation and related concepts are constructed and 
how and to what 
advantage they operate. Analysis and further theoretical discussion are then 
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threaded through the media examples which are considered as, and classified into 
groups of, ideological strategies. A final component summarizes the analysis and 
concludes by questioning whether notions of hegemony, and the media as sites of 
hegemonic struggle, are entirely applicable (in this context) to a society in which a 
fundamental speciesist ideology is still very much apparent as a unifying, 
stabilizing and comforting force. Largely, the analysis is guided by the notion of 
confronting the challenge of otherness and that the engine which drives the 
ideology-mythology is the fear of the liberation of the Other, a threat to cognitive 
and cultural order. Normative welfarism recoils, and in every sense. 
Notes 
1. Another kind of internal critique and attack on animal exploitation from a Christian 
perspective which has run alongside Singer and Regan since around 1975, sharing with the 
above critiques both similarities (moralism is not enough) and differences (itself subjected to 
feminist critique), has come from Andrew Linzey, for whom theology provides a way in which 
'animal rights' theory can be 'released from its current philosophical straightjacket' (see, e. g. 
Linzey 1994: ix). 
2. There are three further areas which we should be clear to identify as not being the concern 
here. We shall not be interested in resource mobilization (being concerned more here with 
identity-orientation), and there is no analysis of media effect s-aud ience reception, e. g. of data on 
what impressions, beliefs, attitudes, knowledge and responses are publicly derived from media 
representations of animal liberation and use. Nor is this a 'responsibility of the media' thesis, 
although it may have implications for such an approach. 
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Chapter 1 
Natures, Cultures & Controls 
Introduction 
In this chapter we shall trace humans' changing attitudes towards other animals. It 
is through this mainly chronological narrative that we may be able to examine how 
orthodox rationale and discourse arose, developed and continue to inform the 
reaction to animal liberation, and because it is within history that we may be able 
to overview the background to contemporary animal liberation ethics which oppose 
the speciesist ideology developed since the earliest use of other animals. In this 
sense the tendency is towards the processual in terms of both animal use and animal 
liberation but it is not a privileging of the processual in the style of, say, Keith 
Thomas (1983) or Norbert Elias (1994) although it owes much to processual and/or 
chronological accounts such as these, Peter Singer's (1977) and Richard D Ryder's 
(1989). Here we shall not attempt to assign any 'inevitable progress' status to 
animal liberation (although some liberationists have claimed inevitabilities and 
this notorious concept has informed an 'inevitable' animal use) but, whether the 
process is continual, continuous, discontinuous or purely erratic, the chronology also 
enables us to identify a dialectic, of sorts, which reaches a kind of synthesis in the 
nineteenth century. In structuring this we shall be borrowing Klaus Eder's (19901 
concept of two cultures - one dominant, bloody-carnivorous, the other suppressed 
and oppositional, bloodless-vegetarian - which, although we may see each culture 
find expression in different ways in different eras, can be used, initially, to locate 
the conflicting attitudes and values. 
Because of this format, a consequent transhistoricism may be detected, and this 
relates to a fundamental point. Although we may perceive that at some earlier 
periods of human history there were no absolute category distinctions between 
humans and other animals, and that later development of such an idea says much 
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about the changing forms of human consciousness and norms about what it is to be 
human, other animals have been considered and used as material, symbolic and 
economic resources at all stages (except for some indeterminate time in prehistory 
perhaps). This means too, that no particular era is identified as "better' or 'worse' 
for animals. The animal-using rationalizations change according to the era - and 
these are related to what the eras determine animals as - but not by much in a 
practical, end-result sense. They are traced here, within significant periods of 
history (this is not a comprehensive history of nonhuman/human relations), not only 
in order that we have some understanding of the traditions which inform 
contemporary discourses, but that the chapter may also serve as a reservoir from 
which the following ones may draw. 
The early part of the chapter identifies the pre-ethical origins of human unease at 
animal use, the ambivalence and inconsistencies which accompany it and the 
strategies deployed to overcome it. The middle part examines the roles of religion, 
ethics and humanism in the formulation of bloody culture rationalism and its 
opposition. The final part explores the 'synthesis' of the two cultures which 
establishes a new conflict or rather the same conflict but on a new level. 
Natural Considerations 
Our present instrumentalist relationship with other species is to some extent 
justified on the grounds of it being natural in terms of the so-called food chain, or 
even still the Great Chain of Being, hierarchical concepts wherein the one-sided 
notion of competitive nature, red in tooth and claw, has played no little part, in 
preference to and obliteration of an idea or ideal of co-operative nature. 
Yet it may be argued that our 'original' relationship with other species, the non- 
exploitative - where biblical-Edenic and secular-pre-hunting narratives may 
coincide in space if not in time - is the natural, and the one which has informed 
orthodoxy - the exploitative - is the parvenu 
(although this is to downplay the 
very real and violent humans-as-hunted era, which has also served to motivate and 
justify the war on nature). The favouritism displayed for the latter illustrates how 
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our relationship with other species depends upon a sophisticated, preferential 
interpretation of the past. If something can be explained in terms of its origin then 
the choice of origin is crucial, for it functions as a charter (see, e. g. Peters 1971: 220- 
221). 
In historical terms, humans possibly became killers out of accident and/or necessity, 
a circumstance which no longer obtains 2. Ever since, it has been thought natural and 
essential to escalate animal use in the process of survival, improvement, 
development, progress, a constant re-naturalizing of what becomes the political. It 
seems not so much that reality is bloody - although in part it is - but that the 
bloodshot visions speak for all reality, and become reality itself. They presuppose, 
are conservatively lenient towards, and reinforce established notions of what we are 
like, what nature is like and how the world is. 
But there would seem to be two ways (at least) of appraising our hunter days. One 
way, following the 'natural' line above, says that it was the early part of the 
continuum which has brought us, cognitively, to our present relationship with other 
species; that early necessary exploitation has led on naturally and rightly to late 
exploitation. And this can serve to justify today's hunting as natural, but even more 
as tradition. The established Western dichotomies, forged by anthropology, 
between animals and society, and the metaphysics of the alienation of humans from 
nature can nowadays be called upon in order to view even such old days as the 
forerunners of another need, to establish order upon the chaos of nature. But even 
when the killing was necessary it was going beyond necessity. Some hunting cultures 
routinely slaughtered, to extinction in some cases, species of animals that posed no 
threat to human life. Some hunting cultures were also brutal towards the prey 
species. We can suggest that this was and is the raw bloody culture. 
Tim Ingold (1994) tells us about another side to hunting culture, suggesting that the 
hunter's concept of his relationship with animals, as indeed with other humans, 
was as a single field, that little or no difference was perceived between humanity 
and nature. The hunter-gatherer relationship with animals was one of respect and 
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familiarity -a combination of autonomy and dependency. A similar line is 
illustrated by Serpell (1986) who explores the relationship as one of equality. But 
here the first problems arise. The hunter has to 'know' animals, has to put himself 
in their place, in order to be successful in the hunt. Not only are other animals part 
of the same field but even of the same 'family', and the empathy necessary for 
successful hunting inevitably leads to sympathy, and the sympathy to guilt. Killing 
nonhuman animals is uncomfortably close to homicide. 
Two things are apparent. One, that even before the appropriation of nature became 
the later separation between culture and nature which allowed all manner of 
systematized atrocities to nonhuman species, some hunters were already engaged in 
this project. Two, that even when killing animals seemed to be essential for human 
survival it nevertheless gave rise to a sense of guilt and unease. Measures would be 
taken to evade it, to manage it. The hunter-gatherer era was one notably 
characterized already by an ambivalent system of food taboos and purification 
rituals (virtually all of which relate to animal 'products') within a prohibition on 
sullying the purity of the natural order. Although favoured aspects of hunter- 
gatherer romanticism may now be appealed to by deep ecologists and others in order 
to justify certain animal uses, ultimately the question must arise: What kind of 
society would emerge from a fusion of (a) the hunter's human/nonhuman 'equality 
mind-set and (b) the disappearance of his need to treat animals as resources? 
Somewhere between (a) and (b) a mentality and a reality are constructed which 
obstruct the emergence of the obvious society, where 'meat' would be murder. Indeed, 
the constructions begin to take place within (a). The tradition of rationalization and 
occlusion, of the naturalizing and eternalizing "statement of fact' - that's the way 
it is - begins here. 
It would seem that the hunting economy represented the first appearance of moral 
conflict between emotional and materialistic considerations. To overcome it and 
evade guilt, hunting was formalized by: totemism; ritualized belief systems; self- 
deception; atonement; and absolution. These have taken various forms - entering 
into a pact with the animal spirit who allows killing only on certain conditions, e. g. 
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no cruelty, no waste, no ridicule; ceremonial acts, e. g. burying the bones of the victim 
in their original formation; assisting the animal to return to the spiritual home; 
begging forgiveness; or restitutional cave painting, rendering the creature's image at 
a sacred spot (Serpell 1986: 144-146). Many of these specific forms are alien to late 
modern society but what remains, e. g. forms of ritual, no 'unnecessary" cruelty and, 
perhaps above all, the seeking of refuge in the symbolic, have been absorbed into 
the contemporary welfarist norm of animal use. 
What hunting tribes also introduce are the inconsistencies or the particularisms 
which have continued to be characteristic of ambivalent human/nonhuman 
relationships. Despite the rhetoric of 'respect', for hunters there were (leaving 
aside the taboos on different wild animal species) three kinds of animal - the 
hunted, the hunting companion, and the pet - and at least three different attitudes 
towards them. The hunted and the pet may often have been the same species, as 
might the pet and the hunting companion. The hunted animal, positioned at some 
distance, encouraged a sense of awe, though his or her function was materialistic, 
providing the tribe with food and clothing. The hunting companion, most often a 
dog, was treated with indifference and even brutality, a working animal to be cast 
off when no longer up to the job, much like animals used for hunting and racing today. 
The pet was loved, suckled and treated as part of the community, an agent of 
emotional fulfilment. Leap to the twentieth century and picture Queen Elizabeth 11, 
patron of the RSPCA, dressed in a fur coat, pet corgis in tow, visiting her racehorses' 
training ground or welcoming deer shooters to Balmoral. Today's welfarist ideology 
- the refined bloody culture - is not only informed 
by the 'natural' but is still the 
sum of the contradictions, of the ambivalence deriving from artificially-drawn 
boundaries, made commonsensical by the internal rationale of instrumentalist 
taxonomy. 
The conflicts and inconsistencies inherent in the perception of other animals as 
symbolic, emotional and material resources did not go away as 
hunter-gatherer 
culture largely disappeared. The advent of domestication intensified them. 
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Transition 
Hunter-gatherer culture persisted for more than ninety per cent of humans' time on 
earth, until the end of the global ice age some ten to thirteen thousand years ago. It 
constitutes heavy baggage not thrown off in the socioeconomic revolution heralded 
by the domestication of plants and animals. Domestication could well have been 
domestication of plants only but, by that time, nonhuman animals also had already 
been brought within the range of human utilization and symbolic value; their 
domestication too seemed to be natural, economically and psychically. For the first 
of many times perhaps, chronology counted against them; the naturalness of eating 
animals and the myth of animal protein had taken hold. 
The pastoralism-herding relationship, based far more on superior force, became one 
of mastery and control; at best, the transition was 'from trust to domination' (Ingold 
1994: 18). But although animals had become slaves, the human/nonhuman proximity 
of pastoralism could only intensify feelings of guilt and remorse, as what trust 
initially remained between husbandmen and animals was betrayed by maltreatment 
and slaughter. Distancing devices were, and continue to be, deployed to evade this 
uneasy conflict between sympathy and exploitation: detachment, often involving 
gratuitous violence; concealment, the individual animal 'lost' among increasing 
numbers farmed; misrepresentation, within a negative anthropomorphism, a 
projection of the animal within; and shifting the blame, it is the gods or spirits who 
demand the sacrifice (latterly shifted to the consumer or some other aspect of the 
specialized industry) (see Serpell 1986: 151). These, we can suggest, constitute a self- 
blinding. 
The emphasis has been on animals used for food but 
By far the greatest consequence of domestication of cattle was the contribution of yoked domestic 
bulls to the emergence of major old world civilizations. (Schwabe 1994: 40). 
Not only did the bovine source of power create surplus plant food production but 
allowed many people their freedom from the labour of 
food production thus 
promoting the emergence of social division of labour, land ownership and the growth 
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of various cultural institutions. Cultivation and culture are one and the same. And 
this is a long process - civilization, as Keith Thomas has pointed out, rather 
statement of factly, 
was virtually synonymous with the conquest of nature ... The civilization of medieval Europe 
would have been inconceivable without the ox and the horse. (Thomas 1983: 25). 
There could have been a symmetry about it. Nonhumans exploited for labour started 
and developed civilization. Their 'redundancy', initiated by the Industrial 
Revolution, could have marked the beginning of the end of animal exploitation (and 
possibly it did). However, the animal use-civilization relationship perhaps 
accounts in some measure, along with the grip of the symbolic, for today's extreme 
reluctance to cease exploiting animals lest civilization crumble. 
Pastoralism, part of the neolithic revolution, has been hailed as the single most 
important development in human history and, like hunting, regarded also as 
necessary, a survival strategy, to feed a growing population but by ensuring a lower- 
risk continuity of the food supply than was provided by an uncertain hunting 
economy. Both humans and animals live with the consequences to this day in the 
development of a form of farming which is unavoidably expansionist, territorial 
and hierarchical and, unavoidable or not, carries with it the practical and 
psychological need to achieve mastery over every useful nonhuman entity and to 
control-eradicate every animal or plant which poses a threat to the imposition of 
human culture and control. This war against 'nature' was escalated to moral and 
other imperatives by religious, philosophical, scientific and cultural dogma. 
Ancient World 
Many of our attitudes towards other species have been shaped by the judeo-Greco- 
Christian tradition(s), but we need also consider the influence of the Old World 
civilizations mentioned above. Calvin W Schwabe (1994: 36) explores this 
distinctive and less familiar aspect of human/nonhuman relations in antiquity, and 
perhaps the additional myths and fables of an interesting transitional period even 
now assist in the maintenance of today's animal use. 
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The most striking factor of ancient world relations with animals was not animal 
utility, for this had already been well established, but the persisting sense of awe, 
intensified by the proximity of domestication. The most profound ancient world 
fusion of metaphor, symbol, simile and analogue still underpin or rather gloss over 
contemporary animal-eating and its promotion long after practical necessity ceased. 
In the ancient world, bovine species, especially bulls, became pre-eminent models for 
kings and chiefs, particularly in their association of power, fertility and dominion 
with heavenly bodies and the mysteries of life. The bull myths, bull jumping, 
baiting and dancing prevalent in ancient Crete and Egypt, like so much of bull- 
baiting in England up until the nineteenth century and continued in bull cruelty in 
Spain and the Middle East, relates strongly to the cult of manliness. Ritual forms of 
bravery-testing against the epitome of strength and dominance, an animal (notably 
a herbivore) who had been conquered and enslaved, is hardly at a great remove from 
the meatismo of flesh-eating. And the domination, institutionalized, takes other 
forms. 
It was in the ancient world also that cattle domestication was accompanied by 
surgical techniques developed to control bulls. Many hunters had revered the animal 
spirit and, subject to contract, slaughtered the individual but now, whilst the species 
was still looked upon with awe, the individual was castrated, nose-ringed and 
horn-clipped in his pre-slaughter years. Primary wealth too was measured in terms 
of cattle though its relevance pertains also to the property rights of domestication, 
the lynchpin of later welfarist legislation. This points towards the concealment of 
the individual and the elevation of species; the primacy of the idea rather than 
the animal self; the flight from specificity. 
Aside from considerations of animal use for food and labour, Schwabe additionally 
provides a reading of the possible origins of humans' unique habit - again, even 
now, claimed to be natural - of drinking the milk of other species. The early 
Egyptian Pyramid Texts refer to the king as the sun bull, identified with the sun god 
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Re, and the depiction of the pharaoh suckling from a cow was associated with the 
cow mother of humankind, a creation myth shared throughout the old world. The 
cow was seen as a symbolic foster mother after the human baby had been weaned 
from the breast. 
Only the profoundest cultural needs, therefore, initially caused adult man to continue to drink 
cow milk through life. (Schwabe 1994: 54). 
We may infer from this that milk drinking was always only cultural whilst 'meat' 
only became only cultural, preserving a habit by symbolic means as necessity slipped 
away. Of course, the cultural essentialism of eating animals is very hard to get at 
through overlaying cultural distinctions between beneficial and polluting foods, and 
rules about what can be raw and what must be cooked, and so on. Possibly, all we can 
talk about are changing forms of local conventions and suggest reasons for them. But, 
although of interest in, and as studies of, cultural distinctionso. their value seems to 
be lessened when the eating of animals is an orthodox and universal constant which 
- and above all this is our topic - is under serious challenge as it is especially so 
today. Moreover, such distinctions derive from the approval of instrumentalism. 
What we need to recognize here is that the application of symbolic processes which 
still underlies today's animal-eating was also established early, and certainly in 
ancient Greece (where the "unnecessar)/' status of 'meat' was well-known) where 
Dionysians would tear at raw bull flesh in the belief that by so doing they would 
receive some of the god's power. It's what Peters (1971: 225) termed contagious magic 
(and see, e. g. Frazer 1978: 34-46 on sympathetic magic). 
Two Cultures 
Hunting-gathering, the transition to pastoralism, and the ancient world have 
enabled us to overview the function of animals as symbolic and other resources 
within what may be called a pre-ethical period, as totemic norms. As we now move 
towards more cognitive institutional forms of morality it is possible to introduce the 
useful concept of two cultures which relies to some extent on Eder (1996) who 
understands the ambivalence of modernity and the relationship to nature as 
resulting from the perpetuation of a precarious equilibrium between the 'bloodless' 
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tradition from within Judaism and the 'bloody' tradition of ancient Greece (we have 
traced the bloody culture further back). In Genesis, killing entered the world after 
man's fall from grace and initiated a complex and hierarchically-patterned system 
of food taboos regulating distance between nature and culture. But, for Eder, it is in 
Israel that the reverse process also begins, in the taboo on killing. This 'civilizing' 
process (which, we can suggest, contrasts with Norbert Elias's, see pp31-32 here) 
replaces the prevalent ancient world practice of human sacrifice by animal 
sacrifice, this by sacrifices of the field, and these by money paid to the sacrificial 
priests (Eder 1996: 125). 
For Eder, modern society retains only a very broken connection to the Jewish 
tradition of the bloodless sacrifice. It continues instead a different traditional 
evolutionary line of the sacrificial feast which emerges from the Greek polis. This 
ritual 'civilized' the earlier blood sacrifices in a different way to the Jewish 
tradition. It did not abolish blood sacrifices but retained them instead as a 
sacrificial feast in Delphi against the resistance of Pythagorean and other groups 
who attempted to call this central symbol of the polis into question (Eder 1996: 126). 
The dominant modern cultural code continues this older tradition, the bloody culture 
of Hellenistic antiquity, and symbolizes the fundamental distance from the state of 
nature (Eder 1996: 129-130): this is the culture that Elias describes. It is the co- 
existence of these, developing into carnivorous and vegetarian cultures, that opens 
two fundamentally different evolutionary options to modern culture (Eder 1996: 132). 
Although in Chapter 4 we shall have reason to question the status of bloodless 
culture as we find it in the human/nonhuman context, for the rest of this chapter and 
through Chapters 2 and 3, we shall use a notion of two cultures, bloody and 
bloodless. The latter should be understood as if shown in inverted commas, as it will 
often be, until we reach Chapter 4's reassessment. The rest of this chapter examines 
how the bloody culture consolidates its ground and how the bloodless culture 
attempts to compete and overcome both its suppression and, in our more animal- 
specific thesis, animals' subjugation. We need first to appreciate the Judeo, Greek 
and Roman contributions to the struggle. 
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Myth Creation 
Adam and Eve were created, and commanded to be, vegetarians in a non-violent, nil- 
maintenance world (Genesis 1: 28-30), although by the use of the word 'dominion' (1: 
26), for instance, to describe humans' estate the Bible has allowed conflicting 
interpretations of the "proper' human/nonhuman relationship. We shall look at 
biblical creation myth, not in order to develop a lengthy exegesis, but to illustrate 
how the well-establi shed use of animals is reflected upon in competing readings of 
Genesis, and to see what kind of morality emerges. 
Dominant theology and culture have had it, with various softenings and variations, 
that God makes man in his own image; a woman and a nonhuman animal are 
responsible for the Fall. There is some dispute over whether the early biblical 
figures remained herbivorous after this (Thomas 1983: 289), but after the Flood 
humans became fully-fledged animal users by special dispensation due to the 
scarcity of other food (Genesis, 9: 1-4). Nature had become wild and the necessity 
and right to subdue and kill had entered the world. Man is at the pinnacle of 
creation with all other species there for the taking. 
Oppositional reading includes such observations as 'Herb-eating dominion is hardly 
a licence for tyranny, it was harmony that was envisaged; and that the 'dominion 
promised us ... is a limited one: we are not made gods in creation but God's deputies ... 
Service not mastery is a better reading of the Jewish creation stories' (Linzey & 
Cohn-Sherbok 1997: 20,123). Genesis 9 permits animal-eating only as a special 
concession to human sinfulness, but the condition - take the flesh but not the life, 
symbolized by the blood - is at best ambivalent (see, e. g. Linzey 1994: 18,125), thus 
leading to the complex food taboos. Moreover, the dispensation can be explained 
instead as a punishment which kosher laws make palatable (see, e. g. Barkas 1975: 
60). Either way, and in relation to later biblical narrative, humans' animal-eating 
condition can be seen as a temporary arrangement, or even aberration. 
The points of note are not only the existence of such and other, older oppositional 
readings - supported by, for instance, the human-nonhuman commonality of the 
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covenant emphasized in Genesis 9,10,12,15,16,17 (Linzey 1994: 34) - which reach 
to a far greater depth of hermeneutics than we have even hinted at here, but that 
such readings are invited by the Genesis writers' troubled minds. They seem either 
to have wished to cover man's state of sin and corruption with rationalization, a 
/realism' ideology after the fact, the bloody option; or to bring attention back to 
what was meant to be and, as later Old Testament writers (e. g. Isaiah) prophesied 
and wished, was to be: the peaceable kingdom ideal (the end of animal sacrifice, for 
instance, is decreed in Isaiah 1: 11f and Psalms 50: 7f), the bloodless option. What is 
relevant is how the latter has been downgraded and the use which has been made, 
up until this day, of the dominant political reading of Genesis in the justification of 
animal use. By this, a divine origin has been attributed to an established 
human/nonhuman morality, thus rendering it virtually 'value-free'. Human society 
thus shuffles off responsibility (other animals, and not just snakes, taking the worst 
of the punishment)3, animal use is further naturalized and eternalized, and 
vegetarianism remains mythical, unfit for the 'real world'; or child-like, 
inadequate for the adult world; or perhaps is the Imaginary, out of place in the 
Symbolic world. 
Greek & Roman Gifts 
The downgrading, dismissal or denial is reflected in what emerges from Greece. 
Vegetarianism was given voice by Pythagoras who, in a kind of mythological 
approach to ethical reason, taught respect for other animals, that they had souls, 
that the souls of dead humans migrated to other animals, that it was wickedness to 
swallow flesh into our own. Plutarch, arguing for the rationality of other animals 
and vegetarianism, taught that other animals should be treated with justice, 
suggesting that it was animal-eaters and not vegetarians who should be asked to 
explain their habits. And Porphyry, who regarded other animals as kin, was 
concerned that consistency required that we apply justice to both humans and other 
animals, recognizing that the killing of the latter was unnecessary and that the 
practice had blunted the most important part of the civilized soul; what we may 
call the bloodless culture option within it. 
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Yet as we know, it was not this school of thought that was to underpin later Western 
tradition but the bloody, that of Aristotle. Unlike dominant interpretations of 
Genesis, there seems to be no great gulf between humans and animals in Aristotelian 
thinking. There was something beautiful in every creature and animals, like man, 
had (sensitive) souls. And there is nothing in Aristotle of the later denial of man's 
animality, but the political animal shared with no other species its intellectual 
and rational soul - the Platonic distinction which the Stoics similarly recognized, 
viewing animals as devoid of reason and therefore without rights. By this principle 
of nature and expedience 
... the use made of slaves and of tame animals is not very different; for both with their bodies 
minister to the needs of life. (Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, Ch. 5, quoted in Regan & Singer 1989: 5). 
And this ministering was quite natural within the Great Chain. What Aristotle 
shares with the dominant interpretation of the oldest Hebrew texts is the appeal to 
design, although here it is the design of nature and not God: 
... we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist 
for their sake, and that the other 
animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and food, the wild, if not all, at least for the 
provision of clothing and various instruments. Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and 
nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man. 
(Aristotle, Politics, 1: 8, quoted in Regan & Singer 1989: 5). 
Animals were at the bottom of the hierarchical pyramid of dominance, treated as 
property rather than as sentient individuals with their own interests. 
Instrumentalism has its secular authority. 
Turning to the Romans, the martial virtues of the empire - itself expanded by 
pressing horses into greater service - did not encourage sympathy for the weak, and 
the routine slaughter of humans and other animals sat comfortably within the 
Roman concept of civilization where the entertainment of ever jading appetites 
consisted of increasingly nauseating atrocities (see e. g. Serpell 1986: 176, Johnson 
1990). The exhibitions celebrated humans' superiority and the domination of nature. 
Roman culture shows what can be done to those excluded from a morality based 
nevertheless on justice, public duty and even kindness. Those beyond the pale, the 
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unseen, some humans and all other animals, could be treated with an entertaining, 
socially sanctioned brutality. 
The Romans were not far removed from the raw bloody culture of our exterminating 
hunters and the pastoralists' distancing device of gratuitous violence used to cover 
the complicating emotions of guilt and shame. But once the barbarity becomes 
recognized as barbarity, disapproved of and tempered by benevolence, the 
complicating emotions come once again to the fore and, like the continued violence 
itself, are in need of different covering or distancing devices more suitable to or 
determined by the particular later, and bloody ages, as we shall see. 
By now though, totemism had almost completely given way; nonhumans no longer 
defined the world, men defined animals. And, crucially, other animals were, 
irrevocably it seems, lumped in with and as objectified nature, alongside plague, 
tornado, flood, drought (as well as plants). Binary distinctions disallow placings 
between culture and nature, except as symbols of breakdown. 
Church Influence 
By insisting on man's immortal soul the new religion further enhanced the uniqueness 
of humans in their unanimality and widened the gulf between them and all other, 
soulless species. Christian influence on Roman culture, especially in the shape of the 
sanctity of all human life, saw the end of gladiatorial combat, but not the end of 
combat with animals. Dominant ancient Greek tradition found a place in 
Christianity and the combined attitudes to animals prevailed in Europe at least 
until the eighteenth century. Lacking the Old Testament's intermittent injunctions 
against wanton cruelty to animals, its non-speciesist vision of what was and what 
will be again - the vegetarian ideal, the 
New Testament's impression of 
indifference towards other species cemented the path for some sixteen hundred years 
of virtually uninhibited anthropocentrism in the Western world, a 
burden of legacy 
animals carry today albeit in modified form. 
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Middle Ages 
The Middle Ages provide us with a colourful picture of human/nonhuman 
relationships and attitudes. It is from here that much of our animal vocabulary 
arose, at a time when language and behaviour in literature, pageants, public rituals 
and criminal trials were dressed in animal symbolism. There is the sense that the 
era's human-nonhuman familiarity may have contained the seeds of development of 
a more equal and benign relationship but we find, especially in the latter part of the 
"second' middle ages, between the dark ages and the Renaissance that, once again, a 
different road is taken. 
Aristotelian and Christian beliefs of the period took on a more functional, 
hierarchical view of other species reinforced by a strong taxonomical trend based 
upon the assumption of impassable theological, ethical and physical barriers 
between humans and other animals. Pre-thirteenth century ecclesiastical lenience 
towards pagan and animal cults was obliterated; animal-human familiarity 
outlawed. To blur the boundaries was impure, a heresy against orthodox belief. As 
the harmony of medieval Europe began to break apart due to plague, crop failure 
and pestilence, the creation of a new order entailed the scapegoating of the symbols 
of disorder, symptomatic of the by now well-established orthodox inability to 
distinguish between the symbolic and the material. It was during the Middle Ages, 
when the universe was one of 'hallucination, the world 'a symbolic forest peopled 
with mysterious presences' that 
Europe was trying to create for itself a culture that would reflect a political and economic 
plurality, dominated, true, by the paternal control of the church, which nobody called into 
question, but also open to a new sense of nature, of concrete reality, of human individuality. 
Organizational and productive processes were being rationalized: It was necessary to find the 
techniques of reason. (Eco 1987: 260). 
To this end, the achievement of St Thomas Aquinas was to synthesize 
Aristotelianism and Christianity and, in allowing the reason of the former to enter 
harmoniously into the latter's culture, created a structure which, as Umberto Eco 
points out, no revolutionary force has been able to shake from within. 
One could only 
speak of it 'from outside' (Eco 1987: 258). The fearsome 
Thomist dogma, which has 
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changed more in degree than kind, provided the basis upon which the Inquisition 
conducted its work in rooting out and destroying any heresy against this classic 
humanocentrism. Even prior to the modern era we find here the institutionalization 
of a 'universalist' morality, an enforcement of conformity, which persecutes not only 
the different but also the different-thinking and different-living. The intolerance 
shown toward those who would undermine falsehoods illustrates the pre-eminence 
of belief over truth. 
Rational humans existed for the sake of individual well-being, but nonhuman 
animals existed for the sake of their species, intended by divine providence for 
man's use, any use, in the natural order. Animal 'intelligence' was explained away 
as merely God-given instinct and any proscription against cruelty to animals was 
intended merely to minimize cruelty to humans, a strong echo of which we find in 
Kant much later. In Christianizing what already had become the convenient 
Aristotelian norm of exploiting 'irrational" creatures, Genesis 1: 29-30 and 9: 3 are 
reduced by Aquinas to 'the imperfect are there to serve the perfect. Despite being 
explicit that animals are sensitive to pain, there were no sins against them (Summa 
Contra Gentiles, iii, 113 and Summa Theologica 1,11, Q72, art. 4; see, e. g. Regan & 
Singer 1989: 8, Clarke & Linzey 1990: 102-103, and Singer 1977: 202). 
The road not taken this time is the one to which St Francis of Assisi had pointed. In 
this we can also note the pre-Thomist introduction by Francis of the inconsistencies 
and ambivalence of those who can be identified within a 'bloodless' tradition. His 
almost pantheist line within Catholicism seems not to have enabled him, despite 
his much celebrated concern for animals, to consider it immoral to kill them for food. 
His beliefs were tied to orthodox cosmology - all had been made for humans. At 
least, this is the interpretation that Peter Singer gives us, not surprisingly perhaps, 
seeing what little time he has for organized religion (see Singer 1977: 193 and 197- 
205). But Janet Barkas (1975: 65) tells us that although St Francis relied on the 
words of Christ (in Luke) for guidance in making non-vegetarian rules for his Order: 
'Eat whatever is put before you', for the man himself animal-eating was an 
exception. Fish was a commonplace in the diet, however. 
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Francis is perhaps a classic example not so much of bloodless culture but of its 
potential and of the conflicting forces. His inconsistency and ambivalence, we can 
suggest, are due not least to being caught within a two-culture tension. Francis's 
compassion for other, brother and sister species from the same origin is pulled 
against by dominant theology (in later cases the authority may change), the sheer 
strength of this discourse, increasing greatly with Aquinas. (Many others of the time 
held, for various reasons, that it was indeed 'sinful for a man to kill dumb animals' 
and it was this very bloodless culture "error' of theirs which Aquinas was at pains to 
refute). We shall see that history is littered with such representatives, but what 
we can also note here is how hagiography generally and indeed apochrypha show 
us again the pattern we noticed earlier with the first two elements of the Judeo- 
Greco-Christian tradition - the downgrading of alternative potential. Or, as 
Linzey & Cohn-Sherbok put it in their identification of the 'positive resources' of 
the Jewish and Christian traditions for establishing animal welfare and rights, 
how the alternative but no less authentic voices which indicate a "reversal of the 
relationship of fear and enmity between humans and animals that appertains after 
the Fall and the Flood' have been sidelined or silenced by instrumentalist readings 
of the Scriptures (see Linzey & Cohn-Sherbok 1997: 13,100) 
If our earlier transition had led to Aquinas, the next transitory period, leading into 
the modern era, was to both consolidate the human supremacy myth he had mixed 
from biblical and classical sources and to work variations on the theme; but also to 
give light to bloodless culture in the minds, if not the deeds, of an increasing number. 
Renaissance & Reformation 
These twin initiatives furthered the process of transition from the medieval to the 
modern and the shift in focus from God back to man; the rise of humanism. They 
released intellectual forces, rediscovered classical Greek and Roman learning and 
broke down Church dominance thus creating space for theological and secular 
reflections, political theory, natural science and moral philosophy. It is during this 
period also that a greater freedom of thought encourages the dissenting pro-animal 
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voice. However, despite the Greek recognition of humans" 'descent' from animals and 
indeed the ability to live without killing, the search for an ideal system of culture- 
civilization now meant man's absolute separation from the "brutes' in order to 
enhance the dignity, value and potential of humans who were not animal at all, 
such were their powers of reason. This also entailed further neglect and subjugation 
of the emotions which have never since been able to command the kind of respect 
that may be necessary for animals" liberation to be achieved. 
From the Middle Ages through the Renaissance, a period of great agricultural and 
colonial expansion, Britain gained a reputation for gratuitous cruelty. Bull baiting, 
bear baiting, dog fighting and cockfighting were commonplace. Royalty set the tone 
with the slaughter of often specially herded or carted animals, and all this took 
place within the embracing ideology of taming nature through cultivation, land 
drainage and forest clearing. Nature, the wild, the wilderness was a sign of the 
Devil (depicted as half animal, utilizing the horror of binary breakdown), a chaos 
to be ordered. 
The increased zeal to cultivate, domesticate and civilize was applied not solely to 
"nature'. Within the same process, human society, despite its new creed of 
humanism, reinforced its hierarchical structure, and the poor, the unfortunate, the 
insane, and many women and children were also excluded. As for animals on farms, 
they (as even now) ' ... were a sort of inferior class, reassuring the humblest rural 
worker that he was not at the absolute bottom of the social scale ... ' (Thomas 1983: 
50). 
Indeed, it may be said that by now, animals were not in the social scale at all, 
having become objects as men became subjects. If it hadn't already been achieved, 
the ambivalence of the Judeo-Christian inheritance - domination versus 
stewardship - was now fully overcome, by dismissing the stewardship possibility. 
It wasn't until the eighteenth century at least that it was fully restored in the 
shape of welfarism. Animal liberation was later to try to take the 
human/nonhuman issue to the other side of ambivalence. 
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Unsurprisingly, there was an excessive reliance upon animal products during the 
f if teenth to seventeenth centuries. Supported by medical advice, roast 'beef' becomes 
a national symbol (Thomas 1983: 25). The conquest of nature and the cultivated, 
civilized, social loftiness was, and still is to a large extent, celebrated and 
symbolized in that dish; the cooked separating humans from the raw- 'meat'-eating 
animal. Through ritual, bloody culture seeks to have it both ways, to be both animal 
and non-animall natural and cultural. Ritual both bridges and covers the divide as 
the very act of cooking cancels the 'natural' claim, though this is best left unsaid. 
But, at the same time, there is also a greater shift in sensibility, in the self- 
consciousness of bloody culture. As referred to earlier [p22], this is territory covered 
by Elias (1994) whose civilizing process, described in terms of the classical rather 
than the romantic perspective, appears to relate only to the bloody-carnivorous 
culture of early modernity. Elias deals with the post-medieval shift from 'natural' 
social hierarchy, matter of factness and non-embarrassment to the serni-urban courts 
where 'from the elements of the old nobility and partly from new rising elements, a 
new aristocracy forms within a new social space, new functions and accordingly a 
different emotional structure' (Elias 1994: 177). Within this context, of increasing 
social division of labour, competing civilities and state monopolization of violence, 
conflict becomes codified at the same time as other means than violence have now to 
be utilized in procuring status. What emerges in this unplanned dynamic are 
corresponding changes in manners. People depend on each other more. There is an 
external and internal regulation of behaviour (see Elias 1994: 445). 
Elias traces this repression and control of the affect structures of humans and society. 
The process consists of bourgeois disgust, shame, fear and anxiety not just at 
animality but of what others may think of one"s display of what they may construe 
to be animal-like behaviour. There's an increasing concealment of personal practice 
and there is nothing 'rational' about it; certain things are just 'not done', in public. 
... people, in the course of the civilizing process, seek to suppress 
in themselves every 
characteristic that they feel to be "'animal". They likewise suppress such characteristics in their 
food. (Elias 1994: 98). 
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It seems that it is from after the Middle Ages that sentimentalism and a fantasy of 
control through ritual set in to the civilizing process of bloody culture through this 
steady move away from nature. The hunters' and pastoralists' unease has come to 
the fore again and new strategies are deployed to evade it. 
Modern oppositions to the collective delusions were about to be felt. Reformation 
independence, a new era of ethical thought, permitted development of both anti- 
and pro-animal sentiment - the former aided by Luther's advocacy of sanctified 
human tyranny, the latter aided materially by the introduction of new vegetables 
and herbs from the New World, giving impetus to the greater possibility of dietary 
change -a dialectical legacy notable ever since in the clash of escalating animal 
use and increasing animal concern. In the sixteenth century, the oppositional culture 
and animals found a new major champion, in the shape of Montaigne, who railed 
against the "absurd arrogance" humans showed towards animals and nature in 
general. Although recognizing that cruelty to animals can indeed lead to cruelty to 
humans, this was not quite the point, for there was: 
... a certain respect, a general duty to humanity, not only to beasts that have life and sense, but 
even to trees and plants. We owe justice to men, and graciousness and benignity to other 
creatures ... there is a certain commerce and mutual obligation betwixt them and us. (Montaigne, 
The Essays, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 316). 
Helping to usher into the growing debate the heresy that humans were not at all 
superior, Montaigne sailed close to the sin of theriophily: 
Let him (who holds all other life to be brought into being for man's sole use and pleasure) show 
me, by the most skilful argument, upon what foundation he has built these excessive prerogatives 
which he supposes himself to have over other existences ... Is it possible to imagine anything so 
ridiculous as that this pitiful miserable creature, who is not even master of himself, exposed to 
injuries of every kind, should call himself master and lord of the universe, of which, so far from 
being lord of it, he knows but the smallest part? ... Who has given him this sealed charter? Let 
him show us the 'letters patent' of this grand commission. Have they been issued in favour of the 
wise only? They affect but the few in that case. The fools and the wicked - are they worthy of so 
extraordinary a favour, and being the worst part of the world, do they deserve to be preferred to 
all the rest? (Montaigne, The Essays, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 317). 
It is this second quotation which throws the difficulties of the first into relief. The 
first hinted at orthodox culture/nature (including animals) distinction, the second 
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revealing more clearly his radical intent, exposing the hollowness of the much 
vaunted rationalism and the 'natural' order. But just as the potential which St 
Francis and others represented was overtaken by Aquinas, Montaigne and similar 
thinkers such as the vegetarian Leonardo da Vinci and the Utopians of Thomas 
More, may have secured some kind of foothold had it not been for Ren6 Descartes 
(and Thomas Hobbes) who, though rejecting the appeal to final causes and even 
perhaps scriptural sanction for human ascendancy, legitimized for most people both 
new and old forms of animal use. Not only this; they did it while giving birth to 
modern philosophy and when the rationales for human domination of other animals 
were shifting from the mythic, religious and metaphysical to the rational, 
technical and scientific. 
Within the context of rising capitalism and its need for new technologies, science 
had become less contemplative and more applied, mathematical and instrumental. 
The aim was to discover nature's usable laws, its order. Science breaks down organic 
nature into constitutive, observable, measurable, experimentable parts; it becomes 
scientistic, the known becomes dominated by the knower, nature is devalued and 
animals become utterly objectified (and see, e. g. Noske 1989: 53-54). Fusing the 
science of mechanics with Christian doctrine, Descartes' rationalist philosophy 
could only see animals - having no language, souls or consciousness - as mere 
automata. This denial of suffering not only provided an answer to the ancient 
theological question of why, since they did not descend from Adam, God allowed 
animals to suffer, but also absolved people from the suspicion of guilt when they ate 
or killed them (Singer 1977: 208-209). This rationalized what had been done for 
centuries but was also of more immediate utility in justifying the increasingly 
widespread fashion for vivisection. The genius of the doctrine was that all objectors 
looked suspect, questioning by implication if man himself had an immortal soul. No 
less than Aristotle and Aquinas, Descartes gives us a clear indication of the 
knowledge-belief-power nexus which determines what animals are or are not. As 
Aquinas Christianized Aristotle, Descartes scientized Christianity. 
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Secularly, more concerned with social order, and yet with the same results, it was, 
for Thomas Hobbes, when all said and done, by the right of nature that man was 
entitled to take those steps which he thought necessary for his preservation and 
subsistence. Rejecting any notion of objective right and wrong, human rule reflected 
merely the naked self-interest of the human species which exercised dominion as 
hostility. The rule over other species rested solely on superior power. Or, as Spinoza 
believed, civilization would be impossible if humanity acted justly towards nature. 
And, still defending his stance by appeal to God's ordinance, Samuel von Pufendorf 
thought humans were in a permanent state of war with other animals and that 
martial law was in force allowing humans to hurt or kill this enemy; God had 
allowed this state of affairs to exist. The sense was still, genuinely or 
disingenuously, that humans could not survive without being predators (Thomas 
1983: 171,299). 
Changing conditions, such as the progress of natural science, the revolt against 
authority, including the Church's, and the shift 'from status to contract", opened up 
the field, as we have seen from Montaigne but, as far as the human/nonhuman 
relationship was concerned, these others closed it down again. Although the 
Hobbesian 'enlightenment' brought ethics into the modern era by anthropologizing 
religious accounts, once again animals were excluded from the embrace. There was to 
be no Leviathan to protect animal interests, and the Hobbesian-Spinozan and even 
Pufendorf philosophies are utilized in today's arguments where animal use is tied to 
a sense of order, and security. Cartesianism itself has enjoyed a fine heyday, its 
dead hand still noticeable in the exclusive dualism which still determines the 
epistemology underlying animal use and, more specifically, in behavioural 
experiments on animals. Vivisection laboratory vernacular (see, e. g. Birke & Smith 
1995) betrays a modern day allegiance to the doctrine as well as serving to distance 
scientists from the facts which disprove it, its deafening and blinding effects 
contributing to animal "invisibility'. These philosophies, redolent of anxiety and 
the need for control, combine to yield the paradox; the necessary nothingness of 
animals. 
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Although moral scruples had hitherto failed to gain much ground due to their 
incompatibility with the direction in which society continued to move, they were 
beginning to find allies in unexpected quarters. As Keith Thomas tells us, the brutal 
realism of the nature-as-slaughterhouse view was to conflict with the principles of 
benevolence and good nature to which it later became customary to pay lip service. 
Building on the Renaissance and Reformation, the combination of factors in the 
succeeding years gave rise to the beginnings of a cultural shift and an increasing 
concern over how other animals were treated by the human. 
Into Light 
Although still strongly defended, allied to the scientific revolution's further taming 
of nature, from the seventeenth century onwards the wanton killing of and cruelty to 
animals came under increasing attack. Oppositional voices were informed by the 
combined or discrete concerns of anti-mechanism, justice, suffering, similitude, 
natural history, theology, duty and the reappraisal of nature and society. 
Cartesianism had itself been in part a reaction to what other forms of science were 
finding out. New knowledge of the wider context, whereby humans began to look less 
significant, served to puncture speciesist vanity within a steady decentring process. 
Astronomers had revealed that the earth was not the centre of the universe and it 
became more apparent that there was a lot more out there than humans knew about. 
Millions of bacteria had been identified, all indifferent to human existence. 
Explorers found uninhabited parts of the world where forms of life had no known 
human use, species had come and gone long before humans had appeared, and 
biblical chronology had been found to be wildly inaccurate - the earth was much 
older than scripture had allowed. 
The destruction of the old anthropocentric illusion was thus begun by astronomers, botanists 
and zoologists. It was completed by the students of geology. (Thomas 1983: 168). 
And if science showed that humans were not at the centre, humans could only give 
meaning to everything if they, through objective knowledge, controlled it and gave 
it a meaning and purpose. In this shift from the geocentric to the egocentric is the 
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transition from an understanding of nature legitimized by a traditional faith to one 
based on scientific research (see Elias 1994: 209). But Descartes' and others' attempts 
at this form of control and the maintenance of human status was not without an 
opposition which did not attempt to restore mastery. 
Some thirty years after Descartes' death, the vegetarian Thomas Tryon was 
probably the first to introduce the word 'rights' (natural' rather than acquired) in 
the nonhuman context. His "fowls of heaven' complained: 
But tell us, 0 Men! We pray you to tell us what injuries have we committed to forfeit? What laws 
have we broken, or what cause given you, whereby you can pretend a right to invade and violate 
our part, and natural rights, and to assault and destroy us, as if we were the aggressors, and no 
better than thieves, robbers and murderers, fit to be extirpated out of creation? (Tryon, The 
Countryman's Companion, quoted in Magel 1989: 73). 
And, ironically, it was the findings of vivisection that helped the animal case. 
Voltaire was appalled not only at the cruelty but at the rationalistic poverty of 
mind: 
There are some barbarians who will take this dog, that so greatly excels man in capacity for 
friendship, who will nail him to a table and dissect him alive, in order to show you his veins and 
nerves. And what you then discover in him are all the same organs of sensation that you have in 
yourself. Answer me, mechanist, has Nature arranged all the springs of feeling in this animal to 
the end that he might not feel? Has he nerves that he may be incapable of suffering? (Voltaire, 
Philosophical Dictionary, quoted in Wynne-Tyson, 1990: 557). 
Montaigne would have approved of both thinkers. Weight was added by Rousseau"s 
rediscovery of nature and, like Porphyry, his promotion of human-nonhuman 
similitude and kinship rather than the presupposed moral significance of 
difference. Our duty to animals derived from the shared sentiency. His idealised 
concept of the noble savage at one with nature has more than an echo of St Francis, 
and served as a counterpoint to Hobbes's 'war". Rousseau had also recognized that 
although civilization had been founded upon domesticated animal labour it was the 
coincidental possession of cultivated land which demanded laws and which 
together led to civilization's corrupting influences. He also shows us the two culture 
divide in the way he works against the sociogenic repression of drives and impulses 
traced by Elias and, like Francis and many other oppositional voices, shows too the 
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internal and external two culture tensions. Rousseau was no vegetarian whilst his 
utopia was and would be. 
The late seventeenth century and the century that followed were increasing the site 
of conflict between sympathy and exploitation. Although Britain was still 
considered by many foreigners to be a cruel nation, the roll call of emerging (albeit 
mostly part-time) humanitarians was impressive: Johnson, Pope, Woolman, Paley, 
James Thomson, Burns, Blake, Cowper, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Southey, Addison, 
Steele and, perhaps above all, Shelley, as vegetarian as his utopia4. This uprising 
of 'unacknowledged legislators' (and other notables, vegetarians such as John 
Oswald and the 'eccentric' Joseph Ritson) was a marked reaction against the dark 
side of enlightenment. That laws against animal cruelty began to be debated and 
implemented later is perhaps echoed in Freud's 'Wherever I've been I have found a 
poet has been there before me'. Theologians speaking out against orthodox teaching 
included James Granger, John Wesley, and Humphrey Primatt who, in 
contradistinction to Aquinas, argued in his A Dissertation on the Duty of Mercy and 
the Sin of Cruelty to Brute Animals (1776) that cruelty was atheism (see, e. g. Linzey 
& Regan 1989: 127-130 and Linzey & Cohn-Sherbok 1997: 9). 
Such figures and many others can be listed as part of the growing chorus of 
opposition to the rigid ontological separation of humans and other animals. But, in 
shifting the ground from metaethics to normative ethics, in a time of natural rights 
doctrine and within the swelling reaction against Cartesianism, it is perhaps 
Jeremy Bentham's individual influence which has been most enduring. 
Utilitarianism - with an inclusion of nonhuman pleasure and pain - was to lay 
behind much of later animal liberation philosophy and campaigning. Like Primatt, 
Bentham compared the status of animals in Britain with that of human slaves in 
other countries, arguing that supposed or real difference was not sufficient cause to 
deny them certain rights: 
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never 
could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already 
discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned 
without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be recognized that the 
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number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons 
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should 
trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a 
full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable 
animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, 
what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they 
suffer? (Bentham 1960: 142). 
Albeit not alone, Bentham had put sentience firmly into the liberation debate. As 
others have commented, the philosophical underpinning made non-instrumental 
interaction with 'nature' more socially acceptable, and began the reversion of 
animals back from objects to subjects. The old criterion had been rationality, the 
"new" competing one was the capacity to suffer pain, an issue more important to 
Bentham than killing. Indeed, what we get alongside utilitarianism's 'strength' is 
the paradox of valuing animal suffering but not animal life itself - utilitarianism 
has difficulty in opposing 'painless' killing (a difficulty shared by the non- 
vegetarian Primatt) - and the emphasis on legal rather than natural rights. 
Nevertheless, whilst Renaissance men, the majority non-Leonardo types, saw their 
increased civility in their distance from and their indifference to animals, by 
Bentham's time the difference between refinement and vulgarity was based to a 
large extent on one's attitude and behaviour towards animals themselves. This too 
seems to mark a significant shift away from, although significantly not entirely 
outside of, the Eliasian process of bloody culture in which we find Kant reinforcing 
the instrumentalist line - animals are 'things' to be used as mere means to man's 
end. Actions only possessed moral worth when duty was done for its own sake, but 
the duty was to man. Animals have no moral status, except that kind treatment of 
them was necessary lest cruelty to beasts lead to cruelty to humans, a theory still to 
underpin much of the ensuing legislation in the nineteenth century. 
The debate over rights and human duties - either as a direct duty to God and 
humans and thereby indirectly to animals, or direct, that as animals were sentient 
like humans they had a right to be treated with consideration - was eventually 
narrowed down to virtually the same thing, a kinder exploitation to suit the greater 
refinement and civility of the age; an enlightened speciesism. 
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Consolidations, Codifications & -Synthesis' 
Up until now what we have been able to trace is a kind of heavily weighted 
dialectical process: domination/ stewardship; sacrificial feasts/end of bloody 
sacrifice; Aristotle/ Pythagoras-Plutarch-Porphyry; Aquinas/Saint Francis; 
Descartes-Hobbes-Pufendorf/Tryon-Montaigne-Voltaire; Kant/Bentham, and so on. 
In the nineteenth century both sides gained ground and strength and we can see how 
four major developments - of legislation, the (R)SPCA, the Vegetarian Society and 
anti-vivisection - suggest both a coming together and a new or continued separation. 
In an increasingly secular and theological-reformist world a combination of factors 
had constituted considerable weight against animal exploitation. The 'war' was 
over. Humans no longer needed to subjugate nature and fend off the wild. 
Additionally, there was a certain stability and sense of security about England 
represented not least by its Empire, industrial wealth and Victoria's reign. 
Typically British 'animal loving' royalty and aristocracy were emulated in an 
increasingly class-conscious society. And Thomas (1983: 301) suggests that 
urbanization and industrialization saw animals becoming less of a production process 
feature and, through the consequent physical remoteness of the individual from 
(farmed) animals, and from reliance on their econon-dc value, town folk were 
familiar with them more as pets. The close relationships formed with companion 
animals who became part of the family fostered not only a greater though vague and 
still confused affection for other species, but a deeper appreciation of their 
character, abilities, emotions, individuality (Serpell 1986 and Jasper & Nelkin 
1992, for instance, place great store by the compassion- and justice-inducing function 
of pets in the past and in the future, though a great many in the UK movement today 
demur). On top of this, Darwin problematized humans' relationship with other 
animals. 
However, what we must not overlook, and in contrast to (or in extension of) Thomas's 
account, is that many of the worst cruelties were inflicted within an urban 
environment, in vivisection, fashion and on draught horses, as Richard D Ryder 
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(1989: 151) tells us. The point for us is what Hilda Kean (1998: 30-34) notes, the 
abundance of animals living in, worked in and herded through cities in the early 
nineteenth century, and the important role of sight in developing the relationship 
between a new sensibility seeing ill-treatment and creating change. After all, the 
success of early anti-cruelty legislation was to rely not just on framing it in terms of 
private property but also on the protection of those very animals who were being 
cruelly treated publicly. And opposition to vivisection came also from those who 
had by now come to 'know' and appreciate the very kinds of animal, e. g. dogs as 
pets, who were being used in laboratories, many of them being stolen for the purpose 
(see Kean 1998: 98). 
Legislation 
Legislative attempts in the early nineteenth century to ban bull baiting and similar 
activities - though leaving ruling class legislators' bloodsports intact - appeared 
to be more concerned with stopping poor, disorderly folk being distracted from their 
work. This has been made much of (by, for instance, Tester 1991; see Chapter 5 here) 
as an anti-working class, anti-revolution, pro-stability measure, thus sitting well 
with a view of the town as a symbol of moral decline. But this is rather simplistic; 
genuine animal concern and the pull of bloodless culture cannot be so easily written 
off. There is the dual nineteenth century concern with both control and progress to 
consider, and there is, after all, a nice distinction between the 'ruling class' pursuits 
of h un ti ng- shoo ting-fishing of 'free' animals (sporting chance) and the 'rabble' 
setting captive animals upon one another (though irrelevant to liberationists 
today). The anti-working class theme is also weakened when we are reminded of 
Richard Martin's (see below) claim that this charge was an insult to the working 
classes who were thus assumed to be inherently cruel or had nothing better to do, and 
when we recognize aristocratic involvement in 'working class' sports such as 
cockfighting and dogfighting. Bull baiting was also defended on the grounds that it 
inspired courage, nobleness of sentiment and elevation of mind, according to George 
Canning. On 25 April 1800, and working further against the notion that such 
measures were a ruling class conspiracy, The Times denounced Pulteney"s ultimately 
unsuccessful Bill against bull baiting as an undue interference with private life, 
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claiming that 'whatever meddles with the private personal disposition of a man's 
time or property is tyranny direct'. This is not so much two class cultures but two 
class- transcen dent cultures pulling against each other, . 
Other pieces of legislation were proposed, some, like the Bill to prevent any 
/wanton cruelty' to animals in 1809 were framed and supported by those also opposed 
to slavery; Thomas Erskine and William Wilberforce, for instance. In 1822, Erskine 
and Richard Martin managed to pass the Act to Prevent the Cruel and Improper 
Treatment of Cattle by framing it as if it were a measure to protect private property, 
property rights being paramount (as they remain), and further laws were enacted 
throughout the nineteenth century, bull baiting and cock fighting eventually being 
banned in 1835. Both indirect and direct obligations were reflected in these 
developments, and their supporters were also involved in a range of liberal causes, 
e. g. emancipation of Catholics, abolition of the death penalty, the establishment of 
legal aid. A major force in the anti-cruelty stance was also, according to Ryder (1989: 
154-155), the Victorian era's acceptance of death and tolerance of killing (done with 
due care) yet allied to an even greater abhorrence at cruelty and suffering due to the 
greater acknowledgement of pain itself in the light of painkiller and anaesthesia 
development, creating a climate of greater sensitivity to suffering, a factor also in 
the reform of prisons, child and female labour and slavery. Reformers were from all 
religious sects and from none and the NSPCC grew out of the RSPCA. 
(Royal) Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
Founded as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in 1824, the SPCA's 
first chairman was active anti-slavery campaigner Fowell Buxton MP, its first 
Secretary was Reverend Arthur Broome and its second was Lewis Gompertz. Other 
founders and early supporters included Martin, Wilberforce and Shaftesbury; the 
mix again being typical of the age. The Society set out to educate through tracts, 
pamphlets and instructive animal fiction for the young (part of the era's 
proliferation of anti-cruelty literature), and also to police the new anti-cruelty laws 
which recognized and enshrined certain animals' rights. The SPCA was granted the 
Royal prefix by Victoria in 1840 and animal welfare had come of age, its patronage 
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ensuring respectability (in contrast to Tudor and Stuart monarchy) which was first to 
be a boon and later, as now perhaps, a handicap; certainly a mixed blessing. 
That protagonists and supporters of early legislation and the formation of the SPCA 
were a mixed bunch is not surprising at an early stage of organized reform, when so 
much cruelty was visible to more people passing from ignorance to seeing to 
commitment, and when the SPCA was displaying a zeal which it tended to lose 
during the rest of the century and into the next. Other organizations, e. g. the League 
Against Cruel Sports and an ti-vivi section groups, sprang up later to fill the void left 
by the Society's failures and loss of radicalism which are, in effect, measures of 
bloody culture's success. Bloody culture became dominant within the RSPCA 
(perhaps inevitable since it was founded upon dominant Christian principles) and, 
until the mid to late twentieth century, successfully governed the human/nonhuman 
territory in its own way and as a representation of the bloodless. The RSPCA's 
routine expulsion of radicals such as Animal Liberation Front spokesman Robin Webb 
in the early 1990s, fellow vegan Lewis Gompertz before him and Reform Group 
members at various times from the 1970s, illustrates the two-culture divide. (That 
Gompertz's expulsion has been suspected of anti-Semitism may be seen to reinforce at 
least Eder's theme). 
Bloodless culture itself can be seen more clearly perhaps in the founding of the 
Vegetarian Society and, to a lesser extent, in the anti-vivisection campaign: the 
first, a codified negation of hierarchical food taboo structures, the second opposing 
bloody culture's scientism. Both sought a renaturalization of society, contradicting 
industrial culture. 
Vegetarianism 
The Vegetarian Society was founded in 1847. Unlike legislation and the (R)SPCA 
which were originally partly but later wholly versions of bloody culture and now 
something of an unequal mixture of bloody and bloodless, there was nothing new 
about vegetarianism which had been practised and advocated (or advocated and not 
practised) for millennia, before and after the rise of the hunting economy, and 
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attacked as crankish for almost as long. It wasn't until 1842 that the word appeared, 
however, hatched from the Latin vegetus (whole, sound, fresh, lively), and became 
widespread after the foundation of the Society by secular followers of William 
Metcalfe, himself a follower of the Revd William Cowherd who had made 
vegetarianism obligatory in his Bible Christian Church in Salford in 1809 (Ryder 
1989: 97). 
Vegetarianism had since at least the seventeenth century also been seen by some as a 
method of lessening aggressive behaviour or of returning humans to a less aggressive 
state. Anatomical study had shown humans not to be natural carnivores, they had 
the wrong kind of teeth, gastric juices and intestines. 'Meat' was unhealthy, it 
caused untold suffering, it brutalized human nature. By the beginning of the 
eighteenth century all the arguments which were to sustain modern vegetarianism 
were in circulation and by the end of the century the land use efficiency argument 
had been added (Thomas 1983: 295 - it had also been recognized by Plato in The 
Republic). In the last third of the eighteenth century and the first third of the 
nineteenth - the Romantic heyday - vegetarianism's radical, revolutionary 
stance, negating social values, opposing war, slavery and in many cases male 
dominance, had become more apparent, evolving into a reasoned system. As Keith 
Thomas points out, once it had been accepted that animals should be treated with 
kindness, it inevitably seemed increasingly repugnant to kill them for 'meat'. 
'Meat'-eating symbolised too man's fallen condition, the earlier thinkers' view that 
it was a concession to human weakness had not been forgotten (Thomas 1983: 288- 
290). 
During the nineteenth century, slaughterhouses began to be obscured from public 
view, and animal carcasses were seen less often in public places and at table. 
Slaughtermen (and others whose trade was animal-related) were virtually a 
despised class, resented even by "meat' eaters. Although it had begun to disappear 
long before, carving at table had remained a position of honour even until the 
eighteenth century when its status was reduced as households shrunk and 
specialists, instead, slaughtered and butchered animals. Households became more 
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locations of consumption only; the link with killing became something to be 
increasingly avoided (see Elias 1994: 98). 
However, we must be careful to identify the two cultures and their approaches to 
animal-eating represented by the last two paragraphs. The difference lies between, 
on the one hand, bloody culture's civilizing process of concealment where Elias 
suggests that vegetarianism might increase due to escalating repugnance at the 
animal within, at the "animal-like' practice of eating animals (Elias 1978: 120) and 
the concern with who we are and, on the other hand, bloodless culture's ethical (and 
more practical) focus instead on human treatment of animals without and the concern 
with who they are, rather than what they are not. The former would be becoming 
vegetarian 'for the wrong reason' and does not appear to have materialized, in 
contrast to what at least seems to be the increasingly animal defence motivation of 
the majority of vegetarians. We can suggest these are repugnances and decencies of 
totally different orders. One culture conceals the link with killing, the other 
exposes and opposes the needless slaughter. 
Anti-Vivisection 
If 1824 and 1847 were major dates a third was 1876. The issue of vivisection 
dominated the animal concern world during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. Seemingly founded on a policy of punishing one form of nature for the ills 
that other forms inflict on humans, its scientists and others had been performing 
experiments on live animals for centuries, but Descartes and his followers had given 
vivisection the ethical all clear, and in the nineteenth century laboratories of 
Frenchmen Francois Megendie, Claude Bernard and Louis Pasteur it was turned into 
an everyday practice. Now, in the new climate of rather confused animal concern, 
their work began to be viewed by many as a scandal of moral decline which 
eventually gave rise in Britain to the ironically titled Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 
which, unlike many other legislative measures, did not abolish a cruel practice but 
legalized one. Though regarded as wholly unsatisfactory by anti-vivisectionists, it 
was not replaced until 1986 by the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act which itself 
did animals few favours and, after one hundred years, marked no conceptual shift. 
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Notably, the major anti-vivisection organizations were founded after the passing of 
the 1876 Act, not so much to police it but to organize opposition to the now legally- 
sanctioned cruelty. 
Animal experimentation's opposition included people from all classes - many of 
whom, again, had also been active in other social causes - but who on this occasion 
were outplayed by the rising religion of science, government-scientist collusion and 
the calculated and enduring promotion of the scientist as saviour. As vivisection, for 
the aristocracy, epitomised the soullessness of modern culture (Ritvo 1994: 109), as 
well as the rise of a competing class, the equating of vivisection with scientific 
progress also enabled its protagonists to depict opponents as anti-progress and 
indeed anti-science. The elevated status of the scientist who knows best, the 
triumph of scientism, the 'objectivity', and subjectivity-masking ritual of science, 
also served to obscure animal suffering which upsets or offends only the squeamish, 
though not obscured to many women and many of the working class who saw in 
vivisection a reflection of their own oppressions (see, e. g. Turner 1980, Kean 1998). 
However, that many of the leading anti-vivisectionists were women, for instance 
Francis Power Cobbe, who opposed vivisection not least because of its heartless 
rational materialism, its rape of nature (much like Margaret Cavendish and Anne 
Finch had railed against Cartesianism two hundred years earlier, see Donovan 
1990: 366), made it all the easier not only to dismiss opponents as irrational and 
sentimental but also to preclude debate about the scientific (in)validity of the 
practice. 
Against the anti-pain trend of the period, science itself maintained the manly 
stoicism of bloody culture. As Harriet Ritvo suggests, in the nineteenth century 
animals were still very badly treated by those taking pride in the doughty national 
character revealed by its infliction (Ritvo 1994: 106) to which Canning's sentiments, 
cited earlier, testify. It took a real and rational man to give and take pain; violence 
continues to be a virtue; and this served not only the individual psychology arising 
out of Bacon's masculine scientism but also reinforced the natural law mythology of a 
cruel static nature; Darwin could be seen to have vindicated them. If animal-eating 
Natures, Cultures & Controls 45 
was always the means by which all other animal use was made acceptable (as noted 
by Henry Salt 1980: 55), vivisection compounded it, building upon notions of necessity 
and crisis, ends justifies the means and a biased utilitarianist balance of interests. 
Moreover, growing middle class respectability, which had lain behind much of the 
emerging animal concern, was compromised by vivisection being conducted by men of 
that very class, if not their ilk. 
From the four developments resulting from the gathering challenge to orthodox 
theological and secular authority as from the sixteenth century we can note the 
following. A form of synthesis is identifiable which in turn gives rise to a renewed 
thesis and antithesis. It is impossible to declare that the beginnings of legislation 
and the foundation of the SPCA were deliberate bloody culture ploys to 
appropriate, appease or represent bloodless culture even if the outcome was to be just 
that. What we know is that such nineteenth century developments came about 
through the forces of both cultures (or elements within both). Whilst the founding of 
the Vegetarian Society can be seen as an attempt at consolidation and codification of 
bloodless culture, the legislation (including the vivisection Act) and the SPCA were 
of mixed origin. 
As parts of both cultures are drawn simultaneously towards each other and apart, 
there is created between them an area of compromise and confusion where anti- 
cruelty foxhunters meet animal-eating anti-vivisectionists (typically Victorian 
anti-cruelty-suffering but killing-tolerant), where progress and control meet progress 
and liberation. It is in this area of ambiguity and redefinition, in which bloody 
culture is well schooled, that it cements its ground with legalistic welfarism, 
enshrines animals as human property and codifies, thereby legitimates, the 
contradictions of animal use. The synthesis becomes a form of bloody culture 
consolidation and control, accompanied by the crucial impression of concern. 
Many had greatly aided bloodless culture progress up until now, such as Paley, 
Chesterfield, Franklin, Arnold, Michelet, Schopenhauer, Bentham, TH Huxley and 
Darwin himself but these, like many others before (and after) them, became and 
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remained vegetarians only intellectually and/or equivocated about vivisection, 
classic illustrations of two culture ambivalence and tension, as are the ambiguities of 
Darwinism itsejf5- Again, the pull of authority, tradition, habit, status, the known, 
plus the new power of science causes enough tension for those stirred by bloodless 
culture, the bloodless potential within them roused, ultimately to recoil. 
But it is not just the pull of bloody culture itself - its tradition, power, "naturalness' 
- that's of great effect. There"s also the seductive strategy. As Thomas points out, 
the contradiction between growing human comfort, well-being and the new 
sensibilities on the one hand, and the miserable lives of most animals on the other, 
was glossed over by compromise and concealment, the age-old practice developing 
greatly in the twentieth century (see also Benton 1996). Eder tells us that modern 
carnivorous culture justifies killing and that killing is assigned to agencies that are 
no longer responsible. All this carnivorous culture asks is not to have to worry about 
anything, not to overburden the system. Ultimately all it demands is that one 
should be thankful for being able to go through the world wearing blinkers (Eder 
1996: 134). All has been taken care of. Concealment and institutionalization take 
away responsibility from the individual, and guilt is evaded. Managerial 
capability is added to the control of nature. 
Although a shift had been taking place, from the insignificance of animal suffering 
to the appearance of the vivisectionist defence of regrettable necessity, for instance, 
by the end of the nineteenth century there had been little change in the dominant, 
fundamental attitude to animals. Indeed: 
During the 1890s, Lloyd Morgan's famous canon for assessing animal behaviour ... worked as 
rampant propaganda for human dignity and uniqueness ... 
Notions about the species barrier 
slipped back from Darwin's emphasis on continuity towards something very close to 
Descartes' 
position regarding non-human animals as simple, unconscious machines. (Midgley 
1994: 189). 
Moreover, hunting experienced a boom throughout the century (cl820-1890) and 
vivisection increased after the 1876 Act, scientism gaining sway as the triumphant 
form of progress. After all, absorbed into the status quo, the theory of evolution 
merely remodelled the older idea of a hierarchy of nature but with man at the apex, 
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not God. This is not a far cry from Aristotle and besides, man had been playing God 
for centuries in creating different versions of animals most easy to exploit. In its all- 
purpose malleability, Darwinism failed to exacerbate the cognitive dissonance 
which advocates of animal exploitation seek to avoid. 
We should note, however, that the animal issue was developing at an embryonic 
common cause stage in the nineteenth century (see, e. g. Kean 1998, Adams 1990). And 
the idea of inclusive progress had seen the beginnings of a coming together of 
vegetarianism, anti-vivisection, anti-blood sports, feminism and socialism. 
(Although many leading anti-vivisectionists were animal-eaters, many others were 
vegetarians, such as Anna Kingsford, Louise Lind af Hageby and Frances Hoggan). 
The synthesis militated against this formulation of a coherent oppositional 
'ideology' which may have had a greater pull on the likes of those listed above in 
breaking out of bloody culture's cosmology and its comforting compromise and 
concealment. 
Moreover, animal concern is now formally broken up into discrete areas of use and 
control which tends towards division rather than unification of opposition to 
animal use. 1n similar fashion to the century's rise of the sense of civic duty which 
stifled revolutionary thought and possibility, codified bloody culture, in the shape 
of welfarism, had warded off and would continue to ward off revolution in 
human/nonhuman affairs. 
'Bloodless culture' faced not only the problem of how to get around thinking 
differently to the orthodox but one of solid grounds, appearance and representation. 
If we see the synthesis in terms of a normative institutional form of morality, bloody 
culture makes laws and enforces them to some extent but these merely regulate an 
unchanged situation of dominance. They show that bloody culture (now continually 
washing the blood off its hands) is, after all, benign, anti-barbarian, willing to 
compromise. Indeed, by its very hegemonic nature it has to compromise. It looks 
reasonable in that, capitalizing on the developing separation and hierarchical 
ordering of the public and private spheres, its repressive tolerance "permits' private 
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people to be, for instance, vegetarians, anti vivisectionists, anti-hunt and so on Cit 
takes all sorts'), moral choices being open to all, but only after the instrumental die 
is cast. On the other hand, bloodless culture which is more concerned with the 
cognitive institutional form - ethics - finds it difficult to do likewise; ultimately 
it cannot find many or any points of compromise (although it may do so tactically 
along the road) and so can appear and is easily made to appear totalitarian and 
overtly ideological, in orthodox terms. 
A system has now been created which, ostensibly, offers room for debate, negotiation 
and amelioration and, to some, appears to afford the opportunity of continual 
improvement until the abolitionist aims are achieved. On the other hand, bloody 
culture has either responded to demands in what its opposition sees (immediately or 
later) as an unsatisfactory manner and/or it has managed to maintain or gain greater 
control not only of animal use but also of how it is perceived, that is, as a well- 
'balanced" system, and also control of the identity of those who disagree and whose 
disagreement, now that everything is under control, can be taken as a sign of excess 
and trouble, not to say heresy. Consolidation has been of bloody culture in codifying 
speciesist ideology and in reducing revolution and transformation to reform. 
All debate here is to be framed even more within this welfarist ideology which is 
not concerned with whether the now regulated and regulating system of animal use 
is unjust but with which of its excesses or irregularities may require attention 
periodically. It is more concerned not with what is cruel (and cruelty is to remain the 
crude perspective) but with determining what is not. This system of excess control 
would be found to be seriously delinquent. 
Summary & Conclusions 
In tracing the changing discourses within a two culture framework we have been able 
to identify a growing strength within each culture, but the bloody always, by means 
of a greater store of more readily digested rationalization after the fact, remains in 
the ascendancy. From pre-ethical unease and its evading strategies, through 
religious, ethical and humanist dogmas that keep humans at the top of the pile, to 
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synthesis and codification, bloody culture has managed to dissipate growing 
opposition, to consolidate a convenient ideology which, drawing upon sources of past 
fictions, informs today's defences and promotions of animal use. Each era lives with 
the accumulation of these deceits and conceits, and of the texts which have run 
counter to them. 
In the relationship with nature and other animals, humans have progressed from 
non-exploitation through necessary exploitation to unnecessary exploitation. During 
all exploitative times humans seem to have been subject to a sense of guilt about the 
use of other species. Animal-exploiting humans' ambivalence towards other 
animals, like and unlike us, has always been central - reverence and admiration 
clashing with callousness and brutality; lack of necessity clashing with habit. 
Bloody culture's choice of the options-potentials wins out each time and the 
anxieties arising have been tackled through the use of self-flattering myth, 
distancing, rationalizing and the more social and legal stratagems. 
Binary distinctions and therefore hierarchically structured approaches to animals 
and society arose even in hunter-gatherer days when nonhumans and humans were of 
'one field' and have been refined in modern versions of culture/nature. Within the 
always dominant bloody culture, where human identity is understood in relation to 
nonhumans, there is the belief that nature and human nature are static (and by 
including animals in nature they are already set apart and disadvantaged). There is 
revulsion, not so much at humanity, for humanity is the superior, but at the animal 
within, which is cast out, and that part of our subject becomes the object which can be 
controlled. Complex distinctions which serve as a form of control and self 
understanding and to explain-justify-rationalize what we do or don't do, eat or don't 
eat, cook or don't cook are notably features of bloody culture and they determine and 
reproduce reality. They legitimize the 'edible' status of those foods taken and the 
practices practised. The structures themselves, elaborate systems of guilt 
assuagement, are prejudicial and yet, though they serve to consolidate domination 
and naturalize the political they also thereby imprison. Bloodless culture not only 
contradicts this but suggests a way out, yet it cannot satisfactorily guarantee safety; 
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indeed to negate the "inevitable' and 'natural' is to threaten collapse of the 
civilization-animal use equation and the human/nonhuman distinction nexus. 
Suppressed culture's trappings and edifice are, necessarilY, so much the lesser, and 
lagging far behind in the construction (and deconstruction) business. 
The cultural is fused with the ethical. Bloody culture turns paradox and 
ambivalence into article of (bad) faith. We are civilized because we are not 
animals: whatever distinguishes humans from other beings (a constantly redefined 
lack in animals) is, ipso facto, the capacity which determines culture, superiority 
and acquires moral significance - humans are political, laughing, tool-making, 
cooking, property-owning, speaking, reasoning and religious (see Thomas 1983: 30- 
32) - whilst human-nonhuman similarities are not endowed with moral strength. 
Simultaneously, the instrumentalist attitude towards the rest of creation is justified 
not only by appeal to a dominant reading of God's design but also by moral appeal to 
amoral nature, red in tooth and claw: we eat animals because we are animals. Such 
appeals are perhaps what Sartre (e. g. 1957: 44) called "bad faith' by which, here, 
the age-old anguish over animal exploitation is escaped. Aided by concealment, 
institutionalization and legislation, the pretence is perpetuated that we are not free 
to act differently, and nor need we. 
With St Francis brushed aside (and, before him, the vegetarian ideal), Aquinas had 
combined the appeals to God and nature to build a formidable edifice. But as freer 
thought is made possible and Montaigne for instance appears to take advantage of 
it, Descartes consolidates the old human/nonhuman position. As his excesses invite 
heightened criticism Hobbes steps in to set things aright. Each time the 
oppositional culture advances it is depressed by further development of the bloody 
culture and not least in its escalation of animal use. When opposition reaches its 
most influential position from the accumulation of decentring, independence of 
thought, radical theology, urbanization, common cause and humanitarianism which 
begin to allow more people to see more than previous cosmology allowed 
(cognitively or socially), bloody culture appropriates it into a new order, aided by 
middle class compromise and inconsistency. Bloody culture, now in the shape of 
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legalistic welfarism, wants rid of the cruelties that outrage its sensibilities, its own 
circumscribed forms of decency and respectability: it outlaws those it can do without 
and hides what it doesn't want to do without. How can a bloody culture do without 
blood? What is left intact though shaken and refined, is the view that, after all, 
nonhumans are lesser than humans and that they are humans' resources. Radicalism 
has been overcome by 'class' consciousness. The Eliasian process, wherein the 
emerging class wants it both ways, triumphs over the Shelleyan, the one Eder 
identifies as beginning in Israel. Or, rather, it has recoiled from it in much the same 
way as many of our "bloodless' representatives have themselves done. 
Conflict continues but now on a different footing; aspects of both animal use and 
liberation are retained, reinterpreted and elevated in the new situation. The genius 
of bloody culture is that in appeasing, in 'yielding' to oppositional demands, it gains 
greater hegemonic strength. The nineteenth century's dual concerns of progress and 
order have built-in factors of control. On the one hand, in relation to types of cruelty 
(limitations of definition and control of the concept) and, on the other, in relation to 
the extent and kind of progress (limitations of definition and control of that 
concept). The result is the the pre-eminence and pincer-like grip of welfarism and 
science. 
In trying to consolidate and codify its own position, bloodless culture"s own major 
deficiency is its inconsistency, the very characteristic of bloody culture from which 
many of bloodless culture's promoters sprang and then to which returned, unable to 
make the crossing, to escape the pull back to bloody culture 'safety". The emergence 
of a more strategic rights discourse, and of new organizations in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, is bloodless culture's direct response to 
bloody 
culture's gaining of such control and definition. 
Notes 
1. We shall not follow Eder's thesis closely for he aims off in a 
different direction, concentrating 
on the development of environmentalism and a new ecological rationalism, suggesting 
that 
ecological reason is impotent to radically alter 
dominant culture through utilitarianism. Eder 
also tends to run animals and nature together, and views animal 
liberation almost wholly in 
utilitarianist terms, concentrating on Peter 
Singer (1977) to the total or virtual exclusion of other 
animal liberation philosophers who may either tend to contradict 
the thesis (e. g. Tom Regan 
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1984) or, ironically, aid it (e. g. Stephen Clark 1984). Further, although Eder pictures carnivorous 
culture as a development of bloody culture, and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless, we 
shall use carnivorous and bloody interchangeably and similarly with vegetarian and bloodless. 
However, we shall draw upon Eder at later stages when, as with the theme of two cultures, his 
thesis is of interest and use. This is just to acknowledge the partial origin of the two culture 
structuring device used here and to make clear that neither an appraisal nor a critique of Eder is 
offered, nor is the application of his thesis made more specific here to animal liberation. 
2. This statement ignores a number of things; that, for instance, many people in 'undeveloped' 
countries may still 'need' to depend on the use of other animals. However, this thesis recognizes 
the plausibility of the animal liberation claim that development in the Western world has 
provided the conditions and opportunity for people to live here at least without resorting to 
animal use, notwithstanding the questionable claims of vivisectionists. Moreover, the 
undeveloped world's needs in this respect are themselves not unchangeable; indeed, claims 
within the wider context of animal liberation, e. g. for the human and ecological benefits of non- 
animal agriculture, address this very point. It is also, of course, questionable whether systematic 
animal use has ever really been without alternative. 
3. We can also hardly fail to remark here upon how, in coming to love and defend the punishment 
it has received and also in meting it out to other species, humankind's bloody culture potential 
exhibits a fulfilled sado-masochist aspect. 
4. Carol J. Adams (1990: 218): 'It could be argued that Shelley's [banned] Queen Mab is the first 
feminist, vegetarian, pacifist utopia'. Adams (1990: 109-118) also recovers the Romantic 
vegetarian meaning of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein: 'It is remarkable that the Creature's 
vegetarianism has remained outside the sphere of commentary,. 
5. Peter Singer (1977: 215-220) identifies such characters and notes how '... with very, very rare 
exceptions, these writers ... stop short of the point at which their arguments would 
lead them to 
face the choice between breaking the deeply ingrained habit of eating the flesh of other animals or 
admitting that they do not live up to the conclusions of their own moral arguments'. For a 
distillation of Darwinism's ambiguities see Noske (1989: 63-70). 
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Chapter 2 
Animal Revelation 
Introduction 
Because the apparent softening of bloody culture - appearing in reasonable 
legislation measures and the policing of those selected cruelties which had been 
outlawed - had left it still (or even more) dominant, there is an increased tension in 
the twentieth century between its instrumentalism and the oppositional 
humanitarianism. Indeed, because of the synthesis which more fully established 
the welfarist paradigm, bloody culture begins to look, to its opponents, even more 
insidious because less blatant. It has assumed a caring face but the mask was torn off 
in the 1960s. 
However, we cannot suggest that Henry Salt saw the situation in the same way at 
the end of the nineteenth century. Writing Animals' Rights Considered in Relation 
to Social Progress (1892), Salt believed instead that from the Reformation and 
especially since the 1789 Revolution, the 'world-wide spirit of humanitarianism 
began to disclose itself as an essential feature of democracy'; the publication of 
Paine's Rights of Man and Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Women 
had made a still further extension of the theory of rights to animals inevitable 
(Salt 1980: 4). He was part of the Bentham-Mill influenced, social reformist current 
of the late Victorian period which, as David Coates (1990: 266-277) tells us: had a 
commitment to social and moral progress; faith in the human capacity for 
improvement, in the twin imperatives of inevitability and justice, in programmes of 
reform, and in state action; believed in the malleability of human nature and in the 
interplay of action-individuals and structure-society; wanted to identify and solve 
social problems; thought that education and rational argument and not class conflict 
held the key to social progress; was keen to carry the egalitarian logic of liberalism 
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to its conclusion; and some, including Salt we can say, condemned competition and 
promoted co-operation. 
What we can refer to as the quasi-synthesis was to Salt a promising development 
but one which had to be shown to be just that. Where things went from here was 
what mattered now. Much of early and subsequent animal legislation appeared to be 
liberationist in that certain practices had been abolished, set a precedent of albeit 
legal 'rights', and hinted at the recognition of natural rights. However, Animals' 
Rights seems also to have been written when his optimism was tempered by an 
impatience and a suspicion that bloodless culture was failing to gain ground, that 
without structured, cohesive development, progress was going to be of the wrong 
kind. Indeed, he wanted society to move along in a certain manner but it went 
somewhere else and the bloodless culture, despite its continued protestations and a 
possible golden age of vegetarianism between the wars, was eventually left 
standing. 
Salt has been perhaps the culture's greatest strategist, standing both in and above 
the fray. When we see him analysing society vis-a-vis animals in the late 
nineteenth century then, he is offering a critique of both cultures and of those, by now 
increasing in numbers, who were not sure where they stood though most, by voting 
with their feet, and by their recoil from what Salt believed would be logical 
progress, enhanced the respectable power of bloody culture. 
We shall refer to this critique and indeed to the whole animal liberation project as 
a revelation which is basically twofold in that it exposes the bases and works of 
instrumental bloody culture and exposes to light and gives light to, among other 
things, an alternative value which, appearing to go back as far as man (Salt only 
refers back to Plutarch and Porphyry), has always been subjugated, repressed or 
overtaken by another. Animal liberation is appealing to or fostering what it 
considers to be a better or higher ethic in the human-nonhuman relationship than 
the dominant (human/ nonhuman) which is ultimately one of human self-interest. It 
is 'better' in that it relates more closely to those values already universally 
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adopted - justice, equality, compassion (whether or not these are products of 
knowledge) - in relation to humans and denied as yet in full measure to other 
animals. (It is universalist in that it sees humans and other animals as 
fundamentally alike in their sentiency). These contingents are, or approximate to, 
universals (is there a fixed, immutable boundary? ) in that once they have been 
achieved they are unlikely to be rejected; in this sense they represent substantive 
progressl. It is in this sense too that Salt saw animal rights, in terms of social 
progress, in the face of the progress of instrumental reason that relegated values to 
an unimportant role in knowledge and life, and passed itself off as value-free. 
Animal liberation would seem not merely to be the latest offspring of Salt or his 
predecessors but, in a bigger sense, is also at least the partial embodiment of Victor 
Hugo's great ethic: 
It was first of all necessary to civilize man in relation to his fellow men. That task is already 
well advanced and makes progress daily. But it is also necessary to civilize man in relation to 
nature. There, everything remains to be done ... In the relations of man with the animals, with the 
flowers, with all the objects of creation, there is a whole great ethic [toute une grande morale] 
scarcely seen as yet, but which will eventually break through into the light and be the corollary 
and the complement to human ethics. (Alpes et Pyrgn&s, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 190-191). 
As others before him (and we can see St Francis in Hugo's thoughts here), Salt was a 
representative of the grande morale in terms of his rather different times. From Salt 
onwards the revelation becomes more powerful and continues to take various forms, 
reveals various things. It is made up of myriad related revelations which attempt 
to effect a change of consciousness or a recognition of a potential in the consciousness, 
and to influence human conduct here and now. 'Consciousness is the first step towards 
emancipation' (Fairclough 1989: 1) but uniquely here it is the consciousness of one 
party (humans) which is the first step towards the emancipation of another 
(nonhumans) and possibly, liberationists would claim, of humans too. 
It is worth compiling these revelations here and although Salt did not refer to all 
we shall see them at play as we go along through this and later chapters. 
The 
revelation is of: an alternative value (and that humans' relation with other 
animals is not value-free); animals as sentient individuals; the connectedness of 
life 
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(creed of kinship); the myths and fantasy that sustained animal use; what humans 
are doing in relation to animals, that is, speciesism as ideologically analogous to 
racism and sexism; the master/slave relationship; empirical fact of animal usage; 
how animal use is linked to a range of other human problems; how animal liberation 
is linked to a range of human benefits; animal liberation being unantagonistic to 
social progress; animal-using culture and its policy of violence not being inevitable, 
natural or immutable; human potential and capabilities; the ethically correct being 
nutritionally and scientifically sound. And, like the Revelation of St John the 
Divine, it has been 'written' primarily on behalf of, though not by, the persecuted. 
We should make clear that neither Salt nor his successors make overt claims of 
revelation in this sense2 but from Salt onwards animal liberation, as an alternative 
form of reason, was greater able to reveal these things, with an emphasis on the 
literal, which had been obscured by instrumental reason's rationalizations, 
concealments and constructions that had not only buried guilt and ambivalence but 
animals themselves, literally and metaphorically. Social practice is the very 
obstacle to seeing through the social practice. When we refer to animal 'revelation' 
here and in the following chapters it must be borne in mind that this does not 
necessarily imply that the revelation is of an ultimate or universal good, value or 
truth being revealed; it is, rather, of the order of solution, disclosure, discovery and 
even prophecy. 
Salt was barely successful in his day and it was not until some twenty-five years 
after his death in 1939 that the torch he had carried was taken up to greater effect 
when, due to several factors which had encouraged or allowed development of both 
bloodless and bloody cultures, the latter's led to an assumption of expertise, to a 
complex system of control wherein those who have such authority have the right to 
manipulate others and do their work secretly. This manifested itself in an explosion 
of animal use, exposed from the 1960s. During this period the process was 
underpinned by strong distinctions still being drawn between sentient 
beings, 
rendering the nonhuman (and types of humans) beyond the pale. 
Much of this will be 
examined in terms of Theodore Roszak's 'technocracy' 
(Roszak 1970) which relates 
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closely to Eder's blood y-carnivorous culture3. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s (and indeed into the 1990s), liberationists appear to 
continue the use of revelation as a perspective and to provide a platform from which 
they can evaluate animal use. Following Salt's prototype efforts, they seek also to 
establish a philosophical alternative to instrumentalism and defend animals 
against exploitative practices. We trace the continuum, the strengthening 
foundation of the counter discourse from Salt, through an animal liberation 
manifesto and an antivivisection classic, to the eve of publication of Peter Singer's 
seminal Animal Liberation. Due to a full-blown animal rights case not being made 
out until 1983/4 (see Chapter 3), discussion of rights here will be somewhat loose 
and general, as it was with Salt himself. (References to Animals' Rights [Salt 19801 
in the main bodies of text will be shown as page numbers only). 
Salt as Strategist 
Fabians & Humanitarians 
Rationalist, socialist, pacifist, Henry Salt considered animals' rights as part of 
humanitarian progress, itself part of the process of increasing equality, a common 
denominator of the century's liberal and radical perspectives (see, e. g. Pieterse 1992: 
7). His Humanitarian League, founded with others in 1891, was concerned with war, 
poverty, women's rights, prison reform, theory of punishment, flogging, animals' 
rights and other causes (see Magel 1989: 92), reflecting, though taking further, the 
notion of connectedness which had been apparent to previous campaigners, as we saw 
in Chapter 1, though fragmented formally by the synthesis. For Salt, animals' 
rights was no single issue although it remained so, outside the range, even for many 
other 'humanitarians'. This element of his work seems to have been largely ignored 
during his lifetime, a neglect which is all the more instructive here, for during the 
years 1887 to 1910 pit ponies, captive animals, horses and stray dogs received legal 
protection and the pole trap was banned. That is, although Animals' Rights "led to 
a great deal of discussion, and passed through numerous editions, besides being 
translated into French, German, Dutch and Swedish, and other languages' (Salt 
1921: 125), in such a climate, Salt may have expected it to help effect greater 
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change. However, the reverse seems to have been the case. Welfarist legislation 
and the existence of the RSPCA easily gave the impression that all was being taken 
care of; Salt was superfluous. The strategist faced stiff opposition even in (perhaps 
especially in) a world of codified welfarism. 
No firm advocate of Fabianism's non-revolutionary pragmatism yet acknowledging 
the usual characteristics of slow reform, Salt shared much of its ethic which 
developed out of Victorian moralism with a strong sense of public duty. Man was 
accountable now not so much to God as to Humanity, and life was not to be lived for 
its own sake but by following a selfless ideal toward a socialist revolution. Salt and 
Bernard Shaw had much in common, their cause one of social reconstruction from 
which animals" interests were not this time to be excluded (despite humaneness 
finding little place in the Fabian philosophy [Salt 1921: 82]). Not only did animals 
deserve justice, but institutionalized cruelty to animals was a social problem, and 
welfarist paternalism wasn't the solution. Robert Skidelsky furnishes some of the 
general background: 
In the last decades of the nineteenth century the feeling was growing that society was in a state of 
crisis; that big changes in social organization were needed if external decline and domestic 
convulsions were to be avoided ... Before [then] people had thought that laissez-faire, plus a 
modicum of private philanthropy, was making things steadily better and would go on doing so. 
Then came a cluster of unpleasant, inter-related events; the collapse of the mid-nineteenth century 
boom, followed by twenty years of violent economic oscillations; the emergence of new great 
industrial powers which threatened Britain's economic supremacy and the security of its empire; 
and the parallel rise of democracy and industrial militancy, through the two suffragette acts and 
the start of the 'new unionism' ... [The massive scale ofl destitution emphasized the irrelevance 
of private philanthropy, the waste of human resources, the potential threat to the stability of the 
state. (Skidelsky 1979: 119). 
What Salt recognized was that the respectable face of animal concern was made up 
in large part of the now discredited philanthropy. It was taking too much for 
granted, assuming that it could continue as an adjunct to the unchanged framework of 
the day's orthodoxy. What Wilde wrote at the time about attempts to alleviate 
poverty seems to mirror Salt's views: 
The emotions of man are stirred more quickly than man's intelligence; and ... it is much more easy 
to have sympathy with suffering than it is to have sympathy with thought. Accordingly, with 
admirable, though misdirected intentions, they very seriously and very sentimentally set 
themselves to the task of remedying the evils that they see. But their remedies do not cure the 
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disease: they merely prolong it. Indeed, their remedies are part of the disease ... The proper aim is 
to try and reconstruct society on such a basis that poverty will be impossible. (Wilde 1975: 
1079). 
Progress & its Obstacles 
At a time when the notion of scientific, rationalistic and material progress was 
perhaps at its height, Salt was concerned with a form of progress with which all 
forms of cruelty were incompatible. Indeed, the purpose of his movement was to put 
science and humanitarianism in place of tradition and savagery (Salt 1921: 134). 
But, aside from the obstacles posed by the orthodox, the problem facing 
humanitarianism was that 
There is a vast amount of compassionate sentiment that is at present scattered and isolated, and 
therefore to a great extent ineffective; it is the business of humanitarianism to collect and focus 
this feeling into an energetic whole ... for ... humanitarianism is nothing more than conscious and 
organized humaneness. (Salt 1913: 836). 
Similarly, for animals' rights within this project, it was 
... unscientific to assert that any particular 
form of cruelty to animals is worse than another 
form; the truth is, that each of these hydra-heads [is] the offspring of one parent stem. (Salt 1980: 
88-89). 
And what was necessary was 'some comprehensive and intelligible principle which 
shall indicate, in a more consistent manner, the true lines of man's moral relation 
towards the lower animals' (P8) which would halt the helpless drift between the 
extremes of total indifference on the one hand and spasmodic, partially-applied 
compassion on the other (pp105-106). If 'there are a thousand hacking at the 
branches of evil to one who is striking at the root' (Thoreau), we could see Salt as 
the one, preaching and practising in his own way what Thoreau preached, and 
practised now and then. 
We should note too that it was only after early legislation, the foundation and 
early works of the RSPCA and the first anti-vivi section societies, at a time of 
assessment, that he wrote Animals' Rights. His strategic genius lay in his 
perception of the inconsistencies of both cultures and of the kinships between not 
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only humans and other animals, but between all cruelties and oppressions and 
therefore between the movements and groups fighting against them. Thus organized 
and underpinned, bloodless culture needed to tackle - in animals' rights terms - 
the basic problem: 
The root of the evil lies ... in that detestable assumption (detestable equally whether it be based 
on pseudo-religious [animals have no souls] or pseudo-scientific [animals have no 
consciousness] grounds) that there is a gulf, an impassable barrier, between man and the animals, 
and that the moral instincts of compassion, justice, and love, are to be as sedulously repressed 
and thwarted in the one direction as they are to be fostered and extended in the other. (Salt 1980: 
102). 
Humans stood in a false relationship towards other animals. The human/nonhuman 
divide, the sentimental discrimination characterized by inconsistency, existed only 
in the imagination and was merely a construct maintained not least by (false) 
consciousness-determining nomenclature: not only were humans barely regarded or 
best not thought of as animals at all, but nonhumans had been given the names of the 
Other - 'brute beast, "livestock, 'dumb' and 'vermin' - in the reification and 
distantiation project. 
Nature 
Salt's work is grounded in the appeal to nature, a creed of kinship. Bloodless culture 
continues to make no less appeal here than the bloody. Both are informed by 
evolutionary theory and turned to their own purposes. And for Salt there was a 
further kinship, between 'nature' and "human nature. Not denying the existence of 
evil in nature (pI18) - and Salt was not averse to the killing of proliferating 
species that threatened human safety or 'supremacy' - or the deep lying evil of the 
selfish, aggressive tendencies inherent in the human (p130), he also knew that 
competition was not by any means the sole governing law among the human race 
(p26). The dominant view of nature, as red in tooth and claw, competitive, was a 
literal dead loss, linked inextricably to cruelty, oppression and warring. Only the 
co-operative view, hitherto suppressed, held out any kind of social progress hope4. 
Similarly, human nature had its better side: 
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... when a man turns aside to avoid crushing an insect, why does he do so? Certainly not because 
of any reasoned conviction as to the sufferings of 'the poor beetle that we tread upon', but for the 
simple fact that, consciously or unconsciously, he is humane: the sight of suffering, however 
slight, is distasteful to him as being human. Of all mistaken notions concerning humanitarianism, 
the most mistaken is that which regards it as some extraneous cult, forced on human nature from 
without; whereas in truth it is founded on an instinctive conviction from within, a very part of 
human development. When we talk of a man 'becoming a humanitarian', what we really mean is 
that he has recognized a fact that was already within his consciousness, - the kinship of all 
sentient life - of which humanitarianism is the avowed and definite proclamation. (Salt 1913: 
836). 
Bloodless culture resides within us no less than the bloody. But the dominant latter 
had divorced humans from nonhumans and the human from the humane. Bloody 
culture (not that Salt uses the term) had repressed man-s better instincts and warped 
our sense of place in and understanding of the world, of our relationship to other 
animals and to each other. Without a consistent sense of universal justice society was 
suffering from an insanity of temperament. However, the general 
... isolation of man from nature, by our persistent culture of the rationative faculty, and our 
persistent neglect of the instinctive, has hitherto been the penalty we have had to pay for our 
incomplete and partial 'civilization': there are many signs that the tendency will now be 
towards that 'Return to Nature' of which Rousseau was the prophet. (Salt 1980: 114). 
This would achieve a balance of intellect and instinct, by a return to the common 
fount of feeling though without sacrificing what humans had gained in knowledge. 
It would provide a path towards yet greater achievement. 
Rights 
Consequent upon the denial of kinship was the denial of animals' rights. But our best 
and surest instincts (pp19-20) could only result in a realization that if humans had 
rights then so did other animals (pl): 
If 'rights' exist at all - and both feeling and usage indubitably prove that they do exist - they 
cannot be consistently awarded to men and denied to animals, since the same sense of justice and 
compassion apply in both cases. (Salt 1980: 24). 
Animals had individuality, character, reason and to have those qualities was to 
have the right to exercise them, in so far as surrounding circumstances permit (pl6), 
to live a natural life which permits of natural development (p28). Although Salt 
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had no interest in discussing the 'abstract theory of natural rights' he recognized a 
'solid truth underlying it -a truth which has always been clearly apprehended by 
the moral faculty" (ppl-2). Without the recognition of jus animalium there would be 
no progress worth the name. Animals have rights and, just as humanitarianism was 
not an extraneous cult, there was nothing quixotic or visionary in the assertion. It 
was perfectly compatible with 'a readiness to look the sternest laws of existence 
fully and honestly in the face' (p28). But this was not what society wanted to do. 
Revelation 
Salt makes the point in relation to fur: 
A fur garment or trimming ... appearing to the eye as if it were one uniform piece, is generally 
made up of many curiously shaped fragments. It is significant that a society which is enamoured 
of so many shams and fictions, and which detests nothing so strongly as the need of looking facts 
in the face, should pre-eminently esteem those articles of apparel which are constructed on the 
most deceptive and illusory principle. (Salt 1980: 84). 
One could speak similarly about a diet made up of different bits of different 
animals, and Salt himself had experienced this revelation: 
*" and I then found myself realizing, with an amazement which time has not diminished ... that 
the "'meat" which formed the staple of our diet, and which I was accustomed to regard ... as a 
mere commodity of the table, was in truth dead flesh - the actual flesh and blood - of oxen, 
sheep, swine, and other animals that were slaughtered in vast numbers under conditions so 
horrible that even to mention the subject at our dinner-tables would have been an unpardonable 
offence. (Salt 1921: 9). 
and he alludes to it when suggesting that most were wilfully blind: 
The terrible sufferings that are quite needlessly inflicted on the lower animals under the plea of 
domestic usage, food-demands, sport, fashion and science, are patent to all who have the seeing 
cye and the feeling heart to apprehend them ... (Salt 1980: 106). 
The ultimate concession of 'rights" was simply a matter of time (p2l), but getting 
people, society, to recognize these "facts', to awaken human-nonhuman affinity, to 
"see', was the task. This practical problem, which consisted not least in a /clearance 
of comfortable fallacies' (pxi), was to be tackled through education - the chief 
instrument of reform - which, in its widest sense, would no longer shirk the most 
important issues, addressing the ambiguous and untenable position of the "sickliest 
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sentimentalists of all' (p124); and the second, auxiliary and supplementary, 
instrument of legislation - the record and register of the moral sense of the 
community - which Salt felt was already lagging behind. 
Society, Kinship & Reform 
We must return Salt to his context of progress which was to be seen in human and 
humane terms rather than the material and the 'value-free' scientistic. Salt's Plea 
was not just for the victims but for the sake of humankind; the infliction of 
unnecessary pain was incompatible with progress. The hideous injustice of 
vivisection, for instance, confining itself to the material aspects of the problem, was 
abhorrent, revolting and intolerable to the the higher instincts of humankind. 
Vivisection was not a science at all but merely a one-sided assertion which found 
favour with a particular class of men, and it confused right and wrong (p87). But 
although vivisection was the fine flower of barbarity and injustice: 
The cause of each and all of the evils that afflict the world is the same - the general lack of 
humanity, the lack of the knowledge that all sentient life is akin, and that he who injures a 
fellow-being is in fact doing injury to himself. The prospects of a happier society are wrapped up 
in this despised and neglected truth, the very statement of which, at the present time, must (I well 
know) appear ridiculous to the accepted instructors of the people. (Salt 1921: 243-244). 
The most far-reaching consequence of Darwin's common origin of all species was 
ethical. Universal kinship, interconnectedness, continuities; there is no sense at all 
in Salt of animals' rights (or of anything) as a single issue. Therefore this is not 
purely an altruistic project and animals' rights and human rights are not 
antagonistic but mutually beneficial and reinforcing. Contrary to all previous and 
subsequent orthodoxy, most pertinently perhaps in relation to his own socialism, 
animals' rights were not something that should or need be sidelined in favour of the 
'priority' of eradicating human problems, for it was only by a wide and disinterested 
study of both subjects that a solution of either was possible (p28). Salt appears to 
have seen the process in Marxian terms though including animals as a class (as well 
as recognizing individuality); inevitable development from now on towards a 
classless society, an end to class antagonisms. The free development of each is the 
condition for the free development of all. There is also the sense that for the first 
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time this possibility was there, both conceptually and practically. 
Throughout Animals' Rights there is an optimism. What we see is a transition from 
the previous centuries of questioning and outrage to the sureness that comes not just 
from knowing how things are but also from the faith in inevitable progress. But 
there is the pessimistic undercurrent (which comes out more in the autobiographical 
Seventy Years Among Savages [19211 although here its more obvious cause was the 
first world war; nevertheless, here too is still evident the faith in the civilizing of 
humanity). The welfarist 'synthesis' was seeking to stifle the further dialectical 
process at a convenient point in the ascent from the 'kingdom of necessity' to the 
'kingdom of freedom'. What Salt hoped for and half-expected at the time, we know 
now not to have come through. The synthesis had brought strands of both cultures 
together and the road that Salt thought society would and should follow from then 
on was the bloodless culture's. But this is the road not taken. 
The major route that emerges from the synthesis is again one of bloody culture's 
choosing. The concession of (certain limited acquired) rights within a controlled 
system of domination - far less than and far different to Salt's ground-breaking 
/ultimate' concession - is as far as bloody culture goes. We have already identified 
nineteenth century legislation's role in the synthesis but what sealed it, it appears, 
and effectively froze the world of human/nonhuman relations, was the principal 
piece of welfarist legislation, the Protection of Animals Act 1911, a classic of 
utilitarianist, duplicitous Enlightenment whereby the meaning of suffering is 
redefined and controlled. Formally introducing the concept of 'unnecessary suffering' 
and therefore that of 'necessary' suffering, it interpreted the latter as 'the balancing 
of the interests of man in the benefits of a particular course of action against the 
interests of the animal in freedom from suffering. This was already tipped in 
humans' favour by the Act exempting: anything made legal by animal experiment 
legislation; the slaughter of animals for food; and hunting and coursing. This is 
welfarism's greatest failure or masterstroke depending upon one's bloodless or 
bloody culture perspective. 
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Had it not been for the bloody cultural First World War, Salt may have seen his 
holistic case taken up to greater effect and we would be now perhaps looking back on 
a more even passage of revelation5. According to Ryder (1989), progress was also 
blacked out by war aftermath wherein animal campaigners took a cautious line lest 
they appeared ridiculous to those with memories of the Somme. And Salt himself 
tells us about the cruel ty-bu tchery-war-mili tarism-imperialism nexus in an 
autobiographical chapter entitled 'The Cave-Man Re-Emerges' - the war had 
retarded the growth of humaner sentiment (Salt 1921). But it did not kill off animal 
concern. Indeed, the terrible suffering and slaughter of the war altered some people's 
perceptions of animals and brought many closer to the recognition of human- 
nonhuman continuities: suffering was suffering; corpses were corpses; war did not 
discriminate. 'Meat' eating mentality was warring mentality. A greater empathy 
was fostered (see, e. g. Kean 1998: 166-179). But this isn't translated into the kind of 
wholesale response Salt wished for: that all bloodshed cease. It seems to have been, 
instead, more of the vague spasmodic sympathy he lamented. In fact, the war 
ultimately compounded the public/private spheres division. Moreover, from after 
the war especially, vivisection epitomized the new modernity with anti- 
vivisection still cast as backward-looking. When Salt's Humanitarian League 
collapsed in 1919 (Salt saw its failure due to its being 'a century or two too early'; see 
Gold 1995: 137), what might have developed into a holistic movement suffered from 
fragmentation of issues once again. Alone or with others, notably Shaw, Salt did in 
fact keep alive certain issues - anti-hunting, anti-vivi section, vegetarianism - 
but 
what he could not be aware of was that, as from the second war, instrumental reason, 
coupled with technological capability, would further separate fact 
from value and 
usher in a new era of animal use. Although Salt would have 
been horrified at this 
realization of the kind of social progress he feared, it was this, amongst other 
factors, that gave rise to a new surge of protest, again as part of a larger wave. 
What further concerns us here is how Salt records the opposition, the 
bloody culture, 
not only in its 'basic evil' but also in its response to 
humanitarian-based animals' 
rights. Remember Salt writing in his autobiography, 
twenty-nine years after 
Anitnals' Rights, that the barest mention at table of the subject of slaughter, and the 
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reification of animals into 'meat' commodities, was an 'unpardonable offence'. And 
how what he promoted was a "despised and neglected truth' which appeared 
'ridiculous to the accepted instructors of the people'. In a society which takes 
animal use as the norm, the revelation is perhaps of that which should not dare to 
speak its name. We shall have cause to recall such things in Chapters 6 and 7 when 
we look at media representations some seventy-five years later and draw again on 
the notion of offence taken by the civilized, and see what vestiges of ridicule 
remain. 
From Salt to the Seventies 
In his Preface to the 1980 edition of Animals' Rights, Peter Singer suggested that 
Salt had left little for his heirs to add but his influence was not to take greater 
effect for some sixty years or so when the still dominant force emerging out of the 
synthesis grew to enormous proportions. Within these 'worsening' conditions a 
contemporary movement was established. It was what the heirs were to do with 
Salt's (and earlier and later) material and spirit that's of importance. From here to 
the end of Chapter 3 then what we shall to do is identify the line of that 
development, tracing the continuum and its linkages to reach an understanding of 
how today's animal liberation movement itself emerged into light in the 1960s and 
1970s. 
Technocracy & Counter Culture 
As we have seen from the above, Salt was looking for and pleading for a new climate 
to be created by ceasing the repression of humane emotions and co-operative nature. 
What he was hinting at throughout was not just a societal change in terms of 
humans' relation to other animals but, and without this there was no hope, a 
spiritual as well as a cultural transformation. We have already seen the prevailing 
ethos to which the overlapping Fabian and Humanitarian League ethics ran counter 
- laissez faire and philanthropy, which were thought 
to be and would continue to 
be thought satisfactory in shaping society and solving its problems. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s a similar situation obtained, only this time, 
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according to Theodore Roszak, orthodox credibility rested on three interlocking 
premises. One, that the vital needs of man were (contrary to everything the great 
souls of history had told us) purely technical in character. If a problem did not have 
such a technical solution, it could not be a real problem. Two, that this formal (and 
highly esoteric) analysis of our needs had achieved ninety-nine per cent completion. 
Snags and hitches were caused only by some irrational elements, a 'breakdown of 
communication', and all could be ironed out by sitting down and reasoning together. 
And three, that the experts who had fathomed our heart's desires and who alone 
could continue providing for our needs, the experts who really knew what they were 
talking about, all happened to be on the payroll of the state and/or corporate 
structure (Roszak 1970: 10-11). 
It wasn't difficult to see how the three premises related to animal liberation 
concerns. The first denied the spiritual and reinforced the old repression of humane 
instinct so lamented by Salt. Further, it merely compounded the Industrial 
Revolution creed that all human problems could be resolved given an unlimited 
amount of material commodities. The second accounted for the exposed animal 
abuses by excusing them merely as excesses of well regulated 'humane' systems. The 
third, that the desires and aims of those who had succeeded in passing off, for 
instance, vivisection and factory farming as triumphs of progress, had become 
inseparable from the policies of the state. The battle against this firmly entrenched 
ideology, this 'reality', was to range wider, be continuous and rather more complex. 
As for the ethos as a whole: 
The paramount struggle of [the] day [was] against a far more formidable, because far less vicious, 
opponent, to which I will give the name "the technocracy". (Roszak 1970: 4). 
This seems to be Eder's 'carnivorous culture" in its widest sense, and it was now more 
formidable precisely because it was more difficult to identify than say poverty, 
racial injustice or the Vietnam war. Opposition to it was initially of a similarly 
unclear and certainly less well organized kind in terms of specific counter ideology, 
ranging as it did from New Leftists to psychedeliacs. Rebelling against what Lewis 
Mumford called a 'mad rationality, a younger generation gave much attention to 
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figures such as 'merry prankster' novelist Ken Kesey (for his 'Combine, 6 read the 
technocracy) and (anti-) psychiatrist RD Laing whose works had suggested that it 
was not the 'insane' who were crazy but the very nature of a society founded on a 
supra-rationality which had given rise to the Inquisition, the Final Solution, the 
world-wide balance of terror and (as exposed by Carson 1962) environmental 
pollution, and which was now reaching its ultimate expression. This was: 
... surely because they [the young] have seen too many men of indisputable intelligence and 
enlightened intention become the apologists of a dehumanized social order ... [whose] ... technocratic assumptions about the nature of man, society, and nature have warped their 
experience at the source, and so have become the buried premises from which intellect and ethical 
judgment proceed. (Roszak 1970: 50). 
Roszak was attacking instrumental reason and the myth of objective consciousness 
which had devalued and rendered defunct the mystical, the poetic, the natural, the 
psychic and the beautiful forces of life. Essentially soulless, and leading nowhere 
but to the waiting place of Beckett's two sad tramps, the technocracy had, through 
reductive humanism, appropriated to itself the whole meaning of reason, reality, 
progress and knowledge. 
What Salt had been advocating for animal liberation -a comprehensive principle 
to tackle disparate though related issues - was exactly what the counter culture 
was trying to forge in opposition to the technocracy. Just as Salt and his works were 
part of something bigger, within which there were many who disagreed with him 
or ignored him, his attempt at comprehensive principle not being taken up, animal 
liberationists from the 1960s were part of a loosely formed, inchoate counter culture 
of various strands which, though they had their opposition to the technocracy in 
common - albeit to different degrees and on different grounds - were to separate out 
rather than merge into agreement as a single movement after the radical protest 
apogee of 1968. This separation seems to have contributed to the animal liberation 
movement (and others) ever since being described or even denigrated in the media as 
'single issue'. 
Animal Revelation 69 
In both cases, Salt's and the 1960s-70s' galvanization of an animal liberation 
movement, the alternative value's renewed promotion was provoked by the failures 
and/or threats and dangers of orthodoxy to humans, animals and society. It had been 
coming for a long time, since Descartes especially, who himself occasioned a more 
immediate humane backlash. The myth of scientific objectivity, or of the objective 
consciousness, had been growing in influence and power, and Shaw, who had 
detailed an an ti-vi vi section case in his Preface to The Doctor's Dilemma in 1905, 
had been aware of it, recognizing that: 
Public support of vivisection is founded almost wholly on the assurances of the vivisectors that 
great public benefits may be expected from the practice. Not for a moment do I suggest that such a 
defence would be valid even if proved. But when the witnesses begin by alleging that in the cause 
of science all the customary ethical obligations (which include the obligation to tell the truth) are 
suspended, what weight can any reasonable person give to their testimony? (Preface to The 
Doctor's Dilemma, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 474). 
The pseudo-objectivity of scientism had placed science and technology beyond the 
parameters of morality; by the 1960s anything went as long as it could be seen to lead 
to practical results and/or a furtherance of knowledge: 
So the sweaty quest for quick, stunning success goes off in all directions. If only one can find a 
way to graft the head of a baboon on to a blue jay (after all, why not? ) ... if only one can 
synthesise a virus lethal enough to wipe out a whole nation (after all, why not? ). (Roszak 1970: 
271). 
By the 1960s and 1970s the animal using element of the technocracy, most notable 
within the increasing industrializations of vivisection and factory farming, was 
evident to those such as Harrison (1964) and Vyvyan (1969 and 1971) who cared to 
look behind the closed doors. Closed doors are somewhat metaphorical of the 
technocratic ethos for not only had abuses and excesses been concealed - and 
animals increasingly reified, their products packaged, obscuring their origins, such 
commodification enabling the maintenance of consumers' clear conscience - but the 
technocratic state had arisen by stealth. Old political dichotomies of left and right 
were becoming less rigid and although the old style daily political argument was 
still framed in terms of the teams, it was the umpire (technocracy and its experts) 
who set the limits and goals and judged the contenders (Roszak 1970: 8). 
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It was the young, arriving perhaps for the first time as a generation with eyes that 
could see the world anew, who were rising up against the expansion of the 
technocracy (most of the contemporary animal liberation movement's major 
philosophers and early activists were aged between eighteen and thirty-two in 
1970), a technocracy which had been aided by the blank stare, the near 
pathological passivity on the part of the older generation that had surrendered 
their responsibility for making morally demanding decisions. Roszak suggests that 
the reasons for the older generation's loss of control of the institutions included: the 
remembered background of economic collapse in the 1930s; the distraction and 
fatigue of war; the search for security and relaxation afterwards; the bedazzlement 
of new prosperity; thermonuclear terror and international emergency of the 1940s 
and 1950s; the rapidity and momentum of technocratic totalitarianism after the 
war, drawing on heavy wartime industrial investments, the emergency 
centralization of decision-making, and the awe-stricken public reverence for science 
(Roszak 1970: 23). 
Transformations 
Rising to a position of primacy, scientism posed as the carrier of truth and from 
which all meaningfulness and value had been derived. Lewis Mumford reminded 
readers of Captain Ahab's chilling confession: 'All my means are sane; my motives 
and object mad' (Roszak 1970: 78), but in animal exploitation terms the technocracy's 
means too were mad, and not just mad, but evil. And now they were made to stand 
naked, the horrors, imbalances, deficiencies, criminalities and delinquencies of the 
technocracy revealed. If their effects were difficult to pinpoint within human 
society the effect on other animals was glaring, once exposed. In order to root out the 
distortive technocratic assumptions, which had established as real the false 
oppositions of reason/passion, intellect/ feeling, head/heart: 
... nothing less is required than the subversion 
of the scientific world view, with its entrenched 
commitment to an egocentric and cerebral mode of consciousness. 
In its place there must be a new 
culture in which the non-intellective capacities of the personality ... 
become arbiters of the good, 
the true, and the beautiful. (Roszak 1970: 50). 
Salt could have written that, and we shall see that as well as proposing a new 
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intellective approach through, for instance, the work of two of its major 
philosophers (though not without their later animal liberationist critics), the 
animal liberation movement (or many within it) in the 1970 to 2000 period would 
attempt to subvert the world view and not least by renewing Salt's call for a 
balancing up of intellective and non-intellective capacities. More than that too: 
What makes the youthful disaffiliation of our time a cultural phenomenon, rather than merely a 
political movement, is the fact that it strikes beyond ideology to the level of consciousness, 
seeking to transform our deepest sense of the self, the other, the environment. (Roszak 1970: 49). 
Roszak suggested that what the counter culture lacked was 'a deep and pervasive 
critique of the mythos of the technocracy. Lacking that, I doubt that [its] strategy of 
ad hoc agitation in the streets can lead to more than temporarily therapeutic 
outbursts of frustration' (Roszak 1970: 293). If we understand the animal liberation 
movement to have been one among several strands to emerge from the counter culture, 
these sentiments, taken together, can be suitably applied to it. The change in man 
proposed by Roszak relates to a sense of spiritual transformation, inseparable from 
the concept of revelation and which would be later apparent in animal 
liberationists - from philosophers to activists - to varying degrees. The 'deep and 
pervasive critique' is begun by animal liberation philosophers and others, Stephen 
Clark (1984) - see Chapter 3 here - coming closest perhaps to an onslaught on the 
whole mythos rather than a narrower critique of animal abuse rationalizations; and 
the "agitation in the streets" can serve as a description of the works of organizations 
and groups as varied as Animal Aid, the Animal Liberation Front and the liberation 
leagues. 
Having seen what caused a younger generation's uprising, we can also ask just what 
conditions were conducive to it? By 1964, Britain was experiencing 'the affluent 
society'. After the depredations of war and reconstruction, the economic situation 
began to pick up, mass unemployment seemed a thing of the past and, along with the 
welfare state, people began to realise the fruits of victory at last. Luxuries 
became 
commonplace, foreign food and restaurants and holidays abroad were part of the 
widening of horizons and expectations while the popular mind was 
freed of the 
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worry of basic need fulfilment. The greater affluence was previously only available 
to the aristocracy and middle classes, for instance the enormous wealth of Victorian 
and Edwardian times during which animal welfare had been legitimized. 
Replacing Alec Douglas Home in office in 1964, Harold Wilson, a complex anti-hunt 
and Fabian-technocrat figure, spoke of sweeping away the "grouse moor' concept of 
government, and radical policies followed. Laws concerning abortion, homosexuality 
and divorce were reformed and capital punishment abolished, in much the same 
way that pro-animal thought had developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries amongst rafts of other social reforms. 
Into this milieu were being added the sheer numbers of younger people, the great rise 
in the number of under twenty-fives. They had more money and autonomy now and 
felt their potential power in a market place, albeit one which was already 
manipulating their dissent and selling it back to them. The search for new spiritual 
values was symbolized by the Beatles in India, by the upshot of communes and a 
general New Age endeavour. Higher education had expanded, especially in the 
humanities, and graduates - from a wider range of backgrounds and indeed from 
many new universities - were now identifying more with undergraduates than with 
the adult world; part of the unique generational disaffiliation of the time. Indeed, 
it was largely out of the informal 'Oxford Group' that the intellectual element of 
the animal liberation movement and some of its milestone publications emerged as 
the latest vigorous pro-animal period got into its stride in the late 1960s and 
through the 1970s during the growth of interest among philosophers in practical or 
applied ethics, after some sixty years neglect. During this time it became widely 
recognized that moral philosophers could make an effective contribution to 
discussions of difficult ethical questions. They were drawn into discussions of moral 
values of equality, justice, war and civil disobedience by US civil rights, the 
Vietnam War and the rise of student activism. Applied ethics became part of the 
teaching in most university philosophy departments (see, e. g. Singer 1974: 647E). In 
what other sphere could animal liberation have found such voice at that time? And 
what better discipline to counteract a science which had attempted to suppress it 
and replace it with its own claim to universality? 
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A Series of Links 
However, before we look at the works of the major animal liberation philosophers 
in the next chapter, we really need to go back to the early 1960s, for not only is it 
reasonable to suggest that today's movement began around that time - as the 
RSPCA failed to oppose bloodsports robustly, the Hunt Saboteurs Association was 
formed in 1963 and thus re-established organized direct action - it is also possible 
that in 1964 was established a basic principle or factor; the link between empirical 
and cognitive revelation; the sweeping away of concealments. The year saw the 
publication of Ruth Harrison's Animal Machines and its serialization in The 
Observer which led to such outcry that the government set up a committee of enquiry 
into the welfare of intensively farmed animals, although most of its many 
recommendations, set out in the Brambell Report (1965), never progressed beyond the 
debating stage. Harrison had produced the first detailed investigation, description, 
analysis and coining of 'factory farming" and the later emerging movement was to re- 
learn from it a major lesson: " ... so long as there is a certain 
deadpan quality to the 
common-sense world, an imperviousness to injustices that go deeper than 
ameliorative reform can rectify ... " (Apter 1992: 169), its theory and action would 
be 
required to shock, to get people to pay attention. Without the unearthing and 
presentation of new facts and new knowledge, without the spotlight of exposure, 
there would be no enlightenment, as early twentieth century anti-vivisectionists 
had also shown in their own shocking expos6s (e. g. Lind-af-Hageby & Schartau 
1903). 
The inexorable rise and subsequent expos6 of factory farming has to be seen in context. 
opposition to vivisection's materialistic outlook especially had always been strong. 
In 1962 it had forced the Home Secretary to set up a departmental committee under 
Sidney Littlewood to inquire into the workings of the 1876 Act, its report being 
published in 1965, again with its many recommendations being scarcely debated in 
parliament. Earlier, Shaw had kept the issue alive in his own works and in the 
press, in the 1940s and 50s CS Lewis wrote pamphlets for an ti-vivi section societies, 
and a wide range of other luminaries from literature, science and other 
fields 
(including Battle of Britain hero Lord Dowding in the Lords) had condemned the 
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practice as immoral and/or unscientific. But the numbers of animals used escalated 
in their millions and the additional rise of technology in the shape of factory 
farming seems to have thrown animal use into sharper focus. 
Against this backdrop, animal liberation was an outraged double take. It was to say, 
'Hey, wait a minute' twice. Once against the excesses and then, on further 
inspection, said it again in relation to the whole history and epistemology behind 
them; a new generation's revelation. This was a radical departure from welfarism's 
acquiescence, for it exposed welfarism's failure - inevitable without a 
comprehensive principle - to even hold in check systems which were recognized as 
inherently iniquitous, expansionist and wherein science and technology's 'advances' 
were dictating tomorrow's moral norms. Even the basic niceties of welfarism were 
being flouted and it was to be hoped instead that the pro-animal movement's own 
'excess' (of liberation) would aspire to the same status; an emerging norm. Moreover, 
there was no return to welfarism as the regulator of human/nonhuman relations, for 
vivisection's deliberate and legalized infliction of suffering had made such 
considerations redundant, and factory farming had arisen due to the fundamental 
inefficiency of traditional systems. Rather than take what animal liberationists 
saw as the logical step of utilizing the power of science and technology in 
progressing beyond animal-based agriculture and research, orthodoxy called upon it 
instead to sustain them artificially. 
This is the classic example of what one might call a tendency towards overkill in all obsolete 
systems. This is the process whereby a particular historical mode of production (such as the 
domestication of animals), or a scientific or industrial technique, reaches its furthest stage of 
application (its reductio ad absurdum) after it has been rendered obsolete by the development of 
the forces of production and the means of production by scientific and technological research. 
(Peters 1971: 225). 
This was a fertile moment, and perhaps a moment only in which animal liberation 
could secure a significant foothold. For it was not long before the older generation's 
now challenged speciesism and unquestioning respect for science was replaced by the 
more formidable technocratic wave that was to sweep up later generations, leaving 
them with little choice but to forge careers within it. Animal liberation in its 
present form turned up in the hiatus between the old fashioned respect and the new 
Animal Revelation 75 
compulsion which was to twin animal liberation's later ethical flourish with 
animal exploitation's technological advance. 
However, empirical expos6s are not in themselves enough to cause, maintain or 
explain the upshot and growth of a social movement. On the heels of Harrison, it 
was the socialist Brigid Brophy who, in 1965, was to provide a link, via Shaw, 
between Salt and the further road to animal liberation. Born ten years before Salt's 
death and publishing her first novel, Hackenfeller's Ape - about a distinguished 
academic risking his career to save an ape from a rocket experiment - just three 
years after Shaw's demise in 1950, she titled her startling Sunday Times article, 
'The Rights of Animals' (Brophy 1965), picked by deliberate analogy with and 
extrapolation from Thomas Paine's The Rights of Man which associated: 
... the case for nonhuman animals with that clutch of egalitarian ideas which have sporadically, 
though quite often with impressive actual political results, come to the rescue of other oppressed 
classes, such as slaves or homosexuals or women ... I invoked The Rights of Man because it is 
classically associated with two Revolutions, the French and the American, which were the 
occasions of quite convulsive adjustment to our vision to correct for the distortions introduced 
by the class barriers of feudalism and empire. (Brophy 1979a: 63-65). 
In setting out what was also an animal liberationist's mini self-defence manual - 
anticipating the accusation of theriophily and the labels of sentimentalist, killjoy, 
economic naif, anthropornorphizer and crank - Brophy invoked the concept of 
rights because they are, she said, a matter of respect and justice and not of love, 
which is capricious and involuntary. And, once embarked upon a course of social 
justice, it eventually carries one through the class barriers, including speciesism, the 
movement against which was to ask, in the light of evolutionary theory, that the 
present high barrier between humans and all other animals be displaced and re- 
erected (based on nervous system and therefore sentience criteria), if re-erected 
anywhere, between the animal kingdom (including humans) and the vegetable 
kingdom, thus radically redefining "nature, 7. And, we might suggest, in the process 
causing the orthodox to recoil in horror at the breakdown of the binary oppositions 
that have constituted the basis of bloody culture. 
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For Brophy, humanity had seemed to switch off its morals and aesthetics where 
animals were concerned, just as the Greeks, for all their philosophical 
investigation, never noticed the immorality of slavery. Following the orthodox 
emphasis, Brophy agreed that it was indeed rationality that mattered, but the 
whole case for behaving decently toward other species rested on the fact of our very 
superiority. It was precisely because of our unique capabilities of imagination, 
rationality and moral choice that we were under the obligation to recognize and 
respect the rights of other animals. A sign that our conscience was about to be 
switched on was the emergence of a new family of largely anthropomorphic 
rationalizations offered by factory farmers themselves (e. g. that farmed animals 
preferred confinements with guaranteed security, shelter and food to the rigours of 
freedom), probably prompted by Harrison's expos6 of intensive conditions. 
Fantasia 
What should concern us here mainly however is Brophy's focus on fantasy, for it is 
fantasy in its various manifestations and as a function of age-old ambivalence 
identified by animal liberationist writers which, perhaps above all and in 
contradistinction to the much trumpeted human rationality, is thought to be 
generally descriptive of orthodoxy's attitude and relation to other species, acting as 
a smokescreen to the revelation, underpinning all anti-liberationist stances. Our 
whole relation to animals was, for Brophy, tinted by it. We were lost in a fantasy 
about our toughness, for instance, where even our humane impulses were disguised 
under 'realistic' arguments - foxhunting is snobbish, factory farmed food doesn't 
taste so nice - for superstition and dread of sentimentality weighted all our 
questions against animals. The silliest superstition was that to which we sacrificed 
animals in our belief that by killing them we ourselves somehow live more fully. It 
was fantasy too, shaped by the either-or scenario, which fabricated a dilemma as 
an excuse for inertia. And recognizing that, among institutionalized animal abuses, 
only vivisection carried with it any semblance of a direct clash of human and 
animal interests, Brophy re-introduced into the vivisection debate the concept of 
Imarginal' cases, one to be emphasised by the major philosophers later. She could: 
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... see nothing (except our being able to get away with it) which lets us pick on animals that 
would not equally let us pick on idiot humans (who would be more useful) or on any humans 
whom we might sacrifice for the good of the many. (Brophy 1965). 
If we look back then at the Harrison book of 1964 and the Brophy piece of the 
following year we can suggest that in combination with the period's spirit of 
rebellion and questioning they triggered the new era. A decade later, Andrew Linzey 
would begin to incorporate animal liberation into the Christian framework, Richard 
D Ryder would publish a breakthrough work on vivisection, and Peter Singer would 
be the first to combine empirical evidence and academic philosophy in one, single- 
author volume, the seminal Animal Liberation. But before then, Roslind and 
Stanley Godlovitch and John Harris edited a collection of essays by various 
contributors, including Brophy and Harrison, which also recognized the value of 
this powerful double act in forcing the revelation. Singer referred to the work as an 
animal liberation manifesto (Singer 1973), and a brief look at both Animals, Men 
and Morals and Ryder's Victims of Science is necessary at this point. 
A Green Light 
A Manifesto 
In his 'Postscript' to Godlovitch, Godlovitch & Harris (1971), Patrick Corbett wrote: 
... we make no bones about our object 
in contributing to this book: we want to change the world. 
(Corbett 1971: 232). 
This bold declaration of revolutionary intent, echoing Marx, illustrating the return 
to applied ethics and, to use Adams' (1990) term, 'rebuking' bloody culture, 
encapsulates the immense significance of animal liberation which gradually took on 
an individual identity out of the mass of radical ferment. Although Corbett framed 
his Postscript in anti-technocracy terms, what is hinted at here is that either as a 
part of a larger revolutionary movement or on its own, animal liberation 
is world- 
changing in its intended application, forcing a thorough re-assessment and re- 
definition of the human/nonhuman relationship. If the seeds of that revolution 
had 
been already been sown, the first green shoots already having 
broken into the light, 
here were the first buds of its new season. If Roszak painted a picture of 
the 
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technocracy and the counter culture, here was a more focused portrait of one aspect of 
it and much of it relates directly to Roszak's concerns. Corbett's Postscript contains 
much that could have been written by Roszak himself, further confirming the 
contextual relationships: 
The revolt of poetry and art against the formalisations of our culture, the revolt of the young 
against the roles which technological society requires them to fill, the concern with music, drugs 
and oriental techniques of meditation, the sudden anxiety to conserve as much as possible of the 
natural environment - these and innumerable other tendencies show that we are having drastic 
second thoughts about the idealisation of man the theorist and man the technologist which has 
dominated Europe for the last three hundred years. (Corbett 1971: 236-237). 
The book exposed in much detail some of the most severe forms of animal servitude; 
analysed the reasons for the continuation of such practices (a clearance of 
comfortable functionalist fallacies and classificatory dogmatism); and outlined the 
reasons why they should cease. The varied work consolidated the ground and 
primed most of what was to follow in fully-fledged animal liberation philosophy. 
Although all the essays are worthy of note, indeed classics of their kind, three are 
especially pertinent here - Maureen Duffy's, David Wood's and Brigid Brophy's. 
Maureen Duffy had recognized that within the technological and scientific 
revolution 
The undeniable improvement in human conditions however has not been paralleled by an 
improvement in animal conditions and in fact has been rather at their expense ... The animals 
have sunk from being members of the family or at least dependent servants to being automata... If 
the circus has lost its popularity with adults it is not, I suspect, because of suspicions of the 
cruelty necessary to make an animal perform faultlessly to schedule but because the other beasts 
have sunk so far below us in our estimation since the beginning of the technological age, in which 
they have no shaping part except as victims, that we no longer need to emphasize the distance 
between us and them. (Du ffy 19 71: 112,122). 
Despite the increase in popular knowledge of animals gained from television 
wildlife programmes and from ethological studies, any erstwhile familiarity had 
not been recaptured and, contrary to what the nineteenth century synthesis may 
have promised, things were in fact becoming "worse' for animals, for any sense of 
sympathy, empathy, had been outlawed. Humans refused to recognize the sentience 
of other species in order that they might go on treating them as objects, projections 
and symbols. Society had made no significant advance in this respect and, in the 
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spirit of Henry Salt's nomenclature concerns, David Wood identified increased 
linguistic and cognitive distortion in the use of such words as 'system' (e. g. 'Three 
Systems for Beef'), 'raw material', "process', 'product", 'efficiency' (of an animal), 
'fodder', 'feed' (rather than food), 'converters', all of which were part of the huge 
pattern of jargon that degraded animals to the status of equipment (Wood 1971: 199). 
Although from our vantage point we can now look at the work and find much of its 
content bouncing back and forth towards both Salt (especially in his political 
concerns) and animal rights theorist Tom Regan (1983) (in his narrower focus), 
developing the one and paving the way for the other, what emerges most is not just 
the combination of fact, analysis and theory, but also the identification of the 
techno-scientific ethos as merely an inhuman, inhumane and soulless virtual 
reality, indeed as an evil fantasy. Instead of exploding the myth of human 
supremacy, the series of body blows inflicted on it had encouraged its enhancement 
and extension. In an even greater denial of the intuitive and sympathetic, the ultra- 
rational techno ethos had, perhaps ironically, set itself on a path towards the 
repair and perfection of illusion. 
What was the pro-animal cause to do in the face of it? In her own contribution to the 
work, Brophy supported Salt's claim that animals' rights were an integral part of 
the great 'social question', nonantagonistic to human rights, and suggested that the 
main problem was to get others to recognize the morality and logic and act upon 
them: 
Persuasion, however, is a psychological act, and although man's moral position vis-ý-vis the 
other animals is straightforward (being a tyrant is straightforward), his psychological position 
is complex. One has only to read anthropological data or the case-histories of 
infantile neuroses 
or the many mythologies that include animal gods or animal-human mixtures or the 
doctrine of 
metempsychosis to recognise a propensity in human psychology 
for forming unrealistic fantasy 
relationships to the other animals. 
If You suppose that such fantasies have no influence on the real 
lives of "normal", 
civilised and modern persons, you will be at a loss to explain why most of those persons eat 
meat. I am not this time pointing to the contradiction 
between being civilised and disregarding the 
rights of other beings ... 
If there were no rights of the other animals to consider, the rights of 
humans would still demand vegetarianism as the only system 
likely to prevent a large part of the 
human population from being starved off the planet. (Brophy 
1971: 132). 
Animal Revelation 80 
The repressed facets of human nature and indeed human thinking would have to be 
given greater freedom in order to give rise to the ability to see through the myths, to 
accept the revelation, and this was not just spiritual but practical. And in its 
exposure of orthodox logic's discrepancies, the movement was declaring that it was 
not one to be legitimately accused of a lack of rationality. On the contrary. As Shaw 
had earlier pointed out that, in vivisectionist logic, the first duty of the vivisector 
was to experiment on humans, and that in the pursuit of efficiency animal-based 
agriculture should be phased out, Brophy exposed the inadequacy of the 
humanocentric twist on evolutionary theory. If indeed life was really a matter of 
survival of the fittest (with all that philosophy entailed for human treatment of 
'lower' animals); if man was simply behaving as evolution ordained: 
... 
he would not be seeking to cure sick humans. He would just out-compete them and let them 
perish as unfit. (Brophy 1971: 142). 
In this concentration on what it saw as orthodox double-think, animal liberation 
was shifting humans' relationship with other animals from the symbolic to the 
literal. It was 'facing the facts' as Salt urged, merging them with the metaphysical 
leap from the 'false' to the 'real' in order to reach an intellectual and imaginative 
sympathy. The manifesto was saying that the real ought to be rational, a theme to 
be taken up by some of the major philosophers later. 
Speciesism & Conformity 
Doing for anti-vivisection what Harrison (1964) did for anti-factory farming, 
Richard D Ryder's Victims of Science (1975) was published as the Sunday People 
continued its own revelations about beagles forced to smoke tobacco substitutes by 
ICI. By the end of February 1975, the newspaper had collected petitions signed by 
over 300,000 people. A third factor in this mix was the appearance in court in March, 
of Ronnie Lee and Cliff Goodman (founders of the Band of Mercy, shortly to be 
superseded by the Animal Liberation Front) charged with causing extensive damage 
to equipment at various laboratories and animal breeding establishments during the 
previous two years. A fourth factor was the 'theft' or "liberation' of 
dogs from the 
ICI laboratories by Mike Huskisson while Lee and Goodman were serving their 
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three-year sentences. These actions had not only shocked but had also, for many, 
lent a certain legitimacy to the physical expression of outrage at animal use and 
suffering; something could actually be done (beyond private lifestyle), and 
something not necessarily linked with class, as was easily made the case in relation 
to hunt saboteurs (as Lee and Goodman had also been). 
Arriving at such a time (Peter Singer's Animal Liberation was not published in 
Britain until the following year), and again combining shocking (laboratory) 
evidence with what have become basic planks of animal liberation - sentientism 
and anti-speciesism - the book gained far more popularity and attention than, say, 
John Vyvyan's largely overlooked history-based works of 1969 and 1971. 
Here we shall look briefly at an aspect of Ryder's considerable contribution for, as a 
psychologist, one who had himself experimented on animals, it is in this aspect of 
animal exploitation - individual and collective psychology - that he offered 
more than just an expos6 of vivisection. It is not necessary to dwell upon the work, for 
Ryder adds little to what has already been considered above although his 
encapsulation of it at the time was important, unique and not without huge 
influence. However, noting this, and that for Ryder, the 'capacity to suffer is the 
crucial similarity between men and animals that binds us all together and places us 
all in a similar moral category' (Ryder 1983: 4), and that the concept of 'species' had 
a nebulous quality about it, we must quote him in relation to that term of his, 
"speciesism' (coined in 1970), an irrational prejudice which had no proper basis in 
evolutionary theory (Ryder 1983: 5-10): 
I use the word 'speciesism' to describe the widespread discrimination that is practised by man 
against the other species, and to draw a parallel with racism. Speciesism and racism are both 
forms of prejudice that are based upon appearances - if the other individual looks different then 
he is rated as beyond the moral pale. Racism today is condemned by most intelligent and 
compassionate people and it seems only logical that such people should extend their concern for 
other races to other species also. Speciesism and racism (and indeed sexism) overlook or 
underestimate the similarities between the discriminator and those discriminated against and 
both forms of prejudice show a selfish disregard for the interests of others, and for their 
sufferings. (Ryder 1983: 5). 
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The racism analogy appears throughout the literature as does the demand of logic. 
But here it is the selfishness which seems to underlie the problem. Unlike, or to a 
far greater extent than racism and sexism with which analogies are drawn, animal 
liberation writing identifies speciesism as being grounded in human selfishness. 
Animal exploitation, prejudice against other species, is more fundamental to most 
individuals' everyday lives: it has not been common practice to eat blacks and 
women for instance. Most people actively participate in it, collude in it, and most 
lives are founded upon it. At almost every moment most humans have been or are 
touching, using or consuming something which is or contains an animal product, has 
been tested on animals, or both. 
As well as being a societal norm, reflecting the convention of species selfishness, the 
collusion is intensely personal and the two are mutually reinforcing. This self 
interest is a significant factor in the separation of animal liberation from, say, 
humanocentric environmentalism-conservation, and makes the former unique among 
the movements which emerged from the counter culture. No other asks so much of the 
individual in terms of altruism and practical, personal, everyday commitment. 
The collusion and its resulting universalist conformity also define orthodox decency 
and this surely is just as great a problem for animal liberation. If people do not like 
to be thought selfish most do like to consider themselves decent and respectable 
(witness the Eliasian process). To question that decency, to suggest that part of it is 
something quite different, something evil perhaps, is to incur wrath and 
incomprehension at those who do not participate in the rituals. Decency conventions 
are at ontological loggerheads. 
Ryder suggests that conformism applied no less to those who exploited animals 
directly. The vivisector was not a sadist (in the main), but one merely conditioned 
and desensitized by education and training, by the promise of security and success. 
Vivisectors know that in order to achieve these ends they have to toe the line; they 
gain the privilege of conformity. Conformity means collusion 
in fantasy, illusion and 
secret guilt but also acceptance and security. 
On the other hand, we could suggest 
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that nonconformism means stripping abuse of its camouflage but also standing naked 
oneself; vulnerable, outside. One almost attains to the position of the Other, and 
through such shared alienation one may develop an even more acute empathy with 
those enduring their chronic otherness. Individuals and society as a whole shared 
the same dilemma. The problem was that animal liberation made the choice 
starker, 'stricter', whilst the erstwhile decency, respectability and leniency of 
animal welfare - perhaps the ultimate concealment - was eating your 'meat' and 
having your animal. 
The old human/nonhuman divide was a long time in dying but, for the orthodox, 
which seemed to include those clinging to welfarism as the ultimate expression in 
human largesse, animal liberation -a baffling combination of decency and 
deviance, purity and pollution, culture and chaos, reason and the irrational - 
threatened to be the 'rough beast, its hour come round at last, slouching towards 
Bethlehem to be born' (Yeats 1970: 100). 
Green Flash 
Distilling the rationalizations and pretexts down to mere fantasy and its relatives 
is not, of course, what the above writers attempted, but they all tended towards and 
hint at it if not, as Brophy and Duffy did, focus upon it. We have seen also the 
repeated call for the more human (or the other and suppressed side of the human) 
that might facilitate the more humane, to ease the readjustment of our vision and 
our reason/emotion balance, rather than increase the conflict. Where the one had 
been denied, the other had grown out of proportion and given rise to analytical 
thinking - no bad thing in itself - but which, grown to grotesque proportions, 
legitimized the horrors it had visited upon humans and other animals alike. 
Prevailing logic was seen to be either illogic or a cop-out logic, failing to carry 
through its own reasoning; priding itself on objectivity it was essentially self- 
serving and sentimentalist. What animal liberation was battling against, it said, 
was far more complex than cruelty, only the random form of which had, with the 
rise of welfarism, tended to lessen (but with shocking increases in the 1980s and 
1990s). Not only had orthodox thinking been conditioned by the orthodox diet - 
Animal Revelation 84 
'meat' on the menu limited the imagination and precluded objectivity - but 
everything which sustained that thinking was faulty. The vaunted reason was not 
rational at a118 
Unconformist in their attitude toward other species, liberationists are unavoidably 
outsiders, self-exiled from prevailing thought patterns, and part of a different 
culture, pacing impatiently beyond the limits of cultural 'reality'. This distance, it 
would seem, aids other kinds of objectivity and logic which discriminate 
differently, take different things for granted. Orthodoxy operated what Robert M 
Pirsig called the static filter that filters out facts, opinions and beliefs that don't fit 
the pattern, and this operated too at the individual level, unconsciously, 
unthinkingly and often against instinct. Two examples from his Lila: An Inquiry into 
Morals follow. 
His character Phaedrus was sailing a yacht to a safe harbour he thought was some 
twenty miles south of Cleveland. Using his harbour chart to navigate the concrete 
dividing walls, harbour buoys and other markers until he found the yacht basin, he 
then tied up at berth and went to sleep. When he woke up he asked someone how far 
it was to Cleveland, only to be told that he was in Cleveland: 
He couldn't believe it. The chart said he was in a harbor miles from Cleveland. 
Then he remembered the little 'discrepancies' he had seen on the chart when he came 
in. When a buoy had a 'wrong' number on it he presumed it had been changed since the chart was 
made. When a certain wall appeared that was not shown, he assumed it had been built recently 
or maybe he hadn't come to it yet and he wasn't quite where he thought he was. It never occurred 
to him to think he was in a whole different harbor! 
It was a parable for students of scientific objectivity. Wherever the chart disagreed 
with his observations he rejected the observation and followed the chart. Because of what his 
mind thought it knew, it had built up a static filter, an immune system, that was shutting out all 
information that did not fit. Seeing is not believing. Believing is seeing. (Pirsig 1991: 343). 
When Phaedrus started to read yachting literature he ran across a description of the 'green flash' 
of the sun. What was that all about? he wondered. Why hadn't he seen it? 
He was sure he had 
never seen the green flash of the sun. Yet he must have seen it. 
But if he saw it, why didn't he see 
it? The static filter was the explanation. He didn't see the green flash because he'd never been 
told to see it. But then one day he read a book on yachting which said, in effect, to go see it. So he 
did. And he saw it. There was the sun, green as green can be, like a 'GO' light on a downtown 
traffic semaphore. Yet all his life he had never seen it. The culture hadn't told him to so he hadn't 
seen it. If he hadn't read that book on yachting 
he was quite certain he would never have seen it. 
(Pirsig 1991: 342-343). 
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Down the years, pro-animal individuals and small groups had been trying to reveal 
the green light, to intrude dynamically upon a static situation, for 'When there is a 
letting go of static patterns the light occurs' (Pirsig 1991: 346). Salt, Harrison, 
Brophy, Ryder and the Godlovitch & Harris writers had, in different ways, 
contributed to their own yachting book and revealed to a larger and more receptive 
range of people that there was, even if they could not see it yet, a green flash of the 
animal liberation sun; a new or revised enlightenment. The value, in Pirsig's terms 
the Dharmakaya light, was still being rejected by the culture's immune system but 
the solution was to look for those factors - the keys - that would make the new 
information acceptable. Providing different kinds of philosophical keys in more 
auspicious times than Salt enjoyed, animal liberation philosophers Peter Singer, 
Stephen Clark and Tom Regan were to make the green light a beacon, and the hope 
must have been that it wouldn't be the same green light that Gatsby had picked out 
at the end of Daisy's dock: 
... the green light ... that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that's no matter - 
to-morrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms further ... And one fine morning - So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past. 
(Fitzgerald 1983: 188). 
There was, of course, nowhere to return to despite the orthodox claim that 
liberationists are seeking transport back to some golden age. In an article in The 
Independent (11.9.95), Felipe Fernandez-Armesto wrote: 
Until about 300 years ago in Western Europe, it was still common for animals to have legal 
rights practically on a par with humans. Rats that despoiled barns, grasshoppers that ravaged 
crops, swallows that defecated over shrines and dogs that bit people were tried in courts for 
their "crimes", represented by counsel and, sometimes, acquitted. 
In Wales and France, pilgrims visited the shrines of canonized dogs: there could be 
no more powerful demonstration of the moral equivalence of man and beast. Today's animal 
rights activists are ultra-conservative revolutionaries who want to put the clock back hundreds 
of years. 
This view has failed to take account of the fact that before, after and while the 
trials were in session and dogs were being canonized, other animals were being 
slaughtered, eaten, used as 'beasts of burden', experimented upon, pitted against one 
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another, hunted and sacrificed in festivals. Animals which offended against 
humans were tried and either punished if found guilty, or acquitted and, if deemed 
edible, slaughtered later (for food) and without trial. Animals who did not offend 
against humans were not afforded a trial, just killed (for food, sport, etc. ). These 
were, and are, always guilty until proven innocent. How such activities, again 
illustrating the inconsistencies and particularisms of instrumentalist taxonomy, and 
indeed of animal trials, square with Salt's ideas or with others expressed by the 
animal liberation movement is hard to fathom, even if the law and trial courts 
themselves had a greater respect for animals' interests than they have today. 
Moreover, contemporary animal 'rights' regards animals not as moral agents but as 
moral patients; they can do no 'wrong' and humans have no claim upon them. 
A certain light, and a greater promise perhaps than that of dominant or familiar 
modernity, was shining through the early, pre-scientistic-mathematical-modeI 
Middle Ages, admittedly, but it was narrow-beamed. Fernandez-Armesto would 
have been on safer ground if he'd suggested that certain elements of certain periods 
of the past held some appeal perhaps (just as some aspects of otherwise unpalatable 
thought does for a few animal liberationists even now), but there is no age to which 
the animal liberation movement seems to want to return wholesale, only perhaps to 
an Eden of the soul, to a recognition of human, nonhuman and earth potential. And 
here we can take up a point made by Klaus Eder. Fernandez-Armesto paints animal 
liberation as a traditionalistic reaction against modernity (or as suffering from a 
modernist nostalgia), wanting a return to a less problematic past. But we should 
rather see contemporary animal liberation as a repressed type of modernity, 
attempting to create an alternative or 'unfamiliar' modernity (see Eder 1996: 141) 
and, we might add, an unfamiliar civility. 
Summary & Conclusions 
In tracing how animal liberation responds to the nineteenth century synthesis, it has 
been considered as representing an alternative value which, throughout time has 
been served by a succession of agents at pains to reveal its light. Recognizing the 
value, which as we saw from Salt is one lying within the human, is indeed a new 
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enlightenment, marked by spiritual and cognitive transformation. Emerging out of 
conditions conducive to social change and appealing to the evolutionary kinship of 
species, Henry Salt's significance lay primarily in his assessment of both orthodox 
and heterodox attitudes toward animals. Both were characterized by inconsistency, 
an immutable feature of institutionalized animal use and yet treatable within the 
scope of the humanitarian ethic. Salt was seen to have been a successor in a long line 
of descent, of those who had already been calling for moral extensionism. Uniquely, 
as a perceptive strategist who conjoined the spirit of Darwin with that of the 
French Revolution, he identified the need for a comprehensive principle to bind 
hitherto separately treated animal concerns, for all abuses too were kin and flowed 
from one source. Moral opposition to them should be centralized, replacing the 
hitherto ad hoc moral localization. 
Being carried and promoted by what we can now recognize as an animal liberation 
movement, the progress of the ethic can be traced along a continuum, breakthroughs 
being continual if not continuous and not necessarily to any practical effect. Salt's 
impact was muted, holism fragmented, especially by the the welfare soporific, 
fears of instability and later world wars. If we look at it in Eliasian terms, Salt had 
come on the cusp of nineteenth century faith and the twentieth century 
disillusionment with the notion of social progress, a notion which had replaced the 
conservation of aristocratic value, only to be replaced itself by the conservation of 
the new existing order where, with the onset of wars, national ideals became 
paramount (and see Elias 1994: 194-198). Britain as a nation of animal lovers, with 
the best legislation in the world, becomes entwined in the process whereby progress 
gives way to fixity, and to Pirsig's static filter. In both conservative and utilitarian 
functionalist modes, society's aim is to restore and maintain established order and 
meaning, of which an ostensible animal welfarism is now firmly part. 
But through Shaw and others and later via Brophy, the torch was carried to those 
within the 1960s-70s counter culture who had, like Salt before them, identified 
animal exploitation as a social problem, but now part of a soulless technocratic ethos 
against which many more, especially younger, people were protesting from different 
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platforms. Animal use came under the microscope; its excesses exposed, its pretexts 
and raisons d'ýtre analyzed to a point of scrutiny unknown in the past. The 
contemporary animal liberation movement was now being launched, and in much the 
same spirit and climate as Salt's. 
A significant social movement becomes possible when there is a revision in the manner in which a 
substantial group of people look at some misfortune, seeing it no longer as a misfortune 
warranting charitable consideration but as an injustice which is intolerable in society. (Turner 
1969). 
It was to continue promoting a 'superior' value in the face of what had already 
assumed and retained the ascendant position despite a series of blows to its vanity; 
the most relevant having been delivered by Darwin. Salient in the range of themes 
identified by the 1960s-70s intellectuals as underlying man's predation were the 
conscious and unconscious use of fantasy and conformity. In linking what he regarded 
as one paradigm of bigotry to another, Richard D Ryder had coined the word 
speciesism, by analogy with racism, to describe the prevailing human attitude 
toward other animals which stressed difference, the determining logic of which, 
like its systems, was declared an illogic, arbitrary and incoherent. 
In general terms, animal liberation had the audacity to suggest that 'Power without 
conscience is the greatest danger that confronts the modern world; and the progress of 
ethics is therefore far more important than that of science' (Vyvyan 1971: 46-47). 
The representatives had been attempting a transformation or even a transcendence of 
oppositions: human/nonhuman; culture/nature; mind/body; intellect/ intuition but, 
in contrast to a selective welfarism's meeker and more acquiescent aim, there was no 
seeking or acceptance of ideological synthesis or absorption. It had become obvious, 
as Salt had suspected, that without a radical revision of the human/nonhuman 
relationship things would only get worse. Rather, there was the attempted 
overcoming of one 'reality', one culture, by another. All the time there has been this 
tension reflected not least in the battle over meanings - sentimentalism, war, 
tyranny, progress, nature-natural, civilization, rationality, what it is to be human, 
respectable, decent, civilized. Liberationists faced a task not unnoticed by Shaw: 
'Nothing is more difficult than to realise a superiority which the world has always 
Animal Revelation 89 
treated as an inferiority' (quoted by Skidelsky 1979: 122), and this related to 
virtually everything in the revelatory animal liberation canon - scientific method, 
land use, food, manners and morals; perhaps above all in its distinctly human 
capacity to imagine an alternative future, pitting what is easily portrayed as mere 
utopianism, and even nostalgia, against speciesist ideology and its hegemonic norms 
and values. 
However, by the mid to late 1970s the counterculture had split apart as had, 
earlier, the scheme Salt initiated. The sense of kinship, not just in human-nonhuman 
but in cause-cause terms, was being lost. Hot dog and beefburger vans welcomed at 
festivals of "peace and love' were perhaps the spectre. Nevertheless, in trying to 
force the revelation, to make society, its individuals and groups see things 
differently or indeed to see (for the first time or again), to see through the speciesist 
ideology, to overcome the culture's immune system, animal liberation would escalate 
its direct action (mass occupation, economic sabotage and animal rescue) and the 
various organizations which made up the social movement would reorganize, 
radicalize and become far more dynamic and mobilizing. But what underpinned 
these efforts and the movement's re-birth were the new philosophical works, key 
weapons in the attritional conflict. 
Notes 
1. We could perhaps quote Gramsci (1971: 348) in support of this idea: philosophical activity, i. e. 
the work of 'organic' intellectuals, must be seen 'as above all a cultural battle to transform the 
popular "mentality" and to diffuse the philosophical innovations which will prove themselves 
to be "historically true" to the extent that they become concretely - i. e. historically and socially 
- universal'. 
2. Carol j Adams (1990: 175-179) also refers to the notion of revelation, as the first step of "the 
vegetarian quest' - 'experiencing the revelation of the nothingness of meat as an item of food ... 
which arises because one sees that it comes from ... someone, and it has been made into ... no- 
body. The revelation involves recognizing the structure of the absent referent'. Animals in name 
and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist (p40). The second step is naming the 
relationships, e. g. the connection between meat on the table and a living animal; between a sense 
that animals have rights and that killing them for meat violates those rights; the recognition of the 
violence of meat eating; and possibly of the continuity between war and meat eating. This stage 
also enables the reclaiming of appropriate words for meat, from euphemisms, distortions and mis- 
naming. The third step is rebuking the meat-eating world by proving that an alternative to meat- 
eating exists and that it works; 'vegetarians ... seek to change the meat eating world'. 
(Within 
Adams' feminist-vegetarian critical theory the final phase of the quest is extended to the rebuking 
of patriarchal society. ) She uses the quest as a context from which to make sense of individual 
vegetarian women's lives and novels thus offering 'opportunities for interpretation rather than 
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distortion'. We shall expand on this - though not adhering to Adams' 'steps' sequence - to 
cover the wider range of revelations inherent in the animal liberation project and also to apply it 
specifically to the experience and/or works of bloodless culture notables, including Salt and the 
later writers of an animal liberation manifesto (this chapter), and the major animal liberation 
philosophers (the following chapter). Adams (1990) is a 'new generation' revelatory text in its 
own right. 
3. Indeed, we cannot continue with Eder's bloody-carnivorous and blood less-vegetarian 
cultures throughout this chapter or the rest of the thesis, for Eder depicts ecological reason as 
vegetarian culture when the ecology movement is not necessarily vegetarian at all (in practice) 
whilst animal liberation has become so (in theory and in practice). However, the two-culture 
framework will continue in the way it has already been used in relation to animal liberation and 
speciesist orthodoxy. 
4. In this view of nature, influenced by Kropotkin, Salt seems to have been taking a line now 
becoming more fashionable within evolutionary psychology - see, e. g. Axelrod (1990) - though 
not necessarily following it to Salt's conclusion. 
5. The muting of Salt's case may also have been due to the 1890s generation's interest in the role 
of irrational forces in human personality and social history and in the ability of capitalism and 
democracy to guarantee prosperity and peace. Socialism threatened loss of property. In effect, 
what Salt saw as necessary and inevitable reforms were viewed by others as a revolution too 
far. 
6. The oppressive force in One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (1962). 
7. Tactically, attempts have later been made to shift the barrier to various locations within the 
nonhuman world, e. g. Singer (1977) and Cavalieri & Singer (1993) and also by group campaigns 
seeking liberation for some species from vivisection, e. g. Animal Aid regarding cats and dogs, 
in 
1998, a move which resurrects the original 1876 Bill's later modified exemptions (see 
French 
1975: 126). 
8. In its focus on what it apparently considered and considers as the bogus logic of animal use, 
animal liberation seems to come close to recognizing Pareto's fundamental 
distinction (in Mind 
and Society) between 'logical' and 'non-logical' action. Speciesist 
behaviour (for animal 
liberationists; for Pareto all human behaviour) would be non-logical in that it is the result of 
impulses and sentiments which Pareto calls 'residues'. These are camouflaged 
in doctrines and 
theoretical systems which Pareto terms 'derivations' and Marxists would call 
'ideologies' (see 
Bottomore 1962: 217). 
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Chapter 3 
A Bible, A Vision &A Case 
Introduction 
This and the next chapter concentrate on the vegetarian or bloodless culture as we 
see it in the shape of major animal liberation philosophers, Peter Singer, Stephen 
Clark and Tom Reganl. Their works have (a) given the movement its intellectual 
credibility; (b) underpinned its various concerns and given it or reinforced its 
name(s); (c) formulated animal liberation's oppositional ideology and discourse, 
performing demythologizing and mobilizing functions, and providing moral capital 
in the war of values; and (d) acknowledged or embraced other and more practical 
aspects of the movement's claims. 
Animal liberation seeks to transform consciousness, values, beliefs and habits, and 
these works reach out to people directly or through the efforts of organizations and 
other individuals. We shall look at the philosophies in order to establish the 
premises upon which the cases are based and by what means their proscriptions and 
prescriptions are reached. We shall also be concerned with how Singer, Clark and 
Regan relate to the revelatory tradition we have traced, and with the successes and 
failures of the project. It will not be necessary here to give comprehensive analysis 
of the three philosophies. It will be enough to understand their basic and general 
points, individually and collectively, as a preliminary to both what follows in 
Chapter 4 where we shall draw upon them, and others, in a specific critique of such 
works, and to the analysis of representations in Chapters 5,6 and 7. 
New Life in the Old Value 
Animal liberation has called for the circle of moral concern to be expanded to 
accommodate other animals whose exclusion, and the consequent treatment they 
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suffer even, or especially, within welfarist ideology, has been termed speciesism. 
Since Henry Salt, further major attempts have been made to underpin this project, 
and Singer, Clark and Regan have adopted different bases or premises upon which 
to found Salt"s comprehensive principle, to effect revelation. They make it clear 
that they have not addressed all the implications and that their philosophies are 
not the end-all of aspirations but that they are (or were when written) enough in the 
current circumstances. There is no blueprint; they are, as it were, unfinished. 
The initial and main practical targets of animal use in all three cases are animal 
experimentation and animal-based farming, the most conspicuous elements, in 
animal liberation terms, of the scientistic rise in institutionalized violence against 
other species (although individually they also preclude other aspects, for instance, 
hunting and trapping in Regan's case). Animal liberation philosophy, through these 
three and others, has attempted and perhaps heralded a kind of Copernican 
revolution but in the moral sphere, a furtherance of the decentring process. 
The main focus of the philosophers' attention is on bloody culture rationalist 
instrumentalism, all three attacking the assumptions of human superiority and 
animal use. Singer and Regan are keen not just to do this but, in highlighting the 
irrationality or inadequacy of orthodox rationality and in refuting charges against 
liberationists of sentimentalism and emotionalism, present 'superior' rationalist 
theories for, as they emphasize, it is reason that compels the application to other 
animals of the basic moral principles we all accept already in relation to humans. 
They adopt the 'language' of the orthodox - the language which established a 
major theoretical justification for animal use - in order to establish a major 
theoretical objection and a new construction of the human/nonhuman relationship. 
Clark agrees with the latter point but is different in that he has little faith in 
rationalism. He does not present us with a system as such but savages and 
lampoons 
the rationalist arguments which have sustained animal subjugation. 
The 
rationalism is a sham, a cover for sentimentalism and 
fantasy. In engaging with the 
terms of the system, Singer, Clark and Regan attempt to subvert the established 
order which, for them, is based upon a justice-violating prejudice and arbitrary, self- 
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serving philosophical positions. They attempt to dismantle the static filter, to strip 
away layers from the obscuring cataract of this orthodoxy. 
Between them, Singer, Clark and Regan consolidate most of the ground others have 
covered before them, Clark perhaps most comprehensively. The three, and other 
pro-animal thinkers, have also conducted their own internal debate, each 
challenging the others' premises. This will concern us to a certain degree but only 
enough to show that differences do exist and that they are rather more than 
noteworthy. Before proceeding, we can group the three together on their common 
ground. 
All animal liberation philosophy recognizes implicitly or explicitly nonhuman 
sentience. Attacking what it considers to be the bigotry of speciesism, it is not 
concerned with dubious notions of and arbitrary distinctions between species but 
rather with the sanctity of the individual animal, though Regan and Singer take 
different versions of this and Clark transcends it. All recognize that, post-Darwin 
kinship especially, the burden of proof has been thrown back on those who (ab)use 
animals and suggest they haven't met it. All three attack animal experimentation 
(although this is qualified in some cases) and animal farming (although just what is 
meant by this, and by the use of the word vegetarianism, is in some doubt). All see 
animal liberation as beneficial to and not antagonistic to humans and/or human 
"rights', Regan most overtly. 
We can note how Salt"s sense of inevitability is lost by now, as even he realized 
before his death. No historical laws are at work. Now it is a case only of what 
should be rather than what should and, within socialist reforming faith, will be. 
A Bible, A Vision &A Case 
The three represent, or are in line of, three different philosophical traditions: 
Singer from Utilitarianism; Clark from Christianity and Neo-Platonism amongst 
others and loosely; whilst Regan makes out a (deontological) rights case. In moral 
extentionist mode, they take established theories across the species barrier, the 
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point at which orthodoxy denies and discards its own principles. Suffice to say here 
too that all three attack and demolish to their own satisfaction the orthodox 
rationalizations, or the epistemology which has sustained the ontology of animal 
use: Singer in a general historical survey; Clark in countering 'eight sophisms' of 
Thomism-Romanism and transcendental humanism (both Singer and Clark attacking 
the use of customs as a disguise for the interests of the strongest); and Regan through 
a rebuttal of contractarianism, consequentialism, perfectionism and indirect duty 
views (though there is more than a hint of them in certain passages of casuistry). 
A Bible 
Peter Singer's Animal Liberation (originally published in the USA in 1975 and in 
the following year in Britain) has for many years been regarded as the 'bible' of the 
animal liberation, or even the animal rights, movement even though Singer is not a 
"rightist'. There is no mystery about the choice of title, however. The cause is openly 
linked with black and other liberation movements demanding an end to 
discrimination based on an arbitrary, morally irrelevant criterion like race or sex 
(Singer 1977: xii). 
His opposition to speciesism, like the above, an irrational prejudice, and to the 
infliction of pain and suffering, is worked out within preference or act 
utilitarianism, a consequentialist theory based on the moral principle of equal 
consideration of interests - for other animals too have interests and preferences - 
rather than equality of treatment: 
The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all ... and the 
limit of sentience, not arbitrary qualities like colour, race, intelligence, rationality, 
is the only 
defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others. (Singer 1977: 8-9). 
Singer's utilitarianism is, in effect if not in intention, a reinterpretation of the 
1911 
Act's biased version of 'balancing of interests' (see p65 above) to make 
it more 
consistent with sound moral principles. Further, it 
is the application of an existing 
ethical system to contemporary 15sues which 
has become more pertinent in what is 
increasingly recognized as a godless world. This is an important theme 
for Singer's 
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work in general. For him, thought independent of the Church has become or has been 
allowed to become increasingly beneficial to animals; the Judeo-Christian tradition 
has been liberationists" great enemy. (In this he is at one with Salt: 'Religion has 
never befriended the cause of humaneness; the Humanitarian League had got 
nothing from religion [Salt 1921: 213,2161). Animal Liberation is in this doubly 
ironical sense then a new 'bible'. 
Singer does not imply that all lives are of equal worth. The idea of human equality, 
for instance, is based not on intelligence or self awareness but on a principle of equal 
consideration of interests. There is no good reason, Singer says, and only speciesist 
reasons, for not extending this principle to other animals, for not including them in 
the utilitarian calculus. Their suffering, physical and psychological, ought to have 
equal moral weight as similar suffering in humans whose interests are already 
considered equally, regardless of other factors, for example intelligence, which tend 
to make them unequal. 
With the focus on pain and suffering, Singer does not make it entirely clear why, if 
it can be done painlessly, killing animals is wrong. In fact, as with Bentham, it isn't 
necessarily wrong, for Singer is content to let the matter rest on this: 
In general, though, the question of when it is wrong to kill (painlessly) an animal is one to which 
we need give no precise answer. As long as we remember that we should give the same respect to 
the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those humans at a similar mental level, we shall not 
go far wrong. In any case, the conclusions that are argued for in this book flow from the principle 
of minimizing suffering alone. (Singer 1977: 22). 
And Singer's qualified opposition to animal-eating rests on his recognition that 
cruelty and suffering are inherent in today's large-scale 'meat' production, 
regardless of any claims of painless killing. 
The same approach is relevant to vivisection, a prime example of the unquestioned 
acceptance of speciesism. Having said that an experiment cannot be justified unless 
it is so important that the use of a retarded human being would also be justifiable2, 
Singer goes so far as to suggest, and in opposition to rights theory, that in an extreme 
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case that very experiment may indeed be acceptable, for example if many lives 
would be saved, or significant suffenng minimized, by its direct consequence (an area 
developed more in Singer 1979). In this somewhat controversial manner, Singer is 
proposing what he sees as a more genuine objectivity, stripped of human 
sentimentalism and arbitrariness. Consequently his system would also allow an 
animal experiment in the same circumstances. 
Animal Liberation's frontal attack was designed to shatter the complacency with 
which humans' deeply ingrained attitude towards other animals is held as an 
unquestioned truth. It attempted also to undermine the plausibility of that attitude 
and its ideological camouflages by revealing its historical shortcomings (Singer 
1977: 192-193). The attitude, for Singer, is easily sustained from generation to 
generation because as children we eat animal flesh long before we are old enough to 
understand that what we are eating is the dead body of a slaughtered animal. 
Chronology again (in this case socialization) militates against animals' interests, 
major interests which humans violate in order to further their own minor and trivial 
interests. The consequences of such violation are unjustifiable and unfair; animals 
winning on aggregate but losing the tie, so to speak. 
This has significant implications, for Singer has been criticized (e. g. by Regan) for 
talking of 'meat'-eating, for example, as a trivial interest, and in relation to 
vivisection Singer suggests that as most experiments are indeed trivial, or serving no 
direct purpose, they should be stopped immediately, but that the rest should be 
replaced as soon as possible by alternative methods not involving animals (Singer 
1977: 33). This particular 'non-absolutism' is characteristic of Singer's approach not 
only to reason, which is the basis on which we must view the subject rather than 
kind feelings and sentiments (Singer 1977: 255), but to appearing reasonable, 
practical, down to earth. 
Animal Liberation is a triumph of marketing the idea that factory farming and 
vivisection are the predictable outcomes of keeping animals outside our sphere of 
equal consideration of interests. Such industries are nothing more than 
the 
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application of technology and science to the idea that animals are means to human 
ends. The astute amalgam of philosophy, gruesome evidence and practical advice - 
theory, expose, recipes - along with ecological and health arguments against 
factory farming, bridges the gap between philosophy department and the general 
public, as intended. Far more than with Clark and Regan, an address to the 
individual, it made philosophy accessible at a time of ethical questioning, 
expressing for the first time, since Salt, in single-author book-length and 
systernatised form perhaps strongly felt but hitherto unorganized thought on the 
most glaring examples of animal use. In Singer's use of well established 
philosophical tradition, which had brought about many of the most important 
political, legal and economic changes towards a more egalitarian society, and 
couched in pragmatic terms, it was a fine work of tactics. It has a certain flexibility 
about it and he may well be right in feeling it to be more in line with normal 
intuition than the rights case is, for instance. Its focus on suffering seems hardly a 
step away from the already established unacceptability of selected cruelties. Singer 
pulls off the trick of not appearing to be talking discomfiting revolution. If the 
appeal is to a mystified mass to which intervention must 'make sense' then, in not 
sounding overly 'ideological', Singer's work has obvious strength. 
A Vision 
Stephen Clark approaches it from a different angle: 
The open iniquity of factory farming has this merit, that it makes self-deception about the horrors 
caused to animals more difficult. It has this demerit, that by contrast the old ways seem courteous 
and kind. So the existence of concentration camps acclimatises us to slums. (Clark 1984: 183). 
In contrast to Singer's emphasis on suffering, he is looking more at the whole business 
of using animals in the first place, and it is the human delusion and arrogance 
behind this use which Clark targets. If God is dead for Singer, he is very much alive 
for Clark who is no pure rationalist, not having rejected faith or religion. Whilst 
Singer draws upon and is located within the utilitarian tradition, Clark's The 
Moral Status of Animals (first published in the UK in 1977) is eclectic, influenced by 
Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Neo-Platonism, Episcopalianism and Mahayana Buddhism, 
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amongst others, taking them to form a holistic vision of how we should, or rather 
should not, treat animals. By far the most wide ranging of the three philosophers, 
providing a review of much that's gone before in theological, philosophical, 
anthropological and sociological terms, undermining falsehoods, and condemning all 
casting of animals in the role of culture's whipping boys, Clark also provides animal 
liberation with its greatest link to a sense of biosphere and environmental ethics. 
His is a plea for tenderness and community; we are, all species, a family in the earth 
household. 
His other influence, Aristotle (whose declaration on plants being for animals and 
animals for man is for Clark a 'loose comment' [Clark 1984: 15]), provides a root for 
his epistemology - doing what is right to do based on what someone of sound moral 
character would do, delighting in the beauty and goodness of the world and its 
members. The Aristotelian ideal is to be extended to all animals. As with Andrew 
Linzey perhaps (see, e. g. Linzey 1976,1987 and 1994), this philosopher of religion is 
a kind of Aquinas in reverse. Whereas, as far as animals were concerned, Aquinas 
synthesized the "worst' of both Aristotle and the Church to tell us they cannot be 
wronged, Clark's philosophy admits both and yet tries to synthesize what's "best' in 
them for animals' benefit; for animals can be wronged. 
It is a mystery how the orthodox know what they claim to know or how they mean 
what they say about animals. Concerned with the presuppositions which make it 
difficult even for decent and intelligent men to grasp the real nature of what we 
regularly and unblushingly perform, the problem is the world-view with which 
decent men have convinced themselves that they obey 'the decencies' (Clark 1984: 
3). Let us recognize that we do evil things and let us stop doing them, Clark pleas, 
for the basic moral principle, following Salt's Humanitarian League's3, is that 
... this at 
least cannot be true, that it is proper to be the cause of avoidable ill. There may be other 
moral principles than this, but this at least is dogma. And if this minimal principle 
be accepted, 
there is no other honest course than the immediate rejection of all flesh-foods and most 
biomedical 
research. 
The point, whatever its later complications, is a simple one, and the attempts of our 
hypocrisy to evade the issue provide a fascinating case-history of the corruption of our moral 
and philosophical sense. (Clark 1984: xiii). 
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His main enemy, aside from the all-pervasive sentimentality - only the cannibal 
is without it - is the (failed) rationalistic attempt to produce an absolute 
dichotomy between man and other animals which Clark sees as a largely 
unintelligible reconstruction of the Stoic ethic, the triumph of culture over nature, 
the use of animals to satisfy symbolic needs 
... in this case to prove that we are the masters. That absurdity we can perhaps forget. But even 
those who have forgotten it sometimes commit a like absurdity - that of defending their actions, 
or even beginning their actions on the basis of what 'nature' does. (Clark 1984: 179). 
Clark is not saying that all ritual is wrong, only the type: 'let us keep ritual ... But 
let us at least abandon war ... In short, let us stop day-drearning and face our friends' 
(Clark 1984: 129,131). We may be rationalizing animals but we are not rational. We 
have a not wholly controllable psyche and yet pretend that we are masters of that 
nature. It is this imposition of rational system, this fantasy of control which Clark 
mocks. 
The work has been criticized, perhaps unfairly, for lacking a 'system' although it 
could be said that this is his very point. For him, systems are 'lethal'. He does not 
have the same faith in reason as do Singer and Regan, for the pretexts - the 
"devices of the heathen' - used to excuse systematic animal exploitation in an age- 
old cover-up, amount to little more than the 'dream of reason' that brings forth 
monsters, an intellectual and psychotic fantasy within which the only meanings and 
values are humans': 
A man, whether he is Thomist or Darwinian, who thinks of non-human animals as stones, devoid 
of any value till men give it to them, is, quite technically, an idiot: he lives in a world of private 
fantasy. He is also a dangerous idiot. (Clark 1984: 134). 
Moreover, with the hint that we do have some notion of an ultimate good, Clark's 
... supposed lack of a system was a consequence... of my conviction 
that it is a vision, not a rule, 
that stands at the heart of any way of life. To change the way that people live it is necessary to 
change the way they see things, to bring a new vision to light in them. If I am right to think that the 
'orthodox' view of nature and humanity is deranged, people will not be cured of it by scholastic 
argument (however important it may be to set out the implications of the new covenant). The 
deranged are cured when they can remember how to see: argument is not enough. (Clark 1984: ix). 
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For Clark, who is keener to talk not of liberationists nor rightists but of zoophiles, it 
is not so much a matter of suffering and pain, justice or rights, but that, simply, we 
have no claim on animals. He asks what right we have to treat animals in the way 
we do and can find no plausible answers: 
In general, we have no rights against animals: no right of punishment, no expectation of 'good" behaviour, no right of command. Man's dominion, if he has such, is not of that sort. As with babies in our care, so with animals: we may not consent to operations that will benefit only us, 
but only operations that will benefit the child, or the animal. (Clark 1984: 73). 
In short, their moral status is as ours: 'If we are sacred then all are. If nothing is, 
then we are not' (Clark 1984: 157). We should concentrate on how individual 
creatures within the whole have a worth and that the whole which is to be 
sustained is the one that allows them liberty. A Vedic influence is noticeable too in 
Clark's sense of praiseworthiness consisting of acting in harmony with the universe, 
that those who do wrong are acting self-destructively. Unsurprisingly then, Clark 
takes more interest too in species, as well as the individual. And this has a material 
base in addition to a spiritual one: 
Our long term interests, as a species, will be best served by a present tenderness to other life -a 
tenderness that we do in fact feel, though it is overlaid and ridiculed by our philosophies. In 
acknowledging this tenderness, this fellow feeling, we may come to see our earth as a cooperative 
endeavour of many million creatures, each with some contribution to the commonwealth ... What 
will such tenderness cost us in terms of comfort, or of civilization? The first steps will cost us 
nothing at all, for it is manifestly cheaper to eat plants rather than animals ... Will our restraint 
- and it must be our restraint, not that of some careful scapegoat - destroy our chances of a 
human life? Will it cause hunger for example? The question is ironical. (Clark 1984: 162). 
Clark's eloquently expressed anger, his use of literary and other allusions, dry 
humour and his more holistic vision - in the Old Testament tradition of peaceable 
kingdom - relates animal liberation more closely to spiritual and environmental 
matters, having one foot firmly in the wider counter culture ethos, binding or re- 
binding animal liberation with other concerns. It is in Clark too that we find 
perhaps a voice closer to a greater balance of emotion and intellect. 
A Bible, A Vision &A Case 101 
A Case 
Towards the end of The Case for Animal Rights (first published in the USA in 1983; 
1984 in UK), Tom Regan suggests in an aside that environmental ethics would be best 
served by rights theory. It is a small point of connection in this area for Clark and 
Regan though Clark would no doubt argue that at such a point rights theory would 
work out as complex as utilitarianism, which both of them reject. Otherwise there 
are few similarities between Regan and Clark, except in their general 
recommendations or demands (and in their revelatory status; see later). Regan's 
similarity with Singer rests on their shared aim to base the animal case on reason 
and to deflect charges of sentimentality and emotionalism. 
Regan's cool, clinical and logical progression towards the implications of full-blown 
rights theory takes Kant's direct duties across the species barrier within a generally 
negative concept of the unacquired rights of non rational but self conscious mammals 
as ends in themselves, not as a means to the ends of humans. Regan's work is 
virtually an extension of human rights applied in the nonhuman case. Indeed, more 
overtly than in Singer or Clark, it is a case too for human rights. His 'models' are 
mammals, aged one year or over and he places a greater emphasis, backed by 
empirical evidence, on mental ability in such animals than Singer and Clark allow 
or are interested in. 
It is not just that these animals have the capacity for suffering or are part of the 
commonwealth but that they are: (self-) conscious; sentient; and autonomous in the 
preference sense, and that they have: desires and beliefs; memory and a sense of the 
future; an emotional life and intentionality; and that they experience fear and 
desire. That is, they share with us a set of biological, social and psychological 
interests (Regan 1988: 121-122), and as we are benefitted to the extent that we have 
increased opportunities to satisfy these interests harmoniously, so, too, are they 
(Regan 1988: 94). These factors make animals 'subjects-of-a-life' who are not to be 
viewed or treated as mere receptacles; their 'inherent value' is to be respected 
(Regan 1988: 243). So, for Regan, the criterion of life is not satisfactory; potatoes and 
cancer cells have life. It is not life which qualifies animals as having inherent 
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value, but their being, like humans, subjects of a life, possessing the above qualities. 
And it is sheer reason which compels us to recognize this. Animals who do not fall 
into this category, e. g. chickens, should be given the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, 
to treat these and other animals any differently - though they may have fewer 
rights - is to encourage the wrong attitude to, and thus violation of, those who do 
fall into the mammal category 
Like Salt, though in far more detail, Regan asserts that if humans have rights then 
so do these animals and that this is not antagonistic to human rights, though we be 
moral agents and they moral patients (they cannot do what is right or wrong) as are 
the paradigm cases of moral patients - human infants, the mentally deranged or 
enfeebled of all ages. We have a direct duty to both moral agents and patients, for 
Both moral agents and moral patients have inherent value, they have it equally thus both are 
owed respectful treatment as a matter of justice ... The myth of the privileged moral status of 
moral agents has no clothes. (Regan 1988: 279). 
In fact, Regan is more specific about kinds of rights than Salt in that, for the former, 
as moral rights are universal they do not arise from legislation, are independent of 
the law of any nation and can be used to argue for changes in the social order, 
including changes in the law itself (Regan 1988: 267-268). 
Although Regan describes as a rational defect the orthodox view that suffering 
inflicted on humans is unacceptable whilst the same suffering inflicted on an animal 
is acceptable, he takes this further, to a matter of harm and 'not all harms hurt'. 
We have a prima facie direct duty not to harm individuals and this cannot be 
overridden by appeals to consequence (although Regan accepts that the prima facie 
rights may be overridden in certain circumstances; casuistry which brings rights 
theory closer to utilitarianism and which has attracted criticism, see, e. g. Benton 
1993: 86-87,213). Death is the ultimate harm, the harm of deprivation, but it may 
not be the worst harm (Regan 1988: 100). 
A "contented" housewife and a "happy" domestic slave may have been harmed without their 
knowing it. Indeed, sometimes the harm is all the greater precisely because those who have been 
harmed are unaware of the harm that has been done. 
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That individuals can be harmed without knowing it has important implications for the 
proper assessment of the treatment of animals. Modern farms (so-called factory farms), for 
example, raise animals in unnatural conditions ... The unspoken assumption is not that what you 
don't know can't hurt you; it is that what you don't know can't harm you. This assumption is 
false. 
... Those animals who are being raised intensively, then, let us assume, do not know what 
they're missing. But that does not show that they are not being harmed by the conditions under 
which they live. Quite the contrary ... what we should say is that part of the harm done to these 
animals by factory farming is that they do not know this ... Even if these animals were not made 
to suffer, that would only show that they were not hurt, not that they were not harmed. (Regan 
1988: 98-99). 
Thus our institutions and practices do not give animals the justice they are due. The 
animal agriculture industry treats animals with inherent value as if they were 
renewable resources and it is this 'impoverished view of the value of these animals, 
not only the pain or suffering that they are made to endure, that exposes the 
practice as fundamentally unjust ... Vegetarianism is not superogatory; it is 
obligatory' (Regan 1988: 344-346). The ultimate objective of the rights view then is 
the 'total dissolution of commercial animal agriculture as we know it, whether 
modern factory farms or otherwise' (Regan 1988: 349-351). 
This in turn is linked to the hunting of predatory animals. As the animal rearing 
industry is now made illegitimate, then so is the hunting of those animals which 
prey on the "property' of farmers, a legal concept to which the rights view denies 
legitimacy and seeks to change. 'With regard to wild animals, the general policy 
recommended by the rights view is: let them be! ' (Regan 1988: 361). 
Regan is also totally opposed to animal experimentation because risks are not 
morally transferable to those who do not voluntarily choose to take them. Any 
benefits ('ill-gotten gains) which may happen to accrue from such a practice are 
morally irrelevant to assessing its tragic injustice. Regan offers this "dissident 
reality': 'Lab animals are not our tasters; we are not their kings' (Regan 1988: 
387). 
And, unlike Singer who talks about phasing out animal research as alternatives are 
found, and unlike Clark who talks of rejecting most biomedical research, 
Regan 
demands immediate abolition of the practice. Although similar to Clark's 
consideration, like Roszak's, that the substitution of expert technical 
debate for 
moral debate is one of the most vicious of rhetorical 
fallacies (Clark 1984: 7), Regan 
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makes a partial departure from his and indeed much previous opposition to 
vivisection; here there is no specific reference to the idea that it corrupts humanity. 
Instead it is purely a matter of prohibiting science which violates individual 
rights: 
If that means that there are some things we cannot learn, so be it. There are also some things we 
cannot learn by using humans, if we respect their rights. The rights view merely requires moral 
consistency in this regard ... 
Those who accept the rights view are committed to denying any and 
all access to these "resources" on the part of those who do science. And we do this not because 
we oppose cruelty (though we do), nor because we favour kindness (though we do), but because 
justice requires nothing less. (Regan 1988: 388,394). 
Like Singer with liberation' before him, Regan had been able to lock in to the spirit 
of the age in terms of 'rights, a word and concept that was gaining greater currency 
as societal emphasis was shifting to the victim and away from the perpetrator, as 
Ryder has commented. We should note too that, true to the liberal-individualist 
spirit and to the capitalist origins of rights discourse, Regan is at pains to point out 
that the revolution and revelation he advocates can be contained within society's 
present structures of free enterprise and the market mechanism. However, for Regan, 
no-one has the right to be protected against being harmed, for example losing one's 
job or business, if the protection in question involves violating the rights of others. 
'In this sense the rights view implies that justice must be done, though the 
(economic) heavens fall' (Regan 1988: 347). Butchers for instance, like any business 
people, can have no claim on the consumer. Indeed, those buying 'meat' exceed their 
rights, for their purchase makes them a party to the perpetuation of unjust practice. 
Now Singer, Clark and Regan have not been without their public differences which 
we do not intend to air here except that some serve to illustrate their positions more 
clearly. Utilitarianism is severely criticized by Regan and Clark (although both 
agree that it has served animals well in alleviating suffering): 
... utilitarianism 
is not the theory its initial reception by the animal rights movement may 
have 
suggested. It provides no basis for the rights of animals and 
instead contains within itself the 
grounds for perpetrating the very speciesist practices 
it was supposed to overthrow. To secure 
the philosophical foundation for animal rights requires abandoning utilitarianism. 
(Regan 1988: 
315). 
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'The utilitarian calculus ... being strictly incalculable, [is] the dead end of argument' 
(Clark 1984: 75), its outcome being a function of one's moral character and purpose. 
In return, Singer has argued that Regan has not shown that respect for inherent 
value of subjects of a life is a reason for embracing a rights view rather than a 
utilitarian view, and Clark has critiqued the abstract theory of rights: "animals 
perhaps have no positive rights: it is difficult to see on what basis we have any 
either' (Clark 1984: 28). 
Singer and Regan represent liberal animal liberationism, a rationalist project of 
emancipation originally espoused by the ideals of revolutionary enlightenment in 
America and France. It extends consideration of interests or of rights without causing 
large scale disruptions to the existing social institutions (aside from animal use or 
the animal using). In all senses though, and to borrow a phrase from Wilson (1973: 
257), the three philosophies comprise a strategy to change the normative order and 
are grounded in the values of society, calling the system to account for practices 
believed to be unjust in society's own definition of justice. 
Revelation 
It is of revelatory character that all three claim that their particular traditions of 
philosophy have been delinquent, have not been fully developed (or not in the right 
directions) before developing them to embrace other animals. They take up themes 
already established and, in their alternative or extended use, these serve as 
revelatory tools. Clark is especially open about using philosophy and other means 
merely as methods of developing, re-creating or changing people's vision. 
The philosophies represent intervention to establish a new social order based upon 
an alternative value. One might see the ethicists as surgeons operating on the blind, 
the myopic and the blinkered. Moreover, animal liberation ethics lay siege to the 
selectivity and inconsistency (marked by taboo and ritual) of normative 
human/nonhuman relations, the Western ontological separation of human and 
nonhuman natures. Indeed, part of their task seems to be to sepdrate animals from 
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the 'nature" which the Enlightenment project sought to control, and to break down 
the us/them, subject/object oppositions (though what hope of success there is by 
their method[s] is open to debate4), whilst Clark breaks them down through a 
greater holism, if not holyism. Certainly there is in Clark a sense of an invisible 
power and a reality other than the one sold to us, and with him we feel most 
strongly an animal liberation ideology performing a demythologizing function. 
Reaching much further back than the other two, drawing upon pre-Enlightenment 
tradition, Clark's work is far more related to a sense of universalism: can one be both 
a Christian and a relativist? (see Rollin 1983: 7). Running through his work, the 
most apocalyptic and eschatological of the three in both secular and theological 
terms, is the virtual leitmotif of 'And God help us if we carry on like this'. That 
Clark is also the one to draw heavily upon certain previous traditions for support 
too brings to n-dnd TS Eliot's sense of returning to our beginning to know it for the first 
time or at least to start again. He hints in a Platonic way at something beyond us, 
behind us, something blurred or hidden, trying to help people remember what they 
once "knew', to recover what is deep inside, to recollect what was once clear but now 
forgotten under the distorting pressures of society, practicality, education and 
training (see Rollin 1983: 18). 
The revelatory nature of the philosophers' own personal experiences is also 
significant. Singer's work is more closely allied to the disclosing of fact, opening 
eyes to the type and scale of animal use. It was the gaining of knowledge of how 
animals were treated that led Singer to write the book with photographic and 
textual evidence with the aim of leading the reader to make a similar "mental 
switch in attitudes and practices' (Singer 1977: xiii) aided by the oppositional use of 
philosophy. 
Regan himself had grasped a 'moral truth' on reading Gandhi, and 'Reason 
demanded that I become a vegetarian', but it was after the death of a companion dog 
that he understood 'in a flash' that his powerful feelings 
for 'this particular dog ... 
had to reach out to include other dogs. Indeed, every other 
dog. Any stopping point 
short of every dog was, and had to be, rationally and emotionally arbitrary. 
And not 
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just dogs, of course' (Regan 1987: 27-28). After cutting his way through all previous 
obstacles, Regan ends his work with a quotation from Ansell Adams: 'We are on the 
threshold of a new revelation, a new awakening ... " (Regan 1988: 400). Regan 
believes that: 
Perhaps, indeed, there is in everyone a natural longing to help free animals from the hands of 
their oppressors -a longing only waiting for the right opportunity to assert itself. I like to think 
in these terms when I meet people who are not yet a part of the Animal Rights Movement. Like 
Socrates I see my role in these encounters as being that of the midwife, there to help the birth of an 
idea already alive, just waiting to be delivered. (Regan 1987a: 42). 
For Clark it was direct experience of calves separated from their dams, "lowing 
miserably' through the night and 'prevented from living anything like a decent life 
according to their kind' that forced his decision to stop financing such practices 
(Clark 1984: v). Again we see how it is new knowledge - earthly revelation - that 
sets the ball rolling and how fresh personal experience can force the issue against an 
animal-violating system that depends to a large extent on maintaining public 
ignorance and dissuading people from seeing what is before their eyes. Clark goes on: 
It is necessary to emphasize that the farmer responsible for our conversion was a kindly and 
honourable man who would certainly never willingly have 'mistreated' his beasts - never 
beaten or starved them. The tragedy of our times is that decent people, step by step, have come to 
treat non-human animals as mere material for their own purposes, but there are far worse 
symptoms of this perverse outlook than [he] ever provided. His animals, we believed, were not 
being allowed the sort of life that they ought to have had, even if it were right to breed them for 
eventual slaughter, even if they were not exactly 'in pain'. (Clark 1984: v). 
There are similarities here with Regan's 'not all harms hurt' and of the treating of 
animals as resources. And there is something here too of the seventeenth to 
nineteenth centuries' concern with the ultimately triumphant stifling of compassion 
in relation to animals as if the suffering was an inevitable, immutable or even 
necessary part of the 'real world'. Especially important is Clark's remark about 
decency, and animals as mere material. Common decency cannot be relied upon. 
Natural squeamishness can easily be overcome by not seeing the animal. We are 
superstitiously Platonic: it is the Idea (the Pig, the Cow) that is more real to us than 
the suffering individual (Clark 1984: 64). Clark also criticised animal-using 
scientists for their bogus objectivity, and Regan similarly: 
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Like Galileo's contemporaries, who would not look through the telescope because they had 
already convinced themselves of what they would see and thus saw no need to look, those 
scientists who have convinced themselves that there can't be viable scientific alternatives to the 
use of whole animals in research (or toxicity tests, etc. ) are captives of mental habits that true 
science abhors. (Regan 1988: 388). 
Animal liberation ethics present a moral case in opposition to the insidious 
accumulation of societal preferences or to an ethical relativism or even ethical 
egoism which amount to the ethics of violence. It tells us that moral questions are 
not answered by saying what we like or dislike, that ethical relativism cannot be a 
valid principle because it is inconsistent, and that it is consistency of approach 
which animal liberation seeks and which is required by a just society. The clash is 
not just between ontologies and their underlying epistemologies but more crudely is 
between morals and mores. We might also add 'between moralism and 
libertarianism' except that the only libertarianism against which animal 
liberation appears to offend is that involved in the 'freedom' to use animals for 
human purposes. 
The revelation attempts to destroy the fantasy grown ever more sophisticated since 
early guilt gave rise to the animal as a social construct and historical object and to 
the myriad devices by which conduct toward other species may be justified. The 
orthodox, as Pirsig pointed out, saw what they believed: believing was seeing. 
Animal liberation was turning the phrase around. 
Incomplete Success 
Underpinned by such influential philosophical works, the animal liberation 
movement has achieved limited success(es). Although the movement tends towards 
a rhetoric which combines Singer, Clark and Regan indiscriminately, 
Singer's 
Animal Liberation especially and even now, seems to be the most popular 
publication of the three (The Moral Status of 
Animals and The Case for Animal 
Rights both being out of print) due perhaps to its greater accessibility and recruiting 
potential, its unique (of the three) shock quality and -a 
double-edged sword this 
- its closeness to utilitarian orthodoxy, 
as much as to its underlying radicalism. 
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We could paraphrase Oscar Wilde and say that animal liberation has been a 
success, most of the audience a failure. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that 
some audiences have been successes and others failures - noting that the 
philosophies make specific appeal to different constituencies, recognizing that 
society is heterogeneous superficially even if homogeneous in its fundamental 
speciesist ideology. Singer, Clark and Regan all lie within the revelatory tradition, 
bringing animal liberation to high expression in the 1970s and 1980s, showing the 
green light to enough receptive people - directly and through organizations - to 
encourage significant protest activity and change in the lifestyles of millions of 
people worldwide, indeed millions in Britain alone (certainly in terms of increasing 
vegetarianism, the rise of 'cruelty-free' cosmetics and the decline of the fur 
industry). Successes have come also in specific legislative and regulatory areas - 
new wildlife protection, many local councils banning hunting and circuses on their 
land and adopting 'animal charters, the abolition of cosmetics, alcohol and tobacco 
testing on animals and the banning of the use of great apes, and so on; in more general 
terms such as the Treaty of Rome recognizing, in 1997, animals' 'sentient beings' 
status; and in the creation of a recognized, academically respectable animal 
liberation discourse (though animal liberation has not yet become an accepted 
discipline in the way that, say, women's studies has [and see Stallwood 19941). 
However, from opinion polls we know that most people have for decades now 
opposed a number of practices which have still not been banned, the same cultural 
lag to which Salt referred. National governments have been slow to respond to 
animal liberation-influenced public opinion even in those areas where the animal 
use or cruelty is somewhat distant, 'frivolous', 'trivial' or not participated in by 
large numbers: fur, circuses and hunting, for instance. But the very use of animals, 
animals seen still as resources, is still very much intact, where it impacts on human 
lives daily: medical research, food and clothing. Perhaps the greatest area of 
noticeable influence has been in welfare awareness, concern and change: 
modifications of animal rearing systems, for instance, which 
indicate a 
reinterpretation of animal liberation or 'rights' by the orthodox. 
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And, all the while, animal use has escalated and become further entrenched in the 
shape of biotechnology and genetic engineering (additional hydra heads) where the 
instrumentalists appear to have won the argument before it has taken place - 
animal liberation always facing new faits accomplis - or is taking place 
somewhere else and where "ethical' debate is restricted to considerations of 
exclusively human 'yuk' and safety factors (and see Birke & Michael 1998). 
Summary & Conclusions 
We have seen then how contemporary animal liberation is underwritten by the 
rival theories of three very different philosophers. We have looked at them 
primarily in order to gain an appreciation of just what it is that animal liberation 
says to us and why it says it, and under which influences liberationists are working. 
We need to know these things if we are to assess how the movement is represented by 
others5. 
To borrow David E. Apter's terms relating to emancipatory movements, Singer, 
Clark and Regan have bound an indeterminate number of people together in a kind of 
discourse community or, as this movement confronts a fundamental aspect of 
orthodoxy, an anti- or counter-discourse community. The '... chief weapon is a 
discourse capable of threatening prevailing norms and principles of power 
particularly when combined with confrontational episodes' (Apter 1992: 141-143). 
They have attempted to subvert bloody culture rationalism (two especially with 
rationalism) and to subvert the conditions of the positivized us and the negativized 
them, to make visible the invisible, include the excluded and correct the denial of 
animals' subjectivity. Animal liberation ethics, the whole revelatory project, 
explodes the animal use topos in seeking a new human-nonhuman relationship. For 
the philosophers, other animals are our kin, as fellow sufferers, subjects of a life or 
members of the earth household. It is this epistemological basis that has continued 
to create the ontology of animal liberation. 
Engaged in a rationalist project of enlightenment, there is enough in Singer's 
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utilitarianism and Regan's rights theory especially to depict them as rooted in 
modernity's linear purposeful model of history, progressing steadily towards an 
idealized goal. This is a dangerous game. It "makes sense' to try to complete the 
rationalist project but can raise the same obstacles; utilitarianism and rights are 
easily subsumed within the domination they have sustained. Moreover, Singer and 
Regan did not follow Roszak's advice; they did not try to found the new version of 
the culture on the non-intellective capacities of the personality. Although 
primarily and ultimately recognizing the importance of the intuitive, because of 
their emphasis on reason and the rejection of emotion as the basis of their cases, 
Singer and Regan also appear to have become somewhat divorced not only from 
Salt"s antipathy to liberal-individualist-capitalist competition but also, at least 
superficially, from his claim that 
... reason itself can never be at its best, can never be truly rational, except when it is in perfect 
harmony with the deep-seated emotional instincts and sympathies which underlie all thought. 
(Salt 1980: 114). 
Clark, however, stands closer to Roszak's camp in this and in his critique of the 
whole disenchanting ethos or mythos. It is in this very connection too that we have 
seen how Clark's vision relates most strongly to our notion of revelation which we 
have also identified in the others, albeit of a more prosaic nature there. 
Despite its incomplete success and its having no power of office, animal liberation 
has gained the kind of ethical strength which presents a powerful challenge to 
speciesist orthodoxy, and much of this strength lies in its consistency and espousal of 
the notion of a comprehensive principle for which the movement can in large part 
thank Henry Salt. 
Now just as we are not interested here in examining the philosophy 
department 
responses to animal liberation ethics (e. g. Frey 1980 and 
1983, Leahy 1991 and 
Carruthers 1992), we are not about to go on to debate further the movement's 
practical successes and failures which indeed may owe more or 
less to the 
performance of animal liberation organizations and activists 
than to the 
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philosophers themselves. Nor are we to take up the internal, strategic turn, 
critiques which, as mentioned in the Introduction and alluded to above, are largely 
concerned with the philosophies effecting a rationalist, metanarrative, 
anthropocentric, Enlightenment, justice, malestream, abstraction paradigm within 
animal liberation although Clark is usually omitted from these, being perhaps free 
from praise or blame, or perhaps too religious or hinting too much at universal 
claims for the tastes of a postmodern turn, despite his lack of faith in the rational. 
What we are interested in is part of the more external area; not so much in how 
these philosophies may have been obstructed and disadvantaged in the political 
field with the rise of Thatcherism or by the development of postmodern culture's 
politics of diversity but in how, underpinned by such philosophies, the movement, 
indeed animal liberation in general (and therefore animal use under its attack) 
have been represented in the mid 1990s, one hundred years after Salt's Animals' 
Rights and some twelve to twenty years post-Singer, Clark and Regan. We shall 
look at such representations Cinterpreting the interpretations') in Chapters 5,6 and 
7. These, of course, constitute a measure of the 'successes' and 'failures' of both 
animal liberation and orthodoxy, in relation to the challenge the former poses. 
However, something hitherto generally neglected is relevant to both the narrative 
we have traced and to any strategic turn in animal liberation. To appreciate it we 
need to go back to a point somewhere between Salt and Singer; in fact, to the 
seemingly unlikely and inauspicious time of the second world war. Richard D Ryder 
(1989) tells us that animal liberation"s development has been interrupted by war at 
various times in history (e. g. cl 798,1854 and 1914). Our own tum now to 1944 breaks 
with that mould to some extent and should also enhance or alter the understanding 
of animal liberation so far achieved. Although their works were not and are not the 
end-all of aspirations, Singer, Clark and Regan have achieved a significant 
advance. They have pushed ambiguities to the periphery in contrast and opposition 
to bloody culture's central ambivalence. Nevertheless there is what appears to 
be a 
certain anomaly internal to animal liberation, and one of a 
different order to those 
social movement anomalies outlined in the Introduction to this thesis. 
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Notes 
1. These are not of course the only animal liberation philosophies but it is these which have 
spawned a huge body of work within (and without) ethics over the past twenty-five years or so, 
and it is these three, though Singer and Regan especially, who appear to be the most often quoted 
and referred to by the movement, its detractors and the commentators with whom we are 
concerned. 
2. It is in this area, of speciesism, that Finsen & Finsen (1994: 185-187) and others identify a 
significance in Singer's case for animal liberation which 'survives any attack on utilitarianism'. 
3. '... it is iniquitous to inflict avoidable suffering on any sentient being' (Salt 1921: 132). 
4. Feminist critique, e. g. Gruen 1993, has it that such dualisms, and that between reason and 
emotion, cannot be overcome by rugged, individualist 'rights' theory which ultimately gives rise 
to a logic of domination. We shall not argue with that case but note that such critique tends to 
ignore much of both Salt's and Clark's contributions to animal defence theory. 
5. This is not to overlook the considerable animal liberation activity conducted prior to Singer, 
Clark and Regan in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and alongside them from the 
1970s, nor that many may continue to be drawn to animal liberation uninfluenced by them 
(directly) though just where their influence ends, if at all, is now impossible to determine. 
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Chapter 4 
Across the Divides 
Introduction 
Representations are determined to a large extent not only by pre-existing attitudes 
but also by understanding s-comprehensions or mixtures of the two. The mixture of 
negative (speciesist) attitudes and misunderstandings-incomprehensions can easily 
militate against animal liberation's interests. Because it seeks to change 
consciousness and attitudes in order to effect the 'proper', or a "better' constructed, 
relationship with other animals, it is the further understand ing-comprehension of 
animal liberation itself with which we are concerned here. In this chapter we shall 
explore further the kind of identity that, consciously or unconsciously, animal 
liberation gives itself, its self -representation. But this time there is a twist in the 
narrative's trail. 
We need to ask, is there an unequivocal statement, or a clear picture given, of the 
movement's full intent? Singer, Clark and Regan take established theories across 
the species barrier, but how far do they go? It is necessary to assess the theories 
against their prescriptions and vice versa; to ask, what is demanded by the 
movement or rather, what, in reference to its philosophies, may we expect these 
demands to be? In this we shall examine animal liberation's use of analogy, for if it 
tends to picture animal use within the same frame as, say, Nazism or to see its cause 
in a similar light as, say, the emancipation of slaves, then we may expect to be able 
to identify direct comparisons rather than contrasts. 
This investigation will also lead on to pit the philosophers against another 
expression of, and a model or criterion for, animal liberation which predated them 
by several decades. Challenging customs that other humanitarian organizations 
(including Salt's) did not question, the Vegan Society's promotion, from 1944, of total 
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non-exploitation of other species consolidated a standard, which had been 
established at least one hundred years earlier, against which all animal liberation 
prescription must surely be measured. 
We shall then consider how all this relates to the movement's central 
welfare /liberation dilemma which has its roots in the nineteenth century synthesis, 
and how this and the foregoing relate to how ends determine means and vice versa. 
Only then shall we be in a position to examine other representations. 
The Slavery Analogy 
In an attempt to make animal liberation more credible and to awaken public 
consciousness to the scale, nature and values of animal use, the animal liberation 
movement uses several parallels, and slavery seems to be the most pertinent. 
Certainly 'speciesism' was coined and has been repeatedly used conceptually in 
relation to racism and sexism but, in more practical terms (though these are not 
without their own conceptual aspects), the movement has drawn analogies between 
animal use and both Nazism and slavery. The latter seems to be the stronger because 
blacks under slavery, like nonhumans now and in the past, were used as renewable 
(and expendable rather than exterminable) natural resources in a respectable 
economic system. Moreover, Aristotle used the analogy and both animal use and 
slavery have been considered at various times synonymous with the process of 
civilizing and the progress of civilization. The systematic atrocities of human 
slavery bear striking resemblance to the practices of institutionalized animal use 
and continuities are identifiable. Indeed: 
The domestication of animals seems to have been a necessary social precondition for the 
institution of slavery as practised in the early civilizations; it provided the material 
foundations 
making the enslavement of humans a practical possibility, and it provided a model which could 
have made the latter psychologically conceivable. (Peters 1971: 
228)1. 
The main reason for looking at this best analogy 
is that it not only serves the animal 
liberation movement's aims, but also enables us to examine 
it in such a light. If the 
movement defines itself in such a manner this provides us with a 
key to its nature 
and self-image. It is also the longest-running and 
has personnel in common, for 
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example Wilberforce and Wesley, emancipationists of humans and other animals, 
and the analogy was drawn too by Bentham and Salt. The latter, in predictive mode 
and again like others, had also suggested that the emancipation of humans would 
bring with it the emancipation of other animals. The slavery analogy allows us to 
'test' animal liberation against its own standards just as the philosophers 'tested' 
society's against its own, and found it wanting. 
We can turn to the comparison of human and nonhuman slaveries, first of all in the 
rationalizations analogy drawn by Richard D Ryder: 
If we examine the arguments used by slave-owners in the past to counter those of the reformers, 
we can see a striking similarity with the view expressed today by those who defend the 
exploitation of animals in factory-farms, the fur trade, laboratories and elsewhere. The slave- 
owners discouraged travellers' visits to the plantations because they considered that such 
visitors were not experts and therefore tended to react emotionally to what they saw, not 
understanding, so it was said, the high-mindedness of such ventures nor the technical problems 
involved. It might be conceded that there were 'isolated' whippings and the mortality rate was 
rather high, but the average slaver could assure his 'ill-informed' or 'over-sensitive' visitor that 
he felt a deep compassion for his slaves and they reciprocated this with loyalty and devotion. 
After all, their living conditions were much better than in the jungle and, besides, these creatures 
had never known sophisticated pleasures and so what they did not know about they could not 
miss. The visitor must not judge slaves by his own standards - to believe that they could feel and 
suffer in a way similar to himself was to be merely 'sentimental'. Above all else, it would be 
stressed, slavery was necessary for economic survival. (Ryder 1989: 1-2). 
In addition, Marjorie Spiegel (1988) furnishes us with a catalogue of practical 
similarities. In terms of physical comparison, of both human and nonhuman slaves 
as victims, we see that the former were and the latter still are routinely: chained, 
shackled or in some way restrained; transported over long distances in dire 
conditions, many dying in transit; separated from their kin; sold at market or 
auction; branded or tagged; hunted, their body parts sold or given away as trophies; 
experimented upon; raped; 'broken'; driven to their productive limits and 
beyond; 
punished (often or always by death) for not measuring up; and generally 
defeated 
physically and psychically2. 
The analogy is not perfect. Singer's parallel with 
black liberation, for instance, is 
somewhat inappropriate, for the latter in the 
1960s was not so much a challenge to 
chattel slavery but to more covert, less organized 
but no less insidious forms of 
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racism. Animals are still at the stage of slavery3. On a functional level, the uses to 
which animals are put far exceed those to which human slaves were (are) subject, 
and the range and level of the violating practices is far greater in animal usage. And 
if blacks had formed a central part of the white diet then perhaps the struggle for 
that abolition would still be in process. 
Nevertheless, slavery perhaps is the most illustrative and instructive analogy 
across the range. As with blacks, especially slaves (but see Ellison 1953), animals 
are largely rendered invisible as is their oppression. For liberationists, if 
nonhumans have interests, feelings, the ability to suffer, inherent value, then the 
dominant class has to be apprised of them or reminded of them, for such 
considerations or constructions do not come naturally or rather, they may come 
naturally but such sympathetic imagination has been repressed and suppressed by 
bloody culture. These people, creatures, animals, are not like us, we have placed 
them beyond our 'sight', for to admit them would demand a disorienting ontological 
reappraisal and undermine our colonizations and their determining epistemology. 
The slavery analogy is pertinent too in that the practice was also universal, 
socially sanctioned, but now virtually eradicated, the consensus of world opinion 
realising its stain, and where it still exists in various lesser-known forms, education 
and legislation will perhaps eventually rout it. Yet three thousand years ago, 
relatively few would have supported the call for its abolition; it would have 
seemed impossibly idealistic. As Brophy pointed out, the Greeks couldn't see it 
(though their slavery was of a different kind). This perhaps is the condition of 
animal slavery now. 
Let us assume the absolute case then, acknowledging that there will always be 
exceptional, extraordinary and nonrepresentative situations to which no 
philosophy can hope to extend with consistency (and this is not to assume, as the 
philosophies themselves do not assume, an absolute inviolability of animal life). 
Let us assume that an animal liberation case could be made out (and pursued 
tactically without dilution), declaring simply that, ý la the abolitionist case, 
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humans should not deliberately use animals for any non-symbolic purpose (except 
perhaps in non-invasive ethological studies in the wild) or in any material way in 
order to utilize their symbolic power. The aim of the abolitionists was abolition, not 
kinder treatment, not better conditions, not longer chains, not fewer slaves, not gentle 
usage, not partial abolition, not a different kind of slavery (notwithstanding wage- 
slavery into which other animals could not enter into consciously), but abolition. 
Slavery was wrong, according to the campaigners, and the world came to agree or to 
see the wrong. What we need ask then is how do the philosophers' prescriptions 
stand in relation to this abolitionism? We saw in the previous chapter what Singer, 
Clark and Regan prescribe in general terms but we can reassess from this different 
perspective here. 
Clark's promotion of anti -vi visec tionism, for instance, is qualified by talk of 
abolishing "most' biomedical research on animals, without saying what should be 
left to continue and on what basis, and although Regan appears to be quite 
straightforward in his recommendations and demands - for vegetarianism, anti- 
vivisection and an end to hunting and trapping - his idea that it is 'commercial' 
animal agriculture which should be abolished leaves one considering what 'non- 
commercial' animal agriculture is envisaged as acceptable within his rights theory. 
It is hard to see what this is, for as even he implies, no animal-using system is 
viable in the long term without routine mutilation and slaughter, a similar point 
made in relation to suffering by Singer who calls for abolition of trivial experiments 
whilst the suffering in non-trivial research can go on until alternatives are found. 
Although the three cases are indeed challenging on different grounds, none of them 
actually makes out a clear, unambiguous case for an end to all animal-using 
practices, and of an activity such as horse riding, for instance, a classic master/slave 
relationship, there is no mention. Understandably, Singer, Clark and Regan did not 
set out to establish in detail the 'proper', or 'better' constructed, behaviour in regard 
to all human/nonhuman practices and relations. Instead they establish principles 
from which we may be able to assume it in most if not all areas. But although we 
may simply extrapolate to give us an idea of how the philosophers would 
look upon, 
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say, animal circuses - obviously unacceptable to all three - what guidance is there 
for something as innocuous to the orthodox as horse riding? 4 
it is here that we have perhaps the best insight into several of the themes which 
have concerned us. It is in this relationship that we can recognize: a human pastime 
- presented and widely perceived to be respectable and harmless; the combination 
of animals and war-victory - the hunting field as a preparation for the battlefield, 
the use of animals for human warring purposes, and the war against animals; its 
blinding nature - representing the cataract which obscures humans' vision and 
hinders revelation; animals as resources; the hidden stories which in different ways 
lie behind the use of animals - horses are 'broken', kin-family groups separated, 
animals which are not up to it or beyond it cast off; the exercise of power and 
domination; and the animal use-civilization equation. Moreover, once broken and 
separated (and often confined to barren fields deprived of shelter, which even 
welfarism does not yet address) it is still looked upon as a kindness to find them 
'work', to keep them active. This then becomes natural; a practical example of 
culture passing itself off as benign nature. 
Now horse riding is possibly too complex for suffering- and interests-based 
utilitarianism to condemn easily (indeed, it is implicit in Singer's work that 
animals can legitimately be viewed as resources or means to human ends, although 
horse riding is no less "trivial' than flesh-eating) and it is not at all clear from 
Clark's work just how we should regard this. From Regan's Case we can get the idea 
that horse riding may be anathema to at least rights theory, which can easily 
accommodate the objection, though it is only an informed guess; Regan's dissident 
reality of 'animals are not our resources" is always shown to us in the familiar 
contexts of more obvious harmful or hurtful usc-5. 
As we have seen it then, animal liberation does not actually spell out what some of 
it implies and what it implies could be spelled out, and especially in a case such as 
horse riding. Indeed, precisely because of its 'innocuity, a condemnation of 
horse 
riding - or 'riding" as its practitioners prefer 
it to be known; again the invisible 
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animal - may be a classic statement of animal liberation from which a stance on 
virtually every issue within the subject could be then confidently assumed. Perhaps 
this could take animal liberation away from any confusion or seemingly endless and 
generally welfarist-framed, cruel ty-abu se-suffering-grounded debate within which 
even vivisection and factory farming can be and are defended. That is, it shifts the 
paradigm and does so emphatically and specifically. However, there may be 
tactical considerations. Would the condemnation of horse riding not appear to the 
orthodox, and especially to many self-professed horse-riding 'horse lovers', to be too 
harsh, even 'loony? But vegetarianism itself has always faced this (which may be 
tactical reason enough, of course, for omitting mention of horse riding). 
What we can conclude is that, taking the foremost philosophers' central works, we 
find discrepancies between the human and animal slavery abolitionisms. We have 
to look elsewhere for the kind of consistency we may expect to find: 
We can see quite plainly that our present civilisation is built on the exploitation of animals, just 
as past civilisations were built on the exploitation of slaves, and we believe the spiritual destiny 
of man is such that in time he will view with abhorrence the idea that men once fed on the 
products of animals' bodies. Even though the scientific evidence may be lacking, we shrewdly 
suspect that the great impediment to man's moral development may be that he is a parasite of 
lower forms of life. 
These words, which appeared in the first issue of The Vegan News in November 
1944 in explanation of the founding of the Vegan Society, were written by co-founder 
Donald Watson, coiner of the word vegan (from vegetarian). Perhaps it is here that 
we can find or to get closer to a best existing model of and for animal liberation. In 
measuring the philosophies against it, more specifically than with the slavery 
analogy, we find also that it has implications for the two cultures scheme used 
hitherto. 
Veganism: A Neglected Model 
Shortly after the Vegan Society was formed it issued the following Manifesto, 
twenty-seven years before the Godlovitches and Harris issued theirs: 
The Aims of the Vegan Society are: - 
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To advocate that man's food should be derived from fruit, nuts, vegetables, grains and other 
wholesome non-animal products and that it should exclude flesh, fish, fowl, eggs, honey, and 
animals' milk, butter and cheese ... 
The Vegan Society seeks to abolish man's dependence on animals, with its inevitable cruelty and 
slaughter, and to create instead a more reasonable and humane order of society. Whilst 
honouring the efforts of all who are striving to achieve the emancipation of man and of animals, 
the Vegan Society suggests that results must remain limited so long as the exploitation in food and 
clothing production is ignored. 
The Vegan Society is eager that it should be realised how closely the meat and dairy produce 
industries are related. The atrocities of dairy farming are, in some ways, greater than those of the 
meat industry but they are more obscured by ignorance. Moreover, the Vegan Society asserts that 
the use of milk in any form after the period of weaning is biologically wrong and that, except 
when taken directly from the mother, it becomes polluted and unsafe. The Society, therefore, sees 
no honourable alternative but to challenge the traditions of orthodoxy by advocating a 
completely revised dietary based on reason and humane principles and guided by science to meet 
physiological requirements. (From the Vegan Society Manifesto November 1944). 
What we need to ask is how much, in distilling an alternative value, Singer, Clark 
and Regan achieved in presenting a comprehensive principle as called for by Salt. 
Do their underpinnings embrace veganism? And if they do, do they spell it out as 
central to the cause, assuming that the philosophies are presented not primarily as 
tactical works, thinking that veganism would be considered too 'extreme' by the 
audience(s). 
The most notable fact, indeed the great anomaly, is that Singer's Animal 
Liberation, a work f&ted as the bible of the 'animal rights' movement - the one 
quoted and referred to most (albeit mixed with rights rhetoric) and the one, with its 
author, which tends even now to flag the movement - actually promotes the use of 
animals. This would not perhaps be so surprising had not a Vegan Society been 
established some thirty years before Singer wrote the work, a Society which 
had 
proclaimed, even as early as 1951 that: 
The object of the Vegan Movement ("to end the exploitation of animals 
by man") is clarified as to 
the meaning of exploitation by Rule 4(a), which pledges the 
Society to "seek to end the use of 
animals by man for food, commodities, work, hunting, vivisection, and 
by all other uses involving 
exploitation of animal life by man. " By the adoption of this rule, 
the Society has clearly come out 
on the side of the liberators; it is not so much welfare that we seek, as 
freedom. Our aim is not to 
make the present relationship between man and animal 
(which if honestly viewed is mostly one 
of master and slave) more tolerable, but to abolish 
it and replace it by something more worthy of 
man's high estate. In short, our aim is to set the creatures 
free - to return them to the balance and 
sanity of nature, which is their rightful place, and so end 
the historic wrong perpetrated when 
man first decided he had the right to exploit and enslave 
them. 
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The second broad aspect of the vegan aim is its effect upon human evolution. Apart from the abolition of an enormous burden of cruelty which is bound constantly to return like a boomerang upon humanity's own head, it has to be remembered that in any relationship of master 
and slave, the greatest and deepest harm is suffered not by the slave, but by the master. Until the 
present relationship between man and his fellow creatures is replaced by one of companionship 
on a relatively equal footing, the pursuit of happiness by man is foredoomed to a painful and 
tragic frustration. (Cross 1951). 
Thus speaking 'to the condition of our modern world' (Wynne-Tyson 1979: 107), Leslie 
Cross went on to claim that this new constitution marked the 'true birth' of the 
Vegan Society and, if we are to measure animal liberation against the slavery 
analogy, this surely is its classic statement, where the ambivalence, the 
inconsistencies, the ifs and buts, seem to be overcome. Can the master-slave 
relationship of riding horses be accommodated here? Only by more sophistry than 
usual. 
The Society not only entwined the various strands of pro-animal thought but also, 
immediately or a little later, bound them with the related issues of natural foods 
(the bloodless culture's appeal to the natural), faith in the possibilities of science, 
human health, spirituality, land economy, environment, social progress and, as we 
shall see later, aesthetics, in a full and coherent statement of bloodless culture 
values6. The benign fusing of Enlightenment and the Romantic. Indeed, the late 
counter culture fragmentation into discrete issues worked contrary to what the Vegan 
Society had already been advocating, having recognized the interrelatedness of 
human, animal and earth liberations, a theme which we can only begin to recognize 
later among the philosophers in Clark. Just as important perhaps is that the 
Society, and vegans in general, had already established a practical underpinning to 
animal liberation, living with moral consistency and proving the ethic's firm 
grounding. This itself is a revelation: veganism is not just an ideal type, veganism 
works (and see Chapter 2's note 2). 
That Singer should then, in 1975, talk of veganism in the following terms is curious, 
unless he is focused, as he seems to be, on tactics or, more seriously, if utilitarianism 
cannot accommodate veganism. That is, in a chapter titled 'Becoming a Vegetarian' 
(rather than 'Becoming a Vegan'), Singer is at pains to encourage more to the fold 
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and is conscious of those whom he believes may be alienated by too strict' a regime. 
In trying to determine how far his philosophy extends, and considering that 
"somewhere between a shrimp and an oyster' is as good a place as any to 'draw the 
line', Singer says, in something of a dodge, that: 
If my toleration of mollusc-eating will seem anomalous to some vegetarians, there is an aspect of the normal vegetarian diet that has drawn the same charges from critics; the use of animal 
products, especially eggs and milk. Some have tried to accuse vegetarians of inconsistency here ... those who eat neither animal flesh nor eggs nor foods made from milk have begun to call 
themselves "vegans" ... What we should ask is whether the use of these other animal products is 
morally justifiable ... for the present it is enough that the reader know that we can do without 
eggs and milk. But is there any reason why we should? (Singer 1977: 179). 
The child was walking but Singer wants to teach him/her how to crawl. He goes on 
to say that: 
Assuming you can get free-range eggs, the ethical objections to eating them are relatively minor. 
Hens provided with both shelter and an outdoor run to walk and scratch around in live 
comfortably. They do not appear to mind the removal of their eggs. They will be killed when they 
cease to lay productively, but they will have a pleasant existence until that time. (Singer 1977: 
180). 
This is animal welfare, not liberation, a result of the lack of prohibition on killing 
if the life is virtually free from inflicted suffering (notwithstanding the 
confinement) and the act of slaughter painless. Moreover, there is no mention of the 
chickicide of day old males - around thirty million per annum in the UK - as 
surplus to the requirements of the egg industry (relevant also if the whole flock were 
free-range). The second edition of Animal Liberation (1990/1995) does consider this 
as a main objection to eating eggs but Singer then asks '... whether the pleasant lives 
of the hens (plus the benefits to us of the eggs) are sufficient to outweigh the killing 
that is a part of the system. One's answer to that will depend on one's view about 
killing, as distinct from the infliction of suffering'. Singer's answer is that he does 
not, on balance, object to free-range egg production (Singer 1995: 175-176). Contrary 
then to our two culture scheme, Singer does not actually shed the blood guilt of 
bloody culture. Like many before him he is tom between two cultures. 
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After suggesting that part of the consistency provided by vegetarians was the non- 
wearing of leather and fur, he claims that: 
We could do without wool, if we wanted to, though since the sheep is not killed for its fleece, and is allowed to roam freely, perhaps this is not a major issue. (Singer 1977: 244). 
This is curious too seeing as Singer also acknowledges that shearing can be a 
terrifying ordeal for sheep and that sheep farmers kill a lot of wildlife. It is also 
very much like Salt's naivety in this respect, ignoring all the hidden sufferings of 
the sheep which Singer has already pointed out as inherent to animal-based 
agriculture, not to mention the economic value of wool without which the sheep- 
flesh industry would hardly be viable. 
By 1990, and after reading Townend's (1985) expos6 of the sheep industry, Singer 
had changed his mind, suggesting that there was a strong case for dispensing with 
wool. This reinforces the point about personal knowledge of course, and one can get 
the feeling that Animal Liberation was written before the author knew all he could 
have known (note even his phrase, in 1975, "some have begun to call themselves 
"vegans""). The conclusion that the philosophy is only applicable to those with 
limited knowledge of animal exploitation would seem not to be acceptable however, 
given that Singer has been prolific and active since 1975, undoubtedly gaining in 
knowledge, witness the above, and yet remaining true to his original principles. 
Singer has moved towards a vegan position, though still far from it. Indeed, the 
quibble over sea creatures keeps Singer short of even vegetarianism. 
Earlier, he had accepted that dairy farming causes 'some' suffering to the dairy cow 
and her calf, and that in an "ideal' world, free of all speciesist practices, we would 
not use animal milks. It is at this point that we find the crux, where Singer struggles 
with a philosophy and its strategy. Retaining the use of inverted inverted commas 
for a word that had been in use for over thirty years, he declares that: 
"Vegans", then, are right to say that we ought not to use dairy products. They are living 
demonstrations of the practicality and nutritional soundness of a diet that is totally free from the 
exploitation of other animals. At the same time, it should be said that, in our present speciesist 
world, it is not easy to keep so strictly to what is morally right. Most people have difficulty 
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enough in taking the step to vegetarianism; if asked to give up milk and cheese at the same time 
they could be so alarmed that they end up doing nothing at all. A reasonable and defensible plan 
of action is to tackle the worst abuses first and move on to lesser issues when substantial 
progress has been made. (Singer 1977: 181-182)7. 
The above passage illustrates two contentious areas. First is the unfounded 
assumption that meat eating is 'worse' than drinking milk. Note that Singer's 'worst 
abuses first' is in direct conflict with Watson's claim that 'the atrocities of dairy 
farming are ... greater than those of the meat industry'. Some seventy per cent of 
bovines reared for 'beef' are originated in the dairy herd where traumatic early 
separation of cow and calf is routine (as in Clark's revelatory experience), cows are 
pushed beyond their yielding capacities, are simultaneously lactating and pregnant 
for eight months at a time and, plagued by laminitis and mastitis and worn out after 
four or five calvings, are then slaughtered some fifteen years before the end of their 
natural life span. The calves are sent for slaughter, or for 'veal' or 'beef' rearing or 
become successors to their dams. These practices ensure that unweaned humans can 
continue with the unnecessary and unique (and to use Singer's term for meat eating 
and most animal experiments, 'trivial') habit of drinking another species' milk. 
Singer deliberates about 'drawing the line' between killing shrimps and oysters at 
the same time as considering the fate of the long-suffering dairy cow and calf as a 
lesser issue8. More importantly perhaps, for our purposes at least, this approach, 
along with Singer's use of the word 'strict' to describe veganism, thus conceding to 
orthodox rhetoric, can lead easily to others' confused representation of the 
movement's objectives. 
The second problem, following on from the first, is that Singer is adopting here the 
same tactic commonly noted as being characteristic of the liberal (especially 
perhaps the political Left) and indeed those who have already rejected the 
arguments for sexism and racism but utilize them in defence of speciesism, the very 
thing Singer wants eradicated. An arbitrary selection of 'worst abuses' is made and 
tackled and then one must play a waiting game before tackling other abuses, in 
hierarchical fashion. What compounds the problem is that substantial progress had 
already been made, by the dairy-industry exposing Vegan Society as from 1944 (and 
by individuals before then). Donald Watson had dealt with the delaying tactic: 
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A common criticism is that the time is not yet ripe for our reform. Can time ever be ripe for reform 
unless it is ripened by human determination? Did Wilberforce wait for the 'ripening' of time 
before he commenced his fight against slavery? Did Edwin Chadwick, Lord Shaftesbury, and 
Charles Kingsley wait for such a non-existent moment before trying to convince the great dead 
weight of public opinion that clean water and bathrooms would be an improvement? If they had 
declared their intention to poison everybody the opposition they met could hardly have been 
greater. There is an obvious danger in leaving the fulfilment of our ideals to posterity, for 
posterity may not have our ideals. Evolution can be retrogressive as well as progressive, indeed 
there seems always to be a strong gravitation the wrong way unless existing standards are 
guarded against and new visions honoured. For this reason we have formed our Group, the first 
of its kind, we believe, in this or any other country. (Watson 1944). 
Of course, Singer made a good point when he feared scaring people off by confronting 
them with too formidable a challenge, and Animal Liberation has been hugely 
successful in promoting the growth of an animal liberation movement and in raising 
awareness of the issue to new heights throughout the Western world. On the other 
hand, it is a backward step in terms of prescription or ends and not just regarding 
veganism. Before Singer, anti-vivi section organizations and the Vegetarian Society 
themselves were already advocating more than his major work prescribes, and no 
animal liberation group now subscribes to the versions of vegetarianism and anti- 
vivisection Singer's utilitarianism demands. It is only the rhetoric and criteria of 
suffering and interests which have powered and continue to power the movement. 
Staying firmly in touch with animal welfare and prevailing philosophy, and 
mixing philosophy with tactics, means with ends, the book seems to be a conundrum, 
its title possibly a misnomer9- 
So, how do Clark and Regan fare here? If it seems strange that Singer keeps 
veganism at arm's length, Stephen Clark, the closest of the three to a sense of 
"nature", makes this claim: 
What follows for our obligations? Simply, that if we are to mean what we say in outlawing the 
unnecessary suffering of animals, we must become, at the least, vegetarians. (Clark 1984: 45). 
It is hard too to see how, with veganism established - and with the chickicide of 
day-old males, the suffering of the dairy cow and the immediate or delayed 
slaughter or crated future of her calf exposed by the Society which broke the silence 
on these issues - Clark did not feel the need to write instead, '... we must become, at 
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the least, vegans'. Although Clark refers to veganism several times, as a stage of 
progression, thus implying that veganism is a material development rather than a 
cognitive change C. .. those vegetarians who have not (yet) progressed to veganism' 
he says, for instance, in his 'Notes for Proselytes' after the main body of the work 
[Clark 1984: 2131), it is vegetarianism for which he makes the case. However, at 
least he uses the word with confidence: 'There will be less suffering in a vegan 
world, even in a near-vegan world' (Clark 1984: 80). But, although declaring in a 
footnote that '. -. veganism is a better project than lacto-vegetarianism ... ', he goes on 
to say: '... we may in the end be able to take some milk from our kin without injustice' 
(Clark 1984: 185). But why this concession to the purely cultural? And is this what 
Regan had in mind when he condemned only 'commercial' animal agriculture? 
This is connected also to Regan's preference for the word vegetarian which he uses 
throughout The Case for Animal Rights, not using the word vegan. Now it had for 
long been the American practice, somewhat in contrast to English usage since the 
1940s-50s, to use the word vegetarian as all-embracing (and technically correct it is 
or, more accurately, was), despite the existence of an American Vegan Society since 
1960. So it is reasonable to assume that Regan, in talking of the total dissolution of 
commercial animal farming (and of animal use in science), was perhaps thinking 
veganically, reservations about 'commercial' notwithstanding. This is supported by 
Regan's later adoption of the word vegan, for example in an article with Gary 
Francione (1993). But why not use it ten years earlier in the major work which, after 
all, came partly as a response to Singer who, as we saw, differentiates between 
vegetarians and vegans? 
His (possibly tactical) use of the word vegetarian, again, leads to confusion and 
should not go without comment. In fact, it could be the case that Regan's whole effect 
is warped by not using the word vegan. Not using it denies the crucial differences 
between vegetarianism and veganism and can lead not least to immense practical 
problems of understanding as any vegan, considered to be 'a vegetarian', has found in 
hotels, restaurants, on airlines or even as a guest in a private house (see The Vegan 
passim). It may seem a small thing but the implications are far-reaching, for by it, 
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both here and in Singer and Clark, vegetarianism is typically equated with rights 
theory and indeed with animal rights and animal liberation. When we can 
regularly read about celebrities and others being described as 'vegetarians' only to 
find that they eat fish, the word and concept of veganism, by contrast, constitutes a 
clear and unequivocal statement. In the light of the nomenclature concerns voiced 
earlier, this immobilizing power of inappropriate words cannot be unimportant in 
self-representation. Surely it is clarity and stability of identity that a movement, 
like the individual, requires. (Or perhaps, strategically, it isn't). 
The chronology is awry then; momentum appears to have been lost. The 
philosophers did not build on veganism, did not make it central to their works. This 
had happened before; it is a repeated anomaly. In 1892, Henry Salt, like Singer 
after him, an advocate of egg-eating and wool-wearing (e. g. Salt 1980: 43 and nd: 35- 
38), had written that: 
I desire to keep clear also of the extreme contrary contention that man is not morally justified in 
imposing any sort of subjection on the lower animals. (Salt 1980: 33). 
He was referring to the contention of Lewis Gompertz who, some seventy years 
earlier, had written: 
... at least in the present state of society it is unjust, and considering the unnecessary abuse they 
suffer from being in the power of man, it is wrong to use them, and to encourage their being placed 
in his power. (cited in Salt 1980: 33). 
Lewis Gompertz, second Secretary of the SPCA, champion of the 'rights' of women, 
blacks, the poor and nonhumans, published his Moral Inquiries on the Situation of 
Man and of Brutes in 1824. We see from Gompertz that it was not the case, as some 
have claimed, that Salt left little for his heirs to add, but that he and they left out 
a lot of Gompertz who, although his work is not fully formulated, being more of an 
uncertain inclination, outlined much of what was to follow (utilitarianism, rights 
and visionary concerns) and more. Recognizing human-nonhuman similitude, 
animals' personal identity, and promoting equal pleasure and happiness in the cause 
of what was moral and just, Gompertz claimed that: 
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... we should never admit of the propriety of the will or volition of one animal being the agent of 
another, unless we should perceive its own good to result from it, or that justice should require it. 
(Gompertz 1992: 68) ... I admit it as an axiom, that every animal has more right to the use of its 
own body than others have to use it. (Gompertz 1992: 110). 
Being a vegan long before the word was coined, and later to be thrown out of the 
SPCA, Gompertz refused to use wool, leather, silk, to eat eggs or to ride in a horse- 
drawn carriage, and much of his neglected work is taken up in the form of 
'argurnents' (with Gompertz as Z): 
Y: I understand that you object to the use of milk; what harm can there be in that? 
Z: It was evidently provided for the calf, and not for man. 
Y: When the calf is taken away from its mother, it is then a kindness to relieve her of her milk. 
Z: But the calf should not be taken away. (Gompertz 1992: 97). 
We have already alluded to Salt's own inconsistencies and it is difficult to square 
his milk and egg consumption with his own claim that assertions of one form of 
animal exploitation being more or less cruel than any other, were 'irrelevant' (Salt 
1980: 106). What places Salt firmly within the irregular inconsistency-to- 
consistency continuum of animal liberation are comments which can be juxtaposed 
thus: 
It is little use to claim 'rights' for animals in a vague general way, if with the same breath we 
explicitly show our determination to subordinate those rights to anything and everything that 
can be construed into a human 'want' ... (Salt 1980: 
9). 
What I say will of course have no reference to wool, or any other substance which is obtainable 
without injury to the animal from which it is taken. (Salt 1980: 79). 
Indeed, in 1899 Salt referred to the charges against vegetarianism's inconsistencies 
as so much 'cock and bull' (Salt nd: 37), for which he was taken to task by the vegans 
of 1944, and it is impossible to determine in the above whether Salt was speaking 
from naivety or some other factor. For Salt, who considered the question of whether 
man is morally justified in utilizing animal labour at all as 'abstruse' (Salt 1980: 43), 
animals were still resources. The rhetorical question is, as with Singer, what kind of 
"animal rights' or 'animal liberation' is it that advocates the use of animals? 
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Moreover, for both Salt and the philosophers to privilege a certain version of 
history in falling short of overt endorsement of Gompertz and veganism also means 
not capitalizing on the substantive shift of ground constituted by Gompertz's 
revelatory contribution. Gompertz epitomizes the green light and, perhaps 
fittingly, shines it on horses. His concern with the way horses were treated appears 
foremost in his work but extends beyond questions of cruelty. Asked, 'How can man do 
without the aid of horses? ', Gompertz's reply is, 'That is his business to find out' 
(Gompertz 1992: 122), perhaps a typical response from one famed for inventions, the 
expanding chuck being one of many. He goes on: 
It is true that we have adopted the method of employing horses to perform our labour, by which 
we have most probably only chosen one method out of a great many, and we have remained 
contented with it ... 
What causes you to think the services of horses so important to man is, that 
you take things as they are; horses being used... (Gompertz 1992: 123-125). 
What is important here is that very ability to see, not only the suffering of horses 
when most others could not see it (which was Salt's concern), but that animals, 
horses, were being used in the first place (which wasn't Salt's concern, until laterlO). 
Gompertz exposes the mythology of animal use naturalism and inevitability (and at 
a time when he believed, or was encouraged to believe, that his largely personal 
project would cost him his health. Moral Inquiries is a triumph of vision, 
compassion, humanitarianism and conviction over knowledge). 
Promoting animal liberation or, in Salt's case, animals' rights without giving due 
emphasis to veganism when the model(s) already existed, not making it central to 
the project, could be a seriously flawed exercise, and the point to be noted is that, 
whether Regan and Clark are promoting veganism or not (Singer isn't just as Salt 
wasn't), it is lacto-ovo-vegetarianism which, one hundred and seventy years after 
Gompertz, is popularly taken as the obligatory stance of animal liberationists. 
Indeed, the caution, if that's what it is, seems endemic. The vigorous correspondence 
during 1909-1912 in the Vegetarian Society's journal The Vegetarian Messenger and 
Health Review had led to the conclusion that the defence of the use of eggs and 
milk by vegetarians was unsatisfactory and that the only "true way' was to 'live on 
cereals, pulse, fruit, nuts and vegetables'. Nevertheless, in what was becoming a 
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familiar pattern, this was reversed in the decades that followed (see Leneman 
1997). 
The denial of veganism's importance or even existence has also been contagious, and 
in the academic literature too. Garner (1993a: 39 and 186) for instance, talks of the 
vegetarian and vegan societies in Britain and elsewhere all campaigning to end 
animal cruelty "which for them involves the end of the meat industry' (no mention of 
dairy or eggs) and even manages to omit the Vegan Society from his listing of the 
other three organizations which formed the Great British MeatOut coalition in the 
late 1980s. The essays in the Garner-edited Animal Rights: The Changing Debate, 
as late as 1996, also ignore veganism, and the earlier "manifesto' edited by 
Godlovitch, Godlovitch and Harris, and a great influence on Singer, also had only 
extremely limited references to it (e. g. Harrison 1971: 23). Ryder (1989) and Tester 
(1991) merely acknowledge veganism, give the briefest of descriptions and fail to 
record the foundation or existence of a Vegan Society, despite the latter offering a 
partial critique of Bryant (1982) who, almost uniquely, spells out that veganism is 
de rigueur within 'animal rights'. Indeed, virtually all the popular and academic 
literature on or referring to animal liberation talks in terms of vegetarianism rather 
than veganism. Benton (1993: 25), even though he identifies the rights view with an 
opposition to 'animal agriculture', equates it with vegetarianism (thus following 
the Regan confusion) and not veganism which, again, is dismissed. And Finsen & 
Finsen (1994: 284,155) still refer to Gompertz as a vegetarian and use inverted 
commas for their reference to vegans. Eder (1996) too, in his references to animal 
liberation never mentions veganism and, although his 'vegetarian culture' is seen in 
terms of negating social (hierarchical) order, lac to-o vo -vegetarianism reinforces 
food hierarchies in terms of the primacy of animal protein and sustains the negative 
magic of complex food taboos which normalize animal-dependent diets. Again, the 
debate seems to be going on somewhere else. Moreover, that Donald Watson and 
Leslie Cross are ignored by Magel (1989) and Wynne-Tyson (1990), the two works 
which represent the movement's most comprehensive archaeologies of pro-animal 
thought, would seem to weaken these attempts to help legitimate the tradition and 
authority of animal liberation heritage through its hallowed value-leaders. 
Across the Divides 132 
Welfare & Liberation 
The outcome of an animal liberation which does not emulate and unequivocally 
advocate non-use and uphold veganism as its base line is, ironically, illustrated in a 
/state of the cause' comment by Singer himself: 
What disturbs me is the fact that the thrust for a really radical change in our attitude to animals 
- in other words, for equal consideration of the interests of animals - keeps getting sidetracked 
into small increments of progress in animal welfare. (Singer 1993). 
What this links to is, again, strategy and tactics; how theory relates to practice. 
We have seen how a less than vegan stance could be seen as a tactical move, but the 
risk is of comprehensive principle being denied again, and a slipping back into, or a 
containment within, bloody culture welfarism, though this is not to say that animal 
liberation cannot achieve its ends by such means. But some do say this in the 
movement's internal conversation. 
Tom Regan & Gary Francione (1993), for instance, are adamant that welfare and 
rights ideologies are morally incompatible and that the enactment of animal 
welfare measures actually impedes the achievement of 'animal rights'll. They 
claim that the movement is generally in danger of continuing to support reformist 
means to abolitionist ends, a policy which they consider to be mistaken for moral, 
practical and conceptual reasons. Animal rights cannot support reformist measures 
which depend upon implausible speculation about the future; making practices "more 
humane' is no more likely to achieve abolition than was making slavery "more 
humane'. Indeed, the opposite is more likely the case; making either 'more humane' 
carries with it the greater probability of the indefinite perpetuation of the 
practice. Rightists must reject such ends-justify-the-means policies for they 
authorize present exploitation and allow animal users to present their reformed 
practices as legitimized by the movement. Further, they tend to encourage an image 
of dishonesty; that in demanding reform advocates are hiding another, abolitionist, 
agenda. 
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Retarding the pace at which animal rights goals are achieved, the moral 
framework of welfarist reforms almost always guarantees that nonhuman animals 
will lose out when their interests are balanced against the claims of human rights. 
Welfarism, then, defeats the ends of justice. 
Concerned with the congruence of ideology and strategy, what Regan & Francione 
propose instead of welfarist step by step reform is indeed a gradualist approach to 
end animal exploitation but that the steps must themselves be abolitionist in nature. 
For example, within the field of animal experimentation, an end to the Draize, 
LD50 and all other toxicity and irritancy tests; and an end to the use of animals in 
maternal deprivation, military and drug addiction experiments, and so on. Within 
agriculture and food, those who advocate animal rights must 'seize the vegan 
initiative'; a "No veal at any meal' campaign, not 'Eat happy veal raised in larger 
social units', is the realistic abolitionist place to start. These are abolitionist means 
to abolitionist ends12. 
They are also critical of the backing off from animal rights by some organizations in 
their attempts to appeal to a wider base. This is counter-productive, they claim, 
because a wide range of pro-animal views is prohibitive of an agreement on the 
(presumably comprehensive) principles informing and directing the movement. The 
end result is the appeal to a welfarist common denominator which ensures animal 
rights will remain an unattainable ideal. 
Regan & Francione also suggest that it is only through the rights path that the 
animals case can link with human rights and the freeing of people too from 
oppressions. Virtually ignoring this concept, Robert Garner (1993b) responded to the 
Regan-Francione article by suggesting that the animal rights movement must 'focus 
its attention on what is strategically possible and, at present, this must involve 
exploiting the very considerable mileage that still exists within the framework of 
animal welfare'. Garner wants rightists to work within welfarism, for to pursue a 
"new fundamentalism' of rights is to stand by and let animals suffer. Garner seems to 
want to keep welfare and liberation merged into an animal protection movement as 
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is implicit in his confusing reference to the welfarist Compassion in World Fan-ning 
as an 'animal rights' group and as also demonstrated throughout his 1993a work. (If 
Garner is right to use this term for CIWF then it tends to confirm Regan & 
Francione's fears of movement 'dishonesty"). 
Influenced by Singer, and assuming that it is Singer's influence which has lain 
behind the movement's successes, Garner believes (as Bryant 1990 appears to) that 
the most effective strategy is 'an on-going attempt to re-define the public's 
perception of what constitutes unnecessary suffering'. This has the advantage of 
working within 'a moral framework - that humans can exploit animals but any 
suffering inflicted must be warranted by the benefits produced - which the vast 
majority can accept'. He cites the successes of the anti-fur campaign as an example of 
how 'the perception of what constitutes unnecessary suffering has shifted' rather 
than a widening acceptance that animals have a moral status akin to humans13. 
Practices such as hunting, circuses, zoos, testing me-too drugs, and so on, are examples 
of those which can be demonstrated to be the causes of unnecessary suffering and can 
be attacked and abolished as such. This is the effective strategy road the movement 
should be taking rather than relying overly on the vision provided by animal rights 
philosophy. 'We must live in the real world', Garner suggests, and that what is 
required is that a direction be taken by a political elite (Garner 1993a: 188). 
Seemingly in agreement with Garner, Ted Benton, again in the 'real world' where 
there is only the vaguest notion of veganism, suggests instead a broad strategy aimed 
at restructuring the economic and technical relations in the food producing, 
processing and distribution industries, and: 
A coalition of forces committed to diverse but complementary aims - animal rights and welfare 
organizations, agricultural trade unions, organic farming interests, health and diet campaigners 
and others - would be likely to be more effective in realizing the kinds of protection sought by 
the rights view than would a campaign relying solely on the moral force of the argument for 
animal rights. (Benton (1993: 161). 
Which - despite its similarity to Regan & Francione in the call for linking with 
other groups, almost totally lacks a 'united against oppression' stance - is an even 
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more severe pull back to what Regan & Francione lament, common denominator 
welfarism. 
This mini overview is intended to show only the abiding strength of the welfarist 
paradigm, the pull of bloody culture and how it relates to veganism. In the early 
post-synthesis stage when things were not so clear, Henry Salt had tried to straddle 
the welfare/ liberation dilemma, arguing for both reductionism and abolitionism: 
'The acceptance or refusal of compron-dse ... is a matter of policy, not principle' (Salt 
1987). Now, in a much later strategic mode, there is a split: on the one hand, Regan 
& Francione who, closer to Gompertz, dissatisfied with progress and suggesting a 
ground shift, consider it a matter of principle; on the other hand, and closer to 
though diluting Salt, Garner (satisfied with progress and suggesting a keep plugging 
away approach) and Benton (dissatisfied and suggesting a dilution of everything, 
which implies an end point of high welfare) consider it a matter of policy. Regan & 
Francione seem to be talking total liberation whilst Garner and Benton are vague 
and/or pessimistic about it. Whilst Garner wants to continue putting veganism as a 
base aside (until the time is ripe? ), and Benton has no time for it, Regan & Francione 
are now talking it: the further one travels from veganism (as a starting point and an 
end point), it seems the longer one stays within and perpetuates slavery, welfarism 
and the speciesist paradigm14. 
If we switch our attention from academic theory to organizational campaigning, we 
find similar divergences. First off, we should note that despite the 'lost ground' 
spoken of earlier in the movement's lack of recognition of and adherence to 
veganism, there appears to have been a gradual development towards the vegan 
nexus by some other groups. In the campaigning magazines one notices in the 1990s, as 
with Regan & Francione, a growing emphasis (explicit or implicit) on veganism in, 
for instance, the promotion of vegan food items and the publication of vegan rather 
than vegetarian recipes. Animal Aid, the only major animal liberation organization 
dealing with all animal issues, on a comprehensive principle, to be founded 
immediately post-Singer (in 1977) has, in the mid to late 1990s, dropped its reliance 
on hidden agenda campaigning and is open about its vegan stance. However, it has 
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all taken a very long time to catch the shirt tails of Watson and Cross, indeed with 
those of Gompertz who, with greater support, may have changed the nature of the 
nineteenth century synthesis and the course of the further dialectic. 
The delay has served, in the 1970s to 1990s, to render animal liberation somewhat 
confusing and confused as to its aims (important for those outside the movement) and 
therefore its means (important to the cognoscente). Even now however, it is easy to 
find, say, the Vegetarian Society, which is in an anomalous position similar to 
Singer's, actively promoting animal products. And, possibly for tactical reasons, 
many of the organizations do still tend to promote by name the more 'user-friendly' 
option of vegetarianism, and anti-vivi section organizations promote 'cruelty-free' 
(non-animal tested) products many of which contain animal ingredients. These two 
factors again split up the vegan, animal-free, comprehensive principle. Moreover, 
throughout the 1990s, there seems to have been an increasing association of 
vegetarianism with 'animal rights' through female vegetarian-welfarist 
celebrities, which may make easier the dilution and redefinition of animal 
liberation, and reinforce the old derogatory association of animal concern with 
sentimentality. For the funeral of leading 'animal rights' campaigner Linda 
McCartney (vegetarian promoter of predominantly vegetarian, and therefore also 
animal, rather than vegan products), Paul McCartney is reported to have written in 
an eulogy that: 'All animals to her were like Disney characters'15. There can still 
be detected an ambiguity and vagueness which only disappears with veganism and 
its lack of concession to orthodoxy's exploitations. For various reasons, not all of 
which are as ultimately liberation-minded as Garner's, many still wish to yield to, 
or cannot resist the pull, and therefore the determinants and deterrents, of bloody 
culture. 
Rebuking Vegetarianism 
Crucially perhaps, the abiding common association of vegetarianism with 'animal 
rights' associates animal liberation with animal use, and animal use is welfarist, 
bloody culture, territory. We can pursue this. The second step in Carol j Adams' 
(1990) "vegetarian quest', as referred to in Chapter 2's note 2, was naming the 
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relationships which could also recognize the continuity between war and animal- 
eating. We saw this with Watson on the foundation of the Vegan Society in 1944. 
But Watson took further Adams' third step, of rebuking the meat-eating world. 
Although appreciating the efforts of vegetarians, he also rebuked the non-vegan 
vegetarian world. If the Great War gave rise to a revelation of continuities between 
warring and animal-eating (as it had for Salt, see Salt 1921: 219-230), it was the 
effect of the second war which took the process across to re-connect with Gompertzs 
vision. Remembering why the Society had been formed in 1944 while war was still 
raging, Donald Watson wrote the following: 
Why did we do it then of all times? Perhaps it seemed to us a fitting antidote to the sickening 
experience of the War, and a reminder that we should be doing more about the other holocaust 
that goes on all the time. (Watson 1988). 
Watson's own connection of animals, veganism and peace not only identifies bloody 
culture rationalism's nadir but also expands the war 'front' (another of Adams" 
notions, see Adams 1990: 120-141) to recognize not just all animals but all animal 
products and, for Leslie Cross and the Society as we saw earlier, all animal use. But 
Watson goes on (and in the process disrupts the foster mother symbolism of old world 
creation myth and reverses the values of sacred and profane): 
Or perhaps it was that we were conscious of a remarkable omission in all previous vegetarian 
literature - namely, that though nature provides us with lots of examples of carnivores and 
vegetarians it provides us with no examples of lacto-carnivores or lacto-vegetarians. Such 
groups are freaks and only made possible by man's capacity to exploit the reproductive functions 
of other species. This, we thought, could not be right either dietetically or ethically. It was 
certainly wrong aesthetically, and we could conceive of no spectacle more bizarre than that of a 
grown man attached at his meal-time to the udder of a cow. (Watson 1988). 
We can follow this revelation through. Humans seem to have gone from being vegan 
to being animal eaters and then, only with animal domestication, to full-blown 
lacto-ovo-carnivorism. In this sense, lacto-ovo -vegetarianism is a product of, is 
firmly rooted in, animal-based agriculture; it is animal-using culture's freakish form 
of veganism. (There should, perhaps, have been no need for Watson to coin a new 
word). 
Across the Divides 138 
This means that, as we said in Chapter 1, we must re-assess the two cultures, as it 
appears that we now have two different versions. The one we have followed, 
calling upon Eder, would place veganism as the full development of bloodless 
culture. However/ if we take our lead from Watson's statements, we can suggest that 
veganism is no such thing but, rather, that it is veganism which is bloodless culture, 
wherever it originates: in an innate alternative potential; in 'our' earliest state; or 
in the ideal of creation myth. We cannot suggest that Watson himself is claiming 
any of this, but we can suggest that he is, in his turn, discovering and connecting with 
bloodless culture as a potential or option, one which had been rejected at the time of 
cultivation and domestication; efforts being made ever since to reconnect but obscured 
as such by established understandings. Eder's bloodless culture's starting point in 
Judaism can be seen as just one effort and the Genesis writers' Eden may have been 
another (after all, Adam and Eve were vegans). 
It may be a further step from vegetarianism to veganism but on a lateral, cross- 
culture route (cognitive), not on a vertical one (material). Not so much a 
development as an abandonment of one culture for another; a substantive shift which 
tends to make claims of "back to the future' somewhat redundant. Many, if not most 
of our 'bloodless culture' representatives so far here - including the anti-cruelty 
foxhunters and animal-eating anti-vivisectionists - have been in some half-way 
house, trying to represent, to reach out to, express a bloodless culture or ideal but 
restricted or tongue-tied (mind-tied? ) by dominant bloody culture. Yet even 
vegetarianism itself, being a product of bloody culture, is a cultural approximation 
of the real, natural thing and imbued with bloody culture's attendant ambivalence. 
Watson, like Gompertz though to a much lesser extent, still in some doubt due to the 
lack of scientific-nutritional knowledge, finally puts bloodless culture in 
perspective, fully identifying and articulating it, now being fully part of it, 
liberated from the concept of animals being here for human use, from the mythology 
of the animal product dietary and from the ambiguity of human/nonhuman 
relations, all of which are retained by vegetarianism. And this has great relevance 
for the orthodox's perceptions and representations of animal liberation- 
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vegetarianism- vega ni sm, many of which picture animal liberation as an extreme of 
orthodoxy. The equating of animal liberation with vegetarianism affords the 
extreme label a certain validity for, as we have seen, the latter can be viewed 
legitimately as a product of bloody culture, on its edge. But it would be illegitimate 
to view and represent veganism-animal liberation as an extreme rather than as an 
alternative. 
What the above relates to is not so much the effectiveness of animal liberation 
strategy in terms of practical results for animals but how, in adopting certain 
principles and strategies and thereby projecting identities, the movement and the 
concept of animal liberation are perceived, represented and articulated by those 
outside the movement. Although Garner, for instance, as we saw above, is keen to 
maintain animal liberation within normative frameworks of political lobbying and 
popular morality, what is omitted is how, drawing upon available material and 
impressions such as the above, this morality is constantly reproduced. 
Summary & Conclusions 
We have seen how, measured against the slavery/ abolition analogy and the model 
of veganism, the philosophers fell short. This is not to say that this was either 
"right' or 'wrong' of them but that it would appear to have particular consequences. 
We have seen how this relates to a welfare /liberation dilemma and a debate over 
tactical approaches, and how all of this may impact on the ability of the 
movement's oppositional discourse and image to effect a conceptual shift in 
human/nonhuman relations, and possibly in how it may relate to others' 
representations of it. 
In his Preface to the 1980 edition of Salt's Animals' Rights, Peter Singer wrote that 
after Salt: 
... the issue 
faded away and was not heard of again until the early 1970s, when human rights for 
blacks and women were a major political issue and the extension of the argument to nonhuman 
animals again seemed a logical short step. (Singer 1980: viii). 
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Chapter 2 set this in context and showed that the issue was indeed heard of in the 
1960s, if not before. In this chapter we have tried to show that the issue was brought 
to its fullest expression in the 1940s and 1950s by the Vegan Society but that, 
suffering from the inauspicious aftermath of war, its message was obscured by 
cultural lag. Moreover, during the 1970s and 1980s, the major philosophers added far 
less than we may have anticipated, given this earlier development, once the 
conditions had been created for a more sympathetic reception of animal liberation's 
ethic(s). Indeed, it appears as if a great opportunity was lost to state the case in 
more forceful terms (just as Salt had not consolidated Gompertzs ground). It 
certainly had the heritage and legacy to draw upon and yet in reaching back to 
Aristotle, Christianity, the Enlightenment, Bentham and Salt it did not also take 
its lead from the Vegan Society and, should it have needed earlier endorsement, 
from Gompertz himself. Strange too that Singer had read Gompertz in 1973 (Singer 
1992: 11) and not thought fit to incorporate veganism into his own scheme where 
Gompertz is described not as a vegan or a total or true vegetarian but, unhelpfully, as 
a 'strict' vegetarian (Singer 1977: 244)16. 
What we see then is the conservatism and selectivity of animal liberation 
philosophy, most noticeably post-Gompertz, until Regan seems to have decided 
that, like the Vegan Society but unlike Salt, it was no longer necessary or indeed 
proper to wait any longer for the ripe moment to promote a full case17 (the above 
and crucial reservations over 'vegetarianism' and 'commercial' notwithstanding). 
Salt's opposition to veganism was all the more curious when we consider that he 
also expressed his eager anticipation of its development (Salt 1980: 80-82) though 
not in so many words. And Singer's lack of enthusiasm for promoting full-blown 
animal liberation is all the more peculiar (and understandable only in terms of 
either a possibly flawed tactical awareness, a general lack of full knowledge of the 
issue or the incapability of utilitarianism) at a time when that development had 
taken place. We could suggest then that not only are the 'truths' of animal 
liberation fearsome for the orthodox, but that veganism is, or has been, a fearsome 
'truth' for the philosophers (and the movement generally) who themselves have 
been fearsome, using fearsome now in its other sense, of apprehension, timidity. 
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Taking advantage of the liberationist zeitgeist Singer, like Bentham before him, 
gave a burgeoning movement another kick start into a new era, but his philosophy 
was not firing on all the cylinders available to him (or perhaps utilitarianism is 
cylinder deficient), and the movement is still spluttering though perhaps now de- 
coking. It is worth asking a question, perhaps: what would have happened if, 
instead, Regan had written in 1975 in a similar format to Singer's Animal 
Liberation, packaged with graphic illustration of animal use but using the word 
vegan? His 1985 essay, 'The Case for Animal Rights' - 'intended for those who 
want to have a clear sense of the intellectual foundation of the Animal Rights 
Movement but who choose not to suffer through the book of the same title' (Regan 
1987: 45-46) - could have formed the basis of the text and, in its anti-slavery tone 
and its greater emphasis on the ground-shifting 'animals are not our resources' claim, 
a different base line for a contemporary abolitionist movement. For example: 
What's wrong - fundamentally wrong - with the way animals are treated isn't the details that 
vary from case to case. It's the whole system ... that allows us to view animals as our resources, 
here for us ... Once we accept this view of animals ... the rest is as predictable as 
it is 
regrettable. Why worry about their loneliness, their pain, their death? Since animals exist for us, 
to benefit us in one way or another, what harms them really doesn't matter - or matters only if it 
starts to bother us, makes us feel a trifle uneasy when we eat our veal escalop, for example. So, 
yes, let us get veal calves out of solitary confinement, give them more space, a little straw, a few 
companions. But let us keep our veal escalop. But a little straw, more space and a few 
companions won't eliminate - won't even touch - the basic wrong that attaches to our viewing 
and treating these animals as our resources. (Regan 1987b: 47-48). 
However, before that and even by the time his Case appeared in 1983-84, largely as 
a result of his dissatisfaction with Singer's position, though acknowledging the 
movement's debt to him, it would seem that the die was cast and no other single 
work was to have the same immediate impact or enduring influence, despite the 
burgeoning rights rhetoric. Chronology counted against, again, perhaps. We cannot 
answer our question. 
For one reason or another then, and by one means or another, what the philosophers 
as a whole appear not to promote in their classic works is a clear philosophical 
statement that animal liberation's base line or its centrality is veganism which, 
more than Salt, was hacking at the root rather than the branches of animal 
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exploitation as from at least 1944 (although people had been vegan before that, of 
course18). Subsequently and consequently, the movement has not exploited fully a 
most powerful and comprehensive weapon or not built its discourse around veganism. 
We can see now that the narrative traced in Chapters 2 and 3 is rather superficial. 
To talk in terms of the green light shining as from the late 1960s-early 1970s is not so 
much inaccurate but rather myopic. A green light it was and the one which most saw 
for the first time, forgetting or not knowing or not wanting to know that it had also 
tried to shine in the darkness of war. Although the works of Singer, Clark and 
Regan have in the past twenty years spawned more philosophical work on the 
moral status of animals than had appeared in the previous two thousand (see Regan 
1990: xi), it was the Vegan Society that had shown that there is nothing so 
practical as a good theory, and Gompertz who had flashed the full revelatory light 
briefly in 1824. These, in effect, were challenges for animal liberation to fully 
(re)connect with bloodless culture. 
Moreover, perhaps it is through veganism that animal liberation could, should any 
of those involved think it necessary, recombine with the issues from which it was 
parted in the late 1960s and thereby establish the kind of challenge advocated by 
some in the 1990s. Uniquely, it is veganism which provides this route back in order 
to go forward (on whatever conceptual basis and cultural correlation). Both Salt and 
Watson spoke of both human and animal problems being solved through a 
recognition of their commonality. Moreover, veganism's range of concerns reinforces 
animal liberation against being viewed derisively as single issue, and its 
alternative, bloodless culture status stands against the 'extremist' label. Veganism 
restores the bigger story. 
The movement seems to have recognized late in the day an advantage or the sense in 
a stronger and more open adherence to veganism and, although this is more 
noticeable within animal liberation organizations now (and always has been 
amongst many within the movement), it seems to have passed without much notice 
from many academics and others. This links with the debate on tactics and strategy 
where a central dilemma concerns adherence to or a break from welfarism where 
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again ends and means become entangled in a round of which determines the other. 
Animal liberation is caught in the dilemma of whether or not to let tactics 
determine ethics and the dominating bloody culture determine bloodless culture 
strategy; ultimately, to extend orthodoxy or up-end it. 
All this relates to the distance that animal liberation has travelled and what it 
looks like on arrival in the mid to late 1990s. And we can take its measure in rough 
manner by referring to John Stuart Mills" comment, cited as a motto by Regan (1988) 
- 'Every great movement must experience three stages: ridicule, discussion, 
adoption'. It can be claimed with some justification that animal liberation has, to 
some extent, reached the second stage and we shall see in Chapters 5,6 and 7 just 
what form this discussion takes. We may at the same time ask whether it has ever 
passed completely beyond the first stage; we know it has not reached the third. 
This chapter may have shown one of the reasons why. The following chapters may 
show other reasons - those of representation - which may relate to this one. 
In our analysis of representations we shall continue to keep veganism in full view; 
not as if the movement were unequivocally embracing and espousing it, though this 
now looks to be increasingly the case, but in the same way that we have used it here 
as a model against which to analyse animal liberation. 
Notes 
1. 'Cattle', which has been used to refer more generally to farmed animals, even to bees (and 
variously to all 'vermin'), comes from the same root as 'chattel', moveable property. Thus, chattel 
slavery. Cattle is used in Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin (1850) to refer to human 
slaves. Oxford English Dictionary. (A point also noted by Finsen & Finsen 1994: 285). 
2. Of more than passing interest is that most, if not all, of these practices continue whether or not 
the 'other' is afforded acquired rights, that is, rights afforded after the use of animals has been 
established. 
3. This point also is recognized by Singer himself (1993). 1 think that Animal Liberation made a 
cogent case for the view that our treatment of nonhuman animals is an atrocity on the same scale 
as, say, the slave trade. 
4. This is not to enter into the crasser area of objection-query - e. g. what about locusts, 
mosquitoes and rabid dogs, and should amoebae get the vote? - by which animal liberation is 
commonly beset, even in academic debate. 
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5. Bryant (1982 and 1990) condemns horse riding but from an anti-cruelty perspective, albeit 
within an animal 'rights' framework. 
6. The Vegan, vol. ii, no. 1, Spring 1946 gave 'Fhe Case for Veganism', and The Vegan, vol. xi, no. 
1, Summer 1958, detailed the'Reasons for Veganism'. 
7. The second edition of Aninwl Liberation modifies the final sentence to read: 'A reasonable and 
defensible plan of action is to change your diet at a measured pace with which you can feel 
comfortable' (Singer 1995a: 176). 
8. It would seem that public ignorance of milk production is rife, e. g. the erroneous belief that 
cows produce milk by eating grass. Moreover, apparently only one per cent of the public 
consider it 'not all right to' milk cows, in contrast to seventy-eight per cent opposed to keeping 
calves in 'veal' crates - Gallup/ Daily Telegraph, 21.8.95. Typically, the pollsters did not ask 
whether it was 'not all right to' separate cow and calf or even to breed the calf at all. 
9. In analysing the philosophers, we could have drawn upon Jasper & Nelkin (1992: 178) who 
classify 'types of contemporary animal protectionists: welfarists; pragmatists (e. g. Singer); and 
fundamentalists (e. g. Regan). Clark is ignored. Certainly this classification has some relevance, 
and Singer's down-to-earth, consequentialist philosophy can be at least loosely described as 
pragmatist. The problem for us here though is that whilst welfarism and 'fundamentalism' (an 
unhelpful, pejorative term also associated by Jasper & Nelkin with 'absolutism' and the 'more 
extreme', P96) can be identified by their ends, pragmatism tends to be a mode, its ends being 
somewhat nebulous (indeed, the 'major goals' attributed respectively to welfarists and 
pragmatists by Jasper & Nelkin can all be identified with welfarists). In trying to overcome this 
last difficulty by clarifying the issue in regard to, say, free range eggs and sea creatures, Singer 
adopts a curious ends position (for a liberationist, though perhaps not for a utilitarianist) and it 
is this which has been of interest to us. 
10. Salt came to see it more from Gompertz's angle: ' ... a civilized posterity will shudder at the 
sight of what we still regard as a legitimate agent of locomotion' (Salt 1921: 217). 
11. This incompatibility identified by rights theorist Regan seems to contradict Keith Tester's 
(1991: 13) claim that 'animal rights' brings together vegetarianism, opposition to hunting, anti- 
vivisection and animals' welfare. This may relate to Singer but hardly to Regan. This again 
highlights the difficulties thrown up by casual use of the term 'animal rights' when rights theory 
is only one means by which the liberation of animals may or may not be achieved - 
12. Francione (1996) spells out in more detail this rights-based incremental approach. 
13. In 1997-98 Garner could have added the UK ban on cosmetics, alcohol and tobacco testing on 
animals, though whether this came about because of his preferred strategy or Regan 
Francione's or a mixture of both is unclear. However, the 1997 ban on the use of great apes is 
surely due more to a combination of 'rights', human-ape commonality and conservation claims 
than to a heightened perception of unnecessary suffering. 
14. For a wider ranging critique of the Regan & Francione position see Finsen & Finsen (1994: 
257-265). 
15. 'Hogs of War', Alexander Chancellor's 'Pride and Prejudice' column in The Guardian, 
13.6.98. What is of interest is how, in a 500-word statement, the Disney reference was seized 
upon. McCartney's full sentence in fact read: 'All animals to her were like Disney characters and 
worthy of love and respect', which puts a different complexion on it. 
16. Clark's heavily referenced work only mentions Gompertz once and not in relation to 
veganism. Regan's Case is not characterized by a call upon previous pro-animal thinkers. 
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17. Watson seems also to have realized three of the things that Salt had suspected already at the 
turn of the century: that the virtually automatic progress inherent in nineteenth century 
evolutionary concepts shifted into an unspecific 'social change' in the twentieth (and see Elias 
1994: 184); that the idea of progress where all changed together and for the better was replaced 
by an understanding of uneven and partial change, different aspects of society falling out of step 
with each other (notably the animals issue being left aside); and that change then had to be forced 
- one couldn't wait for inevitability or for the ripe time. 
18. One of the earliest recorded vegans in Britain was Roger Crab who died at Bethnal Green in 
1680 (see The Vegan, Summer 1997, p 25). 
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Chapter 5 
Ends of a Different Story 
Introduction 
Now that we have established a particular understanding of animal liberation we 
are in a better position to approach an analysis of how it, liberationists and animal 
use are represented in media discourse. However, as a path to this latter part of the 
thesis we shall examine a representation contained within an academic work, one 
which shares some common ground with media discourse in relation to the response 
made to the liberationist challenge. In Animals and Society: The Humanity of 
Animal Rights (1991), Keith Tester makes out an intriguing sociological case but 
which, in attempting to explain animal 'rights" in terms of its functions for its 
practitioners, robs it of its sincerity, identity, ethics and politics: "Animal rights is 
not about animals' (Tester 1991: 177). For Tester's new historicist sociology on the rise 
of animal 'rights' discourse, animal liberation is, at best, of dubious epistemological 
provenance, and he seeks to expose it as a fraud. 
We shall not be concerned with how or whether Tester's constructionist account 
weakens the transhistorical one presented earlier. There is no reason, in principle, 
why the one cannot co-exist with the other, approaching the subject from different 
perspectives. That is, we shall not be concerned to contest Tester's more structural 
claims, for this would involve us in a debate over social and sociological theory and 
methodological issues which would become a thesis in its own right. 
However, although founded upon two legitimate sociological presuppositions, 
Tester's thesis seems, firstly, to go awry at the outset, assuming (and ignoring the 
wider perspectives) that animal liberation concerns itself only, and then only 
marginally, with mammals. Secondly, by diverting attention from the politics to 
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the psychology, and privileging origin over ethics, he undermines the selected 
messengers rather than the message (recoiling from the challenge that animal 
liberation poses). Why we should address the work, concentrating mainly on the 
empirical, is because of its outcome, of the way the premises are used to produce or 
reproduce a negative representation of animal liberation (for it is not their 
inevitable consequence) and ultimately because of what it may hold for us in looking 
at wider and more populist representations. What we shall be interested in is how 
what can be identified as incomprehension, reduction and redefinition combine to 
entrap animal liberation and ultimately legitimize animal use. For the duration we 
shall use Tester's term 'animal rights' and the preferred 'animal liberation' 
interchangeably. (References to Animals and Society in the main bodies of text will 
appear as page numbers only). 
Animal Rights & Humanity 
The combination of two main sociological presuppositions sustains Tester's thesis. 
First, the structuralist-anthropologist claim, that animals are good to think and 
that, in classifying them we are defining ourselves in relation to them and vice 
versa. So, for Tester, animals are a 'blank page'l. Contrary to what liberationists 
believe, or try to make us think they believe, there is no 'truth' or 'reality" of 
animals to reveal; animals 'are nothing other than what we make them' (p42), and 
animal liberation is merely making them anew for its own purposes. Second, from 
Foucauldian "archaeology' and discourse, that history is characterized by 
discontinuities - there is, as it were, no steady 'civilizing' process of 'improvement' 
- and that it is only possible to think certain things within specific epistemes; 
their relative classifications and structures of knowledge mean that the blank pages 
are written upon differently in different eras and this cannot be otherwise. Animal 
liberation only became 'thinkable' in the Modern episteme and it was invented by 
Henry Salt. Animals are socio-historical objects and "animal rights' is a socio- 
historical construction. Far from being a liberationist movement, 'animal rights' 
consists of little more than new versions of anthropomorphism and 
anthropocentrism; animal rightists want to show that they are not animals at all. In 
this relativist account animal liberation does not signal a better relationship with 
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other species, merely a different one, but one inescapably still motivated by self-ish 
concerns though passing themselves off as altruistic. Animal liberation is "dishonest' 
in that it naturalizes its beliefs in order to make them self-evident 
Tester's claim, which he establishes through an analysis of Singer, Clark and 
Regan, that animal liberation only concerns itself with mammals - those animals 
which 'are most easy to anthropomorphize' (p16) - is significant because it is only 
mammals which present humans, with the uneasiness of ambivalent status, as 
human animals. We need to create distance especially from other mammals in order 
to establish our own sense of selfhood. This necessitates an avoidance policy, a 
'slamming of the door" on animals (p88), for animals are a taboo, an impurity and a 
pollution (hence 'vegetarianism') on the part of animal liberation which is an 
extreme attempt at this project. Human response to animality is the key to animal 
"rights'. 
But animals are also historical objects. Norbert Elias and Keith Thomas want to see 
continuities but Tester argues that we have to take account of the different cultural 
meanings of animals relevant to particular eras. Previous 'cruelties', for instance, 
cannot be seen in 'our' ten-ns because 
... the taxonomic structures which shape and mould the relationships between animals and 
society, which define what a cat is, are different. This is what it means to say that animals are a 
historical object; they are used to understand the meaning and basis of humanity, but the 
structures which shape that use are themselves historical. They are discontinuous over time. 
(Tester 1991: 70) ... 
We can only think this and not that because our thoughts and perceptions 
are not free. They are determined by structural rules which have changed historically. (Tester 
1991: 77). 
Tester prefers this Foucauldian (The Order of Things) approach, and the claim is 
that animal rights - as a 'full-blown moral idea and not just idle speculation' - 
could only become possible within the context of one specific taxonomic system or 
problematic, the Modern. 
In order to explain animal rights, Tester asks why humanitarianism arose during 
the eighteenth century, as it could not have done so earlier. Thomas suggests it was 
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due to urbanization removing the anthropocentric blinkers, distancing humans 
geographically and ideationally from regular encounters with animals, thus 
enabling people to view them more objectively. For Tester this is by no means the 
whole story. It is too simply cause and effect or even coincidence. Instead: 
Humanitarianism and sympathy are products of human knowledge. They are solely events of the 
systems of classification which are the foundation of moral relationships, and which attempt to 
make the world intelligible as it is experienced from the city (Tester 1991: 76) ... The ambiguity of 
'Man' provides a full explanation for the rise of compassion in the late eighteenth century. 
(Tester 1991: 87-88). 
Leaving aside the dubiousness of the first sentence which may apply to societies or 
forces within them but not to all individuals within them at various times2, we are 
more concerned here with how he arrives at this 'full' explanation - by tracing the 
different taxonomies of Renaissance, Classical and Modern epistemes. In the first of 
these, the human/nonhuman relation was relatively trouble-fre'e for humans. It was 
an anthropocentric world, animals represented only themselves in their strangeness. 
Man was unique. But in the attempt to order both a rural and urban life, Classical 
taxonomy 'tried to accommodate a double perception of animals as objects which 
were simultaneously seen to be separate from the properly human (which was 
increasingly equated with urban life), whilst retaining a wealth of symbolic 
meaning in the countryside. In other words, animals were at one and the same time 
the Same and yet the Other' (p8l). The classification of animals, based on visibility 
criteria, took the human as the yardstick, searching for the different within the 
same. The system was somewhat untenable, nay unintelligible, for much of the 
sameness was minimal, for example between a fish and a human. 
The taxonomy of the Modern episteme (from 0800) escapes the problem by 
undermining the central category of the same in denying the importance of the 
visible world. Instead, it creates an order of things by concentrating upon the same 
behind the different. Animals" bodies are far less important than the similarities of 
their organic structure. The standard of similitude is reinvented. 'Animal species 
differ at their peripheries, and resemble each other at their centres; they are 
connected by the inaccessible, and separated by the apparent' (Foucault, cited by 
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Tester p85). In the shift from natural science to scientific enquiry, 'Life' becomes the 
classificatory principle, the keystone of knowledge. But, by this, humans become the 
same as animals, and therefore indistinct. However, 
Humans are given a special position as the living object which is also the subject that knows life 
... 
Humans are the animals who know they are different ... The ambiguous status of 'Man' is the 
historical basis for the moral principle of animal rights. It is certainly the classificatory principle 
implicit to the theories of Singer, Regan and Clark. The distinction between humans and animals 
is simultaneously clear and blurred; animal rights is one way in which the ambiguity can be 
confronted and reconciled. (Tester 1991: 87-88). 
Now this reconciliation didn't happen all at once: 'Unity had to be created and it 
only gelled in the late nineteenth century. It drew on roots which reflected the 
curious status of 'Man' as the subject who is an object' (p88). Tester suggests that 
historically it is possible to identify two of the major roots, contradictory demands 
for a moral treatment of animals that play on the paradox of the human as a 
different kind of animal. He labels these the Demand for Difference and the 
Demand for Similitude, both of which arose in the eighteenth century (p88) and 
continue to this day. They clash over what it is to be human. 
For the Demand for Difference, Man was basically evil and had to be educated. Its 
more notable later representatives were Bentham, Kant, Erskine, Martin, the 
(R)SPCA and it was class-based, for only the rich and rational knew how to behave, 
and social reform had to come from above. They stressed the uniqueness of man, and 
organic structures as objects of knowledge. Cruelty was wrong because it undermined 
social order (p105). Cruelty to animals was an offence against social sensibilities. In 
the opposing, Demand for Similitude camp were Rousseau, Ritson, Shelley and 
Thoreau for whom Man was basically good. Cruelty to animals is a crime against 
nature and justice, and the urban working class was only prone to cruelty 
because it 
was trapped in a coercive and oppressive society. The Demand offered a thorough 
critique of the apparent world with an emphasis on the natural. 
Too much 
knowledge merely hid morality. The true basis of human being, and the right 
relationships between animals and society, can be discovered 
if individuals live 
naturally. Then, crucially, Henry Salt appears: 
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Animal rights is an alliance of themes from contradictory traditions. Its development was not 
implicit to either of the Demands: the morality had to be made (Tester 1991: 149). The Demand for 
Difference never doubted that the moral legislators were morally and socially correct, but Salt 
did. Moreover, where the Demand for Similitude condemned culture, Salt believed that it could 
educate and reveal the truth of being. Salt was not saying that only other people should change 
their relationships with animals; rather, he was proposing that as individuals everyone should 
change, and thereby begin to change society. He did not think he was intrinsically better than 
anyone else; it was just that he had come to realise the truth and was obliged to put it into action. 
Salt reconciled 'Man' with animals, culture with nature, and the individual with 
society. None of these alliances had been formed in the prehistory of animal rights. The 
ambiguities of 'Man' had led to deep dualisms in the treatment of animals as well as radically 
different ideas about the best and right path of reform. Henry Salt had managed to accept both the 
privileged 'Man' who is a subject as well as the unprivileged one who was a natural object. This 
is the core of the epistemological break in Animals' Rights. It explains why Salt was so certain 
about what the single, true relationship between animals and society should be. He knew who 
'Man' was, and therefore knew how animals should be treated. (Tester (1991: 156). 
In transcending and fusing the two, Salt 'more or less invented' animal rights (p194) 
and made the Demands part of its prehistory as if the narrative was naturally 
given. Although he was able to do this only in the modern era when animal rights 
became 'thinkable', Salt pretended it always had been. Likewise, Singer, Clark and 
Regan see their moral claims as an immutable truth, upheld today when it would 
have been mocked two centuries ago, simply because we have progressed to a higher 
level of moral goodness. But Tester thinks this is misplaced, for 'animal rights is a 
social construction ... a fiction' (p194), a 'fetish' 
(p172). It's a modern product, just 
another commodity on the market which we are being asked, even forced, to buy 
under false pretences. 
Animal rights was invented by people who wanted to know who 'Man' was, not primarily 
because they were worried about animals. It can be understood as a rupture, an epistemological 
break, in modern knowledge. (Fester 1991: 149). 
We shall not contest the second of Tester's points in the above quotation nor the 
historical narrative that leads to it. It is how that understanding of animal 
liberation is used that will be of interest, and we shall join this with debating the 
first point's reductionist intent and its more obvious implications and repercussions. 
However, we can first of all dismiss the polemic: 
If this book has any polemical intent, it is to ask the militants and the philosophers to realise that 
they are fetishistically upholding obligations which are made and not 
found. (Tester 1991: 194- 
195). 
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This seems to be a straightforward misrepresentation, at least in Salt's case, for he 
was fully conscious of his position: 
It must be noted ... that humanitarianism in this sense [conscious and organized humaneness] as a 
branch of ethical science, is a modern product, for it was not until the eighteenth century - the 
age of 'sensibility' that there began to be any wide-spread recognition of humaneness as a force 
in civilized society. (Salt 1913: 834). 
Caging the Beast 
Blank Pages 
This section will address the representation of animal rights which derives from 
the blank pages presupposition, contesting the empirical assumption, the 
misrepresentation built into it. 
Mammals & Veganism 
Tester tends to play Singer, Clark and Regan at their game but on his ground. Where 
they are pictured as wanting to strip away rationalizations to expose orthodox 
naked self interest and prejudice, Tester strips away their rationalizations to reveal 
theirs. Where the philosophers are pictured as wanting to strip away symbols to 
reveal the 'real' animal, Tester tells them there is no such thing. What is crucial for 
this blank page presupposition to have force is the reading that animal 
liberationist protagonists are only concerned with mammals Cnice cuddly animals'), 
and then only marginally. What they are really concerned with is what it is to be 
"properly human". Unlike Eder (1996), for instance, who utilizes structural 
anthropology to discern societal organization, Tester uses it more in relation to 
individual psychology, to deny liberationists their ostensible motive and indeed 
animal liberation ethics. 
But the mammals focus is a severely limited view, one perhaps which is 
understandable only within that restricted context which one can quite easily 
assume if one hardly looks further than the philosophers - and treats their 
seminal works as definitive rather than attempts at philosophical underwriting - 
and a few chosen extracts from the writings of certain direct activists. Against the 
wider context, taking in veganism as we have explored it above, animal liberation is 
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bigger than its official philosophies, which themselves display ample evidence of 
wider concern. It is noticeable in this regard that Tester too fails to recognize the 
significance of veganism. This is (the first part of) his only reference: 
Vegetarians only give up the flesh of animals, but vegans go a stage further and also try to do 
without eggs, animal milk, cheese, and butter ... Veganism believes that vegetarianism does not go 
far enough. If it is wrong to eat meat, if humans are frugivorous organic beings, then it must also 
be unnatural to eat any produce which comes from animals. (Tester 1991: 143)3. 
Aside from the dismissiveness (similar to Benton 1993: 25), as if veganism were some 
obscure, hardly manageable enterprise on the periphery of animal liberation (some 
250,000 vegans in Britain4 testify to the invalidity of such an assumption), Tester 
implies that it is based solely upon a view of animal-based diets being 'unnatural', 
thus bracketing off liberationist ethics, diverting attention to self-interest5. 
Moreover (and leaving aside the fact that vegetarians dispense with the products 
and by-products of slaughter), vegans go more than a stage further, in dispensing 
with all animal products, including honey, silk and more obscure or specialist 
products such as shellac (derived from the lac insect) thus contradicting the claim, 
as does dispensing with eggs, that animal liberation is only concerned with 
mammals. As Donald Watson (1990) put it when describing 1940s welfarism: 'There 
... seemed to be an illogical preference to work 
for the furry and the cuddly, whilst 
ignoring the rights of the equally sentient scaly and slimy'. To suggest that animal 
rights is only about mammals when 'official' veganism has existed for at least fifty 
years, that both Salt and Bryant (1982), both considered by Tester as representatives 
of animal rights, are opposed to angling, as was Bentham (and note that Brophy 
opened her 1965 article with an attack on angling), that hunt saboteurs have taken 
action against anglers and that the ALF has taken action against shrimping vessels, 
is to ignore the evidence. Salt too showed concern over the killing of insects (Salt 
1913: 836 and 1980: 48). Also, for Clark and Regan, vegetarianism at 
least (which 
itself dispenses with fish and fowl) and opposition to vivisection 
(regardless of 
species used) are obligatory (Chapter 4's critique is irrelevant 
here). One of Singer's 
(1977: 177-178) objections to eating fish rests on the suffering criterion, and 
Regan has 
this to say about shellfish: 
Ends of a Different Story 154 
It is true that some animals, like shrimp and clams, may be capable of experiencing pain yet lack 
most other psychological capabilities. If this is true, then they will lack some of the rights that 
other animals possess. However, there can be no moral justification for causing anyone pain, if it 
is unnecessary to do so. And since it is not necessary that humans eat shrimp, clams, and similar 
animals, or utilize them in other ways, there can be no moral justification for causing them the 
pain that invariably accompanies such use. (Regan nd. c1990: 20). 
In terms of the philosophers, the only claim being made by them, even if we accept 
Tester's mammal insistence, seems to be that mammals are where we start in 
coherent moral underpinning; that at least mammals should benefit from a mutual 
sense of fair dealing. The seemingly logical extension of this is that other species 
too, about whom we know less, should be given the benefit of the doubt. This may not 
apply specifically in Singer's case for he is keen to draw a line of sorts. But even here 
what we need to compare is the line drawn by society - arbitrarily between humans 
and all other animals - with that drawn by Singer where certainty fades, 
"somewhere between a shrimp and an oyster'. The problems are more to do with 
moral extensionism than with who "Man' is. The claim that animal rights is only 
concerned with mammals (and shrimps are a long way from mammals) is untenable, 
in the sense that Tester wants to make of it. That is, Tester thinks it a 'paradox' of 
"profound sociological and moral significance' that animal rights is not meant to 
apply to all animals. It seems to be nothing of the sort. 
Avoidance 
Following from the mammals focus, the charge against animal rights is that it is an 
avoidance strategy (pp44-45), animals are a pollution for liberationists. Now this 
could be a racist charge when the strategy is espoused by one human group against 
another. But animal liberation is about other species; avoiding animals in animal 
liberation terms means allowing them to live their lives. The avoidance Tester 
speaks of is surely, instead, avoidance of explo i tative-instru men tali st 
relationships, a non-co-operation with injustice. It is the kind of relationship which 
is taboo, not animals. Other emancipatory movements can overcome this 
hurdle by 
negotiating alternative and mutually consenting relationships. 
In the case of 
animals this is not possible as far as we know, at least not 
in a systematic, industrial 
and perpetually 'productive' manner. 
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Other obstacles to Tester"s 'slamming the door on animals' thesis, are Leslie Cross's 
talk of companionship, Peter Singer's talk of free range eggs, and the commonwealth 
of Stephen Clark who also suggests, remember, that: '... we may in the end be able to 
take some milk from our kin without injustice'. Indeed, Tester's thesis would have 
been stronger perhaps if he had equated animal rights with veganism rather than 
vegetarianism, for how does Salt's milk- and wool-use square with avoidance? 
Moreover, in writing of activist John Bryant's (1982) 'peep of what could be' in St 
James's Park, Tester claims that Bryant had '... a brief, yet profound, contact with 
the greater truth and reality of nature, and conveniently forgets that St James's Park 
is not wild nature at all' (p175). But, surely, all Bryant 'saw' was a glimpse of an 
ideal. It was quite obvious to him, and significantly so, that the park was man- 
made. Tester suggests that this 'vision" and those of the Animal Liberation Front 
'fare a nostalgia for Gemeinschaft' (p189). Maybe, but Gemeinschaft implies close, 
emotional, face to face ties, a long way from the 'avoidance policy' which is 
ascribed to animal rights. Indeed, Bryant's peep is not exactly of a world where he is 
'distancing' himself from animals. It's the possibility of non-exploitative co- 
habitation in which he is interested. 6. 
Further, it is difficult to associate an avoidance policy with those who (even if the 
long-term aim is hands-off) risk their own freedom during the struggle for animal 
liberation by breaking into establishments in order to rescue/steal animals; those 
who provide homes for these and other animals; and those who work in sanctuaries 
established for such animals7. Credibility is further stretched when, in noting that 
an Animal Rights Militia communique referred to animal 'abusers' as 'filth', Tester 
asks us to 
Notice the rather Mary Douglasian association of improper humanity and pollution taboos ... 
Compared to filthy scientists, the bombers of the Militia, who have nothing to do with animals, 
are quite pure. (Tester 1991: 186-187). 
Now this may make sense in the closeted world of animal rights that Tester has 
fashioned out of cultural symbolism but surely, for the Militia, the scientists are 
'filth' not in their touching of animals but in their use of them as means to human 
ends. As with Bryant, their purity is best read not as self-purity, not as ritual purity, 
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but as the purity of nature at peace. It is the orthodox "blindness' (unconscious or 
wilful) to animal use which allows for animal liberation's objections to it to be seen 
as anti-pollution rather than as genuinely anti-use. The suggestion that what 
liberationists seek through their avoidance is moral self-perfection is also 
contradicted by Henry Salt who wrote: 
To pretend that in our complex modern society, where responsibilities are so closely interwoven, 
it is possible for any individual to cultivate a perfect character - that is the false ideal which it 
is the first business of a genuine reformer to put aside ... they [vegetarians] do not aim at moral 
perfection, but at rational progress. (Salt nd: 35-36). 
Animals and Society reduces everything in animal liberation to self-interest, 
denying any possibility of mutual or universal benefits. If animal liberation suggests 
that what it proposes would also benefit society (what social movement wouldn't? ), 
this is redefined to mean that all animal liberation is a project of who 'Man, 8 is or, 
more specifically, to an individualist self -identity-purity mission. As Tester takes 
animal liberation philosophy as animal rights, what else could be said? Normative 
ethics is about human moral development. 
Other Movements 
In connection with this, there is something of an inconsistency within Tester's 
reading of animal liberation in relation to other movements - e. g. blacks and 
women's liberations. Animal liberation is likened to them only in as much as they 
are all 'struggles preoccupied by selfhood' (p168) but is separated from them in terms 
of historical development and liberationist concerns where animal liberation is seen 
merely to have 'borrowed their radical clothing' (p167). The second point, 
separation, we shall look at later (under An Illegitimate Concern) and take the 
first, conjoining, here. 
It is difficult to see how animal liberation even can be joined with these other 
movements within the scheme of selfhood preoccupation. From the point of view of 
women and blacks their liberations may well be so preoccupied. But animal 
liberation does not correlate in this sense. It correlates with men and whites 
campaigning for women"s and black emancipations. Are these men and whites also 
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preoccupied with selfhood? If they are, it is difficult to know who isn't so 
preoccupied. If they are not, then why are animal liberationists? (Because their 
sympathies and empathies are unconventional? ) The problem is that Tester is 
concentrating not on the cause in its relation to dominant culture and ideology but on 
denigrating animal liberationist individuals for their by-proxy preoccupation. The 
psychological profile breaks down. Tester suggests that the Demand for Similitude 
" ... was the concern of consciously interstitial individuals with a firm awareness of 
self. Contemporary animal rights still is' (p146). But does a firm awareness of self 
really go hand in hand with a preoccupation with selfhood? 
Meaning & Knowledge 
In addition to the more or less empirical matters whereby we can see, taking a wider 
perspective, that animal liberation does not at all limit its animal concern to 
mammals and their function for humans, there remains the basic structural 
presupposition; that animals are good to think. Now we shall make no attempt to 
argue with it but what we can argue with is the conclusion that animal rights hides 
'the utter meaninglessness of animals", as if the morality was "just one more 
entrapment of them' (p206). Certainly society projects meaning onto other animals 
and animal liberation can hardly fail to do likewise, but Stephen Clark makes the 
point which is absent from Tester's account and from orthodox cognitions. Clark 
wants us to consider that: 
An animal's world is not meaningless to it merely because it does not see our meanings: it has its 
own ... It is a mere conceit of whoremaster man to be so convinced that it was only with men that 
meaning, time and death came into the world. (Clark 1984: 104). 
And Clark isn't suggesting he knows their meanings (or, as Tester might put it, their 
'reality' or 'truth"). As he says elsewhere, it is not that animals are dumb but that 
we are deaf (Clark 1984: 95). Even if Clark is 'wrong', Tester misrepresents him in 
the eagerness to set up a straw man of animal rights: 
Despite the beliefs of the protagonists, animal rights is not a knowledge of the irreduceable being 
of animals at all. (Tester 1991: 86). 
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But it's not apparent how animal rights was ever meant to be a superior form of 
knowledge of animals but, rather, of how we act on the common knowledge. In Clark 
especially, and this is not lacking from Salt, Regan and Singer, is the 
acknowledgement of ignorance, and what little we can know - starting with the 
more obvious mammalian commonality - is enough to proscribe their use, the 
infliction of suffering and the causing of harm. They would, it seems fair to say (even 
if it's only sayable in the modern episteme), prefer not to be mutilated, experimented 
upon, separated, hooked, chased, slaughtered, and so on, although for Tester this is 
impossible to say, for we cannot 'know' the 'real' animals. Clark is both questioning 
the knowledge that gives rise to the ontology of animal usage and renders it 
legitimate, and saying that there are other lessons of that knowledge. 
What the concentration on 'Man' also serves to do - hinted at by the claustrophobic 
nature of Tester's account - is to deflect attention from just what it is that animal 
liberation opposes, and enables the reading of animal liberation as a fraud to 
proceed. When Peter Singer provided his readers with graphic detail of life and 
death in the laboratory and on the factory farm (and not exhaustively concerned 
with mammals) - that is, what society was doing or colluding in - Tester claims 
that Singer was merely playing 'the emotional card' (p8) as if this showing of 
evidence were somehow not only bad form but also irrelevant. Thus the legitimacy of 
outrage, supported by reason, is denied. Characteristic of a "blank pages' approach 
for which sentiency is of little or no account ("outside of our investment of it, there is 
nothing about the lion for us to know' [p207% Tester's "flight from specificity' or 
concealment by omission, an orthodox avoidance strategy, aids the attempt to reduce 
animal liberation to a concern about something else. Animal liberation is a front, 
liberationists dissemblers. 
In Tester, the notion of emancipation (and consideration of power, subjugation, 
oppression, domination, politics), for instance, is irrelevant. Animal liberation 
cannot be about anything other than selfhood. By ignoring the evidence, this 
reductionist exercise traps animal liberation within a psychological and 
taxonomical prison. 
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Historical objects 
This section relates to the 'epistemological break', the 'invention' of animal rights. 
As said earlier, it is not the view of historical discontinuities we are concerned with 
but with how that view is used to reproduce a certain representation of animal 
liberation. 
Fear & Ideological Confusion 
Something interesting happens with the notion of animal liberation as an invention. 
Picturing animal rights as such, Tester is able to describe it in commodity fetish 
terms (p172). One could perhaps cite Roland Barthes in support of this; that, for 
instance, "all one has to do is possess these new objects from which all soiling trace of 
origin or choice has been removed' (Barthes 1993: 151). In short, that animal rights 
is mythology. But we have to remember that, in the conflict that Tester recognizes - 
"animal rights may be interpreted as the other side of the rationalized socialization 
of animals ... the two sides are in conflict' (p46) - animal rights is not dominant 
ideology but, rather, oppositional and yet it is subjected to a critique as if it were the 
former. This exercise confuses meanings which are implicated in perpetual relations 
of power (those of animal-using society) with meanings that are implicated in 
relations of freedom (those of animal liberation), the latter's language aiming at 
transformation. Animal rights is here being attacked as if it were a "false' 
universalization when, not having become dominant by a long chalk, it has not been 
in a position to establish such a thing. Still in a revolutionary phase, its 'true, 
universalization is still in place (and see Eagleton 1991: 57)9. 
Tester overcomes or obscures this difficulty by denying the vast gulf between animal 
rights and animal-using society, confusing the former with dominant ideology 
instead of maintaining the recognition of conflict. In Tester's vacuum, where there is 
no sense of oppositional ideology being suppressed, animal rights and animal-using 
society are conflated, firstly in descriptions which are meant to apply to, and 
legitimate, an anti-barbarian orthodox society but instead describe animal rights: 
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... 
humans do, indeed, act morally when we perceive similitude. We know that the organic 
structure of mammalian animals is comparable to the structure of humans and so we modify our 
behaviour. (Tester 1991: 85). 
A knowledge founded on life [as in modern epistemel cannot deliberately inflict pain or death. 
(Tester 1991: 92). 
And then in the fearful imagining that animal rights has already become the norm: 
... animal rights is not natural; it is a social and a historical invention. Society is worshipping a 
thing of its own creation when it falls down before this truth. (Tester 1991: 171). 
An Illegitimate Concern 
As referred to above (under Other Movements), Tester separates animal liberation 
from other movements at a crucial moment by suggesting that Peter Singer merely 
"borrowed their radical clothing' and that Singer was not being entirely honest when 
he did it (p167). Tester wants to tell us how humanitarianism arose and although he 
accepts that the "claims of animals' moral importance were one part of a widespread 
and new humanitarian sentiment, which would include anti-slavery, penal reform, 
and so forth' (p75) he then tells us that 'animal rights is one way in which the 
ambiguity can be confronted and reconciled ... ' (p88). But, we might ask, what are 
the other ways of confronting and reconciling this ambiguity if not the concealment 
and rationalization after the fact that we saw in Chapter 1? And how does all this 
relate to anti-slavery, penal reform, the campaign against child labour, and other 
nineteenth century liberal and radical progress perspectives? So, because it is not 
about animals animal liberation, like the other liberations, is 'preoccupied by 
selfhood' but, because it is about animals, it cannot genuinely be part of the same 
ethic as other (human) liberationslO. On both counts, animal liberation is denied 
legitimacy. 
Incomprehension & Representation 
Animal liberation cannot be about animals for everything is about 'Man. It cannot 
be 
part of a long-term humanitarian narrative because it is a nineteenth century 
invention. It is doubly 'unnatural'. The species barrier is the barrier to 
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comprehension. We must go to the cause and effect of Tester's thesis - to the 
incomprehension and the representation - the latter end being dictated by the 
former and by the means used to overcome it 
We can go along with Tester's historical discontinuities and yet not arrive at the 
same unsympathetic representation; the history could well encourage us to applaud 
Salt for a masterwork, even if it was only possible after around 1800. This would 
still leave the rest of society with the challenge that animal liberation poses 
today. To explain where animal liberation came from does not necessarily mean that 
it has been rendered suspect. But robbing it of its ethics, identity and politics offers 
the opportunity to reproduce the mythology of animal use, and to degrade animal 
liberation by exposing and representing it as a vehicle for ulterior motives. Because 
the cause is incomprehensible - surely people cannot be taking other animals that 
seriously, as their own ends - it must be about something else. This serves as a stick 
to beat the protagonists with while evading their basic challenge, and gives rise to 
a representation which renders animal liberation unrecognizeable as, and denies it 
status as, a sincere liberationist movement. 
Because it is has the wrong credentials, animal liberation cannot be comprehended 
unless netted within an interest system which does apply to humans vis a vis 
humans. It can then and only then be made sense of, but only as something which 
pretends not to be part of this system. What doesn't recognize the system isn't 
recognized by the system unless it can be derisively labelled, and whatever is said or 
done in its name translated into the language of the system, and what is lost in the 
translation is the spirit of the cause. 
We can use 'comprehend' initially in the dual way Barthes uses it in 
his essay 'Wine 
and Milk' (Barthes 1993: 58-61). In describing the grip that wine has on the 
French 
psyche - 'the absence of wine gives a sense of shock' - 
Barthes suggests that its 
... universality implies a 
kind of conformism: to believe in wine is a coercive collective act. 
A 
Frenchman who kept this myth at arm's length would expose 
himself to minor but definite 
problems of integration, the first of which, precisely, would 
be that of having to explain his 
attitude. The universality principle fully applies here, inasmuch as society calls anyone -, %, 
ho 
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does not believe in wine by names such as sick, disabled or depraved: it does not comprehend him (in both senses, intellectual and spatial, of the word). Conversely, an aýN'ard of good integration is given to whoever is a practising wine-drinker: knowing how to drink is a national technique 
which serves to qualify the Frenchman, to demonstrate at once his performance, his control, his 
sociability. Wine gives thus a foundation for a collective morality, within which everything is 
redeemed: true, excesses, misfortunes and crimes are possible with wine, but never viciousness, 
treachery or baseness; the evil it can generate is in the nature of fate and therefore escapes 
penalization ... (Barthes 1993: 59). 
For wine read animal exploitation and animal products; for the Frenchman who 
keeps the myth at arm's length read animal liberation, except that animal 
liberation is spatially comprehended (see Chapters 6 and 7); for society read Tester, 
especially as '... like all resilient totems, wine [animal use] supports a varied 
mythology which does not trouble about contradictions'. Moreover: 
The mythology of wine can in fact help us to understand the usual ambiguity of our daily life. For 
it is true that wine is a good and fine substance, but it is no less true that its production is deeply 
involved in French capitalism, whether it is that of the private distillers or that of the big settlers 
in Algeria who impose on the Muslims, on the very land of which they have been dispossessed, a 
crop of which they have no need, while they lack even bread. There are thus very engaging myths 
which are however not innocent. And the characteristic of our current alienation is precisely 
that wine cannot be an unalloyedly blissful substance, except if we wrongfully forget that it is 
also the product of an expropriation. (Barthes 1993: 61). 
The task of comprehending animal liberation is made all the more difficult, and the 
task of denigrating it made easier, if the colonization it is set against - by analogy 
with Barthes above, for instance, the growing of 'feed' rather than food or, in 
entirely animal terms, the horror stories that lie behind all animal products1l - is, 
as by Tester, 'wrongfully, forgotten. 
He tends to 'make sense' of animal liberation in his system (pp67-68) in much the 
same way as he accuses Norbert Elias (see Elias 1994: 167) of understanding 
(or not 
understanding) the sixteenth century institution of cat burning within 
his own 
system, or Edward Evans (1906) of understanding (or not understanding) medieval 
and later animal trials in his own system (pp72-75). For Tester, the past 
is a foreign 
country where they not only do things differently but think them so 
differently that 
we cannot understand them, we cannot think that. Fair enough. 
But what ýve also 
find is that for Tester animal liberation is not a foreign country for there 
is no 
exteriority in this scheme; animal liberation is some kind of hoax, it must 
be an 
Ends of a Different Story 163 
extreme form of the bloody monoculture, the other extreme to the ra,, -,, version. But if 
we see animal liberation as a foreign country, a culture foreign to the orthodox, then 
Tester's view is 'ethnocentric' in that animal liberation is viewed from the orthodox 
(humanocentric) perspective of the researcher. This charge is dodged by a sý6ng 
from the ethnocentric to the relativistic, by the more defensible ethnographic claim 
that animal liberation does not represent a 'better' version of human/nonhuman 
relationships, only a different and extreme one. And if the possibility of this better, 
even if 'unnatural" version, and the sincerity of animal liberation, are denied, the 
significance of its simpler statements is missed: 
Indeed, when something substantive is said about animals it tends to be fairly banal. Let us be 
honest; it is not actually too profound to say that certain things hurt other species. (Tester 1991: 
196). 
But it is profound if, as it does, society believes or Prefers to believe that certain 
things don't hurt (not to say harm) animals or, if they do, that it is of little or no 
moral significance, or that nothing can be done about it. This goes to the heart of 
revelation. 
One of the notable features of Tester's thesis is how easily confrontation with direct 
activists - the really suspicious characters - entails a 
lapsing into clich6 and 
stereotype. Just as Tester describes Evans' (1906) lack of understanding of animal 
trials, Tester can be seen too to have 'covered his incomprehension with abuse' (p75, 
emphasis added). Animal liberation would be tolerable perhaps if it just submitted 
to the rules, taking its chances in the lifestyles market and letting those of us that 
know a fraud from the real thing get on with our far more honest, and private 
sphere, lifestyle choices. But the problem is that the protagonists won't 
be told. 
They will persist in their fraudulent activity and seem to 
be taking people in. A 
major difference between animal liberation and the Frenchman who 
keeps the wine 
myth at arm's length is that the latter doesn't necessarily 
demand that society does 
likewise; and animal liberation does not seek spatial comprehension 
in terms of 
integration or appropriation, but as wholesale adoption. 
As well as forcing a dodgy 
cult product on us it is the aggressive marketing, deceitful advertising and strongarm 
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salesmanship of animal liberation that's outrageous. The barbarians are not so much 
at the gate as within society but if they will not play society's game they must be 
exposed, labelled and associated with the other suspects. 
Due to their self obsession, the "militants' are, for instance, narcissistic. When an 
activist says We strongly dislike the term "animal lover" ... It is a derogatory term 
like nigger lover, Tester reads this to be a statement showing that 'animal rights is 
not about animals' (p177). Other belief is filtered through the norms and meanings of 
the orthodox and if liberationists are not 'animal lovers' (that is, not like animal- 
using British society12), they cannot be genuine in their cause. They are more 
concerned with 'constructing a selfhood which is divorced from animals' and in so 
doing think that they 'will become better humans' (p177), and bodily too: 
Animal rights rewrites the dietary statements of Rousseau, Ritson, and Shelley so that the natural 
diet is seen as a key to a healthy physique which is itself a symbolic testimony of moral goodness. 
I eat well, therefore I am well. In particular, the individual who only eats vegetarian food will 
lose weight and gain a socially prestigious body (Wynne-Tyson 1979: 103) which is slim and 
highly desirable to the opposite sex (for the prestige of slimness, see Featherstone 1982) ... the 
preoccupation with selfhood of modern animal rights might lead to the slim and moral watching 
over the flabby and violent. (Tester 1991: 177-178). 
This is nothing more than a slur (again fearfully reducing an oppositional 
movement's social aims and claims to dominant culture's preoccupations), deforming 
the spirit and letter of Wynne-Tyson's entire output. In utter contradiction of this 
fantasy, John and Jo Hicks, organizers of Animal Activists, write: 
To us Veganism (sic) is solely about stopping suffering, and, to this aim, converting others to the 
diet. So where do health foods come in, how does the use of brown rather than white flour help 
the animals? ... 
Like most people we live on a trash diet, living a hectic life and eating almost 
entirely out of tins, the deep freeze and the local chippy as do most young Vegans we know. We 
have neither the time or the self interest to worry about health foods ... (Hicks 1979). 
Amongst the millions of words said and written by activists it is easy to find 
material to suit almost any representation (see the forum of Arkangel magazine, for 
instance) and it is in reference to activists especially that Tester's representation 
tends towards media sensationalism. This is perhaps unsurprising, given that much 
of his chapter on direct activism (especially ppl82-192) relies heavily upon 
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Henshaw"s (1989) journalistic work on the Animal Liberation Front and is prone to 
the same factual inaccuracies and distortion. The publication of Henshaw occasioned 
probably the only time that the ALF has seriously considered taking someone to 
court, for libel13. 
In contrast to Tester's narrow focus on mammals as the motivating concern of the 
philosophers and therefore the movement as a whole, he is keen to show us how 'the 
militants' go beyond or contradict the philosophers' stance on violence. That the 
ALF has concerned itself with defending shrimps is of no account (nor is their rescue- 
rehoming of animals) but their and/or others' 'violence' against buildings and 
people is seized upon (ppl82-188). At the same time, orthodoxy's structural violence 
against animals is ignored. The relativism does not apply to violence. And nor to 
Nazism. 
Aside from telling us that the militants are narcissistic, violent or 'noisy' (p190), 
Tester represents an ethical and political crusade as an exercise in totalitarianism. 
That "the militants have curious alliances' is due to author Hans Ruesch's interview 
with a Nazi magazine (p192), for instance, but how Ruesch links with the ALF is not 
at all clear. (His Slaughter of the Innocent and Naked Empress are both, unlike the 
ALF, centrally concerned with the scientific invalidity of vivisection). We have to 
accept though that Ronnie Lee, co-founder of the Band of Mercy-Animal Liberation 
Front - described by Tester as an 'eco-fascist' (p190) - once suggested that 
Nazis 
who joined animal rights groups should not necessarily be expelled, for this would 
deprive 'the animals of some of their defenders' (Lee 1985: 10). But this is one, albeit 
prominent, activist offering one view which is obviously unrepresentative of 
militants' or others" views within the movement. Indeed, these examples are 
possibly the sum total of the movement's Nazi association. Tester does tell us that 
the Hunt Saboteurs Association and the British Union for the Abolition of 
Vivisection have more honourable records than Lee's in dealing with Nazis, but the 
point here surely is that all the major animal liberation organizations and the vast 
majority of those in the movement have such an honourable record. 
The Nazi 
allusion is par for the journalistic course and fits well with Tester's notion of animal 
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rights as 'magical purity' rather than moral and political protest. The militants' 
concern with world populations is reduced to eugenicism (p189) whilst orthodox 
creation of animal population explosions is a taken for granted. Scant attention is 
also paid to what many liberationists see as the fascism of institutionalized animal 
use, the orthodox finding fascist references relevant only to intra- and not inter- 
species holocausts. 
The odd impression given overall is that animals would be better off without animal 
liberationists, and animal liberation is explained away: 
The activities of the militants are just one especially fundamentalist way of living the truth of the 
fetish of animal rights ... The animals only wander into the picture when they are dying or dead. 
The humans are too busy painting their own image throughout the world to take any notice of 
them. (Tester 1991: 193). 
But surely it is Tester who doesn't take any notice of them. Animals and Society's 
expos6 of animal rights could hardly be bettered as a parody of anti-animal 
liberationism. Salt would probably have regarded it as an effort to "absurdly 
exaggerate the least vital points in [animal rights] reasoning while failing to note 
what is the very core of the controversy' (Salt nd: 2), and Edward W Said as 
perhaps a 'learned perspective [which] supports the caricatures propagated in the 
popular culture' (see Said 1995: 290). 
Summary & Conclusions 
In place of a dialectic evolution, Tester uses cultural and epistemological relativism. 
The problem does not lie in this, however, but in the reductionism, representing the 
ethics of liberationists as functionally dependent on their other beliefs and practices 
which, we are told, have nothing to do with, can have nothing to do with, genuine 
animal concern. We have seen that Tester's work runs counter to any notion of 
revelation - for there is nothing to reveal, except animal liberation as a fraud - 
and that the internal context of veganism and the external context of animal use are 
ignored. We have also been able to identify certain other themes - redefinition, 
entrapment, incomprehension and ideologies - within the representation of animal 
liberation given there. 
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Reduction, entrapment and redefinition tend to run together. Reducing animals to 
ciphers, animal liberation to a concern over what it is to be human, and locating 
them within a history of determining structures (restrictions) of knowledge, serves to 
take animal liberation out of its contexts and cage this exotic beast within a system 
of thought which denies it both sincerity and agency, effectively labelling it an 
illegitimate concern. It has been redefined within the very structures from which it 
seeks liberation, those which have determined and explained bloody culture's 
continued animal use. Contrary to 'animal rights' being an 'entrapment' of animals, 
Tester's thesis is an entrapment of animal liberation. 
Picturing animal liberation in such a restricted way that other animals and their 
exploitation are left out of the frame hints at an incomprehension which stems from 
the incredibility of people taking other animals seriously, as discrete beings, ends in 
themselves, rather than trope material. The representation of it is the effect of this 
incomprehension and of the structures used to comprehend it. Tester's concealment of 
animal use allows its comformism and collective acts to remain untouched, its 
mythology to continue, the transhistorical speciesist ideology and its discourse to go 
unchallenged. Against this, any revelation the movement tries to achieve is viewed 
as dishonest or crass, its protagonists denigrated. 
This critique of animal liberation concerns the claim that it naturalizes its beliefs in 
order to render them self-evident. Now this is generally identified as an ideological 
strategy employed by a dominant class or group in order to legitimate its power and 
position and to protect and further its interests. But animal liberation is not a 
dominant power and the interests it is protecting and furthering are not its own. 
Tester appears to disagree with both assertions. On the first count, the conflation of 
animal liberation and society gives the impression that, through subterfuge, animal 
liberation has become a dominant power or is threatening to attain such a position. 
Regarding interests, the extraordinary characteristic of animal liberation is that, 
unlike all other bodies and agencies and movements, it is entirely made up of 
humans 
who struggle for radical change in the interests of others. The major weakness of 
its 
ideological strategy then is that it is not about this or these at all. 
And it is not just 
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that animal liberation is, instead, about human worry over what it is to be human 
but, rather, that animal liberation is the ultimate expression of this anxiety which, 
for liberationists, is all consuming, approaching the pathological. But as we have 
seen, this is far-fetched, animal liberation cannot be reduced to a concern over 
polluting mammals, to an avoidance and self-perfecting strategy. 
If Tester's straw man is doing what everyone else does in relation to the blank pages 
and is no better at the exercise, just different in his equal 'knowledge' or ignorance; if 
he cannot avoid being just another animal trapper, then what is omitted is serious 
consideration of what is in it for animals (such a question being redundant if an 
impoverished structuralist-reductionist view of animals is taken). Whilst it may be 
impossible to determine whether other animals are treated better or worse within 
the changing though consistently instrumentalist taxonomies of different eras, it is 
not impossible to determine whether individual animals are better off not being 
experimented upon, for instance, and at the present time. But, for Tester, animals are 
just as well off without liberationists. 
Whether Salt invented animal rights, whether it was one of Gompertz's many 
inventions, or whether Salt was canny enough to organize humaneness and unify the 
various strands of animal concern doesn't matter at all in terms of the challenge that 
animal liberation poses now. But if animal liberation is pictured as just one way of 
reconciling the ambiguity of 'Man', no better than others, then this covertly 
legitimates animal use and overtly deligitimates animal liberation as a political 
and ethical protest, and renders innocuous the other, non-liberationist, versions of 
reconciliation. Wholly absorbed (comprehended) into the project, liberationists' 
only distinguishing characteristic is their extremeness which distances them from 
the animals whose interests they pretend to serve. The implication is not just that 
liberationists can 'know' nothing about animals, but that they know 
less than the 
orthodox. 
Certainly, to say that full-blown animal rights philosophy is a product of 
modernity is a valid claim and, contrary to Tester, Salt would probably agree. 
But 
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this does not invalidate animal liberation as Tester seems to want to do. What is 
disturbing and despised is that if, within the modern episteme, Salt actually did 
invent a coherent animal rights, others did not. Why they did not, and why-hoýý' 
they did not-do not go along with it, and found-find ways of undermining it, keeping 
it unthinkable, or sidestepping the challenge, is the more instructive area of concern. 
Whether intended at the outset or not, consciously or unconsciously, Tester's account 
is ultimately symptomatic of the recoil from and the obscuring of revelation. Tester 
seems to have dimly perceived the revelatory moment but has tried to contain it 
within a symbolic-Foucauldian account. Yet the academic tone cannot be sustained: 
the work becomes sensationalist, and illustrates the fear of the liberation of the 
Other from functionalist structures. It mimics, and possibly even informs, much of 
what we shall find in the following chapters. 
Notes 
1. This presupposition is not without its critics. Benton (1993: 65-66), for instance, lampoons the 
blank pages approach. 
2. For instance, 'Humanitarianism appears to be the main conscious motive for da Vinci's 
meatless diet' (see Barkas 1975: 70-72) and 'The Utopians feel that slaughtering our fellow 
creatures gradually destroys the sense of compassion, which is the finest sentiment of which our 
human nature is capable' (from More's Utopia of 1516, quoted in Wynne-Tyson 1990: 327). 
Moreover, Tester does not acknowledge that humanitarianism and compassion may also be 
products of belief nor, even if they are solely products of knowledge, how those products are then 
shaped to the requirements of dominant ideology. 
3. The second part of the reference reads: 'Both diets are codifications of points raised by 
Pythagoras and Plutarch, but largely reinvented by Rousseau' (Tester 1991: 143), with which we 
shall not argue here. 
4. Realeat/Gallup 1997. 
5. A Vegan Society membership survey (1990) recorded that 63 per cent of members became vegan 
for 'animal rights' reasons; 16 per cent for health reasons; 11 per cent ecology reasons: and 10 
per cent spiritual reasons. (The Vegan, Summer, p 21). 
6. It is worth quoting Salt here: 'Perhaps the strangest of Mr Chesterton's charges against 
humanitarians was one which he made in his book Orthodoxy, that their trend is "to touch fewer 
and fewer things, " i. e. to abstain from one action after another until they are left in a merely 
negative position. He failed to see that while we certainly desire to touch fewer and fewer things 
with whip, hob-nailed boot, hunting-knife, scalpel, or pole-axe, we equally desire to get into 
touch with more and more of our fellow-beings by means of that sympathetic intelligence which 
tells us that they are closely akin to ourselves ... ' (Salt 
1921: 128). 
7. This general point is also made by Baker (1993: 214). 
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8. Despite downgrading processual accounts, in claiming that animal liberation is an avoidance 
strategy, Tester is not so far from Elias's (1994) idea that vegetarianism could grow out of the 
civilizing process as a repugnance at animal-like behaviour. In addition, there is a brief point of 
contact between Tester's account and ecofeminist animal defence theory in that both critique 
animal 'rights" on the basis of its anthropocentrism. For the latter the problem is that, in the 
rationalist philosophy, animals' rights and interests are recognized the nearer they approach the 
status of humans, sharing standard attributes with man as the benchmark. This runs against 
ecocentrism. Tester claims that animals will remain objects to the privileged subject and that the 
debate, framed in such terms, will go on until we can be certain about the final basis of what it is 
to be human, or until the day when Man' is finally buried (Tester 1991: 89). But, as we can see, 
the two soon separate out again; ecoferninism, like Eder (1996), seeing the anthropocentrism (or 
androcentrism) as ultimately impotent, a conceptual fault or liability; Tester seeing it as a 
suspicious purity obsession and therefore an imposture, for which he seems to rely heavily on an 
outmoded view of vegetarian abstinence. Although they can easily do so, strictly cultural- 
sociological accounts do not have to end up like Tester's whose 'avoidance strategy' of 
liberationists is contradicted by Carol J Adams' liberationist view (similar to both Andrew 
Linzey's and Stephen Clark's) of the present human/nonhuman relationship: 'We are estranged 
from animals through institutionalized violence ... we have also been estranged from ways to 
think about our estrangement ... Eating animals is an existential expression of our estrangement 
and alienation from the created order' (Adams 1994a: 174). 
9. We could also add that the form of thought closest to 'truth' is that of the subjugated or of those 
'thinking' on their behalf. 
10. Incidentally, in this connection, a 1991 University of Utah survey of subscribers to The 
Animals' Agenda magazine showed 84 per cent also supportive of the civil rights movement, 
feminism, the struggle against apartheid, pacifism and gay rights. (Cited by Pluhar 1995: 127). 
11. A Vegan Society leaflet, c 1986-90, read 'Behind Every Animal Product Lies a Horror Story. 
12. An illustration of orthodox animal love is how a loved pet is routinely translated into a 
surrogate child (e. g. BBC1 Six o'Clock News, 30.11-98). Depth of positive emotion can only be 
genuine, and comprehended, if humans, real or symbolic, are the recipients. 
13. See ALF Supporters Group Newsletter, July 1990, pp 5-8. 
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Chapter 6 
Media Representation: Part One 
Introduction 
In this and the following chapter we shift our attention from the representation of 
animal 'rights' contained within an academic work to the more social and certainly 
more common and everyday although, as we have already suggested, there are 
overlaps or inter tex tu A ties. Here we shall be concerned with the representations of 
animal liberation and animal use as found in the media and considered here as an 
index of how the the challenge of animal liberation is or is not confronted. 
Society is steeped in speciesism but that unifying ideology is under sustained attack. 
Animal liberation is a severe challenge to a dominant liberal-pluralist rationalism 
which distances itself from non-institutional cruelties and institutional excesses but 
legitimizes all other institutionalized animal use. Bloodless culture presents itself 
as offering something better, and is founded on those very values on which the 
bloody culture has prided itself: rationality, equality, compassion, justice. There is 
much at stake - power, cognitive and affect structures, values, norms, beliefs, habit, 
economics, mores, language, meaning, knowledge of self and of the ultimate others 
against whom humans have defined themselves. 
The fearsome attack threatens cultural revolution, negation of cultural order and 
liberation of the Other; the culture is exposed as ambivalent, hypocritical, 
inconsistent, its common decency like its common sense a superficiality. Under attack 
the refined bloody culture will defend itself and launch naked counter attacks and 
covert operations, its immune system working sleeplessly. 
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In order to prevent a legitimation crisis, it must maintain its health, status and the 
upper hand and it will do this via certain ideological strategies, and this reaction to 
the attack can be traced in the speciesist media discourse. Together, the strategies 
serve to obscure revelation, to prevent more people seeing the green light and 
defecting to the oppositional culture or, as the orthodox would see it, to the extreme. 
Now all the above presupposes several things, most importantly that the media 
function in certain ways and that they function in certain ways in relation to animal 
use and animal liberation. We should attend to these things before proceeding. We 
shall not be working on the understanding that the media are open-minded or 
objective or balanced in their representations for by the very monitoring of media 
output - which may have begun upon such a basis - it became apparent that such 
pretences are untenable. The character of media discourse here directs us instead 
towards other premises. 
First of all, and not forgetting that social attitudes create and sustain public 
discourse, we shall work from the premise that: 
Social texts do not merely reflect or mirror objects, events and categories pre-existing in the social 
and natural world. Rather, they actively construct a version of those things. They do not just 
describe things; they do things. And being active, they have social and political implications. 
(Potter & Wetherell 1987: 6). 
And that, as these media texts help construct a reality and shape public 
consciousness and popular consent, the two main areas of investigation or analysis 
are how the accounts themselves are constructed and what functions or purposes they 
achieve or fail to serve. 
More specifically, in relation to both animal use and liberation, we shall be working 
to the role of the mass media here as characterized by Larry Gross (1995: 62): that 
(a) representation in the mediated "reality' of our mass culture is in itself power; 
non-representation maintains the powerless status of groups that do not possess 
significant material or political power bases. Those who are at the bottom of the 
various power hierarchies will be kept in their places in part through their relative 
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invisibility; and that (b) when groups or perspectives do attain visibility, the 
manner of that representation will itself reflect the biases and interests of those 
elites who define the public agenda. Hall (1982: 81) reinforces the points: the 
struggle over meaning itself is not the only one; there is also the struggle over access 
to the very means of signification. Accredited witnesses and spokespersons with 
privileged access to the world of public discourse, carry authority and establish the 
frameworks of debate. When those whose definitions are more partial, fragmentary 
and delegitimated actually gain some form of access they have to perform within 
the established terms of the problematic at play. This tends to give credibility to 
the 'common sensical', the orthodox versions of 'logical' and 'rational'. 
Now these things lead us to consider the ideology, hegemony and (Barthesian) myth 
character of media representation and we can suggest that speciesist discourse, or the 
media texts of speciesism, can be analyzed in ideological terms. We have already 
alluded in this thesis to speciesism. and animal liberation as ideologies but we can 
expand upon it here. Because animal liberation is not economistically determined nor 
has conventional political goals, this implies that we should largely dispense with 
questions of reductive ideology (although animal exploitation is not merely 
discrimination but profitable prejudice, like slavery). Yet we should not dispense 
with a notion of ideology so readily. Admittedly, speciesism and animal liberation 
do not fit easily into classic ideology-hegemony-myth frameworks if we take these 
as they relate (in solely human/human terms) to one class or group maintaining 
dominance over another or others through legitimation of that dominance. In 
human/nonhuman terms we can see this at best in the rather unlikely sense of 
animals being forced, persuaded, misled or mystified into believing that their 
objectification - which they above all cannot see as such M- is in their interests. 
That aside, speciesism is indeed an ideology, a death-dealing ideology, 
totalitarian in its methods and effects, where animals are the subjugated "class'. 
Indeed, not to see speciesism as an ideology would itself be open to the charge of 
speciesism. It follows then that we shall have no truck with any rationale which 
considers animal liberation to be ideological whilst the orthodox are merely 
animal-eaters. We are well beyond "food first, morals later'. 
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But can we use ideology, hegemony, myth here to relate to speciesism in 
human/human terms? Who is pulling the wool over whose eyes? Are some classes or 
groups of people suffering at the hands of this ideology and others benefitting 
instead? Superficially at least, the media are merely engaged in a reflection of a 
reality in which the majority appear happy to collude and enjoy its 'benefits. And 
the dominating class in this sense is still the one which also partakes of the same 
'fruits' of animal-based agriculture and health system as the masses. There is no 
clean break which separates 'classes' in relation to speciesism for all traditional 
human classes are speciesist. But what of veganism's claims that its superiority lies 
not just in animal liberation values and ethics, but in the inextricably related 
improvements, promised as a bonus, in human health, hunger and land use, indeed, in 
human rights? If speciesism contributes to human hunger and sickness then we can 
talk more straightforwardly in terms of ideology, an ideology which has as one of 
its strategies the exclusion not only of rival forms of thought and belief but of rival 
forms of practice, those rival forms which are promoted by individuals and groups 
from all classes who constitute, or who aim at, a non-speciesist culture. 
But even then certain critiques of speciesism's status as an ideology may still be 
weakened: we cannot truly speak of it as an ideology, which naturalizes and 
universalizes its beliefs and practices so as to render them self-evident and 
apparently inevitable, without at least recognizing that this is not an ideology 
hatched in the sense of bourgeois ideology and its historical intention. Speciesism 
does have on its side in this the larger claim to naturalness, its traditions as 
illusions of permanence, its killing and animal-eating essentialisms which defy 
complete unravelling. 
So, to some extent an analysis based entirely here on terms of, say, myth would be 
somewhat invalid. As Roland Barthes points out in Mythologies, myth can only 
have an historical foundation, for myth is a type of speech chosen by history; 
it 
cannot possibly evolve from the 'nature' of things (Barthes 1993: 110). However, we 
are long since past the genuine appeal to necessity, and continued animal use 
has 
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been characterized by secondary rationalization which, if it cannot be analyzed 
completely in terms of myth, is indeed defined by its present and continuing 
intention. 
Notwithstanding the contention that society is now a society of fragmented 
ideologies we shall proceed on the basis that speciesism. as a unifying ideology can 
indeed be analyzed in ideological terms. What we are to focus on is how it utters its 
message and on how 'meaning (signification) serves to sustain relations of 
domination' (Thompson 1984: 130-131); how speciesism. is maintained in the face of 
attack, when it deploys classic ideological strategies (of legitimation) - promoting 
beliefs, values and practices congenial to itself; naturalizing and universalizing such 
beliefs; denigrating ideas (and their agents) which challenge it; excluding rival 
forms of thought; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself (see 
Eagleton 1991: 5-6), although this last strategy is rather moot here, the obscuration 
is more of a self-deception. We shall substitute the confusing and redefining 
strategy. 
Here, the notion of ideological 'mystification' relates not just to the masking or 
suppressing of social conflicts (ideology as an imaginary resolution of real 
contradictions) but also to the mystification which seeks to obstruct the kind of 
revelation we have been concerned with throughout; one which reveals in a 
different light not one's own subjugation but that of the mass of the Other. What we 
shall do then is view the discourse from an ideological critique viewpoint, drawing 
on Barthesian myth. 
But, because of the weakened notion of ideology, and because we are looking at this 
speciesist discourse as it appears in the media - taking the media as a site of 
struggle rather than, initially at least, an ideological state apparatus - we can 
consider ideology also, and more generally, in terms of Gramsci's hegemony, which 
includes ideology. McQuail gives a summary: 
Hegemony refers to a loosely interrelated set of ruling ideas permeating a society, 
but in such a 
way as to make the established order of power and values appear natural, taken-for-granted 
and 
commonsensical. A ruling ideology is not imposed but appears to exist 
by virtue of an 
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unquestioned consensus. Hegemony tends to define unacceptable opposition to the Status quo as dissident and deviant. In effect, hegemony is a constantly reasserted definition of a social 
situation, by way of discourse rather than political or economic power, which becomes real in its 
consequences. (McQuail 1994: 99). 
Not just the class outlook or world view but the manufacturing of consent, the 
maintenance of credibility and legitimacy; a manipulation which involves the 
production of ways of seeing and thinking and of excluding or downgrading 
alternative visions and discourses. And hegemony is of use here not only because it is 
'a less economistic way of conceptualizing the relationship between ideological, 
social, political and economic processes and relations' (Bennett 1982a: 52-53) - 
ideological struggles being seen on their own terms rather than in relation to some 
other site - but because it enables us, again at least initially, to view animal 
liberation in a struggle to win the agreement of other groups in order to achieve the 
universal recognition, acceptance and adoption of bloodless culture values. This is a 
crucial point for, as we have earlier claimed, animal liberation does not merely seek 
some form of accommodation within a dominant speciesist ideology, a discrete area 
of discursive privacy within liberal-pluralism. It is not a plea for toleration of 
diversity of belief and value. In this the obvious charge against it, and the defence 
of the status quo and its 'repressive tolerance', is that it is animal liberation which 
is totalitarian. However, animal liberation does not seek power for itself as a group 
of individuals or for animals; it seeks to end it in human/nonhuman relations. 
Appearing to have great faith in human nature, animal liberation does not seek to 
shuffle elites, only that they and others come to 'see' and act upon the revelation. It 
negates the concepts of hegemony and power in human/nonhuman affairs. It is not so 
much hegemony itself that we are interested in but its modus operandi and the 
opportunities afforded, or not, for participation in the struggle. 
Relating more specifically to media and media function in relation to animal 
liberation, and to draw upon concepts used in Christopher Campbell's (1995: 3-6) 
work on race and the media, we shall be examining how majority culture perceptions 
(preferred readings) reproduced in the media feed mythological notions about 
animal exploitation and liberation - notions that can contribute to contemporary 
speciesist attitudes, the animal-using consensus. Or in Barthes' terms how, through 
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their rhetoric, "bourgeois myths outline the general prospect of this pseudo-physis 
which defines the dream of the contemporary bourgeois world' (Barthes 1993: 150). 
Several of Barthes' 'rhetorical figures' will assist in the analysis. 
We have referred to a work on race and media, but just as the speciesist discourse 
cannot be analysed on the same terms as one may analyse sexist or racist discourse, 
for instance (analysis of speciesist discourse having to find its own way in an 
overwhelmingly speciesist world where media representation is saturated with 
speciesism), the method(s) used in those analyses too, in this case, cannot readily be 
applied here. Regarding the style of analysis it should be noted then that: 
There is no analytic method as such, rather a broad theoretical framework which focuses 
attention on the construction and functional dimensions of discourse. (Potter & Wetherell 1987: 
169). 
It is the speciesist discourse's freedom to be blatant which determines the analytical 
basis and yet, because its messages are broadcast in and to a speciesist society where 
dominant models about animal use (and possibly 'animal rights") are shared, even 
the explicit can appear implicit or tacit or even subliminal. An example of the 
difference between analysing racism and speciesism in elite discourse in this sense is 
the case of what van Dijk (1993) calls the semantic move of denial: 'We are not 
racist but ... '. Within speciesism the speciesism 
is not denied openly - it is the 
social norm and the proud boast of many - so the denial relates instead to its own 
criterion, of illegal cruelty: "We don't want animals treated badly but ... '. Thus we 
are operating from at least one remove and a crucial one, for it separates cultures. 
The aim here is not only to relate media discourse to the foregoing narrative and 
exposition but to cover the gamut of representational types more at the macro level, 
rather than at the micro level of stylistics and semantic structures. (Depth may be 
sacrificed to breadth in the process). So we cannot follow, either, an analysis (e. g. 
Kress & Hodge 1979, Fairclough 1989, Potter 1996) which may linguistically analyse 
in detail a small number of examples, looking perhaps at the use of passives and 
intransitive structures which may attenuate participants' roles, for instance. 
Nor can 
we follow one which concentrates on theory rather than its application to a 
large 
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number of specific examples (e. g. Foucault 1981 and 1991). Nor are these chapters 
able to use the kind of space necessary for a combination of these analyses (e. g. Said 
1995). Moreover, we have already traced the changing dominant and subjugated 
discourses. What we are interested in, as referred to at the start, is just how society's 
speciesist condition is defended and how overwhelming speciesist ideology is 
reproduced in media discourse when under attack. Although it draws upon some of 
the above works, the analysis here falls between the kinds mentioned, being a 
combination of qualitative content analysis, ideological textual analysis and 
informal discourse analysis and, due to such matters, the style of these chapters 
differs somewhat from the foregoing. As in previous chapters, however, the 
following material keeps both animal use and liberation in view, considering 
together both the media's offensive rhetoric - "constructed precisely to rework, 
damage or reframe an alternative description", and defensive rhetoric - 'its 
capacity to resist discounting or undermining' (Potter 1996: 107). In effect, these are 
two aspects of recoil. 
The overriding claim is that the manner in which the media function serves to 
suppress the development and adoption of animal liberation. They act as a brake on 
emancipation, maintaining the species barrier: thus far (welfarism) and no further, 
a circumscribed liberalism reproducing the legitimation of speciesism. In this 
particular expression of dominant articulate thought we see the failure to confront 
responsibly the challenge of animal liberation, to confront otherness and difference; 
how it has, instead and through incomprehension and fear, controlled in various 
ways and within the parameters of the welfarist synthesis. The chapter will also 
serve as a report, not only on media-bloody culture performance but on animal 
liberation progress (in terms of ridicule and discussion); specifically on that of an 
animal liberation as we have understood it here. 
Throughout, we should remember that animal liberation, to a large extent though 
not wholly, rests upon a rationalist philosophy, a major strategic tool in extending 
prevailing norms to other species; using bloody culture's norms for its own purposes. 
This identification with the bloody culture also tends to identify its 
decency with 
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common decency as if it were part of an Eliasian civilizing process and Which can be 
viewed as taking things too far. So, instead of this being a clash of different 
decencies, animal liberation can be viewed as being within the same field, not 
recognized as of another order. This problem also operates, as we saw in Chapter 4, 
in relation to the philosophers and movement, for one reason or another, not 
emphatically espousing veganism but vegetarianism which has a foot, if not its 
roots, in bloody culture. We should carry with us here not only the 'model' of 
veganism but also what has become the norm of 'animal rights' equating with 
vegetarianism, whatever the movement's intentions. And we shall have to see how 
these factors may afford orthodoxy the opportunity to use animal liberation for its 
own purposes, not least in picturing animal liberation as an extreme of it, rather than 
an alternative to it, an oppositional and bloodless culture. 
This relates to something we mentioned in the previous chapter; how animal 
liberation was uncomprehended, calling upon Barthes' dual sense of comprehend. We 
shall keep this in mind, remembering that the spatial and intellectual 
(in)comprehensions may work against animal liberation in different ways. 
* 
The media in question here are the quality press (where we may expect to find the 
highest or more considered popular articulate thought), the Radio Times, BBC1's, 
BBC2's, ITV's and Channel 4's fiction and non-fiction output where animal issues 
were flagged (and often where not), and the BBC1 Six o'Clock News. All television 
coverage was during the period 6prn until midnight which meant, for instance, the 
omission of daytime studio free-for-all formats which generated more heat than 
light, and there is little consideration given to newscasters' and anchor peoples' 
winks, smiles, frowns and raised eyebrows that cue viewers' appropriate responses to 
stories and comments. Soap operas were also excluded, and there are no case studies. 
During the period of this monitoring - specifically during 1994 to 1996 
but calling 
upon earlier and later examples - obvious case study candidates may 
have included 
the 1995 live export demonstrations and the trial and imprisonment of ALF activist 
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Keith Mann during 1994-95. Interest has been more in what appear to be the routine 
representations, although elements of these two 'events' are incorporated into the 
analysis. 
Another of Gross's points is that we should not take too seriously the presumed 
differences between the various categories of media messages. News, drama, quiz 
shows, sports, etc. share underlying similarities of theme, emphasis and value. 
Elliott et al (1986: 272) also claim that narrative codes and ideological reference 
points cut across varied forms, e. g. news, comedy, fiction. The inclusion of news, 
current affairs, fiction, comedy, articles, columns and comment in this analysis 
affords too a greater comprehensiveness and shows how actuality and fictional 
forms accumulate meaning(s) in an overwhelming and relentless regime of 
representation. 
The spectrum of media material and its organizational presentation needs comment 
before we proceed. Taking speciesism as an ideology, material from the media 
discourse was categorized within typical ideological strategy groupings and then 
broken down into more manageable and illustrative genres or "tactics'. (Admittedly, 
this is somewhat artificial for more often than not more than one strategy or tactic is 
at work at any given time). It should be stressed however, that material was not 
initially selected with this in mind; that is, in order to fit a theory. On the contrary, 
the gathered material (and what is used here forms merely part of a much larger 
archive), if not exactly dictating the scheme, was found to be most easily 
accommodated and, hopefully, accessible within it. Material has not been rejected if 
it contradicted the argument (and some material which tends to work against the 
theory is included as representative of rarity even though, in terms of strict 
representative ratio, it should not appear at all in this small sample. The archive 
shows the -negative' representations utterly overwhelming the positive or semi- 
positive). 
Another point could be held in mind while reading this material. There may 
be 
recognized in this analysis examples relating to different historical strands of 
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bloody culture - from Cartesianism, Thomism and Hobbesianism, for instance, but 
other examples show how they combine to give the same result. This point being 
that what is drawn upon are dominant models and the accumulation of bloo&, 
culture tradition, the topos, the 'reservoir of ideas or core images from v,, hich 
specific rhetoric statements can be generated' (see Karim 1997: 153) just as we have 
been able to draw upon the reservoir of Chapter 1 throughout this thesis. These 
areas are largely coterminous, of course. 
As this part of the thesis is broken down into two chapters, this Introduction will 
serve for both, the Conclusion and References appearing at the end of Chapter 7. 
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Ideological Strategies 
Promotion 
There is perhaps no need to outline extensively the media's blatant promotion of 
animal use and killing and thereby the overt reproduction of speciesism, the beliefs 
and values congenial to it and the practices 'beneficial' to it. In a speciesist society, 
the media will not only be saturated with it but specific enticements and instruction 
in the practices and recreations will predominate. So, the initiation of young 
children into bloody culture traditions extended also to the promotion of educating 
them in the ways of bloodsportsl, and all the quality newspapers ran full-page 
weekend features not only on how to cook animals but on the pleasures of bloodsports 
and animal farming. These included such items as teaching readers how to kill 
magpies and crows after luring such 'vermin' with a trapped live decoy2. In fact, 
there seemed to be a desperation to extend the range of dominion. Much of the 
promotion was of activities one could travel abroad to participate in or watch, 
activities which were not allowed or available in the UK, such as "game' shooting 
in Africa3; turkey hunting in America4; lassooing calves in Ireland5; camel wrestling 
in Turkey6, or the celebration of the annual elephant festival in Thailand where 
wild elephants were captured, separated, confined, 'broken', and forced (with kicks 
and prods) into logging, playing football, taking part in tugs of war and races. With 
no sense of irony on the part of programme makers or enthusiastic spectators 
(tourists), the latter wore 'Save the Elephant' t-shirts7. 
But this section is more concerned with the less obvious. First of all we should look 
at some of the defining examples of speciesist discourse which constitute the quality 
of a common morality where, if animals and concern for animals are recognized they 
are as something of a joke. Unsurprisingly, coverage was loaded in favour of humans 
- where the highest (or any) level of sympathy, concern and privilege was 
reserved only for one's own kind; a display of species loyalty. The ethical and 
ontological framework was determined by what the media were prepared to take 
seriously, so here too was an area of trivialization. It also drew in the more common 
indulgence of sentimentality and ultimately defined the human 'In relation 
to 
'lesser' animals. 
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Invisibility-Low Visibility 
This tactic of ideology maintenance regarded animals as the insignificant Others, 
only incidental to the action, to life. Their suffering, their use, was inevitable, 
their subjugation the natural order of things; it went without saying and therefore 
passed without comment. Human interest came not just first but first and last, 
founded upon occlusion. As Steve Baker puts it, drawing on Barthes: 
The unwritten priorities of the culture enable even that which is in full view to be rendered 
effectively invisible - or if still visible to be drained, by common consent, of any significance. 
The dominant culture view that the subject of animals is essentially trivial ... is a clear case in 
point'. (Baker 1993: 8). 
And this applies to animals themselves as much as to their advocates and the 
issues. Footage would show freshly-netted fish trampled and gutted while still 
alive, as the narration talked of human livelihood8 (this applied also to footage of 
sheep-dipping and fears over farmers' health), or pictures showed as an ("unseen) 
visual, a calf, head clamped between a farmer's knees, having his/her ear 
mutilated for a news item on the Irish claim for exemption from the EU ban on cattle 
imports due to the BSE scare9. (Virtually all BSE-related coverage failed to concern 
itself with bovine suffering). In coverage of horse racing, which treated it as if just 
another sport, horses and jockeys would be shown crashing to the ground with 
details given of the fate of the latter only10. The Radio Times preview of The Great 
Australian Camel Race stated that: 'Few of the participants [the riders] could 
foresee the physical and psychological challenges they had set themselves'll. The 
trailer for Channel 4's The Great Outdoors gave shots of people doing various things 
to the voiceover of 'Walk it' (showing a footpath); 'Sail it' (a yacht); 'Fly it' (a 
glider); 'Ride it' (not a bike, but a horse)12. And BBC1 Six o'Clock News would run 
items on winter's 'big freeze', focusing on the suffering of the old, the infirm, the 
homeless, wildlife and farmers, but was blind to the millions of farmed animals 
routinely fenced in and deprived of natural cover or artificial shelter13. 
Invisibility which, as we see, also served to disguise the master/slave relationship, 
could also be due to the shadow cast by a weaker form of animal protection; a 
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species-oriented conservationist flight from specificity, a hint of which was 
contained in the concern for wildlife in the elephant and "big freeze' examples 
above. BBCI Six o'Clock News ran an item on sharks endangered by overfishing. 
While viewers were being encouraged to worry about this situation the footage 
showed a shark with a hook in his/her mouth and another in his/her side being 
hoisted onto deck14- Despite the suffering before our eyes, the shark was spoken of 
not as an individual but as a species, a vague notion of The Shark. And in a 
television investigation of the death of environmental campaigner Andrew Lees in 
Madagascar, the locals were shown paying homage to him by slaughtering a bull 
and hanging the bull's head on a fence, a ritual in which Lees's partner took part. 
Lees had been investigating the RTZ company's damaging impact on the local 
culture and environment, of great concern to the film makers for whom the crude 
slaughter, and the bull himself, were of only local symbolic interest15. 
When animals and their use gained low-grade visibility, when the culture's 
blindness was not entirely conspicuous, media representations stood as examples of 
pure humanocentrism, the trivialization (or exclusion) of animal concern and the 
reinforcement of dominion. The animals were recognized only in order to render them 
insignificant. 
The Independent featured jockey Graham Bradley's 'nightmare" of oversleeping and 
missing a race, then being chosen later to ride a winner. Some 750 words were given 
over to this transformation of human fortunes, leaving the last 50 or so to tell readers 
that at the same meeting two horses 'had to be put down' due to race injuries, making 
it 'a bad afternoon for the owner and trainer' (emphasis added)16. 
Instrumentalism was inherent and only sometimes appeared in such bold statement 
as Martin Whittaker's in The Independent, telling readers: 'OK, so they're cute. But 
llamas have their uses' and, after asking: 'So what exactly are llamas good forT, 
went on to list the ways by which they may be exploited for human ends17- And in 
the Goldring Audit, the eponymous reporter looked at a calf and then asked the 
farmer, 'When will that be eatable? '18. 
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A gung-ho celebration of motor culture in the Australian outback (Jeremy Clarkson's 
Motorworld) saw the eponymous hero rounding up panicking cattle from a 
helicopter, shouting, 'You can run but you can't hide'. Clarkson then went on a tký, o- 
hour camel hunt, jumping from a jeep in order to boondock the exhausted animal who 
was captured for racing in the Middle East. Clarkson's parting comment to the camel 
was, 'There's no veal protestors where you're going. ' The 150-foot long animal- 
transporting trucks in the area 'don't need to be thoroughbreds; they need to be 
mules', and without them, 'northern Australia would starve', the reality-fixing 
statement of fact. At no point was there the slightest concern for the cattle, the 
environment or even wildlife, many of which were mown down by the huge lorries 
and 'make a mess of the truck'19. 
After winning the 1996 St Leger, jockey Frankie Dettori was given a four-day whip 
ban for using the whip on a horse called Shantou too forcibly and too often. Horse- 
whipping enthusiasts subsequently interviewed on Right to Reply included racing's 
TV commentators justifying whip-use by analogy with boxing - Shantou was known 
for 'needing bullying ... he got bullied and he won, 
20. A celebratory interview of 
Dettori in Radio Times was headed by the jockey's quote: 'Colts are like men, you 
can bully them. Fillies are like women, you have to keep them sweet, sentiments 
typically unchallenged by interviewer Andrew Duncan2l. 
And, in the face of this insidious onslaught, so relentless it became virtually 
invisible itself, editor Andrew Marr could claim in The Independent that 'the 
tyrannies that forced ordinary people to become heroic are dead or in retreat, 
22, 
ignoring or not seeing the human 'tyranny' over nonhumans, and the rising numbers of 
animal liberationists risking their security, health, freedom and lives by their 
actions which were almost entirely 'unseen' by the media, and certainly in this sense 
(see Exclusion section). 
Comedy & Humour 
Other animals are a vehicle for comedy, beasts of humorous burden. 
Within this 
category, especially within "alternative' stand-up comedy, there was a shade of 
the 
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critic and satirist. One might look especially to alternative comedy - noting its 
avowed anti-sexism and anti-racism - to provide an alternative to conventional 
approaches to animals and their liberation. One could expect, perhaps, to find here 
attacks on speciesism, on animal exploitation and abuse or at least on individuals 
committing cruel acts. But, as early as 1983, and setting the tone for most if not all of 
what followed, it seems, London Weekend showcased alternative comedy with a 
series titled Stomping on the Cat. Anti-animal or anti-animal liberation jokes were 
the stock in trade of most television comedy of all kinds, betraying perhaps the age- 
old tension and contradiction inherent in the orthodox relationship with other (non- 
laughing) animals. 
Lauded for its courage in pushing the boundaries, Channel 4 has been a provider of 
"alternative' comedy since its inception in 1982 when it raised false hopes for animal 
liberationists by also showing the harrowing Animals Film. But its record was to be 
more characterised by the Just for Laughs series in which derisory references to 
animals were standard, e. g. 'Ever taken your contact lenses out and put them in the 
cat's eyes, and then put the cat out on the balcony?, 23. Further, its One Night Stand 
series featured Jake johannssen's routine about cow-tipping, and hunting cows with 
hammers, ducks with pliers, and tortoises with power drills. One of two bored 
characters in the channel's Absolutely suggested that: We could go out and shove a 
banger up a cat's ass, 24, and its Drop the Dead Donkey offered this variation: 'I was 
so incensed I head butted the cat", along with running gags about 'that incident with 
the cat, 25. 
The Clive Anderson Show (passim) hardly let an opportunity pass for an anti- 
animal-liberationist joke. For instance, enthusiastic horse-whipper-bullier jockey 
Frankie Dettori appeared here as a bloody culture hero. Anderson turned the 
practice of whipping into a gag or two at the expense, not of the guest as was usual on 
this programme, but of horses used for racing who, being thoroughbreds, were 
'thick, 26. Animals' "lack of intelligence' anchored much of television comedy. 
Other cases thought suitable for laughter, across all channels, included: a video clip 
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of a tethered bear in a TV studio attacking a woman and getting beaten for it27; jokes 
about eating calves, transporting live animals and vivisection, all at animals' and 
not humans' expense28; , ... if there are vegans (mispronounced as 'vayguns) 
watching, this coat is not made of leather, it's made of Linda McCartney' 29; jokes by 
television cooks about eating animals, vegetarians (all of whom 'look ill'), and 
'vayguns, 30; and, without irony, and highlighting perhaps the distance a sexual 
politics of meat has yet to travel, a female protagonist of a television comedy series 
ramming stuffing into a dead turkey while chanting 'Begging for it, 31. 
It was not so much the 'bad taste' of some of this humour (although we can disagree 
with Gross [1995: 631 who suggests in unconsciously speciesist manner that it is only 
homosexuals, communists and, currently, Arab "terrorists' whose enemies are 
generally uninhibited by the consensus of 'good taste') but, on the contrary, the 
received opinion, and the fundamental conservatism of television humour which 
was not used to undermine the sacredness of speciesism or even the excesses of the 
exploiting institutions unless the victims were humans, health-wise. The pull of 
such respectability also seemed irresistible for one-time 'vegetarian' Billy Connolly 
whose several TV series promoted angling, ostentatious leather-wearing and exotic 
animal-eating32. 
That animals and their suffering were not serious topics but legitimate sources of 
humour leaked into other areas and included: a report on pig rustling, with 
newsreader Michael Buerk quipping: 'Police are obviously hoping someone will 
squeal, 33; the claim that it was a "Good Day' for Iranian donkeys when Iran's 
Ministry of Commerce decided to increase foreign currency by allowing the export of 
30,000 of them34; a weather forecaster, for once recognizing that animals on farrns 
were not merely rural decoration, perhaps, predicting with a smile, that 'The sheep 
are going to be a bit cold tonight, 35; and a promotional item on ostrich farming with 
the reporter breaking into hysterics at the sight of frightened ostriches trying to 
escape their confinernent36. The background to all these was the high number of 
programmes and sitcoms which continued to bring animals into studio or story 
for a 
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laugh. Over all, although we have to accept the possibility of extremely rare 
exceptions, the comedy, humour, frivolity and insensitivity were to nonhumans 
what Bernard Manning is to non-whites and non-English. 
Fantasy: Sentimentalism & Emotionalism 
To some extent this was the flipside to comedy. The fantasy consisted of the 
necessity of animal use and a dream-world of caring humanity which, in the shape 
of end-of-news animal stories, often went beyond the anodyne, to mawkishness. 
Emotion and sentimentality were: perfectly acceptable, even de rigueur, and without 
limit, when the relationship was human-human; ambivalents when the 
relationship was human/nonhuman in welfarist terms (television was generally 
favourable, the press antipathetic although both favouring child-animal 
sentimentality); but certainly not acceptable when the relationship was human- 
nonhuman in an animal liberation context. Animals were denied the emotional 
space. The tactic in this struggle over meaning was to characterize even animal 
liberation - rationalist - as emotional and sentimental in order to denigrate it. 
And there was no aversion to the use of emotional blackmail: 
Nearly 3 million animal experiments were performed in British laboratories last year ... Most of 
us can accept, albeit with discomfort, the necessity of such work. Few parents would put 
shampoo on their baby's hair without knowing that its low toxicity had already been proved37. 
First, the 'necessity" fantasy (a host of cruelty-free and animal-free shampoos have 
been on the market for decades), then the sentimental example, a formidable 
coupling. Note also the mythology of vivisection's authority and validity. 
Heart of the Matter was concerned that 'the case for those who are suffering and 
might benefit from animal experiments is rarely heard', a fantasy in itself. 
The 
opening and closing sequences, sandwiching a host of interviews and a studio 
debate, 
focused on a wheelchair-bound vivisectionist displaying his stated love 
for animals 
by petting ponies and cuddling a new-born pup38. And a photograph 
in The 
Independent showed (again without the slightest hint of intentional 
irony) a 
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farmer, eating a beef pasty, while pleading sympathy in a town centre for a Union 
Jack-draped prize heifer Molly') 'who would have to be killed if a (BSE-related) 
36-month cull were enforced39 
Regular sights in the press, especially at weekends and holidays were pictures of 
children petting or feeding animals on farms. Scenes from the slaughterhouse would 
have been more 'real' perhaps. Indeed, the idea that there are no slaughterhouses 
or that they exist due to someone else was illustrated by the 'Malmesbury Two' 
episode. When this pair of pigs escaped from a Wiltshire slaughterhouse in January 
1998, the media reacted as if the orthodox were not animal-eaters, as if the pigs 
were heroic, as if some other system were responsible for the animal rearing and 
killing industry. A practising slaughterman was even brought on to wish them the 
best of luck. 
Fantasy also contributed towards the debilitating nature of speciesism, the 
inability to see beyond the norm, as if it marked the limits of reality and its 
possibilities. In an attempt to rear 'organic chicken' - giving them a 'brief but 
glorious life before eventually meeting the Paxo packet' - at an affordable price, 
Paul Heiney queried the practice of feeding 'fish meal' to chickens. Finding difficult 
the role of paragon, he agonized thus: 
What's the point anyway? All you are doing is turning one form of protein into another. Why 
not eat the fish in the first place? The trouble is, if I do not have the fish meal in the chicks' 
rations they will grow so slowly that I shall end up with table birds more expensive than 
lobster. Then the world would demand more lobster instead and they, in turn, would be 
consigned to a hellish intensive farming system. 
Of course, it is impossible to be entirely sound from an ecological point of view. If I 
were, my conscience would not let me eventually wrap the dressed chickens in plastic bags, or 
even paper ones. So, for the moment I am carrying on with the fishy feed ... trying 
hard to be good 
and finding it difficult40. 
One could unpack this statement indefinitely but suffice to say that Heiney seemed 
to be trapped within the fantasy where protein equates with animal products, 
where fish death is ignored (just as a euphemism is used for chicken slaughter) 
within constructed hierarchies of protein, suffering and value, and where animal use 
and his own involvement in it were inevitable. He was unaware that lobsters ývere 
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already intensively kept, and that - as vegans would have it - ecological 
soundness can be far more nearly approached via non-animal food production. It was 
the cognitive and cultural, and not the material, limitations that created the 
obstacles to being 'good'. And the fantasy was not without its own 
anthropomorphism: 
Rani the elephant, turning 30 and in her statuesque prime, has finally packed her trunk, said 
goodbye to the circus and gone to Southend for a rest. Like any star, she would probably sit 
down and cry if she knew she would never again hear the roar of the crowd ... 
41. 
This fantastic notion of animals being thankful for their human-dictated role - just 
as cattle would willingly offer themselves up to the knife and cats help humans find 
cureS42 (and see Birke & Michael 1998) - also characterized a Times leader. 
Implicitly accepting animal consciousness on this occasion, it claimed that animals 
enjoyed interaction with humans, citing sheepdogs, budgerigars and sea lions, who 
'(seem to enjoy having something to do, 43. 
But this dream-world of a caring humanity which had come into existence in order 
to worry about how it exploited animals or to save other species from ennui was too 
much for some, and yet their reaction to it seemed perverse. Jo-Ann Goodwin began in 
The Guardian with: "Why are the British so pathetic about animals? ' giving as her 
first, and hardly representative example, hunt saboteurs. A clutch of off-the-peg 
ascriptions - self-indulgent, inadequate, arrested development, self-loathing, 
emotional cripples (virtually the same labels Brophy had anticipated in 1965) - 
was then applied to anyone who could be identified with animals. So, Beatrix 
Potter, CS Lewis, Richard Adams, vegetarians, vegans, hunt saboteurs, donkey 
sanctuarists, pet owners and even pet breeders were all reduced to the same person - 
like animals, the Other. She ended with a plea for a "reality': 
We ought, as a nation, to grow up and stop trying to pretend that Peter 
Rabbit is still our best 
friend. In the greater scheme of things, the worst of humanity is worth considerably more 
than the 
best of bunnies44. 
This is, of course, and yet invisible to Goodwin, the reality we already 
have, the 
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one that Montaigne railed against in the sixteenth century and Salt in the 
nineteenth. It exhibits the same fear as Tester in his conflation of animal liberation 
and society. Animal liberation (from the vegan model) could well respond bv 
suggesting that the attempt to 'grow up' may be best assisted by weaning from milk. 
And notably it is only the orthodox who refer to rabbits as 'bunnies'. 
Beastly Animals! 
We should also pay attention here to the media's ubiquitous, derogatory use of the 
term(s) 'animal(s)' - used as if it were a legitimate metaphor or simile - where 
cultural approval is lent to negative feelings. And this is where we begin to see the 
spectre of animal liberation and its cronies. 
At root was the horror of human animality. First the denial: " ... we are not 
animals, 45 or 'about 120,000 years ago we ceased being animals and became civilized 
human beings, 46. Interestingly, the two bogus claims come from different sources; the 
first Renaissance humanist, the second biological /evolutionary, both somewhat 
detached from Aristotle's recognition of human animality, though retaining 
Aristotelian notions of hierarchy. As did a BBC TV advertisement for Ceefax 
subtitles but in a different way. It illustrated the range of programmes where the 
Ceefax facility was used, each example accompanied by the voice-over's comment. 
When a wildlife programme was shown, the voiceover said 'From wildlife ... 'and 
when a news programme was shown, the voiceover said ' ... to real 
life, 47. The 
continually reinforced human/animal dualism gave rise to the convention of what 
Adams (1990) calls the absent referent: 'He beat me like a dumb animal, 48 and 'You 
walk in here and kick her like a dog'49, which reduces nonhumans to insignificance, 
validates cruelty and ignores the connecting oppressions. The disturbing cultural 
norm of casual, 'invisible' cruelty to animals also emerged, unchallenged as was 
always the case, in news and documentary interviews: "Instead of coming home and 
kicking the cat, they kick the wife and kids, 50. 
When those disliked or disapproved of are labelled Animals!, the species is not 
specified, of course: as long as it is beyond the barrier, on the other side of the 
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culturally-drawn line where all other animals - lions, amoebae, rabbits, spiders, 
sharks, earwigs, chimpanzees, worms - become The Animal humans no longer are. 
And where animal individuality is again denied. 'People become 'animals' when 
they get behind the wheel of a car, 51. 
Or when they regress collectively. The cover of The Sunday Times supplement, 'The 
Culture', illustrated its lead article, 'Return of the Dark Ages: Norman Stone on the 
rise of barbarian culture' with a photograph of contemporary pinstriped man 
overdraped in a raw animal fur, brandishing an animal bone as a weapon52. 
Civilized is using technological weapons and wearing processed skins and furs. 
The situation became even more complex and, in another conflation of bloody and 
bloodless cultures, the orthodox fixation was projected onto liberationists as if they 
too thought along these lines. In a baroque twist on the use of the term beastly, Robin 
Page wrote a pro-hunting piece in The Telegraph titled 'Winter's tales about 
friendly Mr Fox and his beastly pursuers'53. Reducing others to orthodoxy's standard 
again, "beastly' is how he thought hunt saboteurs saw hunters. And, in a case of 
further misreading, of a fantasy within fantasy, Philip Howard in The Times 
thought that 'animal' had ceased to be a 'politically acceptable' insult, when 
/animals are perceived as victims not vicious, 54. But by whom? 
All that was wrong with humans could be offloaded onto a failure to rise 
sufficiently above the animal, the Eliasian and Tester's Demand for Difference 
territory. What we think is animals' reality becomes our metaphor (see Adams 
1994b: 184). And, as Baker (1993: 202) points out, even animal liberationists 
themselves have been denounced as animals, and significantly by a pet dog, in a 1990 
Gaskill cartoon (on the occasion of an alleged 'ALF bomb' injuring a child). 
Liberationists were trebly beyond the pale: being associated with animals they 
were as insignificant as animals; injuring humans they were 'animals'; 
being 
denounced by a dog they were worse than animals, who themselves were 
better off 
without liberationists. 
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Exclusion 
We have already encountered some representation of liberationists, and this leads 
us into the territory(ies) of Exclusion and Denigration, strategies reserved for those 
not participating in the instrumentalist-sentimentalist world of civilized, caring 
humanity. We shall look at the Exclusion strategy first before proceeding to the 
Denigrations at the beginning of the next chapter, although the former itself affords 
the opportunity to conjure up lurid images of those denied access and real presence. 
They remain spectres here, for the main exclusion is of liberation which, when not 
entirely excluded, was allowed entry only for the purpose of ejecting or defeating, 
setting up for a fall. 
In debate and discussion on any animal issue, the host-chair was always of the 
orthodox, for instance the notoriously partial Mary Warnock55, and often a 
journalist, for instance the anti-liberationist John Diamond, even when the 
programme was not a regular one hosted necessarily by an anti-liberationist, such as 
Jeremy Paxman. Another standard was to place pro-vivisection scientists on the 
authoritative, trustworthy and value-influencing platform or panel and have 
liberationists struggle to contribute from the mixed-opinion audience. Further, 
whether by intent or because bloody culture thought-pattem precluded certain ways 
of thinking, animal liberation was a non-starter as a problem solver. 
This was another form of Invisibility but of animal liberation and liberationists 
rather than animals. Generally, exclusion was evident in a lack of programmes and 
articles dealing with the subject of animal liberation in its own right, although 
animal welfare was conspicuous as a subject as well as an organizing principle. 
Despite the presence of four million vegetarians in the UK, vegetarian cookery 
programmes were not featured, vegetarian dishes only appearing sparingly within 
the plethora of 'on-Lnivore' cookery programmes shown during the chronic BSE crisis, 
reflecting a designated status of bloodless culture food as merely a temporary change 
of meal - try Chinese, Italian, French, Indian, vegetarian, vegan cuisine; 
ethnic 
rather than ethical. And no other kind of programmes for vegetarians ý-,, 
ho 
outnumber many other groups who do have their own programmes, again reflecting a 
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bias against a group that seeks to effect fundamental change. (One may not expect to 
find vegan cookery programmes due to vegans' lower population numbers perhaps, 
although vegans too outnumber other groups enjoying dedicated programmes, but the 
media and others do tend to equate animal liberation with vegetarianism). 
Similarly, many animal liberation events such as street demonstrations, mass 
rallies and economic sabotage were just not covered at all, but more interesting 
perhaps and related to this, was the practice of selectivity of exclusion, excluding 
from news reports actions in which many rather than a few liberationists were 
engaged. For instance, The Telegraph used a large photograph and a small report to 
cover one anti-fur demonstrator dumping a dead raccoon on the Vogue editor's plate 
in a New York restaurant56. The Guardian ran a similar piece of coverage of a small 
number of protestors at the Damien Hirst restaurant where skinned cows' heads 
create the ambience57. But there was no national media coverage of the many 
actions taken, by hundreds of people, in the UK and abroad, in support of imprisoned 
ALF activist Barry Horne's hunger strike during the same period (although there 
was coverage of the "terrorist' as he neared death in a subsequent hunger strike in 
late 1998). What was included were items which involved controversial public 
individuals and personal objection. What was excluded was that which struck at 
the heart of institutionalized animal use, unless the striking - like "violence' - 
could be easily condemned and attention diverted from the system that provoked it. 
So, the rescue/theft of animals from establishments is no longer covered, lest it 
afford animal liberation sympathy, perhaps, but their wildlife- and pet- 
endangering release from fur farm cages is covered, and extensively58, thus linking 
the demonized ALF with the demonized mink, both vermin when active outside of 
the normative frameworks. 
Exclusion 
Exclusion here refers to the more specific exclusion of animal liberation voices and 
the denial of animal liberation when the subject matter was human use of other 
animals. The media also generally excluded animal liberation voices from reports on 
animal-based scientific and agricultural 'progress' as if there were no controversy 
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and no animal liberationist claims. Events, issues, situations were presented as if 
there were no animal liberation 'experts'. This was not so much a case of extra 
ideological weight being given to primary definers, so establishing and maintaining 
a high degree of cultural closure (see, e. g. Stevenson 1995: 36), as weight given to 
them only. 
So, during the 1995 Science Week, BBC2"s Newsnight held a studio debate on 
science, contributors to which included David Hunt MP and spokespersons from 
Friends of the Earth, Body Shop, Green Alliance, ICI, Merck and the almost 
inevitable journalist (Richard D North), but no anti-vivisectionist (abolitionist)59. 
Indeed, the mythical status of science as a carrier of miracles, and the potency of 
'scientific research, were still very evident in the countless media items which 
referred to the latest 'breakthrough. If it could be related to children's health or 
cancer or both, so much the better; animal liberation was especially insignificant 
here, in much the same way as one never or rarely hears voices objecting to space 
research or indeed to capitalism. To a large extent animal issue discussion 
constituted a -science' discourse drawing on scientists (or their media 
representatives) as the primary arbiters of right and wrong, true and false, real and 
imagined (see, e. g. Hansen 1991: 452). But not animal liberation scientists, an 
exclusion essential to the maintenance of the myth of 'animal lovers' being anti- 
science. Most one of these dubious breakthroughs had vivisection at its source and 
yet hardly ever was an anti-vivisectionist invited to comment on the ethics and/or 
scientific (in)validity of the practice. So, even the ethics of cloning and 
xeno transplantation were pronounced upon by animal-using scientists (although The 
Guardian published a 250-word article by animal defence philosopher Mary 
Midgley condemning the practice of cloning6O). Science was pushing the boundaries 
of the morally acceptable (the horrors of the developmental stages of cloning, for 
instance, being scrupulously censored by the media) and the public would catch up 
with this progress once realizing the balance of benefits. Other forms of thought, 
knowledge and progress were devalued in the process. 
The faith in the animal use-science combination was so great that, even in an age 
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when efficiency is the watchword, the fundamental inefficiency of animal-based 
agriculture went without mention, the praise going not to non-animal systems but to 
genetic engineering development (albeit with qualms about the consequences for 
humans). That is, to the extension of the existing system which followed only its 
own cultural logic and taken-for-grantedness. Lack of necessity becomes dire need. 
Equating animal use with essential progress served to delegitimize protest. 
As a rider to the concept of faith in science as a definer of reality, BBC1 Six o'Clock 
News reported on experiments at Pennsylvania State University which were 
leading to the conclusion that pigs 'are intelligent'. The reporter told viewers that 
'It may be difficult to believe, but it seems there may be brains behind the bacon, 6 1. 
Pigs are not intelligent until science detern-tines it (and then goes on using them). This 
also highlights the scientistic exclusion of the intuitive and instinctive which, 
despite critiques of animal liberation rationalism, are inherent in the "benefit of the 
doubt' stances of the philosophers. The results of the experiments may amaze the 
orthodox - who will want more of such and conflicting evidence, ad infinitum, 
before acting upon it - but liberationists would be amazed that the experiments 
were required at all. That pigs are intelligent is either "obvious' or irrelevant or 
both. Exclusion of liberationist voices from such reports was possibly due not just to 
their being lost for words but also to the ruling out of consideration the logical' (non- 
too], non- 'bacon') direction the human-porcine relationship should now take. 
Generally when the science tended to favour the liberationist case, liberationists 
were excluded all the more, serving to prevent consolidation. Independent research 
condemning deer hunting was reported with comments from the hunt but none from 
the anti-hunt, and the COMA and World Cancer Research recommendations to cut 
down on meat consumption on the basis of a meat-cancer link were reported with 
comments from the Meat & Livestock Commission and butchers but no vegetarians, 
let alone vegans62. 
In a more regular exclusive pattern, whilst BBC1' s Question 
Time panellists 
included politicians, company bosses, charity bosses, ecologists, conservationists, 
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journalists, academics, blacks, women, chefs and comedians - that is, as 
representatives of a particular standpoint - no animal liberationists appeared on 
the panel of authority (and rarely appeared even in the non-authoritatiN'C 
audience). Aside from such denial of liberationist legitimacy, expertise and possibly 
articulacy, and the exclusion of any viewpoint that may contest the framing of 
debate, never mind offering opposing views within it, other forms of exclusion took 
advantage of the absentees who could thereby be referred to in shadowy terms and 
spoken for. A few examples: 
A Guardian report on the RSPCA defending the safety of Aintree's Grand National 
course extensively quoted the welfarist charity's equine consultant, the clerk of the 
course, a Jockey Club spokesman, and the trainer of the 1997 winner, but no animal 
liberationist, just a reference to the 'animal rights faction' not being appeased63. 
BBC1 Six o'Clock News heralded the start of the hunting season with an interview 
from a Master of Foxhounds who spoke of the violence against hunters from 
saboteurs, though no saboteur was interviewed64. And on the opening of the London 
Aquarium, BBC1 Six o'Clock News mentioned briefly that some people opposed the 
use of animals in such a facility and then countered it with a conservationist saying 
how such considerations were outweighed by conservation needs. The rest of the item 
consisted of a series of people connected to the Aquarium, extolling its virtues65. 
An alternative version of exclusion was for the orthodox representative to play the 
friendly Devil's Advocate. In The Goldring Audit, the superficial critiques of 
various animal using practices came only from Mary Goldring herself and not from 
source. The routine destruction or abandonment of foals and horses who did not live 
up to expectations (as racing industry money-earners) was, therefore, afforded 
unchallenged defence66. 
Partial Exclusion: Imbalance 
This was where a liberationist or, more likely, a welfariSt voice was present 
but 
given far less time or weight than those representing the orthodox, yet within an 
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ostensible framework of balance. An extension of this exercise was to tip the balance 
in favour of the orthodox - and at the last minute or shortly after the event. At the 
end of Heart of the Matter which asked the question, sm moralk, 'Is vegetariani 
superior to meat-eating? ', host Joan Bakewell tucked in to a steak67. BBCVs Six 
o'Clock News carried an item on xenotransplants in which the 'debate' involved 
first a pro speaker, then an anti. These were then followed by an interview with a 
patient who was waiting for a transplant operation68. The Independent gave 200 
words to a British Field Sports Society spokesperson to speak up in defence of hare 
coursing (the Waterloo Cup) which had been covered in a reasonably balanced piece 
the day before. No such follow-up space was given to the antis69. On Newsnight, 
Jeremy Paxman blatantly sided with Telegraph columnist RWF Poole in order to 
ridicule Britain's leading fox expert Professor Stephen Harris's statistical research 
results which undermined fox demonology70. A few weeks later, Poole used his 
column to review the discussion and criticise the 'well-meaning" Harris still further. 
The argument had taken place 'under the kindly eye of Jeremy Paxman' and 'Both 
Paxman and I choked a bit at that' (one of Harris's statistics)71. 
When allowed space or time, condemnations of animal use were paired with a 
defence from the industry in question, usually along welfarist and cruelty lines thus 
precluding liberationist debate; but celebrations of animal use were rarely paired 
with dissent from animal liberationists or even welfarists. So, when a television 
programme held the promise of free liberationist speech this was not in fact the 
case. There was always something to undermine it, whether strong or weak. For 
instance, Counterblast: It Shouldn't Happen to a Pet launched an attack on pet 
keeping and the pet business. But, perhaps in the interests of 'balance' (by which 
routine anti-animal liberation programmes were not encumbered), it also included 
(was forced to include? ) counter views from pet owners, who 'couldn't do" without 
their pets72. 
War Cries: Angels of Mercy? (note the question mark) gave animal liberationists 
the 
rare opportunity to explain why they were active against animal use. 
But this was 
undercut by intermittent on-screen statements announcing that the scientists who 
Media Representation: Part One 199 
were invited to appear had declined due to "fear for their lives'. And, in case it vvas 
becoming obvious that animal use was not a simple matter, that opposition 
constituted serious argument, or that the issue was spiralling out of the control of 
normative thought, the programme was immediately followed by a reductive, 
sentimental, binary-reinforcing trailer for the following week's programme which 
would ' ... tell the story from the other side. A heart surgeon says why he thinks 
humans are more important than animals, 73. The liberationists had not claimed the 
reverse. 
Inbuilt imbalance was also regularly scheduled. In a weekly set-piece of 'balanced' 
commentary, the Radio Times featured articles by the anti-animal liberation 
journalist Polly Toynbee, and others by the tame, token vegetarian DJ John Peel. 
Strident views were balanced against balanced views. Presented with the golden 
opportunity of commenting on anti-liberationist Jonathan Meades's clich6-ridden 
television programme J'Accuse: The Vegetarians74, Peel's defence of vegetarianism 
was about as weak as it could be - 'Perhaps I am not a very good vegetarian 
anyway'75. The end point of these is that order is restored, and fairly; the 
opposition has been 'given a chance, and seen off. 
Moving the Goalposts 
Liberationists' main arguments and values were often excluded or sidelined in favour 
of some easier ground on which to preserve the status quo, or reduced to something 
(anything) which the culture considered to be more important than other animals 
and the liberationist ethic. National Vegetarian Week gained a small, frivolous 
feature on The Good Food Show, which reduced animal eating to a matter of taste or 
fashionable lifestyle choice76, and The Sunday Times promoted cormorant fishing 
in Japan as a holiday feature, which included a 'taste is everything" finale: 
All the same, some people will consider the fishing cruel, and will think of the riversmelt, highly 
regarded in Japan, as a delicacy, with tainted antecedents. I did hesitate myself for a moment, 
before I bit into my helping of barbecued fish. For a different reason, though. Was I sure 
I fancied 
eating fish which had been regurgitated by a cormorant? A queasy thought. But it tasted so good 
that soon I did not care77. 
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BBC2's four-part series, Meat, looked at our 'changing' attitudes toward the cooked 
flesh of other animals. Carnivores' Club members - many of them quality press 
journalists - were quoted extensively, and all the 'experts' were animal-eaters. 
Against all this, a vegetarian failed, predictably, to convince a bunch of rugby 
players that the vegetarian food he had prepared for them tasted better than 
Ymeat, 78. Seen off again. 
Emphasis could also be shifted to another context. In the revealingly titled The 
Trouble with Animals (and see Denigration: Problem), Sarah Dunant presented a 
superficially balanced in-depth programme on animal liberation. Peter Singer and 
Stephen Clark made rare appearances in order to articulate part of the case and 
were countered by another philosopher and, perhaps inevitably, a couple of 
journalists. But attention was suddenly switched to the Cree Indians - hunters 
whose culture and livelihood were presented as being threatened by animal 
liberation. That is, instead of concentrating on the same main ground focused upon by 
the liberationists - animal-based agriculture and experimentation (and notably, 
the American Tom Regan, who overtly condemns hunting in The Case, was absent) - 
the ground was shifted to a different context, and ethics were displaced by the 
practicalities of a native culture for which there was a growing liberal 
ethnographic affection. (The context could have been, say, the north east of 
Scotland where culture and livelihood presently 'depend' on farming animals for 
'beef' although, in a climate of BSE and Scottish 'meat-related E-coli scandals, 
they could not be guaranteed the same sympathy). The implication was that if 
animal liberation appeared disadvantageous to Cree Indians then British animal- 
using practices were justified79. Further, once the scene had been shifted to a native 
culture, concern was not extended to, say, Amazonian peoples whose livelihood and 
culture had been destroyed by cattle ranching. Moving the Goalposts is a close 
relative of redefinition of which we shall see more later under 
Confusing& 
Redefining. 
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False Dichotomy & Polarization 
The more formal framing of discussion and debate took the style of a false 
dichotomy where an exclusive choice was constructed within which the 
'commonsense' option was made inevitable, its case overwhelming the weakly 
portrayed claims of a selected alternative. Additional options, notably those of 
liberationists, for instance non-animal agriculture and medical research, were 
excluded from the reductionist exercise as forbidden options, roads not shown on 
bloody culture's map. 
In an article titled "Don't knock intensive farming - bar the slug pellets' the choice 
was between intensive and organic farming systems, both animal-based80, and the 
Jeremy Paxman-fronted You Decide asked 'Should we end factory farming?, 81 (and 
not 'Should we end animal-based agriculture? '). 
The third part of the television series, Meat, followed the same line, with the 
added bonus of holding the "extremists' as a threat on the outer edge of the debate in 
order to encourage the only sane choice. But, despite the rare admission that the 
export of live calves was due to the milk industry discarding surplus offspring at a 
few days old, and the observation that if the country went organic the country 
couldn't be fed (two of veganism's concerns), the question of veganic (vegan-organic) 
agriculture was not considered82. Bloody culture logic would not extend that 
far, and 
could not recognize it as fundamental to an alternative culture, or perhaps the very 
obstacle was that it could, fearfully. 
When liberation concerns were brought into view, hoary reductionist 
frames of 
antagonism, conflict, competition, and sentimentalism were the common coin. 
On 
Newsnight, Jeremy Paxman asked, 'How many dogs are worth the life of a single 
child?, 83; throughout Heart of the Matter, Joan Bakewell asked anti- 
vivisectionists if they believed human life to be more valuable than animal 
lifc84; 
and twenty years after Animal Liberation, Peter Singer was still 
being asked which 
trapped animal he would save first, a deer or a human85. 
These were the dead 
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weight of orthodox articulate thought, understanding stopped in its tracks bý- 
authoritative clich6. Clich6s are usually born of 'truth' but this is 'truth, born of 
clich6, with reality emerging from the underlying fundamental dyads. If there is a 
human to be saved, the media will be trying to paint other animals into the picture 
in order to create a dilemma, a crisis - for which moral rules are not made - from 
which the everyday - for which moral rules are made - can be extrapolated and 
reinforced; generalizing from and institutionalizing the preferred exceptional. 
There is something here too of the journalistic, scientistic, positivist need for the 
black and white, the hierarchic and a winners/losers framing, or frame-up. 
Polarization was a close relative of False Dichotomy and applied more to the 
liberation movement itself, pitching welfarists against 'terrorists' thus excluding 
the bulk of liberationists who inhabit the middle ground or travel another road. An 
article in The Observer reported that a series of secret meetings between pro- and 
anti-vivisectionists had been taking place over the last couple of years, attended by 
'every significant anti-vivisectionist ... bar the out and out terrorists' (emphasis 
added). In fact, no major anti-vivisection organization, nor the anti-vivisectionist 
Animal Aid, was involved at a1186. 
This was apparent also in The Telegraph where the ethical debate concerned only 
animal welfare where, on the pro-animal side one found either the welfarist 
Compassion in World Farming or "animal rights fanatics-the balaclava brigade' 
but no-one in between87. Non-animal agriculture and non-terroristic liberationists 
were unthinkable, non-existent or barred entry. The exclusive or heavily-weighted 
either-or scenarios betrayed a fear of: the other's liberation; the potential collapse 
of the known; and a different way of seeing. 
Omission 
By omission, information was omitted which may have carried the threat of 
gaining sympathy and respectability for animal liberation or raising uncomfortable 
thoughts to challenge the 'common sense' of animal use. Again, a sense of 
forbidden 
or impossible knowledge. 
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A full-page Sunday Times article on the antibiotic Septrin which 'has been linked 
to a hidden toll of deaths and injuries" had nothing to say about the questionable 
scientific validity of animal testing88. Similarly, an article in the Independent 
explored how, for instance, and somewhat belatedly, science has become as much a 
problem as a solution, but within the 1400 words there was no mention of vivisection 
and its own catastrophes89. And the Equinox series investigated how much valuable 
research had been 'suppressed' by 'irrational fears' of scientific progress. These 
fears, lamentably, had suppressed pioneering primate head transplantation work. 
The other questions - how much valuable research had been prevented, and how 
many valuable drugs rejected, by the animal experiments paradigm - were not 
considered90. As in the 'cure around the comer' mythology, animal-based research 
could never be shown to be failing humanity. It was an article of blind faith, as was 
animal eating, preserved in a report on 'Medical advances set to cut cancer deaths by 
a third: 
Lung cancer, currently accounting for 38,500 deaths annually, could be cut by 30 per cent as 
smoking decreases. Bowel cancer kills 20,000 people, but this could be cut by 40 per cent with 
improved screening9l (emphases added). 
Lung cancer was self-inflicted; bowel cancer was nature-inflicted. Smoking should 
decrease, animal-eating can continue with better science. (Interestingly, uncooked or 
undercooked meat carries risks of food poisoning: it is the cooking of meat - the sign 
of the social and civilized - that forms cancer-causing heterocyclic animes 
[see, e. g. 
Barnard 1997]). 
Whilst the stories behind animal products and animal-using practices usually went 
unrecorded (unless they were -excesses': see Naturalizing & Universalizing: 
Excesses), this was not the case if an animal-using industry was 
in real danger of 
demise. That is, if an animal exploiting practice was challenged, readers and 
viewers were informed about the hidden suffering and 
hardships that could ensue if 
it were halted (the 'prohibitive cost of change' syndrome). 
For instance, BBC1 Six 
O'Clock News carried a report on the last meet of the 
Quantock Stag Hunt, leaving 
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viewers with a final shot of the hounds behind a fence, and the voiceover vvorrying 
about their fate92. However, this again only went so far, typically ornitting to 
mention that hunt hounds are routinely abandoned or shot when either not up to the 
job or too old, at around six years of age. (Also see Promotion: Fantasy). 
Only Connect I: Problems & Solutions 
just as animal use was generally seen on a single issue basis, never considered as a 
whole, the target broken up, animal liberation was only ever seen in its single issues 
- an ti-vivi section, vegetarianism, etc. - and yet a single issue status of animal 
liberation as a discrete whole was sustained, in its rejection, by media failure or 
unwillingness to connect it to other related issues. (Ironically, this negative "single 
issue' status assigned to it also, inadvertently, afforded animal liberation its 
comprehensive principle). Coverage of animal liberation routinely decontextualized 
it, or limited the context of incidents, events and situations. The tendency towards 
one dimensionality militated against what animal liberation would consider to be 
its problem-solving potential. But contemporary speciesism itself was not 
problematized: animal liberation was, then, offering solutions to problems which 
'don't exist' or, as Roszak had pointed out, the tactic was to show that any problems 
arising were solvable, if at all, within the established 'rules' of society and culture 
(and see e. g. McQuail 1994: 367). (The reader may be advised to study Appendix 1 
before reading the following examples). 
In an article for the Independent on world food resources, David Bellamy scared 
readers with statistics on the rising human population, dwindling fish stocks and 
grain harvests, but did not consider how the world's exploding farmed animal 
populations use most of the world's land and water resources, nor entertain the idea 
of non-animal agriculture93. In its 'Education' section, a Guardian feature on water 
scarcity throughout the world did not consider the vast amounts of water used 
by 
animal-based agriculture94, and ITV/Anglia's Survival series looked at the 
problems of subsistence in the more hostile parts of the world, but its depictions 
did 
not lead on to a consideration of using land to feed people rather than using 
land to 
feed animals to feed people95. 
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When some kind of acknowledgement of the animal-based farming problem ývas 
made, it was again not pursued. The Natural World: Badlands made the connection 
between the persecution of the prairie dog - because it "competes' with human- 
produced and owned cattle for grazing land - and the decimation of wildlife, e. g. 
eagles, that depend on the prairie dog as a food source. But cattle ranching was still 
considered to be a fixed part of the equation96. Likewise, fishing and fish farming 
were reported as being responsible for the killing of seals, cormorants and 
albatrosses, as if fishing and fish farming were as natural as the weather97. 
This is as far as it went: on the problem of famine, a rare piece in The Independent 
discussed vegetarianism and food distribution, and suggested that: 'If everyone on 
Earth were vegetarian, there would be just enough food for us all'98. Notably, the 
condition was not 'If everyone on earth were vegan, there would be far more than 
enough (Although both are simplistic, ignoring distributive justice). 
Only Connect II. Oppression- Oppression 
This was a more straightforward failure, to connect one abuse or oppression 
(condemned) with another (condoned). 
In Clive James in Buenos Aires, the eponymous hero was typically hard on the 
human rights abuses in Argentina whilst happily immersing himself in the 'glory' 
of the 'natural' animal-exploiting macho culture of polo players and gauchos, of 
rodeos and barbecues99. This "celebrity abroad' genre was not notable for its famous 
tourist criticizing even local cruelties. 
The next two examples link us back to our earlier sections on Invisibility and 
Animals!. The Independent (Does machismo face death in the bullring? ') was 
moved to carry a piece in celebration of the bullfight by a woman achieving status as 
a matador in Spain: she 'has cojones' remarked journalist Elizabeth Nash1OO- 
The 
bull, usually visible in condemnations of bullfighting, had suddenly 
become 
invisible (as a woman became visible, as a man; a triumph 
for liberal rather than 
cultural or eco feminism, perhaps). 
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The Promised Land series focused on the northward migration of blacks during the 
1940s-1970s to escape the hostilities and penury of work on the plantations where 
they were 'Beaten like animals', 'Living like dogs', 'Shot down like a dog'. Many of 
those who travelled north took jobs in the feed lots and slaughterhouses of Chicago, 
but the oppression connections and awful, glaring irony were lost on the programme- 
makers who settled for the simile validation of animal cruelties101. (Incidentally, 
and in contrast, Adams [1990: 511 reminds us of how Upton Sinclair's novel, The 
jungle, used the operations of the Chicago slaughterhouse as a metaphor for the fate 
of the worker in capitalism. But the descriptions of slaughter made the 'absent 
referent' [animals] all too present and thus overwhelmed the metaphor). 
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Chapter 7 
Media Representation: Part Two 
Ideological Strategies 
Denigration 
Largely, this far more offensive strategy served to tell animal liberation, 
liberationists and the various publics just what animal liberation was; a media- 
determined identity, and usually within a unifying 'we' discourse. Again, animal 
liberation is being spoken for and about, depicted here in negative terms, as bad 
company. Media representation consisted of mug-shots of the undesirable 
liberationists, who could be depicted in any fashion (a point also made by Baker 
1993) - the inadequates, the motley crew, the theriophiles, the 'animal lovers', 
the politically correct, the nutters, the extremists, the violent, the terrorists, the 
"animals', who were also fighting amongst themselves. In contrast to Exclusion, there 
was always room for the troublemakers and freaks in this rhetoric of othering, 
where the norm was reinforced by pointing to concrete examples of what it is not (see, 
e. g. Murdock 1981: 207). There was an element of myth here too: 
... myth prefers to work with poor, incomplete 
images, where the meaning is already relieved of 
its fat, and ready for signification, such as caricatures, pastiches, symbols, etc. (Barthes 1993: 
127). 
And, following on from Chapter 5 where we identified an incomprehension of animal 
liberation, we can note just how liberation and liberationists are labelled sick and 
depraved. Perhaps the ultimate sign of their sickness and the ultimate affront to 
speciesist decency was to value 'animals above humans' (and, by extension, nature 
above culture, body above mind, the very inverse of orthodoxy, or what can only 
be 
seen as an inverse within the limitations of orthodox binary cognitions). 
Depicting 
liberationists as extreme served to validate the centre (a tactic noted 
by other 
researchers of different issues), a centre where animal love is kept 
in proportion. 
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Most of this section consists of stereotypes, to accompany the rash of clich6s, but the 
section breaks these down into several distinct types, the first being the more obvious 
range which tended to be the standard fare of television drama. 
Stereotyping 
Essentializing, reductionist and naturalizing, stereotyping symbolically fixes 
'difference' and boundaries. It is part of the maintenance of social and symbolic 
order, bonding the normal together, maintaining purity; and it tends to occur where 
there are gross inequalities of power (see, e. g. Hall 1997c: 258-259). 
Within this representational practice, liberationists were deviants and so was 
anyone else who could be linked or confused with the cause. Not only were they a 
deviation from the norm but, because of their identification with something which 
could not really be taken that seriously or comprehended - animals and their 
liberation - ulterior motives or other reasons were found for that identification. 
Any form of what was considered overidentification with animals was fair game, 
like animals themselves. Animal liberation was used as a trope not just for those 
things that the norm finds execrable but in a redirecting at animal liberation of 
society's negative cognitive models of animals. 
It was animal defenders, of any hue, who were the (generally inconsistent) oddballs, 
often the personae non grata of ideological fictions. The stock of whipping boys that 
television drama could draw upon included animal liberationists who could also be 
drug addicts-dealers as well as terrorists who, for instance and perhaps ultimately, 
valued animal life more than the search for a cure for childhood cancer102. 
Alternatively, by being often portrayed comfortingly as wimps or eccentrics, they 
counterbalanced the more threatening challenge of the ALF. 
In BBC1's Ballykissangel series a ram was hoisted in a crate above a crowded 
local 
fair. In response to a woman who objected to the wheeze, the village priest 
(the good 
guy) pronounced that the animal had no soul, it didn't think. The woman ývas 
the 
local eccentric and drunk103. In Only Fools and Horses, it was a mad axeman escapee 
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who hated both anglers and people who ate fish104; in A Touch of Frost, hunt 
saboteurs were portrayed as a riff-raff collection of anarchists and thieveSI05; in 
Common as Muck, it was the retarded character who said, about two dead rabbits 
poached by a workmate: 'They should be running about a field, they should'106; and 
in Cracker, a man went crazy, shaved off all his hair, killed a Pakistani shop 
keeper and a police psychologist, but was shown to love cats107. Between the Lines 
depicted an animal rights group as seedy 'veggie lunatics' and 'the fruit and nut 
gang" living in a squat and led by a crackpot. That the leader turned out not to be an 
animal liberationist at all, but an industrial spy, did nothing to undermine the 
depiction, for that was his 'authentic' cover108. 
Such images and identities were never undercut by irony or subverted by a developing 
narrative, and liberationists (and those who, in typical media confusion, were 
considered their ilk) fared hardly any better in non-fiction. The casual loaded 
reference - Peter Hughes in The Times opened an article on travel with the words: 
"It is a paradox of tourism that, like cat lovers, it is kinder to animals than it is to 
people'109. And the full-blown assault - in television's Expert Witness, a 
reconstruction of the case of ALF activist Keith Mann and the events leading up to 
his arrest and imprisonment, he was portrayed as a human hater, fanatic and 
terrorist, wearing leather boots, frightening little girls in supermarkets, conspiring 
in vans stiff with chainsmoking, balaclava'd characters or in dimly lit rooms 
draped with banners. Searching for Mann after his escape, police were shown 
talking to a Mann 'associate" - who just happened to be a street performance 
fire- 
eater. The programme also constructed incidents which did not happen in order to 
demonstrate what Mann could have done, for instance a car was shown exploding. 
Adding insult to injury, Celia Hammond, former fashion model turned cat 
sanctuarist, and unwitting one-time employer of Mann, was inaccurately depicted as 
seedy and obesellO 
One of the regular columnists promoting bloodsports was RWF 
Poole who ývrote a 
'Country Diary' in The Telegraph and who represented 'animal rights campaigners' 
with this equally bizarre collection of clich6s in just one splenetic article: 
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[those] that I have managed to talk to sound equally ignorant ... they patently understand little 
about animal welfare ... their "love of animals" is a furry cloak for hatred of people ... the sincerity of this hatred ... is based on ... good old class hatred; and now that God is dead, PC has 
replaced prayer ... and they are more concerned about their own mortality than immortality ... Anything involving death reminds them that one day they too must die, and this they cannot face 
... what nicer thing 
to worship than something nice and furry with big brown eyesl 11. 
The major themes running through these representations are irrationalitv and, 
because animal liberation rationality is identified with the irrational and 
insignificant Other, an incomprehension which automatically ascribes ulterior 
motives in order to make (common) sense of it. The ulterior motives are rendered into 
the familiar and knowable, indeed to the very motives of the orthodox - 
hierarchically-determined class- (or species class-) based self-interest. And if the 
orthodox have little serious time for animals, animal liberation must then have 
little time for real humans, who know the facts of life. The binary distinction 
disallows concern for (and the imagination to comprehend concern for) both human 
and animal rights; it must be human rights and animal welfare. (And someone had 
to take the 'animal rights bible' tag literally). 
In the Times Magazine, John Diamond began with the common appeal to readers' 
solidarity, bonding us, the normal, the insiders, with hyperbole and sarcasm: 
So how shall we, you and 1, celebrate the World Day for Laboratory Animals today? Should we 
perhaps go out and shoot a few diabetics? Or maybe we could join in a jolly pill-crawl of our 
local hospitals, taking cancer patients off their chemotherapy treatments? Perhaps by way of 
showing how unspeciesist we are, we could release a few smallpox viruses into the water supply 
and set loose live rats in the nearest nursery school112. 
Diamond claimed also, quite inaccurately, that anti-vivisectionists found that their 
ethical argument wasn't working (because most animals vivisected are not 'cuddly') 
and had lately switched their argument to scientific invalidity. The piece also 
included the almost obligatory suggestion that anti-vivisectionists 
had a hidden 
agenda and stated too, again entirely inaccurately, that 'more energy 
is put into 
promoting the anti-vivi section case than the vegetarian one' 
(though this may be 
the situation in the USA, see Finsen & Finsen 1994: 268-269). A couple of months 
later, Diamond wrote about the response he expected to this and other 
similar 
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pieces: ' ... no less than a couple of bricks through the window'113 and, having not 
received them (yet), recycled the article for The Observer COf Mice and Nlen and 
Militants: John Diamond mauls animal lovers with no time for humans'114). In a 
further diatribe, against vegetarians, Diamond, ý la Tester as much of this territon, 
is, spread the fallacy that contemporary vegetarianism was merely vanity Chealth 
and slimness) dressed up in a cloak of morality115. In her own incomprehension, 
journalist Anne Robinson was also sure that liberationists had ulterior motives: 
I am ... suspicious of individuals who want to ban something. Too often I find they prefer to 
police other people's lives because their own are too messy to bear close attention. I wonder why 
the saboteurs with dreadlocks and rings through their noses do not usefully park their camper 
vans outside Battersea Dogs' Home and volunteer to assist in relieving the suffering of domestic 
pets ... I wonder where it will all end. Perhaps eventually the protestors will dispense with 
excuses and simply pour paint over Volvo, BMW and Mercedes estates on the rather more 
straightforward basis of: 'I don't like you, 116. 
When Robinson bowed out, her 'Diary' place was taken by Germaine Greer, another 
prominent opponent of animal liberation who, in the Independent Magazine, had 
already opted for the same ulterior motives strategy in order to explain the 
campaign against fur. It had ' ... little to do with animal liberation and a lot to do 
with class antagonism'. She went on, in quite typical ignorance (and elevating 
leather to crucial proportions), to claim that 'no attempt has been made to discredit 
the wearing of leather' for that 'would bring home to most English people just how 
much they had to lose if they espoused animal rights'117. (Both the Vegetarian and 
Vegan Societies and Animal Aid have been discrediting the wearing of leather since 
their inceptions). That there is more to be lost than gained in an intervention is, of 
course, classic revolution-negating stuff. 
We have to accept however, that some of the incomprehension may be more related 
to genuine simple-mindedness or utter 'blindness" than to disingenuous 
ideological 
strategy, but the same incomprehension shone through. Lynne Truss ridiculed 
the 
Campaign for the Abolition of Angling because 'I could never love a 
fish' and because 
attacking anglers was 'like attacking a person for quietly reading a magazine'. 
Despite the long history of vegetarianism, she was astonished that anyone 
could 
claim that 'Fish have rights'. In not untypical. 'priorities' mode she was 
amazed 
Media Representat I 'on: Part Tuv 212 
that anyone could care for fish when there was a war going on in Bosnia, although it 
was not made clear how a concern over Bosnia precluded dispensing with angling and 
fish118. We could suggest that projecting worry out towards a distant atrocity whilst 
trivializing the here and now serves to excuse not taking responsibility for one's own 
daily actions, and denies the possibility of recognizing the expanded war 'front'. On 
the other hand, one can suspect a more serious intent. This kind of approach is what 
Barthes (1993: 35) called Blind and Dumb Criticism where the critic, professing not 
to understand (or even not understanding at all), is in fact saying 'I don't understand, 
therefore you are idiots'. Blindness and dumbness are elevated to a universal rule of 
perception and to reject from the world animal liberationist thought. 
However, there were some rare positive representations. ITV's London's Burning 
offered a sympathetic portrayal in television drama, of a vegetarian anti- 
vivisectionist (a member of the fire brigade who said: 'Those who sent the bomb 
disgust me as much as the people who do the experiments'), despite a generally pro- 
vivisection storyline with animal activists (that is, people who act on their beliefs 
outside the private sphere) as the villains119. In the Frank Stubbs series, animal 
liberation campaigners protested at a pharmaceutical company's AGM. Although 
they looked rough they were well-organized and articulate, and the programme 
appeared to have sympathy with their case120. 
Politically Correct 
The contemptuous 'politically correct' (or 'ultra politically correct' as The 
Telegraph had it in relation to anti-speciesistsl2l) was a catch-all term applied to 
anything or anyone perceived as carrying an ethic beyond the bloody culture norm; an 
over-development of competing civilities. It allowed something (or someone) to 
be 
held in bemused contempt when to name it (or them) more specifically would 
have 
been to open up the possibility of its (or their) seriousness and potential. 
One 
example will suffice. The Telegraph referred to the non-animal 
Cirque du Soleil as 
'one of the new breed of politically correct circuses'122. The newspaper could 
have 
used 'ethical' or "humane' as the adjectives instead but this would 
have necessitated 
a redefinition of either term outside of the speciesist framework. 
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Sackcloth & Ashes: Puritans, Extremists, Fascists & Terrorists 
The depiction of animal liberation and non-animal diets as extreme functioned as 
warnings to stay away, not to be brainwashed into this dangerous cult of zealots 
who, as in Tester's depictions, sought purity from the pollutions of animals and 
animal products. So negative terminology and association were commonplace: 'The 
taste of extremism: how healthy are macrobiotic and vegan lifestyles? '123, and 
"Strict' vegetarians, 'strict" vegans and even 'strict' semi-vegetarianS124,125. 
The purity to puritan range also gave rise to 'statements of fact' and fixed the world: 
'Contemporary philosophers such as Tom Regan and Peter Singer offer a new vision 
of "'animal rights" too puritanical to be enacted'126. Again the derision, the 
perception of animal liberation as going to the extremes of orthodoxy. We could say 
that the tag here confuses (in Hurne's terms) doctrinal puritan rigidity with the 
political puritans who maintained the highest principles of civil liberty. Their 
'crime' is to include animals within it. The puritan label also takes us back to the 
sense-making ulterior motives accusation levelled against those who opposed 
bearbaiting, 'not because it gave pain to the bear, but because it gave pleasure to the 
spectators' (Macaulay). 
The association of animal liberation with violence too was endemic (one can trace a 
liberationists = animals = nature = violence continuum), serving perhaps to deprive 
animal liberation of political status (though variously associated with fascism), 
and relegated to the level of criminality-irrationality. To name is to judge: 
... deciding whether an action is terrorist ... is more the result of a verdict 
than the establishment 
of a fact; the formulating of a social judgement rather than the description of a set of phenomena. 
(Elliot et al 1986: 256). 
An Independent article repeatedly alluded to bomb outrages and threats to animal 
experimenters as if these were the stock in trade of the animal 
liberation 
movement127. 'Animal extremists are thought to have destroyed premises 
in North 
York shire'l 28. 'Anarchi sts and animal rights extremists are planning a spring 
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offensive ... ' 
("Mink hunters fear season of violence by extremist s')l 29. 'Try telling 
that to an animal rights campaigner, though, and he'll probably hit you, 130. Hugh 
Fernley-Whi ttingst all wondered in an Independent feature if, as a result of his 'eat 
anything' cookery series, 'some real (sic) militants will fire-bomb my house'131. 
It was not always quite so straightforward. Reducing an issue to an easily condemned 
tactic seemed also to be the delegitimizing function of the BBC on the abandonment 
of the 1997 Grand National, due to IRA bomb threats. At the time of the decision to 
abandon the meeting (and despite the police having announced that they had 
received at least one IRA coded message) the Grandstand team gave viewers the 
impression that the 'bombs' were the work of an 'animal rights' outfit. Distraught 
horse trainer Jenny Pitman spoke of 'these people' who "don't love animals at all'. 
By 5.20prn it was commonly understood that the perpetrators were the IRA, and yet 
the BBC1 News at that time showed again the same Pitman interview - the 
connection between the two groups of 'terrorists' being successfully achieved. Animal 
liberation had been the cause of disruption in 1995 and it was now guilty by (false) 
association132. 
And the Hitler-Nazi label endured, finding room in virtually all sustained attacks 
on animal liberation. Leaving aside considerations of Hitler quite possibly not being 
a genuine vegetarian at all, let alone vegan (see, e. g., Cox 1992: 205), that Himmler 
was a chicken farmer, Goering a keen hunter, and indeed that Stalin was an animal 
eater (which were not mentioned, nor other animal-using tyrants in this 
'debate'133), the Hitler-Nazi myth was deployed to associate animal liberationists 
with Hitler's dietary preferences; with intolerance and coercion; and, as we have 
already seen as a piece of standard rhetoric, to associate animal 'love' with 
human 
hatred. The Nazi association alone was enough to delegitimate and dismiss 
(any of 
the media versions of) animal liberation. 
Again, the casual, thought by-passing use: 'Animal rights fascists will not stand a 
cat's chance at Cruft, s., 134, and 'It is true that the Hhrer loved animals'135. 
And 
then passed off as a serious contention: unopposed on BBCI's Question 
Time, Oxford 
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historian and regular television and quality press contributor Niall Ferguson 
associated live export protestors with Hitler's vegetarianism, suggesting 
authoritatively that the audience 'think about it, 136. The cover of The Independent 
Weekend promoted its lead article, an interview with author William S Burroughs, 
featuring the headline, 'William Burroughs shot his wife, but he's very kind to 
cats'. The accompanying photograph showed Burroughs dressed in a full-length 
black leather coat -a Nazi favourite138. And, unself consciously, presenter Pete 
McCarthy was himself wearing a black leather jacket when he associated 
vegetarians with Hitler in an otherwise frivolous and brief feature on National 
Vegetarian Week138. The Nazi -huma n-hati ng representation also served to 
distance animal liberation from human liberations, and animal exploitation from 
human oppressions (and see Exclusion: Only Connect II). 
However, on the very rare occasion there was an attempt to put things in 
perspective: ' ... it is a strange kind of terrorist campaign, to say the least, that is 
waged for 20 years without killing anybody'139. However, the general 
representation of animal liberation as trouble, evil, deranged, sinister precluded any 
consideration of the thick case book of liberationists themselves (never mind 
nonhumans) suffering threat, terror and physical assault from animal users. 
"Fur Flies' 
But there was always space for coverage of liberationist in-fighting. These people 
only want a scrap, the cause is immaterial; it's a pathological problem. An 
extremely rare (500-word) piece on the Vegan Society appeared only as a result of a 
heated AGM140. The same newspaper (Observer) increased its space for a (700- 
word) report on internal strife at the Vegetarian Society141 and did the same for the 
British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection142. These amounted to more space 
than was ever given to such organizations on an animal use issue. 
Problem 
Cumulatively then, and further to animal liberation not being recognized 
for its 
potential as a problem-solver (see Exclusion: Only Connect A it was 'animal rights 
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groups" who, in one dissident mode or another, were the problem - the negative- 
destructive force, 'the extremists' who laid factory farms 'under seige, whilst it was 
scientists who solved the problems by, for instance, creating 'super chickens' who 
could withstand the rigours of the broiler house143. Channel 4s sympathetic 
coverage of Suzanne Chipperfield entering the family circus business as a tiger 
'tamer' told viewers that, 'The tigers are not all she has to contend with, referring 
to animal liberation protestors144. And TV fiction took up the theme: Casualty 
depicted two 'animal rights activists whose terrorist activities ... cause problems for 
the hard-pressed hospital staff'145. 
Yet a Times leader on the funeral of campaigner Jill Phipps, who was crushed to 
death beneath the wheels of a lorry bearing live calves for export, not only confused 
things in trying to explain them but became confused over just who or what was the 
problem: 
Britain has a long and honourable tradition of animal welfare. Yet the people of this country 
have always recognized, in regard to animals, the frontier between welfare and rights. In the 
wake of Ms Phipps's "martyrdom", there will arise a temptation to blur that important 
distinction. There is a danger which we should take guard against: older, kinder concerns must 
on no account be harnessed to a more destructive engine146. 
Leaving aside the dubious claim made earlier in this leader that middle class 
stirrings against the live export trade came only as the result of the work of 
undesirable "agitators', it was difficult to know exactly what the leader writer 
thought s/he meant by this curious statement, not least because in this context surely 
the destructive engine was, literally, tragically and ironically, the cattle truck -a 
symbol of the animal welfare system - which killed the campaigner. 
Tradition is 
tradition, and yet it was the 'long and honourable tradition', the 'older, kinder 
concerns' defended by The Times, which were themselves responsible for the crudc 
live export trade. The episode and its coverage also poignantly illustrated one of 
Roland Barthes' points regarding system validation. In his essay 'Operation 
Margarine', he wrote of how the 'sick' [liberationists here], those with the 
'illness', 
those who rebel against the inhumanity of the Established Order, were expected not 
to collide head-on with it but rather exorcise it like a possession; should 
instead rid 
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themselves of a prejudice which costs them dearly, costs them too much in scruples, 
in revolt (see Barthes 1993: 42). 
Fear & Loathing 
Perhaps the most virulent, uncomprehending, fearful and affronted Cartesian 
contributions came in the same newspaper, from Bernard Levin, exemplar of culture 
above nature, man above animal, rationality above emotion, order above 'chaos'. 
Consistently denying intellectualism to the cause, not bothering to confront the 
challenge, it was easier to fire-off at the Me noire. Animal liberationists were 
running wild in towns and countryside, plotting to overthrow civilized society: 
The Single Issue Fanatics, notably the 'Animal Liberation Front', find smashing windows, 
wrecking lorries and burning buildings too tame for their hatred of mankind, and now yearn to 
find a suitable human being to kiII147. 
Levin's 2,000-word Times article of 10.1.95, which re-ran much of the same 
demonizing ground CAnimal liberation affront: There is murder in the minds of those 
who claim to be protecting livestock), was a classic of the genre, pitched 
hyperbolically somewhere between Keith Tester (e. g. 1991: 170-193) and Alf 
Garnett. At the time of the Shoreham. protests against the live calf trade and just 
after the sentencing of ALF activist Keith Mann, Levin offered these considered and 
assured thoughts on the 'animals" who know nothing about animals. Levin has the 
knowledge that belongs to power and, like Tester, knows how to entrap the threat to 
the (re-)establ i shed order: 
I don't much like veal, except occasionally in a Wienerschnitzel, but I propose to eat it in huge 
quantities for weeks on end, starting now ... 
The "Animal Liberation Front" has no interest in 
the treatment of animals; it only wants to hurt human beings, starting with their windows ... 
[This is] a cause that would rejoice if lives were taken ... the violent ones 
do nothing at all in the 
way of actually getting face to face with any animal. (Cynic that I am, I would bet that some of the 
Fronters don't know the difference between a cat and a dog) ... these 
fanatics ... howl 
for human 
blood and will not stop until they have slaked their thirst ... they will not rest until 
they have 
killed. 
... Keith Mann ... could have been, with 
his strength and determination, ,, ery useful in a 
society like ours. But he rejected the real society for the false one148. 
Levin's real society is where one doesn't come face to face with, doesn't see calves, 
who are not only invisible, hidden behind 'veal' but, for Levin, also behind the 
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further and ultra-cultural screen of Wienerschnitzel. That Mann is depicted not as 
he is (as a recognizer of calves), but as he should be, makes one of Barthes' rhetorical 
figures - "Identification' - relevant here: 
... the 
Other is a scandal which threatens his (the petit-bourgeois man's) essence ... There are, in 
any petit-bourgeois consciousness, small simulacra of the hooligan, the parricide, the 
homosexual, etc., which periodically the judiciary extracts from its brain, puts in the dock, 
admonishes and condemns: one never tries anybody but analogues who have gone astray: it is a 
question of direction, not of nature, for that's how men are. (Barthes 1993: 152). 
Levin too seemed to be ignorant of the far more significant ground that lies between 
animal liberation 'violence' and animal welfare - or perhaps this was merely 
another case of deliberate polarization and false dichotomy; the ALF again used as 
a political synechdoche. In contrast to the ALF, he wrote: 
There are, of course, many organisations which are truly dedicated to the welfare of animals; 
two very familiar ones are the RSPCA and the Blue Cross. 
As with Tester, and now that the values and beliefs congenial to the bloody culture 
have been restored, animals would be better off without liberationists. Levin also 
wrote of the ALF in these terms "... oh how those spotty creatures love to give 
themselves big boys' names ... '. At the same time as representing them as 
thugs and 
terrorists Levin infantilized (or adolescentized) them, the contradiction typical of 
stereotyping. Again, the subject of animal liberation wasn't serious enough to 
warrant what Levin thought liberationists were doing so they must be mad or 
immature, the culturally fixed sites of "extreme' animal concern-identification. In 
his own way he both entrapped activists between the force of opposites from which 
there was no escape and excluded them from serious debate. 
Like RWF Poole earlier (Stereotyping), Levin shows us how the orthodox cannot 
intellectually comprehend the Other, in this case the liberationist, who will 
instead be ignored, denied or transformed into the image and terms of the orthodox. 
If the Other is thought to be irreducible he or she becomes the exotic -a pure object, 
a spectacle, a clown. Relegated to the confines of humanity, 
he or she no longer 
threatens the security of the home (see Barthes 1993: 151-152). 
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In one of Woody Allen's films he delivers the line: 'I know some people. Well, 
they're not exactly people', and to a large extent this was how the media 'knew, 
liberationists. They were typically presented not so much as people but one- 
dimensionally, extremely rarely as 'ordinary' people who happened to be vegan or 
vegetarian or liberationist but rather as vegetarians or animal rights terrorists or as 
nutters who were nutters because of their relationship to animals. They weren't, 
couldn't be, quite people. This was the other side of denying liberationists presence 
in matters of fact (in Exclusion). Both strategies, overflowing with negative 
attributes, contributed towards shadowiness and incompleteness; there was 
/something wrong' with them; they were irrational and incomprehensible. Genuine 
concern and political protest are denied or erased in this exercise of discursive power. 
When libbers show up we know there's trouble. To represent them otherwise would 
be not only to render them sympathetic but would also confuse, contradict or 
highlight the ambiguity of the natural order where they are merely phantoms, 
tropes and signs. (Perhaps this is why the iconography in fiction more often than not 
included leather, as though liberationists too had to be shown to be inconsistent and 
hypocritical, or was this just to associate them with Nazism, or was it just more 
ignorance and confusion or, ý la Greer, to be convinced that life without leather is 
impossible? ). How could these be decent folk, like us? 
This ascription and denigration was an exiling, a marginalization, a keeping 
in 
place, an imprisonment which allowed the further promotion of a world-view 
untainted or barely tainted by any recognition of or concern for animals 
in a 
liberationist sense. As Edward W Said pointed out in reference to 
Arabs, if they 
occupy space enough for attention, it is as a negative value, as 
disrupters (see Said 
1995: 286-287). But, lurking behind the above images is the menace not of jihad 
but of 
liberation. Consequence: a fear that the liberationists will take over the world. 
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Confusing & Redefining 
The intellectual incomprehension takes on a more prosaic nature when we notice how 
confused the media appear to be regarding animal liberation. However, there would 
seem to be more at work than a genuine bafflement. The confusion strategy, an 
obscuration in itself, seemed to be related to or part of a larger project to redefine 
animal liberation for orthodox purposes. Just as earlier strategies allowed the 
glimpse of a shadowy liberation and its proponents, Confusing & Redefining went 
towards appropriation in the struggle to maintain legitimacy and to control 
meaning. The bloody culture then, through this combined strategy, reasserts its own 
authority, enabling its representatives and representers to assume the role of experts 
and moral guides in the absence of the excluded. This relates more to spatial 
comprehension; a nullifying co-optation. 
Confusion 
By this we can refer to the seemingly erratic media use of descriptive terminology 
and the general ambivalence which inform dominant human attitudes to other 
species. Media approach to animal liberation seemed to be grounded in the confusion 
philosophy, exploiting the 'bias against understanding' which was guaranteed to 
baffle the layperson and obscure a movement and its message; to make the whole 
cause complex, too much to think about, and that much easier to present in orthodox, 
authoritative terms. 
The Times described Animal Aid, Britain's leading animal rights organization (as 
it calls itself), as 'an animal welfare pressure group' but recorded that 'animal 
rights activists' jeered at live export lorries149. However, in The Times, Danny 
Penman referred to the welfarist Compassion in World Farming as an 'animal rights 
group'150 as did the BBC1 Six o'Clock News 151. 
The Times ran two animal-oriented reports wherein 'fanimal rights' campaigners 
(in 
fact it was the welfarist Compassion in World Farming) chall enged minister 
William Waldegrave over live exports, but it was 'animal 
lovers' and "animal 
welfare charities' who were outraged at the killing of an elephant at a wildlife 
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park152. (CIWF was by far the most quoted pro-animal organization, its welfarist 
stance perhaps being intellectually comprehended most easily and representing no 
ostensible threat to the institution of animal use). The Sunday Times offered this 
slick interchange: 
Wildlife groups are demanding a change in legislation to help prevent what they claim is 
indiscriminate killing of seals by fishermen. Animal rights supporters met in Edinburgh last week 
following reports ... 
153. (emphases added). 
No animal rights group was represented at this meeting which approved of fishing 
and of 'killing rogue seals' although, to be charitable, this "confusion' may be an ill- 
informed attempt to see animal 'rights' as something more than single issue. 
However, in an Observer report on a heated Vegan Society AGM, Ben Macintyre 
confused readers by writing that: 'Some members believe that the rowdier element 
within the vegan cause ... is the result of infiltration by anti-vivisectionists ..., I_54. 
(The Vegan Society, as we know, has always been anti-vivisectionist). And John 
Diamond suggested that 'Vegetarianism as a moral stance only makes sense if it 
excludes eating any living thing'155 as if vegetarianism didn't do this by definition. 
One of the greater confusions could be found in features on and interviews with 
'vegetarian' celebrities who ate fish156, and a more peculiar form of confusion, 
though perhaps not without its ideological reductionist motivation, was the habit 
of describing celebrity vegans as vegetarians157. The Radio Times referred to the 
Madhur Jaffrey's Flavours of India focus on the 'strict vegetarianism' of Gujarati 
cuisine only for the programme itself to serve up meals containing milk and 
yogurt158. The confusion was compounded by Lynne Truss's peculiar comment 
in her 
TV review of the programme: 'The Gujarati cuisine is so strictly vegetarian that it 
eschews all root vegetables" 159 (perhaps meaning macrobiotic). 
By this process - 
vegans-to-vegetarians-to-fisheating - bloodless culture is 
broken up and swallowed 
by the bloody. Adams (1990: 79) offers a perceptive analysis of this 1weakening of 
the concept of vegetarianism', how it dismembers word from meaning, eviscerates 
radical protest and weakens the effort at new naming 
(and, we might add, 
strengthens the orthodox efforts at renaming). What also concerns us 
here is ho%,,, 
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bloodless culture is, again, comprehended only by bringing it into known territorv 
where other animals and their products are consumed. The problem, and this is not 
brought out by Adams, is that vegetarianism, rather than veganism, opens the door 
to this confusion and dismembering, by its own animal product consumption. 
There is the distinct possibility of course that those responsible for such coverage 
(and again the representation is stiff with such confusions) are themselves confused 
and/or just plain sloppy, the 'faddy' issue not worth the time or trouble to get it 
right. But the other side of this is that generally, the steadfast denial of the word 
liberation - unless conveniently associated with the 'terrorists' of the Animal 
Liberation Front - and the use instead of "rights' or 'welfare' served to minimize 
any sense of animals being in need of liberation. The media's interchanging of 
'rights' and "welfare' was indicative of something more profound than a concession 
to popular rhetoric. This leads us to consider redefinition which extends analysis of 
the points made earlier regarding the drawing of animal liberation towards 
welfarism. and its animal-use legitimations. 
Redefinition 
Animal liberation philosophy was bypassed except in name(s), and the animal use 
defences of yesterday were dressed up in today's language. This was the media 
moving with the times all the better to keep them in their place. So, welfare issues 
were, more often than not, termed rights issues; the same story, different title. Not 
merely a tinkering with the rhetoric but an appropriation. Welfarism was the 
representation of liberation. 
Warmly reviewing the first in a Brass Eye series which satirized current affairs 
programmes - the current affair here being 'animal rights' - 
Germaine Greer 
described animal rights as 'incoherent, giving as an example the 
fictional dinner- 
party liberals lampooned on Brass Eye who did not object to lobsters 
kept in boxes but 
who did object to veal calves kept in crates. This example, of classic inconsistencý', 
comes from welfarism and it was the ambivalent welfarist orthodoxy 
Greer was 
criticizing when she (like Brass Eye itself) thought she was ridiculing 
'Incoherent' 
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animal rights160. A common delusion or a piece of disingenuousness? (and, again, 
very much like Tester's confusion of animal rights and society). Both Brass Eye and 
Greer were ignorant of animal liberation theory and, in the latter's case, we have a 
further reason to suspect it. On a BBC2 Arena debate in 1990 in which Greer (and 
Mary Warnock and Stephen Rose) spoke against a 'That the Animal Kingdom 
Needs a Bill of Rights' motion, Tom Regan (in an extremely rare appearance in UK 
media) expressed his exasperation at having to debate with those who had 
apparently not troubled to familiarize themselves with the theories. Perhaps Greer 
Warnock and Rose typically prejudged any such theory to be absurd, akin to 
Barthes' Blind and Dumb Criticism, which we met earlier (under Denigration: 
StereotYping). More interesting, perhaps, is that the motion was carried in Regan, 
Richard D Ryder and Andrew Linzey's favour and yet this success seems to have 
been suppressed in the media. Subsequent debates have resorted back into the more 
easily controlled welfare or single issue territory and the hoax of open debate. 
Less formal discussion followed the same pattern. Coverage of fur traps on 
Newsnight, for example, was illustrated with powerful video footage from the 
anti-fur, Lynx-David Bailey ouevre and of animals writhing in traps. But host 
Kirsty Wark talked of campaigners as 'animal lovers' and the studio debate was 
framed in welfare terms - the 'what kind of trapsT questionl6l. 
Failure of effort or cognition was central to the displacement of liberation. In 
offering a sigh of relief in The Times that the perilousness of buying products in 
ignorance of their country of origin and its bad human rights records was now 
virtually over, Alan Coren now felt pressured to recognize the ethics of food 
production at home. Are these eggs "barn fresh', for instance162. But, again, the shift 
made was from human rights to animal welfare (not to animal rights or liberation). 
Defining or redefining the debate was also apparent in The Telegraph, which 
told 
readers how a new hardy race of 'super chickens' had been developed at a secret 
location: 
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The new breed of birds should silence critics of the huge broiler houses who have complained 
that the animals have weak bones and lose their feathers. The 'super chickens' grow faster, 
produce more lean breast meat and have stronger bones and thicker feathers to keep ýý. arrnlQ. 
All was now acceptable. The system was not wrong, only the birds. We can see from 
such coverage how the 'meaning' of the issue was generally relocated back into the 
welfare category, into the 'sphere of legitimate controversy' and safe territory, 
where objectivity and balance are sought (see e. g. Shoemaker & Reese 1991: 188; 
Hallin 1986: 116-117). This appeared to be a form of co-optation whereby animal 
liberation was disarmed of its potential or even its raison d'etre. In a leader 
supporting the relaunch of London Zoo in 1993, The Times had this to say: 
The world is far less sanguine about the confinement of animals than it was when London Zoo 
was founded in 1828. The pre-Enlightenment belief that man has careless dominion over the 
beasts dies hard, but the writings of Bentham and Schopenhauer against animal exploitation are 
gaining intellectual currency. Contemporary philosophers such as Tom Regan and Peter Singer 
offer a new vision of "animal rights" too puritanical to be enacted. But the appearance of 
Bentham's slogans against animal suffering in shop windows is not simply faddish164 
In a cultural lag (one to be preserved at all costs, it seemed) it was, for The Times, 
Bentham and Schopenhauer and not Singer and Regan (never mind Clark) who 
represented the new intellectual paradigm. Animal liberation was seen not in terms 
of its contemporary representatives (extreme versions of enlightenment; an excessive 
rationalism perhaps) but in terms of their - safely pre-1911 Act - predecessors, 
though even Bentham and Schopenhauer are hardly adopted here as moral guides. 
Liberation had been acknowledged in order only that speciesism itself could acquire 
a new gloss. 
The other side of redefining was not to admit liberation in the first place, continuing 
along the old welfarist line. Illustrating the politically determined 
distinction 
between illegal and legal cruelties to animals as society's moral reference point, 
The 
Telegraph ran a full-page feature headed 'Everyone is against cruelty 
to animals. 
But opinion differs sharply over what is cruel - and about the 
best ways to combat 
it'. Aside from concerning ourselves with the obvious 
fact that not everyone is 
against cruelty (or that cruelty is arbitrarily defined), 
it is apparent that the 
debate was still being framed in terms of (illegal) cruelty, the 
base line of ýý, elfarism 
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(a la RSPCA) rather than in terms of, say, 'not all harms hurt' or 'animals are not 
our resources'. One of the articles on the page concerned Paul & Linda McCartney's 
purchase of land to protect deer from hunting, but it was written by a Devon farmer 
who was 'bitter about the damage done by the rock star's love of deer. The farmer 
attacked the McCartneys because deer got in the way of his animal farming which, 
itself and its own inherent cruelties, were beyond question. Nothing appeared by the 
McCartneys themselves or by anyone on their behalf. A second article ("Vets split in 
the debate on ethics') was about the ambiguous position of vets in the pay of 
'questionable' farming systems such as battery egg production. Notably, it was the 
/originators of the contemporary debate on ethics' who were here excluded from it. A 
third article (Killing them kindly: the skills of the stalker') presented the 
deer/human relationship as one of necessary culling, in cruelty/ kindness terms. But, 
most revealingly, the final article was the regular angling column, typographically 
marked off from the rest of the page. Angling remained aloof even from the cruelty 
debate165, for angling cannot be safely discussed within even welfarist ideology. 
The only way for the angler to combat cruelty is to cease angling. When the solution 
is simple, it is ignored. When it can be constructed as complex, the orthodox can 
guide us through, and relocate the ( mock) debate. Result: the practices continue. 
Guilt, Decency & Gentle Usage 
Promotion (especially its fantasy world of caring humanity), Exclusion, Denigration 
and Confusion & Redefinition combined to contribute to a reclaiming of the moral 
high ground, a classic example of which could be seen during the 1996 BSE 'crisis'. 
This also functioned for the media as the representative 'farm animal' issue for a 
very long time; an opportune moment - mini legitimation crisis in the monolith of 
animal agriculture - to silence and then taunt the liberation movement, 
to obstruct 
revelation and revolution. Media practice was to deny space and time to animal 
liberation groups, who were clamouring for attention, whilst simultaneously 
condemning them for not being outspoken on the issue. 
The practice was widespread and illustrated, for instance, 
by a rash of articles in 
the press and a diatribe on Question Time, all without equal or any 
response166. 
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Orthodox outrage was often expressed that the slaughter policy was killing 
'healthy' animals, as if 'healthy' animals were not slaughtered as the norm (and 
see Promotion: Fantasy). Having cleared the ground of what it may haý'e seen as 
competitors, it was the media who spoke for seriousness and decency. This also fed 
into the mythology of animal liberationists ('phoneys') not really caring for 
animals at all which appeared strongly, for instance, in Tester. 
The extension of this was to establish the boundary and also to put one of the 
media's own out there as a rogue marker; one who didn't quite go along with the 
inevitability of cruelty but, nevertheless, with the inevitability of animal lise. 
journal ist-cum-organic farmer Paul Heiney, whom we met earlier, made a pitch t'or 
'meat we can honestly enjoy' and claimed the following: 
The rearing and killing of animals happens behind closed doors. It is only since we have been 
given a glimpse of the appalling transport trade - which is but one of the injustices heaped upon 
farm animals that we have made any kind of fuss167. (emphasis added). 
Conveniently excluded from this 'we' discourse are the campaigners against live 
export who had been active for decades and with far more than a glimpse available 
for those willing to look beyond the media's version of the world. A few weeks 
earlier, kind master Heiney had informed readers, with the inaccuracy and half- 
truth that passed for reality within the animal harvest mind-set, that: 
Being organic, it is as environmentally friendly as you can get; it treats farm animals with respect 
and demands of them what they are naturally capable of giving168. 
The three points here only make sense if it is presupposed for each that nonhurnan 
animals are humans' resources and that agriculture has to involve them. 
The 
presuppositions are apparent not least in the use of "farm' rather than 
'farmed'. 
That the media were claiming decency as their own, or claiming their own 
decency 
to be the only standard, was also demonstrated in features which seemed 
to have 
been influenced to some extent by unacknowledged liberationist 
thought and 
language. Selected animal-using practices were identified as 
being 'kind to 
animals'169 or as something which could be done 'with a clear conscience'110, 
or 
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which were 'guilt-free'. In a typically confused manner, the writers seemed to 
connect with the age-old problem of guilt which may attend their usual support of 
animal exploitation. In an article improbably titled 'Feasting ývith a guilt-free 
complex: Max Davidson feels no qualms about tucking into rabbit sausage', the writer 
went on to describe the other foods he ate - cod, crab and venison - presumably 
with a guilty conscience, and was inexplicably proud that a rabbit had taken the 
place of a pig on that particular occasion. 'Morally', he wrote, 'the [rabbit] dish was 
a masterstroke'171. Entrenched in arbitrary welfarist distinctions, Davidson's 
article is perhaps a classic example of the (updated though plus qa change) 
complexities of hierarchically-ordered taxonomies - the negative magic - from 
which animal liberation seeks to break free. It is not a vegan, or even vegetarian, 
diet (presumably 'rabbit food') which is the moral masterstroke, but rabbit eating. 
Part of Davidson's fantasy here is perhaps the notion of being innocent if the animal 
was killed in the wild, that he or she had a life according to his or her kind before 
the early death. But this hunter romanticism ignores the unsustainability of such 
'food' production, an unsustainability which has led to intensive rabbit, crab and 
deer farming. This vision of the future is nostalgic, bloodshot and hopelessly 
utopian. 
It was noticeable from such examples that exclusion of the bearers of liberation 
served to clear the ground for consolidation of and by the authorized version, a 
reworked welfarism offering retreat from the ghosts of guilt stirred up by the 
evicted. The ambivalences, hierarchies and 'common decency' of welfarism were 
faced with no opposition, for what serious opposition could there be? The effect 
is a 
displacement of animal liberation by a refined speciesism which robs the 
former of 
its meaning and purpose and uses its language for orthodoxy's own ends. 
Animal 
liberation is not comprehended intellectually but spatially, and to 
bloody culture's 
advantage. 
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Naturalizing & Universalizing 
Because this is perhaps the transcendent strategy, we have seen it in operation 
throughout the earlier examples. Here we can look at some of the tactical moves 
within the strategy more specifically. This is where we find an area similar to our 
initial defining examples of Promotion in that they serve to endorse, except that 
here, in this rather more mythological territory of cultural closure, we sense the 
work of a system knowing itself to be under attack and fearing the consequences, as it 
perceives them. It defends not only through denigrating strategies but, following on 
from a reassertion of its place, through the reiteration of statements of fact, 
naturalizing and universalizing animal use, and reinforcing - and returning us 
safely to - cultural norms and thought patterns of the taken for granted. Inherent in 
this was the unquestionableness of animal-using industries and practices, which 
were featured superficially. The cultural, as well as the political, became 
naturalized; legitimation reproduced. Much of news coverage, for instance, would be 
characterized by the casual statement which required no explanation. In a BBCl Six 
o'Clock News item on the leaked EU report recommending a postponement of the 
cosmetics animal-testing ban, the visual showed mice in a laboratory while the 
voiceover announced, quite gratuitously and dubiously, that 'Many animals like 
these are used in life-saving research'172. Reality is thus defined. 
When endorsement of animal exploitation did carry with it an internal critique of 
the practices in question they were located within a tight normative framework 
where the statement itself was not even necessary. So, for example, The Goldring 
Audit examined the fishing, horse racing and animal-based agriculture industries, 
but their fundamental legitimacy was never questioned. The rape of a tethered mare 
by successive stallions was just a natural part of the natural 
business of horse 
breeding173. Culture as physis. 
It was not only the legitimacy that was unquestionable but also 
the limited range of 
knowledge which kept things in their place. The reinforcement of 
hierarchical and 
exclusive dietary structure was evident in a report on 
hunger in the former Soýlct 
Union where the focus was on iron deficiency, the only cure 
for which was 'iron-rich 
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meat'174. And demonstrations by British farmers protesting recent BSE export bans 
showed them claiming that 'If we carry on like this there'll be no lix, estock industrý, 
in this country'175, an invitation, perhaps, for comment and even programmes on the 
possibility and the alternative. But, again, this was the road not taken, it doesn't 
feature on bloody culture's map. 'No livestock industry' is code for the unknown, 
which is chaos. 
Excesses 
The fundamental institutions were beyond the frontiers of censure, alternatives to 
animal-based agriculture especially were beyond comprehension. It was not animal- 
based institutions which the media criticized but their excesses or, as Roszak would 
put it, merely their "snags and hitches'. Condemnation of the excesses served to 
legitimize the system, giving the impression of objectivity and detracting from the 
oppositional critical dimension (see, e. g. Molotch 1979: 91, Riggins 1997: 11), and to 
show that all was well-monitored and under control. The audience was steered 
towards the idea that excesses were one-offs, unrelated to each other, somehow 
abherrent and not inherent to the system itself. Drugs that caused side effects, other 
harm and death, for instance, were not results of an invalid system but of inadequate 
testing by that unquestionable systern. 
During the BSE "crisis', media focus was almost entirely on its impact on the farmiiig 
community, on politicians, on the economy, and on the human health victims, to the 
exclusion not only of the cows but of the milk issue. This far outstripped coverage of 
the campaigns and statements made by animal liberation groups and the 
damaging 
effects of animal products in general on human health- Continuous epidemics of 
salmonella, listeria, E coli, Newcastle disease, swine fever, for instance, continued 
to be treated as the excesses and exceptions rather than giving rise to a questioning 
of 
animal-based agriculture and diets. The imperfections and vexations would 
be aired 
but they were then undermined in order to reinforce the culture's 
immune _, -vStcn1. 
Here we can refer to one of Barthes' principle figures of rhetoric, 
'The Inoculation: 
admitting the accidental evil of a class-bound institution the 
better to conceal its principal C%'il 
one thus protects against the risk of a generalized subversion. 
(Barthes 1993: 150). 
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A news item informs viewers that poorly pasteurized milk may cause bowel disease. 
But the bulk of the report goes on to feature a stream of experts extolling the virtues 
of milk and emphasizing that there is 'no need to change your diet'. The health 
risks of properly pasteurized milk are ignored as are its alternatives and its 
inessential dietary status176. 
Animal use itself was framed in the same way. Powerful and disturbing as thev 
were, Channel 4's Countryside Undercover: Bringing Home the Bacon and Its sister 
programme Countryside Undercover: It's a Dog's Life (about the use of dogs in 
vivisection) were both reported from a welfare and not a liberation perspective, 
focusing again on excesses and illegalities. The investigator in Bringing Home the 
Bacon was an animal eater, and the harrowing scenes Cof illegal treatment of 
livestock') were contrasted with the acceptable and only alternative: organic pig 
farming. The investigator in It's a Dog's Life was not opposed to animal experiments 
in medical research177. Moreover, even these kinds of expos6 remained one-offs 
with the meagre follow-ups telling us how the offenders had been mildly, or not, 
brought to book. What viewers had seen in these two programmes was undoubtedly 
serious, and they would seem to have been exposing only the tips of icebergs, and yet 
the issues and the material just passed away. Trust was placed in 'stricter control'; 
liberationists were superfluous now that unnecessary suffering had been exposed. 
The ills and contingent evils of the system-institution have been expressed but the 
animal-using system itself has been redeemed and on the way to cure; after all, it 
alone can feed us and keep us 'healthy'. 
The strategy seemed to be so effective that even recurrent excesses could do little to 
alter perception; the mythology feeds on them. We saw in Exclusion: Exclusion 
how 
in 1997 the RSPCA and the Jockey Club defended the safety of the Grand 
National 
course. In the following year's race three horses 'had to be put down'. 
Both RSPCA 
and Jockey Club order further enquiries into how to make the course safer. 
There's no 
talk of banning the race or indeed horse racing in general where some 
250 horses die 
each year; the welfarists have it under control. 
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Rome Has Spoken 
Taken from Saint 'to refrain from the killing of animals is the height of 
superstition" Augustine, the tactic title here refers to a dogmatic version of cultural 
closure, to ontology hiding epistemology, construction passed off as nature. And here 
we meet, more specifically, Barthes' rhetorical figure of the naturalizing 
'Statement of fact: 
Bourgeois ideology invests in this figure interests which are bound to its very essence: 
universalism, the refusal of any explanation, an unalterable hierarchy of the world. ... Bourgeois aphorisms ... belong to metalanguage; they are a second-order language which bears 
on objects already prepared. Their classical form is the maxim. Here the statement is no longer 
directed to a world to be made; it must overlay one which is already made, bury the traces of this 
production under a self-evident appearance of eternity ... The foundation of the bourgeois 
statement of fact is common sense, that is, truth when it stops on the arbitrary order of him who 
speaks it. (Barthes 1993: 154-155). 
The connection between animal experiments and medical advance, for instance, was 
cemented and all sense of other probability and possibility closed off. And it wasn't 
just the media operating as primary definers; others were elected to the privileged 
position to make unchallenged "statements of fact'. 
If it wasn't for advances in medical science, I wouldn't be here. I was a rhesus baby. If it wasn't 
for the experiments on those monkeys, I and a lot of other people simply wouldn't be alive178. 
But often it was the media who assumed the positive or positivist language of 
science. At the end of a BBC1 Six o'Clock News item on USA animal liberationists 
demanding the release of chimpanzees from a research institute, it was the reporter 
who concluded with the statement that chimps were 'irreplaceable' in research and 
- with the ultimate legitimation and unconditional allegiance of 
'my species wrong 
or right' - that 'we may not have the right [to use them] 
but we have the need'i 79. 
Channel 4's Poor Man's Pig, a typical piece of unfettered vivisection propaganda, 
told viewers, oddly, that "Without this animal [the armadillo] humans would 
be no 
nearer a cure for leprosy than we are now, thus presenting failure as triumph180. 
When Prince William shot a stag for the first time, in 
November 1996, the 
otherwise even-handed report in The Telegraph, which quoted 
both supporters and 
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opponents, rounded off with this statement of fact: ' ... it is necessary to cull loo, 000 
[red deer in Scotland] each year to keep the herds at a stable number'. The final 
sentence was the giveaway: 'Those managing the estates rely on stalking for 
economic survival", another etched-in-stone understanding of the countryside - the 
one that even 'townies" can't fail to appreciate - which disallowed any other 
reading of deer or countryside possibilities 18 1. The Independent told readers 
authoritatively, under a title of the same name, 'Why we have too many seals, 182 
Untypical and positive coverage of non-animal research appeared in The Times 
('Researchers are opening the cages of the animal labs) but the journalist still found 
room to inform readers of the "fact' that, 'Another example is transplant surgery, 
which could not have been developed without animal experiments" 183. And in the 
Goldring Audit, animal use and its culture of violence were further reinforced by 
Goldring thus: 'artificial insemination has done so much for livestock'; 'beef is 
grazed on land that is not suitable for anything else'; horse Ineaking" depends 'on 
the love and patience of the trainers and groorns; and the thoroughbred was 'a pea- 
brained racing machine'184. 
The statement of fact was most obvious within the 'nature red in tooth and claw' 
myth, naturalization par excellence, reinforced by countless wildlife programmes 
devoted to predation and horror. The /real world' myth also functioned to 
perpetuate country/town opposition and promote killing: 'The country law of tooth 
and claw, too easily forgotten by urban dwellers, is part and parcel of a proper 
butcher's trade'185. The philosophy was further promoted by Desmond Morris 
in his 
television series The Human Animal, an historical overview of humans' completed 
progress to the pinnacle of social, sociable and superior animal-eaters186 and, 
presumably, animal skin wearers. In Realms of the Russian Bear, presenter 
Nikolai 
Drozdov told viewers that humans are marmosets' greatest enemy. 
Marmosets, he 
said laughingly, made 'good fur hats, one of which he wore187. 
'Of course, there's no feast without cruelty', Thomas 
Sutcliffe informed readers in 
the Independent 188 thus reinforcing an equally inaccurate 
Tiýný, ý leader: 'it is 
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impossible for Homo Sapiens, which is a carnivorous species, to live without crueltv 
to animals'189. These two, though related in their reproduction of predation and 
'bad faith', come from different areas. Whilst both have significantly omitted the 
word "deliberate' before 'cruelty, Sutcliffe is working on the basis that any 
accidental harm (to worms and insects, perhaps) is probably unavoidable in growing 
and harvesting arable crops, which therefore justifies the avoidable; once the 
killing starts we may as well escalate it. And The Times is doubly misleading. We 
do not share carnivore physiology and it is only by cooking meat that we are able to 
eat it, thus making humans, if anything, limited ornnivores. The moral choice is 
made under the cloak of inevitability. 
Such programmes, articles and statements tended to perpetuate the notion of an 
immutable human nature and its relationship to immutable 'wild' nature. Humans 
could not exist without being predators, the old Pufendorf line. Putative carnivores, 
we rise above other animals through superior ruthlessness and power, even cruelty 
itself being inevitable. Responsibility was shuffled off onto natural law: 'It's a cruel 
world'. This is where two of Barthes' rhetorical figures - the maxims, proverbs and 
common sense of 'Statement of fact' and 'the Privation of history' (the 
irresponsibility of man) - coincide to universalize an unalterable hierarchy of the 
world, refusing any explanation (Barthes 1993: 151,154). 
Inaccuracy, Ignorance & Scaremongering 
Statements of fact also served to curtail apostasy, in maintaining the primacy of 
animal products - animal liberationist diets were continually misrepresented, 
often 
outrageously. Typically, no balancing or correcting articles or programmes would 
follow; non-animal diet and agriculture just had to be inadequate and 
detrimental. 
In an article in The Times, a GP author offered this canard: 'Deficiency of vitamin 
B12 follows inevitably from a strict vegan diet' which was described as 
'highly 
restrictive' and 'faddy'. The article also stated, equally erroneously, 
that 'Iron 
deficiency is commoner in vegetarians' than in omnivores190- 
ITV's The Big Story 
claimed that 'propaganda' in schools was resulting in young girls 
becoming 
vegetarian and, consequently, anorexic (is this what 'bloodless' culture 
means to the 
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orthodox? ). It also featured, and endorsed, a doctor at one clinic forcing vegetarian 
girls to eat meat 'as it was the only way to get them the protein they needed'191. 
Notably, the media were interested in seizing upon this rather than in engaging 
with just what it is about animal use and animal products that gives rise to health 
problems and also makes girls turn to vegetarianism in the first place. The latter is 
written off as a fad of the individual, the former an excess of the system. (The 
scaremongering is ironic at a time when orthodox diets are straining to approximate 
to vegan nutrition status). 
Breathtaking ignorance and inaccuracy tended often to merge not only with the 
inevitability of killing but with the limited imagination of the dominant, as in 
these two examples: 
Cattle are a vital link in our food chain ... No cattle means no prime grassland and a landscape 
turned over to the cultivation of oil, seed, rape (sic) and genetically engineered soya beans. Give 
up on beef and veal, and it's the thin end of the wedge whereby our whole larder is diminished 
and impoverished. Besides, if we give up on veal, what are we going to do when it's time to kill 
the fatted calf? 192. 
If the world turned vegan the cow and the chicken would become extinct193. 
As with foxhunting, killing animals now becomes a benevolent act of conservation, 
but of their Forms or Ideas. And as with Greer and the leather fetish earlier, here is 
the revolution-negating warning of what there is to lose (never what there is to 
gain, nor what crop and animal species/breeds have already been lost to animal- 
based monoculturalism). 
Fabric Repair 
Fabric Repair refers here to the continuous makeshifts, to the media practice of 
rushing to patch up rents in the fabric of orthodoxy in order to re-establish or 
re- 
affirm the dominant discourse. It is a routine rearguard action, a propaganda 
exercise not without its own statements of fact. Speciesism is a strong myth 
and the 
attack upon it by animal liberation is making it a weaker one 
by exposing its 
political trace, but the fabric repair (including loads of 'artificial nature') 
serves to 
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restore its strength. And strength is perhaps the operative word, much of this 
territory being marked by "tough' values. 
The most obvious examples - ones which were not constrained by any requirement of 
immediate or later 'balance' - could be found in The Telegraph which specialised 
in such a role, as was apparent in its support and sympathy for: the animal circus, 
when in seemingly terminal decline194; for hunting, when threatened by a 
prospective Labour government195; for McDonalds, when the company ývas losing 
face in the longest High Court libel case in history196; for the fur industry, in the 
face of growing disapproval197; and for shooting, in the wake of Dunblane198. 
Again, the defence did not necessarily rest on the same evidence as the prosecution. 
Tactics changed to suit the new necessities - McDonalds was celebrated as a good 
training employer, for instance, and not as a fast 'meat' outlet. 
The Sunday Telegraph magazine made out a six-page martyr-victim defence of 
besieged cat-vivisector Colin Blakemore, telling readers 'what the animal rights 
campaigners don't want you to know'. A photograph showing Blakemore cuddling 
his daughter cuddling a pet cat was juxtaposed by one of a campaigner wearing a 
'Vivisectors are Scum' t-shirt199. 
BBC1's The Gamekeeper series, which encouraged our sympathy for the breed, was 
screened during a period when traditional country sports were coming under 
increasing attack, and Firing Range virtually gave viewers a re-run but extended the 
range of gamekeepers' problems - "vermin" - to include rabbits and 
'ruthless 
killers' such as crows, foxes, stoats and weasels, but not gamekeeperS200. 
The Times attempted the task of defending the force feeding of geese by tube, 
funnel 
and pump which enlarges the liver to produce foie gras. The growing number 
of 
objectors to this practice were merely 'morally squeamish' 
201. And at the height of 
the protests over the live export of calves, restaurant critic 
Jonathan %Icadcs, in 
Levin mode, made a point of recommending establishments which ser%-ed 
k, eal 
tartare and calf's head as well as fbie gras. One of the restaurants 
cspecially 
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Perhaps the most notable example of fabric repair, however, came at the tail end of 
the major live animal export protests in the shape of BBC2s Public Eye CAnimal 
Wars'). The 'wars' did not refer to any human war against animals (a concept alien 
to media discourse), but to actions taken against the trade by animal campaigners. 
The focus of sympathy were those who, going about their lawful export business, 
were suffering, with special emphasis on their children. Protesters were seen 
attacking lorries and wrestling with the police whilst an exporter, who spoke in 
interview about the campaigners' 'anarchy', chatted amiably with police officers 
(pictures speaking louder than words). Campaigners had 'no understanding of the 
animals' who were 'treated well because it is in the farmers' interests' but no 
contradictory or exporter-incriminating footage was shown of the animals 
themselves (words where pictures would speak louder); and no airing of the 
fundamental issues or any consideration of the roots of the protest203. 
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A Composite 
In these two chapters, much of the material has been broken up in order that 
different aspects of the ideological representation could be illustrated. Different 
parts of the same media text, for instance, appeared in different sections. However, 
and finally, we can break with that pattern here and, remembering different 
strategies and tactics, present briefly some speciesist discourse in a more 'holistic, 
fashion. What it shows is how, drawing on previous tradition and rationalization, 
many or all the above strategies are, more often than not, deployed simultaneous] v 
or on a regular beat lest the reader or viewer be left in any doubt about the danger of 
irrational animal liberation. Rationalism is prized above all in this discourse of 
superiority, of triumphant though anxious culture, for nature is the lurking enemy. 
The attempt, as before, is not to comprehend intellectually (for any such endeavour 
has been abandoned, even if begun) but to dismiss and/or pick at. 
Polly Toynbee, a BBC and Independent regular and, as we have seen, an inhabitant 
of the animality denial world, told Radio Times readers that: 
I am unlikely to become a vegetarian, not being over-burdened with a sense of guilt about 
animals. I wish them to be treated well and killed painlessly, but see no reason why we should 
not eat them. Animals eat each other. If they really had the same right as us not to be killed, then 
we might also have a duty to police the animal kingdom and ensure they didn't kill one 
another204. 
Animals eat each other (except that only some animals eat some other animals), 
therefore we can eat them (though only some of them); but they can't eat us, because 
we are not animals. Again too the confident ignorance of or deliberate distortion of, 
animal liberation theory. But two areas are concealed in this: that the orthodox 
already legally police the 'natural' world in the shape of killing those species, 
for 
example, seals, foxes and crows, that predate on species 'owned, used or 
favoured by 
humans; and that wishing animals 'to be treated well' is to 
hide the inherent 
cruelties of their use. Moreover, the deliberate cruelties of vivisection 
cannot be 
accommodated within this sentiment. These points raise the 
larger one which 
relates to the very nature of media: that the endless stream of authoritative 
though 
piecemeal reasonings obscures the lack of and requirement 
for overall coherence. In 
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this way, sentimentalism, myth and fantasy can all too easily be passed off 
rationality in a world where all nature is bad and all science good: 
Nature is the enemy, red in tooth and claw. It killed most babies ' gave us smallpox, famine, plague and a life of unremitting toil followed by early death. Science is our triumph over nature. Truth 
- demonstrable, provable - matters. Toleration for this brain-rotting stuff I'New Agery] is fashionable, but we should be harsher rationalists. Humanity is humiliated when people are drunk on delusions. What hope for progress if we abandon reason in droves to seek out sentimental escapism? It is distressing to watch grown-up people foolishly seduced by fairy 
tales205. 
A denigrating, statement of fact, and reductionist pro-vivisection article by Toynbee 
in the Radio Times referred to: "fanatics; "violent animal lovers'; 'terrorist tactics'; 
experiments which 'have to be done on animals'; drugs 'that would never have 
existed or gained licences if they had not been shown to be effective in animals first'; 
and to Professor John Martin who 'effectively demolishes the specious and 
tendentious reasoning of the animal activists' (on Frontline, Channel 4,6.9.95, and 
he didn't); following it with: 
But an emotional spasm over pictures of bunnies in labs is no substitute for calm and rational 
choices. In the end, human lives are worth more than those of animals206. 
Thinking that there was an organization called the 'British Union of Anti- 
Vivisectionists', Toynbee suggested that 'the answer' may lie with 'moderate 
animal rights supporters (sic) ... approving the value of the research and 
the 
conditions in which the animals are kept. But this is animal welfare, in the 
confusing and redefining strategy; the "answer" is to let them have her way. In The 
Independent CAnimal rights can damage your health") Toynbee wrote of how 'vital 
medical research - and the safety of scientists - is threatened 
by the rise of the 
anti-vivisectionists, 207. 
In another Independent piece, Toynbee sought reform of charity 
laws to exclude 
'animals or the other bizarre causes that have slipped in ... Religion and animals 
would be fallers-under any new law that made any sense ... 
if old ladics want to 
leave money to cats, I do not want to be party to that lunatic transaction'. 
And ý-ct, 
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under her new rules, 'There would be new winners, they are the weak, the small and 
those without clout, 208 -a good description of nonhuman animals. Then, in a 
libertarian defence of cruelty, this time hunting - 'the rights of a small, if eccentric 
bunch of people' (it's acceptably eccentric to kill foxes but lunatic' to care for cats) - 
Toynbee reached the main, paradoxical point: 
Personally, I don't much like the killing of foxes, but since I think we are less cruel to fo\CS o%rer 
their lifetime than we are to chickens, or most farm animals that end up in abattoirs, only N'Cgans 
have a coherent position on hunting. On a points system of cruelty, taken over a whole lifetime, 
we are probably far crueller to farm animals than foxes, despite their bloody end. The fact that 
foxes are inedible makes no difference, since we only eat meat for pleasure - lentils and pulses 
(sic) will do just as well or better209. 
Despite the culturally determined logic - cruelty to animals on farms justifies 
hunting, both justified by pleasure - Toynbee brings us back to the consistency 
problem where it is 'only vegans' who present and constitute coherence. It is 
inconsistency and lack of necessity which actually justify animal use. Animal 
liberation has coherence, so we will reject it; we don't need to hunt foxes or kill 
animals for food, so we will. Nonhuman animals just aren't that important. This is 
what remains when the camouflage is stripped away; not the 'real' animals but the 
real reasons. 
One is reminded of another of Barthes" rhetorical figures - Tautology - which 
verbally makes the gesture of rationality only to abandon it. Refuge is taken in this, 
as one does in fear or anger when at a loss for an explanation, as if to children: 'Just 
because, that"s all! ' And, as they are like children, irrational, too much associated 
with animals and a threat to order, animal liberationists and those who can 
be 
associated with them are told over and again in different ways the same 
thing: We 
are more important than animals, because that's how it is, 
because I say so'. 
Tautology creates a dead, motionless world (see Barthes 1993: 
152-153). Moreover, it 
is not so much the power of the argument, but the opportunity 
for its constant 
repetition that precludes any contradiction. 
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However, Toynbee's finest moment gave readers this gem. On contemporary 
television, she wrote: 
.. there 
is now little of the casually sexist, racist, hornophobic beastliness of yesteryear... 210 
Causally, deliberately, consciously or unconsciously speciesist? And what sense of 
the logic of related dominations? At the time of writing, Toynbee was the media's 
'Writer of the Year'. 
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Me 
summary & Conclusions 
From media deployment of the ideological strategies of Promotion, Exclusion, 
Denigration, Confusing & Redefining and Naturalizing & Universalizing, we can 
note what, in relation to media coverage of Islam, Said (1985) called the couch . ng 
(with far from objective material, stiff with clich6s) and the covering up (what 
doesn't fit media perception or construction does not get covered). These worked 
simultaneously for the besieged bloody culture, defensive rhetoric inherent to all, 
offensive rhetoric notable most in the openly aggressive, relentless diatribes of the 
rational culturalists, purveyors of perennial dualisms and superiorities. In this 
articulate thought especially was perhaps the highest expression of symbolic elite 
discourse where the fear, fantasy, selfishness, hatred, incomprehension and sheer 
ignorance of common decency and common sense oozed off page and screen in response 
to the animal liberation attack. Relying on unifying ideology, much of it constituted 
phatic communication as in the nonsense lyrics of folk song chorus encouraging others 
to join in. 
The mantle of the animal Other was forced upon liberationists. Age old perceptions 
were brought to bear, the topos drawn upon, in fending off animals' liberation. We 
saw how the same but different was dealt with linguistically in, for instance, binary 
forms of representation; socially, in the struggle over meaning, for instance over 
I rights' and welfare; and culturally, in terms of classification - like animals, 
liberationists do not fit easily, they are like us and not like us; pollutions 
(see Hall 
1997c: 234-236), and so were rendered invisible or denigrated, operations 
facilitated 
by polarization and stereotyping processes. This was how the accounts and meanings 
were constructed, the functions or purposes they achieved being the command 
of 
reality, a reality in which, by their absence in any substantive 
form, liberationists 
themselves and indeed liberation were 'symbolically annihilated' 
(see Gerbner & 
Gross 1976 and Tuchman et al 1978) by the animal use-eternalizing 
dominant 
ideology. Alternative constructions were marginalized, 
downgraded or 
delegitimated, made unthinkable or unspeakable 
(see, e. g. Hall 1982: 67). 
Revelation is obscured. The manner in which the media 
functioned served to 
Suppress the development and adoption of animal liberation. 
In recoil rnode(s), they 
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acted as a brake on emancipation, maintaining the us/them barrier: thus far 
(welfarism) and no further, a circumscribed liberalism reproducing the legitimation 
of speciesism. We saw the failure to confront responsibly the challenge of animal 
liberation, to confront otherness, difference and indeed similitude; hoýý', instead and 
through incomprehension and fear, media texts served to control in various ý%, ays and 
within the parameters and determinants of the welfarist synthesis. 
The media approached the subject from a position of imperium, producing strltegic 
knowledge - functional and instrumental - in the service of power and the 
valuational base of science rather than, as liberationists would demand, moral sense 
and imperative. If the media's impact had much earlier been accused (b%, the 
Frankfurt School) of 'impeding the formation of a socialist political consciousness 
amongst members of the working class' (Bennett 1982a: 42), we could follow by saying 
that there had been also an impediment to the formation of animal liberation 
consciousness amongst the various publics. 
Intellectual incomprehension was primary and lay behind all the strategies ývhere 
animal use was the basis for collective morality. It led to fear and thus directly to 
denigration-ridicule where animal liberation could not be a serious alternative. But 
it was in the strategies of Promotion, Exclusion, and Naturalizing & Universalizing 
that the secondary spatial incomprehension was at work, where animal liberation 
was never allowed to offer or comprise a solution. In the strategy of Confusing & 
Redefining, spatial comprehension became the alter ego of intellectual 
incomprehension - absorbing, manipulating, muting, emptying animal 
liberation of 
its radical meaning, even to the point of reducing its values to a matter of taste; 
public to private domain. As with Tester, the revelatory moment, when 
dimly 
perceived, is recoiled from and concealed, its creators sniped at. 
Yet there was little evidence that the media in general 
had even seen Pirsig's green 
flash. Perhaps they saw animal liberation but did not or could 
not believe it. It 
didn't square with the contours on the bloody culture's chart, 
so was filtered out or 
diluted. The conventional meaning-categories embodied 
in society's codes were not 
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flexible enough to represent animal liberation without distortion and prejudice. 'Not 
all harms hurt' and 'the cow does not exist for us, the cow exists for the cow, were 
incomprehensible notions so set aside in favour of kindness /cruelty considerations in 
the known territory of brutal ism/ sentimentalism, the more comforting paradigm and 
its (balance of) 'benefits', reinforced by ideological ly-reductive dichotomies. 
Myopias and species loyalties of this kind diverted attention from the routine of 
animal use, its wider context, other meaning and implications. 
But the British public were also perceived as having a tendency towards 
sentimentalism over certain animals, yet rather than being regarded as a reaction 
against this, animal liberation was seen as an extension of it or mistaken for it. 
Orthodox sentimentalism, incoherence, fantasy were all projected onto liberationists 
in the same way that 'animal' qualities in humans are projected onto other animals. 
In the process, liberationists' and liberation's discrete identity was obscured. 
Compressed into fragmentary images, animal liberation's 'extreme' was made its 
norm; species taken as genus; generalizations of all animal liberation being taken 
from the particular (the demonized ALF), leaving the bulk of animal liberation - 
including its philosophy and possibilities - barely considered or explored, and 
therefore also marginalized. It just could not be a responsible, respectable, sensible or 
sincere concept or movement, so it was almost literally meaningless and therefore 
opened up for any med i a-con trolled interpretation. Discussion and meaning of the 
human/nonhuman relationship, of animals and of animal liberation were taken 
hold of by the media, becoming as institutionalized as animal use itself. 
Just as animal liberation had attempted to speak in the terms of the orthodox, 
the 
orthodox robbed animal liberation of its own meaning(s) and, 
instead of allowing 
liberationists the time and space for understanding, they were most often spoken 
for 
or represented at best as (always opposed) opiners rather than 
fact-givers, in great 
contrast to scientists and even journalists who, in familiar grammar 
(ami usually 
unopposed), told readers and viewers how it really should 
be, and %, as. As the 
rationalism of animal liberation philosophy tends to render 
it placeable 16thin the 
same field as rationalistic speciesism, and the 
firm association of animal liberation 
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with vegetarianism possibly sets it within the same field as bloody culture, 
whatever else it promotes is seen also as within the same field Of competition. So 
animal liberation rationalism, seen as part of the same order as the orthodox, 
results in the reiteration-promotion of speciesist rationality and the labelling of 
animal liberation as irrational. Animal liberation decency and compassion, seen in 
the same field as the speciesist versions, results in ever increasing ostensible animal 
concern, the reiteration-promotion of speciesist decency (the welfare and wildlife 
paradigm). In both areas animal liberation is lesser, worse, a shadow. 
And just as human superiority is defined against what other animals lack, animal 
liberation was used as another way of defining civilized society; by what animal 
liberation is not. Television offered twee animal stories (always about pets or 
wildlife) at the end of the News, and a plethora of wildlifel and pets programmes, 
all echoing, presumably, what the media considered to be the acceptable attitudes 
towards animals or those which made 'good television'. But there was no series on 
fundamental institutional usage (and the very 'nature' of this media ensured that 
the issues were dealt with on an ontological level thus preserving the invisible 
epistemology that creates animals as objects), only odd programmes on institutional 
excesses, and very little on the source of the mess which Animal Hospital and Pet 
Rescue helped to clear up, and perpetually (whilst Pet City opens yet another retail 
warehouse). This, for the media, did not appear to be a serious subject; we should 
care, but not too deeply. Or perhaps it was too serious: compassion ends ý%, here 
structure begins, so structure n-dght end where compassion extends. 
To watch the above series (and others which also validated the keeping of many 
pets in confinement and killing the abandoned), along with the erratic 
Absolutely 
Animals for instance (e. g. Channel 4,20.9.95) - though undoubtedly genuine in 
its 
animal concern, especially later (1997) - was to forget, or not realise, 
that such a 
thing as animal liberation existed, or even needed to. The texts of speciesism 
in this, 
as in the scientistic discourse of progress, delegitimized protest. 
That the BBC, for 
instance, ran twin series called Animal Hospital and 
Children's Hospital seemed tO 
be symptomatic of a perception which paralleled society's 
treatment of animals and 
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children, as though such treatments were of the same order, children and animals 
already sharing the same protection and care in society. Behind media 
representation as a whole there was the (mis)perception of a society which is fully 
enlightened, which took the form of concern about its 'slaves'; a new self-flattering 
myth, of haute welfare and its hauteur. 'We' care for animals; we who emit the 
message are the civilized; we of the superior rationalism are in charge and hal, e it 
all under control. And we have no need of help from the animal 'rights' freak show. 
Television series celebrating the work of police dog handlers (coinciding with court 
proceedings against police dog trainer cruelty), vets and zoo keepers were the icing 
on the cake. The common decency was a gloss on the structural violence, leaving the 
actions of the ALF and other riff-raff now gratuitous, without context. 
In defending the attitudes and values which underpin the status quo of animal use, 
the media reproduced commonsense ideology or were working to what Inglis (1990: 
79-80) calls 'strain theory'. Like a nanny or 'auntie', they reassured viewers and 
readers that everything was alright really, as long as things were maintained as 
they were, under welfarist control, although a few things needed tidying up 
occasionally. All we had to do was go blithely on as if all made sense. We would just 
have to settle for the 'fact' that, like the poor, the problems, the excesses and 
indeed the cruelties would always be with us. And their causes would, anyway, 
have to take their turn which, perhaps, would come when every human problem 
(never solvable by animal liberation) had been solved by (animal-manipulating) 
science. Or, reminding ourselves of Eder: all that this discourse demands is that 
'one 
should be thankful for being able to go through the world wearing blinkers' and not 
see the green light off to the side. Media representation of animal 
liberation 
appeared to be a tribute to a speciesist fantasy which animal liberation 
hoped to 
subvert, to expose the myth of a caring humanity that was 
doing all it possibly 
could. The irrationality of animal liberation lay in its inability 
to accept the 
sentimental illusion. 
Underlying many of the strategies was anger at the affront 
to speciesist decency and 
the conventions of the tribe; to culture, where humans are 
in control. In just being 
Media Representation: Pa, t Two 
246 
there, in daring to speak its name and to speak of what the gloss concealed, animal 
liberation committed the 'unpardonable offence' to which Salt had referred. These 
were not merely fearsome truths but "despised and neglected' ones which, in Mills, 
terms of a great movement's career, may have reached the second stage, of 
discussion, but which were never discussed without a sense of orthodox outrage 
(liberationist outrage being bad form) and/or ridicule, without being re-shaped to 
fit, and not entertained in any context or frame where the outcome could be adoption. 
With the ideology's discourse apparently speaking through journalists, the affront 
and the fear of the 'irrational', the negative imagination running riot was partnered 
by a lack of positive and sympathetic imagination. The deficiencies and 
delinquencies permitted perpetuation of both speciesist sentimentalism and the 
claim of animal liberation ulterior motive and dubious knowledge. Noticeable was 
the partial transition from Topsell's stereotype (1607): 'They which love beasts in a 
high measure have so much less charity to men' to the characterization of 
liberationists as not exactly people (animals? ) who cared for neither "beasts' nor 
men and knew nothing about the former to boot. Not for one moment was time or space 
allowed to consider that animal liberation could be unantagonistic to human rights, 
a stance maintained by ignoring or not comprehending the human benefits promised 
by veganism, not least in feeding the starving. Indeed, close links between species 
and race loyalties were suggested - the statement of fact was not 'if we all turned 
vegan the world could be fed and the single largest cause of avoidable sufferings 
routed' but, implausibly: '*... there would be no cows'. (They cannot exist outside of 
their human-resource roles). 
There was a sense that future development and improvement 
had been cut off; that 
the limits of the status quo were the limits of the world: 
... this limitation of vision and perceptions 
is an inevitable consequence of 
the dictatorship of 
definition, interpretation and consciousness ... 
(Stokeley Carmichael, quoted in Altschull 
1984: 
200). 
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How any of this would be different had animal liberation, when it turned up the 
wick, made a vegan stance unequivocal as from the mid 1970s is uncertain; it may or 
may not have contributed to the negative and confused representation of an 
alternative holistic vision and project of substantive difference. Nevertheless, we 
saw how, alone, it was veganism. (' --. only vegans ... ') that was beginning to receive 
true acknowledgement and force a break in both 'incoherence' and incomprehension 
barriers. 
* 
At the outset it was suggested that we could consider viewing media representations 
under the concept of hegemony and its allowance for the struggle over meaning, but 
we could be tempted instead to conclude that we should not lose sight of the links 
between economic, social and cultural domination approached through the earlý' 
Marxist concept of ideology: 
... those groups who own the means of production thereby control the means of producing and 
circulating a society's ideas. Through their ownership of publishing houses, newspapers and 
latterly the electronic media, the dominant classes subject the masses to ideologies which make the 
social relations of domination and oppression appear natural and so mystifying the 'real' 
conditions of existence. (Gledhill 1997: 347-348). 
The media are major instruments of ideological domination, and this 
... makes it difficult to conceptualize a position from which to resist or challenge 
it, except 
through the values of the dominant elite ... (Gledhill 
1997: 348). 
Gramsci's hegemony may, as Gledhill suggests, have provided a way round this 
impasse, explaining not so much the fixed grip of domination but consent won 
in the 
to-and-fro between forces. And representation may be a key site in this struggle since 
the power of definition is a major source of hegemony. But is there a site of struggle 
of definition in the media with the small amount of animal 
liberation Input V%'C 
have witnessed? What sense of competition against the 
ideological unity of 
speciesism, its unifying , we' discourse and its relentless 
media reproduction, 
underwriting existing power relations? 
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The concept of flexible hegemony does not seem to be entirely applicable or, if it 
does, it is in its infancy in relation to animal liberation or, rather, it may have been 
in its infancy between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s2 but then denied further 
development. As Gledhill (1997: 348) points out, within the hegemony framework 
... ideologies are not simply imposed by governments, business interests or the media as their 
agents - although this possibility always remains an institutional option through mechanisms 
of direct control such as censorship. 
To say that there was no extensive direct control such as censorship would be a 
dubious claim indeed, and what we have seen takes us past a notion of tendentious 
media. At one with the state on institutionalized animal use, the media (at least 
the media seen here) would seem to have been operating in relation to this as 
something close to an Ideological State Apparatus, functioning by unified ideology 
but also, secondarily, by repression (see Althusser 1971b: 138-139), doing little more 
than bathing society in a speciesist discourse. We could further suggest that, as the 
media (along with other ISAs, especially education) have replaced the Church as 
the erstwhile dominant ISA, they have, in relation to animals and animal 
liberation, not only taken up its preferred dominion-domination doctrine and 
reproductive capabilities but also the role of opiate provider, not this time to the 
exploited but to the exploiters, which includes themselves. If the dominant 
ideology has its principle cultural and consciousness effects on the human 
superordinates (as suggested by Abercrombie et al [19801) and its material and 
psychic effects on nonhuman subordinates, against the broadest claims of animal 
liberation-veganism, the ruling class would thereby be hiding things not only to the 
detriment of the animal 'class' (kept as a class by denying individuality, as opposed 
to animal liberation's identity and animal class politics) but to the 
detriment of its 
own self. And, as narcotics-use also has negative material and organic effects, this 
is 
not confined to the cultural and cognitive. 
Notes 
1. What seems to emerge ultimately from the wildlife genre is not so much 
how marvellous other 
species are but how marvellous the programme-makers are. 
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2. The slim amount of animal liberation literature devoted to media representation - aside from 
the uncritical 'Our campaign was covered by ... "- tends to agree that not only did media 
coverage change for the worse but it changed during the mid 1980s. Richard D Ryder tells us that 
through most of the 1970s the media gave considerable (and quite often sympathetic) coverage to 
the movement but by 1978 the novelty seemed to have worn off. However, there was a resurgence 
of interest as the movement took more direct action [as from around 1980 with the advent of the 
short-lived Animal Liberation Leagues' mass break-ins and occupations], though this interest 
too dried up around 1984-85, about the time of the Mars Bars contamination episode, from which 
time the media increasingly ignored the militants or castigated them as terrorists (Ryder 1989: 
287-288). Also, 'press sympathy was suddenly lost: it had become the trend for the media to 
attack 'animal lib fanatics' (Anon 1989); '... the often favourable coverage which accompanied 
animal rights campaigners in the early 1980s has been almost entirely replaced by antagonism ... 
... television 
documentary makers, investigative reporters and Fleet Street (or Wapping) hacks 
alike are sticking to safer ground. It seems that many have realised that they had bitten off rather 
more than they could chew ... Serious questions about the effects of abolishing our 
institutionalised subjugation of animals reared their heads' (McIvor 1988). And see, for instance, 
Anon (1986/87) and Harris (1987). 
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Summary & Conclusions 
This thesis has examined how, through revelatory means, animal liberation seeks 
to overthrow, rather than find space within, dominant, unifying and self-blinding 
speciesist ideology; how, in so doing, it gives rise to representations which illustrate 
how speciesism is reproduced and otherness confronted, and which are driven by fear 
of the liberation of the Other, in whom and in whose subjugation humans and human 
society seem to have so much invested. 
In Chapters 1 to 4 we attempted to establish an understanding of both animal use and 
animal liberation so as not to approach representations of both in a vacuum, and this 
meant doing a lot of history which was followed in largely linear fashion, 
recognizing and reflecting the transhistorical nature of animal use. 
Chapter 1 traced the history, tradition and discourse(s) of human/nonhuman 
relationship(s) up to and including the nineteenth century in order to explore the 
reasons for uneasy use of animals; the various attitudes and beliefs developed and 
deployed to rationalize human behaviour; the voices raised against this orthodoxy 
at different times; and the societal factors which undermined and forced 
reassessments of the subjugation. The organizing structure of the narrative was a 
dialectic involving tension between two incompatible forces, characterized within a 
concept partially borrowed from Eder (1996): of dominant bloody-camivorous culture 
and repressed bloodless-vegetarian culture. This struggle of opposites, both of them 
riddled with inconsistencies, was seen to grow until, forced by reformation and 
humanitarian accumulations, strands within each appeared to collide to form a 
'synthesis' and a new dialectic proceeded on a higher level but with the same 
contradiction continuing, one yet to reach a new synthesis. Both cultures would 
become more formidable adversaries, though in different ways - through the 
consolidation of a comforting welfarist paradigm and its control of meaning and 
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value in human/nonhuman affairs, and in the later development of a challenging 
liberation movement. 
Chapters 2 to 4 focused on animal liberation itself and its efforts to break down the 
edifice of animal exploitation. Continuing the chronology, Chapter 2 covered the 
approximate period 1890s-1970s, from and including Henry Salt's Animals" Rights to 
the eve of publication of Peter Singer's Animal Liberation, and began to look at the 
movement's attempts at more cohesive strategies. The chapter examined: Salt's 
work and his period; from Salt to the 1960s' signs of emergence of a contemporary 
movement; and reached an assessment of how, in their identification with other 
animals, animal liberation's latter-day representatives attempted to expose the 
facts and fictions of prevailing ideology. Salt, in the line of "bloodless culture' 
expression, was the first real strategist, his Animals' Rights growing out of a canny 
perception that the welfarist paradigm was inconsistent and untenable and 
presented liberationists with problems. His major, humanitarian-based 
contributions were to build on evolutionary kinship, to make the plea for co- 
operative 'nature', identify the need for a comprehensive principle to bind disparate 
animal concerns and to include animal liberation within the programme of social 
progress, of increasing equality. 
Due largely to welfarism, the continuing inconsistency of bloodless culture, increasing 
scientism, wars and their aftermaths, it wasn't until the 1960s that the torch was 
taken up and a 'manifesto' of animal liberation appeared in 1971 which drew 
attention to how human/nonhuman relations had been skilfully mismanaged. 
Roszak's work on technocracy and counterculture provided the context which also 
showed how, if bloodless culture common cause had fallen away 
in the early 
twentieth century, a similar fragmentation occurred in the late 
1960s-early 1970s 
separating animal liberation out from related issues. From the movement's writings 
certain themes were identified as fundamental to the case 
being made - the failure 
of welfarism; revolutionary intent; explosive combinations of empirical 
evidence 
and emerging animal liberation theory; the balancing of 
intellective and intuitive 
faculties; the struggle between symbol and the literal, and the rational and 
the 
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irrational; the challenging of orthodox sentimentalist fantasy, self-interest and 
conformity; and the overcoming of 'blindness' through revelation. 
In an attempt to understand how contemporary animal liberation was galvanized 
and remains underpinned by moral philosophy and how this proceeds from the 
revelatory platform, Chapter 3 introduced three of its foremost philosophers and 
their further strategic works - Singer's utilitarianism, Clark's eclectically derived 
vision and Regan's rights theory - which attempted to take previous tradition 
through the species barrier. We noted how this was fraught with the danger of 
counter discourse speaking the rationalist language of orthodoxy, that which had 
served in bloody culture's consolidation of animal use. But Clark"s 'systemless' work 
was seen to provide something of a counterpoint which opens animal liberation up 
from purely rationalist concerns. Consideration was also given to the incomplete 
success of a movement grounded in normative ethics. 
This lead us to offer a critical assessment, in Chapter 4, of animal liberation's 
contemporary agenda and self-presentation. The human and nonhuman slaveries 
analogy drawn by the movement generally, and the neglected model of veganism, 
were used to examine the proscriptions, prescriptions and putative comprehensive 
principle status of the philosophies. We found that animal liberation"s most 
comprehensive principle was to be found within veganism (a challenge to or within 
animal liberation) but that, despite Lewis Gompertz and the Vegan Society, the 
philosophers (tactically, fearfully? ) had not espoused it emphatically, leaving 
animal liberation associated with vegetarianism and, as with the use of 'rights' 
theory rationalism, with a foot in bloody culture. Veganism then looks like an 
extension of animal liberation. But it was suggested, instead, that it is at the point 
of veganism that not only is consistency truly established but that here is the 
substantive ground shift. Here is the full revelation. It is at this point that bloodless 
culture refuses compromise and lessens the opportunity for bloody culture to redefine 
and usurp. Here lies the bloodless culture common-cause nexus; this is bloodless 
culture and where it finds its true voice, not least in 'rebuking' the non-vegan world. 
Our previous two-culture scheme was questioned; the 'bloodless' traced thus 
far 
appearing as reaching out to the real thing. Nevertheless, we saw how the dcnial of 
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veganism remains endemic. Although acknowledging the movement's late shifts 
towards a vegan foundation, the combination of these factors raised questions about 
tactics determining philosophy and about which means create which ends: the 
welfare/ liberation dilemma. Animal liberation's self-presentation becomes confused 
and was to prove problematic in representations of it as an extreme of bloody culture 
rather than a discrete alternative-oppositional culture. 
Establishing such understandings enabled use of them as relief against which to 
examine, in Chapters 5,6 and 7, representations of animal use, liberation and 
liberationists more than one hundred years into the post-synthesis phase, as an 
element of the wider speciesist discourse. These representations served as an index of 
how the animal liberation challenge is met. 
In Chapter 5 we turned to a contrasting narrative, understanding and academic 
representation of animal liberation. Empirical-based analysis of Keith Tester's 
view of animals as blank pages and of animal liberation as a fraud in an epistemic- 
cons truc ti vi st-new historicist scheme served as a pathway to Chapters 6 and 7, 
enabling us to draw out themes of reduction, redefinition, entrapment and 
'incomprehension' which had relevance for the analysis of media representation. 
Chapters 6 and 7 concentrated on how, with bloody culture under attack, the media 
function to maintain a system of control, regulate normality and reproduce the 
dominant speciesist ideology through humanocentric forms of understanding and the 
management of symbols. The chapters offered an analysis of media representation of 
animal use and liberation, postulating the theory that media performance obscures 
revelation, inhibits animal liberation's development and eternalizes animal use. 
The theoretical perspectives relating to ideology, hegemony and myth were set out, 
preparing the ground for an investigation into how, through signifying practices and 
the general command of reality, liberation and related concepts and issues are 
constructed, and how and to what advantage they operate. Analysis and 
further 
theoretical discussion, informed by Barthesian mythology, were then threaded 
through the media examples which were considered as, and classified 
into groups of, 
offensive and defensive ideological strategies which drew upon the 
topos, the 
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comforting pool of rationalizations and rhetoric accumulated since hunter-ga therer 
days. A final component summarized the analysis and concluded by questioning 
whether notions of hegemony, in relation to the media as sites of signification 
struggle, were entirely applicable (in this context) to a society in which a 
fundamental speciesist ideology is still very much apparent as a unifying force and 
where animal liberation could find no unmediated (and little mediated) access to 
the sites. Largely, the analysis was guided by the notion of 'confronting' the 
challenging otherness of both animals and animal liberation and that the engine 
which drives the ideology-mythology is the fear of the liberation of the Other, an 
intellectually uncomprehended but spatially comprehended threat to cognitive and 
cultural order. 
* 
Much of what we have seen reflects how the conversion of Enlightenment into 
positivism has cut across animal liberation's path. Popular in the nineteenth 
century, its evolutionary approach - society passing from theological to 
metaphysical to positive (scientific) stages of development - was compatible with 
evolutionary theory and its extension to human society in the shape of social 
Darwinism. Gathering strength in the 1920s, it aided the obscuration of Salt's 
evolutionary kinship (much like Pythagoras was overtaken by Aristotle, St Francis 
by Aquinas, and Montaigne by Descartes earlier), informed the later technocracy, 
and contemporary animal liberation was to find its own moral progress more than 
matched by the advent of genetic engineering which, in its ultra commodification of 
animal patenting, is the utter antithesis of veganism; the dialectical link between 
domination and liberation. Positivism's scientistic glorification of the human, its 
reductionism, its love of system, its separation of fact and value and its certainness 
have all been recognizable here as characteristic of the bloody culture. 
Perhaps 
above all, in relation to what we have found in our analysis of representations, 
has 
been positivism's fear of what it sees as mental anarchy, and 
its propensity towards 
controlling and taming, in the same way that natural-scientific 
knowledge has been 
and is used to tame 'nature'. It was suggested in 
Chapter 3 that animal liberation 
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ethics challenged ethical relativism or egoism and we can add here the ethical 
positivism which maintains that what is, is good. 
This formidable science' underpins and sustains speciesist mythology. Whereas 
'revolution announces itself openly as revolution and thereby abolishes myth' 
(Barthes 1993: 146), the representations of animal liberation we have seen tend to 
produce or reproduce myth. That which seeks to preserve or eternalize 'reality' is 
faced by that which seeks to transform it, to demystify or demythify it, to call its 
bluff. Animal liberation has been seen in its process of breaking down the 'good', the 
falsely obvious, from the platform of revelation, but all the time, bloody culture 
continues to promote, naturalize, universalize its own beliefs and meanings, doing so 
through the media which reject the basic planks of animal liberation - the 
material and the moral. Materially, animal liberation cannot be beneficial. It 
cannot be progress. Indeed, perceived as more nature than culture it is a threat to 
progress - served by views of animal liberation as nostalgic - for progress is 
measured in (animal-use and nature-conquering paradigmatic) science terms, and 
animal liberation is maintained as "anti-science' or non-science. The very notions of 
animal liberation co-operative problem-solving potential residing in non-animal 
agriculture and science are not worth trying to think about, can barely be thought. 
Going to extremes with impossible schemes. 
Nor can animal liberation signal an advance in morals; bloody culture maintains 
dominance by its resistance in the name of moral economy, silencing or downgrading 
other moral concern. Animal liberation has the audacity to suggest that the world is 
not at all perfect, that the triumph of culture over 'nature, and the bloody welfarist 
culture itself are, after all the highminded work, not only questionable but ethically 
corrupt. That culture should be regarded as not really civilized, and that the 
accusation is thrown by those who, again, not being the culture must be nature, 
is 
perhaps the biggest affront to human confidence and self-esteem. The affront turns to 
outrage, for whereas pluralism looks for compromise there is perceived to 
be little or 
no compromise in unredefined animal liberationl which itself 
is denied legitimate 
outrage. What can it be angry about? Liberationists must 
be misguided, dubious, 
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irrational, heretical, sinister, dishonest, totalitarian, murderous and treacherous. 
The media could only "recognize' animal liberation's claims by reducing them to 
tactics, or to taste, but most especially to a version of competing civilities, all of 
which can only be seen in terms of normative welfare. The challenge of animal 
liberation induces shame, fear, anxiety and affront, major factors of the bloody 
culture of Eliasian civilizing process. Bloody culture recoils, deploying strategies 
which denigrate the attackers, reinforce its own self esteem and rightness, and 
appropriates animal liberation meanings in order to maintain its own. Revelation is 
obscured. The ideological strategies take the politics out of animal liberation, trying 
to contain it as personal acts which have no place in the public sphere (where they 
become acts of ulterior motive). Animal liberation's anomalous status tends to open it 
up for representations of it not so much as a serious social movement but merely as a 
form of collective behaviour, a fad, a craze, a cult, a delusion; or as an ideology, lest 
the status quo itself be recognized as one. The massive structural violence against 
animals is disregarded (except as its excesses) and the emphasis placed instead on 
individual or small group 'violence' (and see, e. g. Karim 1997: 176), often used 
synecdochically, reinforcing the extreme status of animal liberation. The orthodox 
are thus allowed to regain the moral high ground where guilt and responsibility are 
evaded by ever increasing glosses of decency and concern laid over the stench of 
'inevitable and natural' animal use, like applying deodorant on sweat. This 
civilizing process seems to be the triumph of form over content; a covering, mirroring 
the invisibility of animals and the concealment of animal-using establishments. 
In the confusing and redefining, animal liberation was raided in an effort at co- 
optation by which its counterhegemonic potential was lost through 
its translation 
into the dominant cultural context. it was the media who were 
'borrowing the 
clothes' of the impostor, re-tailoring them to fit the 
body PO"t'c. What utility can 
be found in animal liberation is easily assimilated 
into speciesist discourse, 
appropriated, thereby neutralizing the beast, 
bringing it under control. Being thus 
displaced, it becomes something else, anything else, and the 
'debate' about it takes 
place somewhere else, on the bloody culture's grounds and 
terms. Animal liberation 
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disappears when the media get hold Of it just as animal suffering is ameliorated by 
studio discussion. Animal liberation is rendered superfluous to our already decent 
society where animals are treated better than anywhere else in the world. As both 
threat and suggested improvement it is outrageous. And, as Keith Tester claims 
(1991: 192), animal 'rights' exists in a fundamentalist ghetto but, as he does not go on 
to say, this is where it is trapped, where it is forced to live, as animals themselves 
are, though as a symbolic rather than a symbolic and material resource. 
Labelled extreme thus validating the centre, animal liberation is held, at best, in 
the 'going too far-whatever next' frame. The commonsense of 'everything in 
moderation' applies no less to compassion but not, even now, to science. Fact (and its 
valuational base) is unfettered, value has to catch up. Animal liberation is going too 
far in both directions, backwards in 'anti-science' and repression mode and forwards 
in value-oriented, Other-liberation mode. It is by turns or at once both irrational and 
over-rational. Other Others (or at least some of them) have finally been recognized 
as human and this begins the rehabilitation. We have more invested in the 
human/nonhuman binary and its perceived, imagined or constructed differences 
which animal liberation, in its favouring of similitude, seeks to do away with. As 
old certainties break down, perhaps it is a comfort that we, all classes, all races and 
both genders, have a unifying ideology and a closed universal sign system in 
speciesism, despite its local accents. The end of ideology and post-ideology theses 
serve not just to hide the existence of this unifying ideology but to erase the notion of 
welfarism-speciesism as an imaginary resolution of real contradictions, and to render 
absurd the attack upon it. The species barrier - and the tautological cultural 
imperative of 'we are more important than animals' - remains the ultimate and 
universal article of faith; all roads go off the map at this point. 
But that another life form is both operating on the map and 
hinting at something off 
it is disorientating. Animal use has determined not only how we perceive 
civilization and progress, but also what constitutes the civilized and 
the known. 
Bloody culture perceives in animal liberation a threat to 
its own understandings and 
cognitive and cultural order, to a civilization 
founded upon the backs of animals (and 
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to an animal-loving society which, it seems, will do anything for animals except get 
off their backs). 
We can expand a little on what fears this liberation threat may induce. We referred 
earlier to Elias's civilizing process relating to bloody culture (and no less than to the 
more conservative, functionalist theories he critiques), and we can apply one of his 
central notions here - the question of sociogenic fears (see Elias 1994: xiii) - in 
relation to what the challenge of animal liberation means to it. We have to enlarge 
upon this for our analysis of the interplay of bloody and bloodless cultures, and we 
shall leave aside fears which are more specific to individuals' personal relations. 
We cannot determine exactly and completely what fears are constitutive and which 
relate to the social function of animal use, but we can suggest they include those 
associated with: (a) functionalist collective conscience, order and social solidarity 
breaking down, a more generalized subversion; (b) the more Freudian aspect, wherein 
if the culture of violence towards other animals constitutes a scapegoating 
sublimation of aggressive instinct, perhaps animal liberation is a 'repression' too 
far. With the "acceptable' outlet for societal aggression closed off, human society 
may become more violent (just look at the ALF) or become more miserable 
(symbolized in diet-impoverishment); and (c) the forced recognition and confession 
of guilt, if speciesism is self-hatred, and welfarism (as Watson 1944 suggested) the 
bad conscience of the parasite. It may also upset property owners, power seekers, 
Panglossians, libertarians, wealth and status seekers (where success is still 
measured in terms of animal product use), and conservatism (with its fear of the 
'tyranny of the enlightened) and liberalism (with its fear of 'absolutism), both 
shuddering at animal liberation's 'excesses' of freedom and rationality. And what of 
the work ethic if animals are not to be commissioned into service? Social negation 
becomes cultural negative. 
Unavoidably assisting in their own dehumanization by their association with 
animals, their 'over-identification', animal liberationists threaten regression 
to the 
animal from which the civilized have striven to be free. 
If the liberation is tO 
become a reality, what then of bloody culture's bearings? 
The entire combination 
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spells chaos, the media"s version of anarchy. We could suggest, then (and taking a 
liberty with WB Yeats), that at worst, animal liberation threatens to make 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; 
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world 
... Surely some revelation is at hand. (Yeats 1970). 
The revelation is dimly perceived and recoiled from, for it 
Troubles my sight: somewhere in the sands of the desert 
A shape with lion body and the head of a man, 
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun, 
Is moving its slow thighs ... (Yeats 1970). 
The representations we have seen here seem to suggest that the orthodox are more 
appalled and horrified by the challenge of therianthropic animal liberation than 
by the horrors of animal use (which themselves now involve the breakdown of 
human/nonhuman barriers in the shape of ultra-utilitarian xenografts and their 
inevitable chimerism). It's not just the animal liberation creature that's fearsome, 
but also the orderless, structureless, cultureless desert on the edge of bloody culture 
whence it seems to come rather than the ordered, structured, cultured laboratory. 
The real or fabricated fears have their consequences for animal liberation which, 
not regarding itself as a threat to society at all, quite the reverse, is - if we can join 
with the orthodox and view it in symbolic terms - more of a secular Hound of 
Heaven (Thompson 1972): the (Divine) Love, the beneficence, the revelation, that 
pursues us even when we seek to flee from it and to which we ultimately submit 
having seen through our misplaced fear. Except that, instead of fleeing from it, the 
orthodox seem to capture and exclude it as if it were the rough beast; that 
is, 
imprison it, denigrate it, define it in their own way according to their - the only - 
epistemology, milk it, reproduce it, 'kill' it and then, in contrast to 
Tester's fetish, 
sell off the product to the many who, guided by media strategies, are willing 
to 'buy' 
it. In relation to animal liberation the media acted 
like both hunters and 
pastoralists (again, having it both ways). Not to 
be these would be symbolic death. 
Instead, animal liberation's values become bloody culture's resources; 
life at Others' 
expense. 
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Whereas animal liberation is a leap of faith, speciesist discourse, as we have seen it 
in the media, constitutes and encourages not just bad faith but purblind faith and 
purblind fear. This was the partially-sighted leading the myopic in a circle of 
security, exclusion and entrapment. If welfarist bloody culture looks like it's moving 
on it is instead going around in the untenable space between the 'callous indifference' 
of the past (not yet lost) and the 'logical' path of humane progress, whether that 
path be linear or lateral. 
As we noted in the Introduction, animal liberation is all about transforming people's 
consciousness, habits and spirit; effecting change in allegiance from bloody to 
bloodless culture. Both cultures exist as options within society as they do as 
potentials within the human individual. We are born into the ways of dominant 
bloody culture which expects us to subscribe to its teachings and hides those things 
which may make us doubt it and search for the alternative. Attempts against bloody 
culture can be seen as attempts at reconnecting with, or a rediscovery of, the 
bloodless. But, largely obscured by the blinding light of the known, safe culture, the 
bloodless is not at all clear, which accounts in part for inconsistencies, and it is not 
until Gompertz that we get close to a clearer vision though even he was not entirely 
sure that his project was viable. Salt recoiled from the fullness, then Watson and 
Cross, albeit still with some practical doubts but notably with faith in both nature 
and science, bring the culture into full view. The philosophers draw back, and then 
we see a more general move again towards that light. All the time there 
is this 
attempt at revelation. 
And in our revelatory context we noted how, for the bloody culture orthodox 
in 
relation to other animals, believing is seeing; sight is 
determined by humanocentriC 
belief (immune) system. Animal liberation is filtered out 
by it. But it is a belief 
system which is not complete without being 
bolstered by the idea that, even then, 
seeing is deceiving, it's eating that's believing. 
Simone Weil suggested that, 'The 
trouble in human life is that eating and looking are two 
different operations ... it 
may be that vice, depravity, and crime are nearly 
ahý, ays, or perhaps alwaý, s, 
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attempts to eat what we should only look at' (quoted in Berry 1979: 81). Bloody 
culture confuses the acts of eating and looking; it can't see animals unless it is eating 
them, or vivisecting them, caging them, etc., acts which are never quite enough to 
overcome the uncertainty of the symbol which, nevertheless, is just enough to 
guarantee animals' invisibility as entities in their own right, as their own ends. So 
it goes, round and round; the perpetual holocaust to which Watson referred. And one 
sustained by the perhaps wishful delusion that the Lambs in the field are alwavs 
the same lambs. 
The use of trope to represent animal liberation is akin to how society favours 
symbolic thinking to the literal in talk and thought about animals (and see, e. g. 
Adams 1990: 74). If, psychoanalytically, symbols are an act or object representing a 
repressed unconscious desire, in relation to nonhumans the desire is not repressed. 
Moreover, the use of symbol covers not just other animals but the gaps in orthodox 
knowledge of what or who they are. Whereas animal liberation has a negative 
capability2 - admitting at various points, and happy to live with the fact, that it 
is not exactly sure about who or what all animals are; it knows 'enough' - orthodox 
positivism must maintain the illusion that all is known or can and should be known, 
for certain. Bloody culture's seeing capability is based on eating (etc. ) those whom, 
according to animal liberation, we should only look at. The whole revelatory 
scheme of animal liberation seems to be dedicated to this, seeing is both means and 
end. Comprehension and transformation are one and the same. 
Animal liberation claims to have a clearer sight, a better vision, not so much 
entirely of the 'truth' or 'reality' of other animals from a position of situated 
knowledge (more an uncovering of the morally significant aspects of animal 
commonality), but of a superior relationship with other animals 
based on common 
knowledge and that the present relationship is not 
fixed, or is fixed only arbitrarily 
and temporarily. Yet there is a problem 
here which links incomprehension, 
revelation and alternative value. Peter 
Singer's Animal Liberation has been hailed 
as the bible of the animal rights movement. 
But, if we take the works of Gompertz, 
Salt, Watson, Cross, Singer, Clark and Regan together as 
the (no less polysemic) 
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bible, we can draw comparison with Althusser's comments on Marx's Capital, the 
'Bible' of the International Workers Movement. Althusser's point here 1ý'as that 
whereas the workers 'understood' Capital so easily because it spoke of the everyday 
reality of the exploitation they suffered under the capitalist system, the 
intellectual specialists had trouble 'understanding' it: 
... they do not suspect, they cannot suspect the extraordinary power and variety of the ideological grip ... They are not in a position to criticize for themselves the illusions in which they live and to whose maintenance they contribute, because they are literally blinded by them. 
(Althusser 1971c: 72-73). 
Perhaps the most influential works - the green flash yachting books? - are those 
which speak to our condition, telling us what we already 'know' or feel or see but 
which we have, or have had, suppressed; those which defamiliarize, make the 
taken for granted appear new, seen again or for the first time, enabling the 
reappraisal and transformation, strengthening self-confidence in the 'unfamiliar'. 
The pro to-liberationist's ready identification with other animals and their 
condition enables easy understanding and agreement with Gompertz, Salt, Watson, 
Cross, Singer, Clark and Regan; for others an incomprehension which, though the 
'war' is long finished, leads to the vicious circle of continued animal use (animals as 
POW slaves), the fantasy and the incapacity for innovative thought. Suffused in 
perceptions of animal liberation's material and moral 'impossibilities' is the lack 
of, or suppression of, sympathetic imagination of other animals' experience, and of 
the practical, justice-driven Gompertzian imagination of what society and 
civilization are capable of without resorting to blinding animal use. This relates to 
social and cultural vision, and Shaw's comments on his own 'sight' are instructive: 
... I got a clue to my real condition 
from a friend of mine, a physician who had devoted himself to 
ophthalmic surgery. He tested my eyesight one evening, and informed me that 
it was quite 
uninteresting to him because it was normal. I naturally took this to mean that 
it was like 
everybody else's; but he rejected this construction as paradoxical, and 
hastened to explain to me 
that I was an exceptional and highly fortunate person optically, normal sight conferring 
the 
power of seeing things accurately, and being enjoyed by only about ten per cent of 
the population, 
the remaining ninety per cent being abnormal. I immediately perceived 
the explanation of my want 
of success [as a playwright] ... 
My mind's eye, like my body's, was "normal": 
it saw things 
differently from other people's eyes, and saw them better. 
(Shaw 1946: vi). 
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A major concern for animal liberation lies in that want of success, in the possibility of 
only a limited number of people ever being predisposed to see the green light, unless 
there is a universal 'normal' sight of the mind's eye which either exists, can be 
restored or, more sociologically, in an alternative scheme, created. And that 
restoration, correction or creation would seem to depend greatly on the 
representations animal liberation enjoys or, as we have seen here, suffers and where 
the orthodox belief system determines that the normal or normative imperfect sight 
not only sees other animals as little more than symbolic and material resources, but 
mistakes the Hound for the rough beast. 
Although this thesis has not been written with the aim of providing a report but 
with analysing representations against our understanding of animal liberation, and 
especially in relation to the vegan liberation model in both liberation and use cases, 
it is worth making a few observations in this connection. The ironic, or perhaps 
inevitable, aspect of animal liberation is that even though, in order to free animals, 
it has attempted to use the language which has subjugated them, then judging from 
the representations it is still intellectually uncomprehended, although it is 
impossible to tell where disingenuousness ends and incomprehension begins. 
Whatever it is, those with the most of it have retained the most discursive power 
and the greatest capacity for projecting animal liberation as complex and fearsome. 
We have seen how an animal liberation grounded in ethics and within 
Enlightenment rationalism has been met with negative representation, with 
the 
recoiling, big gun offensive rhetoricists whose own base has 
been overwhelmingly 
rationalist and with a greater stockpile to draw upon. Indeed, an endless supply 
and 
the same arguments and inaccuracies continuously recycled. 
And we have seen how 
many of these seem also to have drawn eagerly upon 
Tester as if Animals and 
Society were yet another chapter in the bible of anti-animal 
'rights' (a bible which 
can be comprehended) and how Tester has drawn upon media representation; 
many of 
the tirades were interchangeable. Certainly in 
its aim of eliminating accusations of 
sentimentality and emotionalism, animal liberation 
has not succeeded, such notions 
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still being rife in the media, for this excessive concern for the mere (cuddly) animal 
must still be childish. But if liberationists do not 'love' animals in the orthodox 
manner, they must be more concerned with themselves, as in Tester. And, despite 
what has always seemed to be animal liberation's strong belief in human potential, 
its 'idealism' and 'utopianism', in both the media and Tester liberationists don't 
seem to care much about other humans either, notions fostered by wrenching animal 
liberation, and indeed animal use, out of both their moral and material contexts. 
However, none of the foregoing has meant to suggest that animal liberation is 
following, or has been following, a 'wrong" or 'right' strategy. There is as much 
reason to believe that it will achieve, or fail to achieve its ends whether it overtly 
takes the full revelatory stance of veganism, or imagines that its success lies through 
vegetarianism, or through welfarism, or through rights, or by going it alone, or by 
forging or re-forging the late nineteenth century-early twentieth century common 
cause with other groups. (Or ironically, that its ends are achieved as a result of 
entirely empirical matters; through fact rather than value, though in the wider 
liberationist case the two are not separated). We have not been interested in 
deciding upon the movement's best options (or indeed what the media should be 
doing), only to analyse what appears to have happened and in terms of 
representations. Certainly, if we have not seen anything of media effects on the 
public here then we have seen how, in passing off construction as 
fact and in 
renaturalizing the political, the media may affect the movement, not 
least in 
intensifying its revelatory dilemmas. 
Notes 
1. Compromise links with (in)comprehension. There is always room on 
letters pages for 
correspondents who complain that whilst they are willing 
to cater for their vegetarian guests, 
their (intolerant and impolite) vegetarian hosts are not prepared 
to serve them 'meat'. 
2. A term coined by poet John Keats, who defined 
it as: '. -. when a man 
is capable of being in 
uncertainties, mysteries, doubts without any 
irritable reaching after fact and reason' (quoted 
in 
Barry 1995: 25). Peter Barry refers to it as a privileging of the unconscious, 
the silent working of 
the mind erupting into the spirit or the consciousness. 
In our scheme we could say it %%, as the 
return of the repressed bloodless culture. 
Sumrnarv & Conclusions 270 
Appendix 1 
Data on nonhuman animal use and land use 
In cycling grain through farmed animals 90% of its protein is lost, and 96% of its calories. 
An acre of cereal can produce five times more protein than an acre devoted to meat production; and legumes (beans, lentils, peas) can produce ten times as much. Thus the greater the human consumption of animal products, the fewer people can be fed. 
While it takes, on average, 25 gallons (113 litres) of water to produce a pound of 
wheat in modern Western farming systems, it requires 2,500 gallons (11,250 litres) of 
water to produce a pound of meat. 
85% of topsoil loss in the USA is directly attributable to animal-based farming. 
All above from Seager (1995). 
Calculations on water requirements by David Pimental, water resource specialist at 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York (reported in the New Scientist 1.2.97), show 
the following: 
Litres of water required to produce lkg of food 
Potatoes 500 
Wheat 900 
Alfalfa 900 
Sorghum 1,110 
Maize 1,400 
Rice 1,910 
Soya beans 2,000 
Chicken 3,500 
Beef 100,000 
Some 75% of all UK agricultural land (60% of all UK land) is used to feed/rear 
farmed animals. (Vegan Society). 
Cattle alone 'take up 24% of the land mass of the planet' (National 
Geographic 
magazine, July 1992). 
Nearly half of the European Union's methane emissions comes 
from ruminant 
digestion and manure (New Scientist, 7.12.96). 
Numbers of animals slaughtered for food in the UK per annum: 
675 million chickens; 
38 million turkeys; 15 million pigs; 3 million cattle; 
19 million sheep. Some 30 
million male chicks are slaughtered on hatching per annum. 
(MAFF/HMSO/ Animal 
Aid 1995). 
Numbers of animals used per annum in the 
UK vivisection industry: approx 2.6 
million (1995 figure; Home Office/HMSO). (Approx. 
50-500 million ý.,, orldwide)- 
Further such information may be found in, e. g. 
Clements (1995). 
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Appendix 
Further Research 
Possible further research which could lead from (or the need for which has been experienced while researching and writing) this thesis could include (mostly 
qualitative) research into: 
e responsibility of the press and political economy viewed through the 
representation of animal liberation; 
e public knowledges of and attitudes towards animal use and animal liberation in 
relation to their sources of information, which could be studied in tandem with or separate from media effects-reception work in this area; 
e animal liberation in a more detailed and larger work concentrating solely on 
representation; 
9a syntactically based form of discourse analysis in relation to media and animal liberation; 
- deeper analysis of the individual ideological strategies and tactics addressed in 
this thesis; 
e representations of animal liberation and animal use in the tabloid media. A casual 
monitoring of tabloids suggests (a) that more space is devoted to animal cruelty 
issues in the tabloids, and (b) that positive representation is higher there. In April 
1999, the Sunday People launched a campaign to ban vivisection; 
" representations of animal liberation and animal use in soap operas; 
" animal liberation and gender; and race; and class; 
4, animal liberation and different "constituencies', e. g. the religious, the atheist, the 
young, the middle aged, the old; 
" animal liberation and different occupational groups; 
" animal liberation as a UK social movement; 
" the challenge to animal liberation in a postmodern world; 
the effect of speciesism on the cognitive and affective structures of liberationists; 
patterns of the liberationist 'quest', from revelatory moment; 
animal liberation and speciesism in relation to different political structures, e. g. in 
communism, capitalism, green anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, etc. and to theories 
of 'human nature; 
" legitimate and illegitimate violence in relation to animal use and liberation; 
" soya, seeds and the feminization of culture: promise or threat; 
-, case studies, e. g. media coverage of World Day for Laboratory Animals over the 
years, or of a liberationist's hunger strike; 
a UK-focused work comparable to Gerbner (1995); 
engaging animal liberation with established (non-animal) sociological thought. 
See also Cunningham (1995). 
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